Holman, Jr. v. Wexford Medical Services et al

Filing 86

ORDER GRANTING 70 MOTION for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed by Warden Roeckeman, Salvador A. Godinez. Signed by Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson on 11/17/2017. (nms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL D. HOLMAN, JR.,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DOCTOR LARSON, WARDEN
ROECKEMAN, SALVADOR A. GODINEZ, )
and WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., )
)
)
Defendants.

Case No. 3:16-cv-215-DGW

ORDER
WILKERSON, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed by Defendants Salvador A. Godinez and Zachary
Roeckeman (Doc. 70). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Michael Holman is an inmate currently in the custody of the Illinois Department
of Corrections (“IDOC”). Plaintiff filed this action on February 29, 2016 alleging violations of
his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he
was provided inadequate medical treatment for a scalp infection and notified prison officials of the
inadequacy of the treatment, but to no avail. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended
complaint on August 2, 2016 and is currently proceeding on an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim against Defendants Dr. Larson, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Warden
Roeckeman, and IDOC Director Salvador Godinez.

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Defendants Roeckeman and Godinez filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit (Doc. 70). In
support of their motion, defendants rely on records obtained from the Administrative Review
Board (“ARB”) asserting it only received two grievances from Plaintiff (dated July 18, 2015 and
June 28, 2016), neither of which were adequately exhausted.
In particular, Defendants explain that Plaintiff’s July 18, 2015 grievance was received by
the ARB on July 27, 2015 and was returned on the same date without a final decision because
Plaintiff did not provide a copy of his counselor, grievance officer, or warden’s response.
Plaintiff was directed to provide said responses “if timely.” Defendants assert that Plaintiff
resubmitted this grievance to the ARB in January, 2016 and it was again returned without a final
decision because it was submitted beyond the allowable timeframe.
With regard to the June 28, 2016 grievance, Defendants argue said grievance does not
exhaust Plaintiff’s claims in this matter as it was filed almost four months after this lawsuit was
initiated.
Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’ motion explaining that he was delayed in
resubmitting his July 18, 2015 grievance to the ARB because he was transferred to Robinson CC
in August, 2015 and did not receive the ARB’s response until sometime in October, 2015.
Plaintiff asserts he sent the “counselor’s and etc. responses” to the ARB sometime in December,
2015. Plaintiff also asserts he submitted grievances dated May 16, 2015 and June 18, 2015 to his
counselor at Big Muddy, but explains it was all “to no avail.”
Pavey Hearing
Pursuant to Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008), the Court held a hearing on the
issue of exhaustion on September 7, 2017. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified on his behalf
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concerning his efforts to submit his grievances and exhaust the administrative review process. In
particular, Plaintiff explained that he submitted a grievance to his counselor on May 16, 2015 and
received his counselor’s response to said grievance on June 3, 2015. Plaintiff submitted a copy of
this grievance to his grievance officer, but never received a response. This grievance was
ultimately stamped as “Received” by the ARB on January 7, 2016; however, Defendants indicated
they were unsure as to why it was not listed as a separate grievance with the ARB.
With regard to the June 18, 2015 grievance, Plaintiff indicated that he submitted it to his
counselor on June 18, 2015, but did not receive a response until July 31, 2015. Soon thereafter, in
August, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred to Robinson Correctional Center (“Robinson”). It is not
clear what happened with this grievance after Plaintiff’s transfer; however, Plaintiff explained that
he first received mail in October, 2015 from the ARB returning his July 18, 2015 grievance, to
which he submitted his responsive documents in January, 2016. With regard to the content of his
grievances, Plaintiff indicated he complained about the medical treatment he was being provided
for his scalp infection, but did not specifically complain about the actions of Defendants
Roeckeman and Godinez, instead relying on the fact that they are in charge of the whole system.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See also
Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005);
Black Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc. v. Near North Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 409 F.3d 833, 836 (7th
Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are in
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genuine dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the
moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970). See also Lawrence v.
Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). A moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law where the non-moving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. The Seventh Circuit has stated summary
judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it
has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.” Steen v. Myers, 486
F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859
(7th Cir. 2005) (other citations omitted)).
Exhaustion Requirements under the PLRA
The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under Section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of available administrative remedies is a precondition to suit.
Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Perez v. Wis. Dept. of Corr., 182 F.3d
532, 534-535 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that § 1997e(a) of the PLRA “makes exhaustion a
precondition to bringing suit” under § 1983). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an
affirmative defense; defendants bear the burden of proving a failure to exhaust. See Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Dole v. Chandler, 483 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). The
Supreme Court has interpreted the PLRA to require “proper exhaustion” prior to filing suit. See
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Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). This means “using all steps that the agency holds out,
and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” Id. at 90, (quoting
Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)). In finding the PLRA requires proper
exhaustion, the Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the statute as
stated in Pozo, which required an inmate to “file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the
time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025. In Pavey, the Seventh
Circuit instructed District Courts to conduct a hearing to determine whether a Plaintiff has
exhausted his remedies. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008). If a Plaintiff has
exhausted his remedies, the case will proceed on the merits. If, however, a Plaintiff has not
exhausted, the Court may either allow Plaintiff to exhaust or terminate the matter.
Exhaustion Requirements under Illinois Law
Under the procedures set forth in the Illinois Administrative Code, an inmate is required to
file a written grievance within 60 days of the “incident, occurrence or problem that gives rise to the
grievance.” ILL. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 20, § 504.810(a). The grievance must be filed with the
inmate’s counselor, unless certain discrete issues are being grieved. Id. It must contain “factual
details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint” including what happened, when, where
and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.
Id. §504.810(c). If the complaint is not resolved through a counselor, the grievance is considered
by a grievance officer who must render a written recommendation to the Chief Administrative
Officer (“CAO” – usually the Warden) within 2 months of receipt, “when reasonably feasible
under the circumstances.” Id. §504.830(e). The CAO then advises the inmate of a decision on
the grievance. Id.
An inmate may also file an emergency grievance that would be forwarded directly to the
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CAO. Id. § 504.840. If “there is a substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious
or irreparable harm to the offender,” consideration of the grievance will be expedited and a
response shall be made. Id. § 504.840(a) and (b). If the grievance is not considered on an
emergency basis, “the offender shall be notified in writing that he or she may resubmit the
grievance as non-emergent, in accordance with the standard grievance process.” Id. § 504.840(c).
An inmate may appeal the decision of the CAO to the Director of the Illinois Department of
Corrections. The appeal must be in writing, must be directed to the Administrative Review Board
(ARB), and must be received by the ARB within 30 days of the date of the CAO’s response. Id. §
504.850(a). See also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 806-07 (7th Cir. 2006).

