Corbier v. Watson et al
Filing
199
ORDER GRANTING Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 122 , 124 , 126 , 128 , 130 , 132 ). Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 7/21/2017. (tfs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAWN CORBIER, as Administrator of the
ESTATE OF JOSHUA B. JURCICH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16-cv-0257-SMY-SCW
vs.
ST. CLAIR COUNTY SHERIFF RICHARD
WATSON, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
(“Wexford”), Doctor Muddasani Reddy, Nurse Sandra Thurman, Nurse Jana Reuter, and Nurse
Brandy Nichols (collectively, the “individual Defendants”) motions to dismiss Counts I, II, and
VI of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) (Docs. 122, 124, 126, 128, 130, 132).
The individual defendants move to dismiss Count I on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to plead
facts necessary to state a claim. The individual defendants also move to dismiss Count VI on the
grounds that Plaintiff failed to attach the requisite affidavit for medical malpractice claims in
Illinois. Wexford moves to dismiss Count II on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to plead facts
that allege that Wexford employees violated Plaintiff’s decedent’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff
opposes the motions (Doc. 153). For the following reasons, the motions are GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges the following facts. Plaintiff’s decedent, Joshua Jurcich,
was arrested for possession of a controlled substance and taken to the St. Clair County Jail on
March 6, 2014. Jurcich had been detained at the St. Clair County jail many times over a 16 year
period. On at least seven occasions, Jurcich had informed the jail staff that he suffered from
mental health problems. On at least one of those occasions, an unspecified booking officer noted
that Jurcich was suicidal.
During the most recent detention, Defendant Officer Steven J. Frierdich gave Jurcich a
mental health screening and referred him for further mental health evaluation. Jurcich informed
Defendant Nurse Thurman that he was “dope sick” and had been diagnosed with scabies. Nurse
Thurman placed Jurcich in medical segregation.
On March 11, 2014, Defendant Officers James D. Wagner, Mark J. Harris, Dante S.
Beattie, Thomas Mesey and Eric L. Walter beat Jurcich for refusing to return to his medical
segregation cell. Jurcich was then examined by Defendant Nurse Reuter who cleared him to be
placed in general population.
Jurcich was placed in a maximum security cell where he
verbalized suicidal thoughts to fellow detainees. On the evening of March 11, 2014, jail staff
found Jurcich unconscious in his cell from a suicide attempt. He succumbed to his injuries and
died two days later.
Among others, Plaintiff asserts the following claims as the Administrator of Mr. Jurcich’s
estate: Count I, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that the individual defendants violated
Jurcich’s constitutional rights by knowingly disregarding the risk that he would commit suicide;
Count II, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that Wexford is liable for the actions alleged
in Count I because Wexford’s policies allow its employees to routinely deny detainees with
mental health issues access to proper treatment; and Count VI asserts a wrongful death claim
under Illinois state law based on the aforementioned actions of Wexford employees.
Discussion
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations
in the Complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In order to state a claim for which relief can be granted, a
plaintiff need only provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, the allegations must be “more than labels
and conclusions.” Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2008). The requirements of
Rule 8 are satisfied if the Complaint (1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly
suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496
F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Count I
To properly plead a failure to protect claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege
facts showing that (1) Mr. Jurcich was “incarcerated under conditions posing substantial risk of
serious harm” and (2) “the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his health or safety.”
Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). Deliberate
indifference means “actual knowledge . . . of the existence of the substantial risk and that the
[defendant] considered the possibility that the risk could cause serious harm.” Washington v.
LaPorte Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 306 F.3d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 2002).
Brandy Nichols
Plaintiff alleges that Brandy Nichols was “responsible for the medical care, treatment,
and welfare of Mr. Jurcich while he was detailed at the Jail, and failed in that responsibility.”
(Doc. 118, p. 5). Plaintiff further alleges that Brandy Nichols was “working at the Jail that night
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and responded to Officer Knyff’s request for assistance after he found Mr. Jurcich hanging in the
cell[,]” and that she “had knowledge of the fact that Mr. Jurcich was a suicide risk and failed to
take any measures to monitor and protect him.” (Doc. 118, p. 11).
Defendant Nichols argues that Plaintiff alleges only the vague legal conclusion that she
knew Jurcich was a suicide risk. She further argues that Plaintiff fails to allege that Nichols had
any interaction with Jurcich, that she knew he had been in an altercation or that she knew that he
had been placed in a maximum security cell. Plaintiff maintains that it is reasonable to infer that
Nichols had access to Jurcich’s mental health records and “therefore must have known about his
mental health issues.” (Doc. 153, p. 5). Plaintiff also maintains that Nichols did not provide
Jurcich with the necessary mental health care to abate his suicide risk. Id.
Notwithstanding the arguments Plaintiff advances in her response, she has not pled
sufficient facts to support her claim against Nichols. The only facts contained in the Complaint
specific to this defendant are that she was working in the jail the night Jurcich died and that she
responded to Officer Knyff’s request for assistance after he found Jurcich injured in his cell.
Those facts alone do not state a viable deliberate indifference claim – they merely establish that
Nichols was on duty the night of the incident and responded when Jurcich was found. The
Complaint contains no facts from which an inference can be drawn that Nichols had access to
Jurcich’s medical records or that she knew he was a suicide risk. Accordingly, Count I is
DISMISSED without prejudice as to Defendant Brandy Nichols.
Sandra Thurman
The allegations surrounding Defendant Thurman’s involvement are identical to those
regarding Brandy Nichols with the exception of one interaction. The day after Jurcich arrived at
the jail, he informed Thurman, a nurse at the jail, that he was “dope sick” and had been
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diagnosed with scabies while at St. Louis University Hospital. He was then placed in medical
segregation where he was alone in his cell for almost 24 hours a day. Jurcich remained in
segregation for approximately four days before the alleged beating.
