Corbier v. Watson et al

Filing 286

ORDER: Defendants David Nichols, Patrick Fulton and Jon Knyff's Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 271 ) is GRANTED IN PART. Count I is hereby DISMISSED as to Defendant Nichols. The Motion is DENIED as to Defendants Knyff and Fulton. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 1/17/2019. (bps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DAWN CORBIER, as Administrator of the )
ESTATE OF JOSHUA B. JURCICH,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ST. CLAIR COUNTY SHERIFF
)
RICHARD WATSON, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 16-CV-257-SMY-SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of the Motion to Dismiss Count I of
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, filed by Defendants David Nichols, Patrick Fulton, and
Jon Knyff (Doc. 271). Count I sets forth a failure to protect from the risk of suicide claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual defendants (those other than St. Clair County and Sheriff
Watson). Defendants move to dismiss Count I pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed a
Response (Doc. 283). For the following reasons, the Motion will be GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part.
The Third Amended Complaint
Plaintiff Dawn Corbier, Administrator of the Estate of Joshua Jurcich, deceased, makes
the following relevant allegations in the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 267): Joshua Jurcich
was arrested for possession of a controlled substance and taken to the St. Clair County Jail (“the
Jail”) on March 6, 2014. (Id. at ¶ 20). Jurcich had previously been detained at the Jail 16 times
over a 16 year period. (Id. at ¶12). On at least seven of these occasions, Jurcich had informed
the Jail staff that he suffered from mental health problems, and on at least one occasion, a
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booking officer noted that Jurcich was suicidal. (Id.). Jurcich was diagnosed with Bipolar
Disorder by jail medical staff in 2008 and 2013. (Id. at ¶13). Jurcich exhibited several “suicide
risk factors” such as being a young male with a history of mental health and substance abuse
issues, which combined with overcrowding and poor living conditions to exacerbate his
likelihood of self-harm. (Id. at ¶ 57).
At the time of Jurcich’s March 6, 2014 detention, the Jail was overcrowded, understaffed
and unsanitary. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-56). During intake, Defendant Officer Steven J. Frierdich gave
Jurcich a mental health screening and referred him for further mental health evaluation. (Id. at ¶
21). On March 9, 2014 Jurcich informed Nurse Sandra Thurman that he was “dope sick”
(withdrawing from heroin) and had been diagnosed with scabies. (Id. at ¶ 22). Thurman placed
Jurcich in medical segregation. (Id. at ¶ 25).
On March 11, 2014, Defendant Officers James D. Wagener, Mark J. Harris, Dante S.
Beattie, Thomas Mesey, and Eric L. Walter allegedly beat Jurcich for refusing to return to his
medical segregation cell. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-34). Lieutenant Sutherlin and Mesey then escorted
Jurcich to the medical office where he was examined by Nurse Reuter. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35). During
the examination which was conducted in the presence of the correctional officers, Jurcich
informed Reuter that he was taking “lots” of psychotropic medications. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-37).
Nevertheless, Reuter approved his placement in segregation. (Id. at ¶ 44). Jurcich was escorted
to a maximum security segregation cell by Sutherlin, Mesey, Fulton, and Sergeant Missey. (Id.
at ¶ 46). He was later taken back to the medical office for a chest x-ray, and was escorted back
to his cell by Sergeant Nichols. (Id. at ¶ 58). During the walk back, Jurcich and Nichols spoke,
and Jurcich appeared to hesitate before going back into the segregation unit. (Id.). Nichols
appeared to “mock” Jurcich before he acquiesced and walked back in. (Id.).

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Once Jurcich was back in his cell, Defendant Officer Fulton was on duty for cell checks.
(Id. at ¶ 59). During his shift, Fulton spoke with Jurich at least twice; entering the cell for nearly
five minutes on one occasion. (Id. at ¶¶ 59-60). Officer Fulton’s other cell checks were cursory,
with him not even looking into Jurcich’s cell.

(Id. at ¶ 61).

After Fulton’s shift ended,

Defendant Officer Knyff took over responsibility for cell checks. (Id. at ¶ 62).
Knyff spoke with Jurcich at his 5:37 p.m. check, and then conducted two more cursory
cell checks. (Id. at ¶ 63). A detainee in the same unit heard Jurcich tell Fulton and Knyff that if
he did not get to see a nurse or get a shower, he was going to kill himself. (Id. at ¶ 64). A
second detainee in the unit heard Jurcich tell Knyff that he was going to kill himself. (Id. at ¶
65). At approximately 6:40 p.m., Knyff found Jurcich unconscious in his cell from a suicide
attempt. (Id. at ¶ 68-69). He was transported to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital and died two days later.
(Id. at ¶69).
Discussion
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), a
Complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Lodholtz v. York Risk Servs.
Group, Inc., 778 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion
to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The Court must also draw all reasonable inferences
and facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2014).

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Plaintiff alleges that all of the individual defendants knew or should have known that
Jurcich was a danger to himself, but failed to protect him. Because Jurcich was a pretrial
detainee and not an inmate, Plaintiff’s claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See,
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015); Miranda v. County of Lake,
900 F.3d 335, 350-351 (7th Cir. 2018).
Under Kingsley and Miranda, a pretrial detainee need only establish that the defendant's
conduct was objectively unreasonable – not that the defendant was subjectively aware that it was
unreasonable. Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352-53. In other words, a plaintiff must show that a
defendant acted intentionally or recklessly as he “knew, or should have known, that the condition
posed an excessive risk to health or safety” and “failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the
risk.” Id. This is a more exacting standard than that required to prove negligence, or even gross
negligence and is “akin to reckless disregard.” Id.
As suicide clearly poses an excessive risk to health and safety, the question presented is
whether Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Nichols, Knyff and/or Fulton knew or should have
known that Jurcich posed a serious risk to commit suicide and yet failed to act with reasonable
care to prevent him from doing so. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not pled facts adequate to
meet this standard.
Taking Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences
therefrom, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately pled a failure to protect claim against
Knyff and Fulton. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges they each had at least one conversation with
Jurcich leading up to his suicide attempt, and that according to other detainees who were in the
area, Jurcich specifically communicated suicidal ideation or intent to Fulton and Knyff. These

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facts would be sufficient, if proven at trial, to satisfy the “knew or should have known”
requirement.
The same is not true with respect to Defendant Nichols. Plaintiff alleges that Nichols
“was aware that Mr. Jurcich had been beaten by several officers for refusing to go back into
medical segregation[,]” that Nichols had a conversation with Jurcich while escorting him back to
his cell after his x-ray, and that “Nichols mocked Mr. Jurcich after Mr. Jurcich appeared hesitant
and resistant to go back into F-Max.” (Doc. 283 at 7). Plaintiff argues that it “is plausible to
infer from these facts that during this exchange, Mr. Jurcich communicated his suicidal ideations
to Sergeant Nichols and rather than move Mr. Jurcich to a suicide-proof cell, Sergeant Nichols
mocked Mr. Jurcich and ordered him to go back into F-Max.” (Id.). But what Plaintiff suggests
is a plausible inference is nothing more than mere conjecture. As such, Count I must be
DISMISSED as to Defendant Nichols.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 271) is GRANTED IN
PART; Count I is hereby DISMISSED as to Defendant Nichols. The Motion is DENIED as to
Defendants Knyff and Fulton.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 17, 2019
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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