The ARB will

submit a written report of its findings and recommendations to the Director who shall review the
same and make a final determination within 6 months of receipt of the appeal. Id. § 504.850(d)
and (e).
An inmate is required to exhaust only those administrative remedies available to him. See
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit has held that administrative remedies become
“unavailable” when prison officials fail to respond to inmate grievances. Lewis v. Washington,
300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002); Brengettcy v. Horton, 423 F.3d 674, 682 (7th Cir. 2005). The
availability of a remedy does not depend on the rules and regulations as they appear on paper, but
on “whether the paper process was in reality open for the prisoner to pursue.” Wilder v. Sutton, 310
Fed.Appx. 10, 13 (7th Cir. 2009). If further remedies are unavailable to the prisoner, he is deemed
to have exhausted. Id. Prisoners are required only to provide notice to “responsible persons” about
the complained-of conditions. See Wilder, 310 Fed.Appx. at 15 (citing Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d
678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006)). An inmate forfeits the grievance process, however, when he causes the
unavailability of a remedy by not filing or appealing a grievance. See Kaba, 458 F.3d at 684.
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DISCUSSION
Based on the evidence in the record and arguments proffered by the parties, the Court finds
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to Defendants Roeckeman and Godinez
prior to filing this lawsuit.
Two requirements must be met in order for Plaintiff to exhaust his claims against
Defendants Roeckeman and Godinez. First, Plaintiff must have submitted a grievance that
sufficiently exhausted the administrative remedy process. Second, said grievance must have been
sufficient to put the institution on notice that he was complaining about the actions of Defendants
Roeckeman and Godinez. Plaintiff’s grievances clearly fail to meet this second requirement.
The Illinois Administrative Code requires an inmate to include “factual details regarding
each aspect of [his] complaint, including … the name of each person who is the subject of or who
is otherwise involved in the complaint.” 20 ILCS § 504.810(c). An inmate who does not know
the name of certain individuals must include “as much descriptive information about the individual
as possible.”

Id.

This requirement assures that the purpose of the PLRA’s mandatory

exhaustion procedure — that prison officials have a “fair opportunity” to address an inmate’s
complaint — is met. See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, it is clear
that Plaintiff did not name or describe Defendants Roeckeman and Godinez in any of the
grievances complaining about his medical treatment. Indeed, at the hearing, Plaintiff indicated
these Defendants were not specifically named in his grievances, but rather, he was relying on these
grievances to exhaust against Defendants Roeckeman and Godinez because they were in charge of
the whole system. Plaintiff, however, is not proceeding against Defendants Roeckeman and
Godinez in their official capacities and there is no respondeat superior claim pending against
them. Rather, Plaintiff is attempting to hold Defendants liable in their individual capacities
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alleging these Defendants were specifically informed of Plaintiff’s issues with his medical
treatment, but failed to take any action. Plaintiff’s grievances, even when read liberally, simply
did not put the prison on notice that Plaintiff was complaining about the inaction of Defendants
Roeckeman and Godinez.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies filed by Defendants Salvador A. Godinez and Zachary Roeckeman
(Doc. 70) is GRANTED and these Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly at the close of this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 17, 2017

DONALD G. WILKERSON
United States Magistrate Judge

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