The question is whether the facts relating to Thurman’s one interaction with Jurchich is
sufficient to suggest that Thurman had actual knowledge of the risk that Mr. Jurcich would
commit suicide. They are not. As Thurman notes, “Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest that
through this encounter, Nurse Thurman saw, heard of, or found any indication that Jurcich was
having suicidal thoughts.” (Doc. 127, p. 3). Without such facts, Plaintiff’s claim against
Thurman cannot survive dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Accordingly, Count I is
DISMISSED without prejudice as to Defendant Sandra Thurman.
Jana Reuter
According to the Complaint, after the alleged beating, Nurse Reuter “examined Mr.
Jurcich and cleared him for placement back in general population. Upon information and belief,
despite having knowledge of Mr. Jurcich’s mental health status, Defendant Nurse Reuter failed
to screen Mr. Jurcich for suicidal ideation.” (Doc. 118, p. 7). As was the case with respect to
Defendants Nichols, a conclusion that Nurse Reuter had knowledge of Jurcich’s mental status
requires an unsupported inference that she had access to and actually looked at his mental health
records. Although Plaintiff alleges that Reuter examined Jurcich, there are no facts pled that
suggest or infer Reuter gained actual knowledge of Jurcich’s risk of suicide during the
examination. Accordingly, Count I is DISMISSED without prejudice as to Defendant Jana
Reuter.
Dr. Muddasani Reddy
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The Complaint asserts that Dr. Reddy is a psychiatrist and the Mental Health Director at
the jail and was employed by Wexford during the relevant time period. The Complaint further
alleges that Dr. Reddy was responsible for the Jurcich’s mental health treatment and failed in that
responsibility. (Doc. 118, p. 5). There are no other factual allegations involving Dr. Reddy.
However, Plaintiff argues that it is reasonable to infer that as the Mental Health Director, Dr.
Reddy knew about Jurcich’s mental health issues. (Doc. 153, p. 5). Again, there are insufficient
facts pled to permit such an inference. Although the Complaint alleges Dr. Reddy had access to
information that likely suggested Jurcich had mental health issues, there are no facts that suggest
that Dr. Reddy was “exposed to information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known’
about it[.]” Sanville v. McCaughry, 266 F.3d 724, 737 (7th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, Count I is
DISMISSED without prejudice as to Defendant Dr. Muddasani Reddy.
Count II
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Wexford is liable for the policy, practice and custom of
providing inadequate mental health care to detainees, or in the alternative, that Wexford is liable
in respondeat superior for the actions of its employees and/or agents. (Doc. 118, p. 13).
Plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim fails because the doctrine cannot be the basis for holding
government contractors liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of its employees. Sanville
v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). Rather, to hold Wexford liable, Plaintiff must
show that Wexford employees violated Jurcich’s constitutional rights due to a policy, practice or
custom of Wexford.
As previously discussed, Plaintiff has not alleged facts that suggest Defendants Brandy
Nichols, Sandra Thurman, Jana Reuter and Dr. Reddy had actual knowledge of Jurcich’s suicide
risk. The only other Wexford employees are identified as John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3,
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and John Doe 4. Plaintiff alleges that John Doe 1 was the mental health professional and/or
psychiatrist who screened and evaluated Jurcich when he entered the jail. John Does 2, 3 and 4
are additional mental health professionals and/or psychiatrists who worked at the jail. The
Complaint contains no facts alleging or suggesting that any of the John Doe defendants had
actual knowledge of Jurcich’s suicide risk. Despite the allegation that John Doe 1 screened
Jurcich upon his arrival at the jail, nothing suggests that this defendant gained actual knowledge
of the suicide risk during this screening. All four John Does’ alleged knowledge of the suicide
risk appears to be based on an assumption – not facts – that they had access to Jurcich’s mental
health records. Once again, this is insufficient to state a viable claim. Because Plaintiff fails to
properly allege that any of the Wexford employees violated Mr. Jurcich’s constitutional rights,
Wexford cannot be held liable and Count II is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Count VI
Count VI asserts a state law claim for wrongful death under 740 ILCS 180/1.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “breached their duty to provide for Mr.
Jurcich’s health and safety[.]” (Doc. 118, p. 17). “In any action, whether in tort, contract
or otherwise, in which the plaintiff seeks damages for injuries or death by reason of
medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice, the plaintiff’s attorney . . . shall file an
affidavit, attached to the original and all copies of the complaint, declaring . . . that the
affiant has consulted and reviewed the facts of the case with a health professional . . . that
the reviewing health professional has determined in a written report, after a review of the
medical record . . . that there is a reasonable and meritorious case for the filing of such
action.” 735 Ill. Comp. Stst. Ann. 5/2-622.
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Defendants contend that this count must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to attach
the required affidavit. Plaintiff argues this is not a claim for medical malpractice, but rather a
wrongful death claim based on negligent or willful and wanton conduct. There are three factors
to consider in determining whether a claim is one for medical malpractice or ordinary
negligence: (1) whether determining the standard or care requires applying distinctively medical
knowledge or principles, however basic; (2) whether the activity that resulted in the alleged
injury was inherently one of medical judgment; and (3) the evidence that will be necessary to
establish the standard of care at trial. Bommersbach v. Ruiz, 461 F. Supp. 2d 743, 753 (S.D. Ill.
2006). Deciding whether or not to place someone on suicide watch is a matter of mental health
evaluation which requires the application of distinctively medical knowledge.
As such,
establishing the standard of care at trial will require expert testimony. Therefore, as to the claim
asserted in Count VI, Plaintiff must comply with the affidavit requirement of 735 ILCS 5/2-622.
Accordingly, Count VI is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: July 21, 2017
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
DISTRICT JUDGE
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