Gauen v. Board of Education Highland Community Unit School District No 5
Filing
57
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 44 Motion in Limine; granting 45 Motion in Limine and denying 46 Motion in Limine. See Order for details. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 12/18/2017. (klh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KAREN GAUEN, Ed.D.,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 16-0207-DRH-RJD
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
HIGHLAND COMMUNITY UNIT
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Pending before the Court are several motions in limine filed by the parties:
(1) plaintiff’s motion in limine (Doc. 44); defendant’s motion in limine No. 1 to
exclude evidence of future pension losses (Doc. 45) and defendant’s motion in
limine No. 2 to exclude evidence of other bad acts (Doc. 46). As the motions are
ripe, the Court rules as follows.
The district court has the inherent authority to manage the course of a
trial.
Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443
(1984). The court may exercise this power by issuing an evidentiary ruling in
advance
of
trial.
Id.
A
party
may
seek
such
a
ruling
by
filing
a motion in limine, which requests the court's guidance on what evidence will (or
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will not) be admitted at trial. Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir.
2013). Prudent motions in limine serve a gatekeeping function by allowing the
judge “to eliminate from further consideration evidentiary submissions that clearly
ought not be presented to the jury.” Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family
Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997). By defining the evidentiary
boundaries, motions in limine both permit “the parties to focus their preparation
on those matters that will be considered by the jury,” id. and help ensure “that
trials are not interrupted mid-course for the consideration of lengthy and complex
evidentiary issues,” United States v. Tokash, 282 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir . 2002).
As with all evidentiary matters, the court has broad discretion when ruling
on motions in limine. United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113, 1121 (7th Cir.
2015); Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002).
Moreover, the Court can change its ruling at trial, “even if nothing unexpected
happens[.]” Luce, 469 U.S. at 41, 105 S.Ct. 460. Rulings in limine are speculative
in effect; essentially, they are advisory opinions. Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d
562, 570 (7th Cir. 1999) (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
First, Gauen moves to exclude evidence of a statement of an EEOC
investigator in an email to her counsel which suggests she does not have a valid
claim of pay discrimination with regard to the position of Principal. She contends
this evidence is inadmissible because it is hearsay, it has no probative value and is
unfairly prejudicial and it will not assist the jury in deciding this case. The Court
agrees with Gauen that this evidence is hearsay.
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Thus, the Court grants this
portion of plaintiff’s motion in limine.
Next, Gauen moves to exclude evidence that two school administrators in the
mid-1990s and early 2000s, Barry Thomas and Pat Schwarm, were paid higher
salaries than two other school administrators with the same positions who had less
administrative experience, Steve Lanxon and Marvin Warner. Gauen argues that
this evidence should be excluded because it is irrelevant. Defendant counters that
this evidence is highly probative of its defense to plaintiff’s claims. The Court
disagrees with plaintiff and finds that this evidence is relevant. The defendant
notes that ultimately the school board is the decision maker on salaries. Thus, the
Court denies this portion of plaintiff’s motion in limine.
Also, Gauen moves to exclude evidence that Superintendent Sutton made a
decision to pay [recommend] a lower salary to one of the male Assistant Principals,
Caleb Houchins, than was paid to her when she was an Assistant Principal. Gauen
maintains that this evidence lacks sufficient probative value to be admissible. The
Court finds this evidence relevant and admissible. Moreover, Houchins was hired
as Assistant Principal in March 2015 five months prior to Gauen filing her EEOC
charge on August 18, 2015.
Thus, the Court finds no reason to exclude this
evidence. Thus, the Court denies this portion of plaintiff’s motion in limine.
Further, Gauen moves to exclude evidence regarding the actual rate of her
base pay because it is a matter of law for the Court to determine in advance of trial.
The Court disagrees. This is not a question of law and the jury should be allowed
to hear evidence on this clearly relevant issue. Thus, the Court denies this portion
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of plaintiff’s motion in limine.
Lastly, plaintiff moves to exclude evidence at trial that defendant has limited
financial resources and that any award to Gauen would harm innocent students.
Gauen contends that this evidence is highly improper. Defendant concedes that it
will not argue or mention to the jury an award would harm innocent students.
Thus, the Court denies as moot that portion of plaintiff’s motion in limine.
However, the Court notes that defendant is not precluded from introducing
budgetary evidence insofar as salary decisions are concerned.
Additionally, defendant moves in limine to exclude evidence of future pension
losses. Defendant argues that in this case future pension losses are not recoverable
as a matter of law because Gauen will be made whole by Teachers Retirement
System (“TRS”) for any required credit or adjustment to future pension earnings
based upon a judgment awarding back pay.
Gauen counters that the motion
should be denied as this evidence is crucial to her right to be made whole. The
Court agrees with defendant. It appears that pursuant to Section 1650.360 of Title
80 of the Illinois Administrative Gauen will be made whole by the TRS if she obtains
a judgment awarding back pay.
If necessary, the Court will enter an order
requiring defendant to make the contributions should the evidence support it.
Thus, the Court grants this motion in limine.
Lastly, defendant moves in limine to exclude evidence of other bad acts.
Specifically, defendant moves to exclude evidence of other female employees in the
district, Hilary Wagenblast, Susie Kronk, and Deanna Dobbs, who were allegedly
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paid less or treated differently on the basis of her their sex. Defendant maintains
that any evidence as to these women should be excluded as irrelevant, are of no
consequence in determining this action and bear no plausible relation to the issues
of the case. Further, defendant maintains that this type of evidence is highly
prejudicial. Plaintiff opposes the motion as to Ms. Wagenblast arguing evidence
that Michael Sutton discriminated against Ms. Wagenblast is probative of whether
Mr. Sutton also discriminated against plaintiff. 1 The Court agrees with plaintiff
and denies the motion in limine as to Ms. Wagenblast. This evidence regarding
Ms. Wagenblast’s application process for the Assistant Principal in 2015 is relevant
to the issues at bar and will allow the jury to make a permissible inference
regarding discriminatory animus by Mr. Sutton if it so chooses. See Hasan v.
Foley & Lardner, 552 F.3d 520, 529 (7th Cir. 2008)(“‘behavior toward or
comments directed at other employees in the protected group’ is one type of
circumstantial evidence that can support an inference of discrimination” (citation
omitted)); Hitchcock v. Angel Corps Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 740 (7th Cir. 2013). Thus,
the Court denies in part the motion in limine as to Ms. Wagenblast and denies as
moot in part the motion in limine as Ms. Kronk and Ms. Dobbs.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part plaintiff’s
motion in limine (Doc. 44); GRANTS defendant’s motion in limine No 1, motion to
exclude evidence of future pension loss (Doc. 45) and DENIES in part and DENIES
1Additionally, plaintiff notes that she will not introduce any evidence concerning either Ms. Kronk or
Ms. Dobbs.
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as moot in part defendant’s motion in limine No. 2, to exclude evidence of other bad
acts (Doc. 46).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Judge Herndon
2017.12.18
12:14:57 -06'00'
United States District Judge
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