Moore v. Hill et al

Filing 3

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 4/13/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CORTEZ L. MOORE, #K-59741,
Plaintiff,
vs.
S. HILL, JOHN DOES,
KIMBERLY BUTLER,
BILLIE GREER, and
JOHN BALDWIN,
Defendants.

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Case No. 16-cv-00261-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Cortez L. Moore, an inmate at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings
this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint comes now before the Court
for a preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner complaints to filter out
nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss any portion of
the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to
relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a
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complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual
allegations as true, some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to
provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir.
2011); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not
accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal
statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to
be liberally construed. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
Plaintiff claims that on March 13, 2015, his cell light went out when the fan in his
housing unit was turned on. (Doc. 1, p. 4). That same day, Plaintiff informed Defendant John
Doe #1, a correctional officer, about the light; John Doe #1 told Plaintiff that he would submit a
work order. Id. Over the next eight days, Plaintiff repeatedly reminded Defendant John Doe #1,
and informed Defendant John Doe #2 (another correctional officer), that the lights were not
working in his cell and requested that they speak to maintenance about the situation. Id.
Although Defendants John Doe 1 and 2 said that they would fill out work orders, no one from
maintenance came to replace the lights. Id. On March 21, Plaintiff spoke to Defendant John
Doe #3, a lieutenant assigned to his housing unit, about the lights. John Doe #3 told Plaintiff that
he had not been informed of the situation, but assured Plaintiff that he would submit a work
order form. Id. at 5. But again, nothing was done to fix the lights.
On March 23, Plaintiff submitted a grievance to Defendant Hill, the grievance counselor,

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complaining about being left in the dark for 10 days.

Id.

A week later, Defendant Hill

responded that the grievance had been received and a work order had been submitted, but as
before, Plaintiff’s cell remained without light.

Id.

Finally, on April 5, Plaintiff filed an

emergency grievance with Defendant Butler, warden at Menard, regarding the lights and the
extreme cold in his cell. Id. On April 9, Plaintiff received a response from Defendant Butler
noting that Plaintiff’s grievance did not constitute an emergency. Id. at 6. Subsequently,
Plaintiff appealed the decision to Defendant Baldwin, director of the Illinois Department of
Corrections, and the Administrative Review Board. Id.
It is unclear when exactly the light in Plaintiff’s cell was replaced. At the very least, it
appears that Plaintiff was without light from March 13 until April 5, 2015. It is also unclear just
exactly how dark Plaintiff’s cell was during that time period. Plaintiff states that he had to lay on
the floor in order to read or play chess “by moonlight or outside dimness.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff also
mentions in passing that his cell was extremely cold at that time and that he became ill lying on
the cold cell floor. Id.
Plaintiff seeks punitive damages and injunctive relief.
Discussion
In a case involving conditions of confinement in a prison, two elements are required to
establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause. First, an
objective element requires a showing that the conditions deny the inmate “the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities,” creating an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The second requirement is a subjective element –
establishing a defendant’s culpable state of mind, which is deliberate indifference to a substantial
risk of serious harm to the inmate from those conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842.

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In determining whether a particular condition constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,
courts have noted that the Eighth Amendment “does not provide a fixed formula” but instead
“‘draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.’” Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 600 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
In the instant case, Plaintiff asserts that he was confined to a cold, dark cell for over three
weeks.

Whether these allegations rise to the level of stating a claim under the Eighth

Amendment is a close call. The degree to which the cell was dark and cold, and the extent to
which these conditions posed a risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety are questions of fact that
cannot be determined at this time. As such, out of an abundance of caution, the Court will allow
Plaintiff to proceed on his claim that the conditions violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment. The next question at this stage then is whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that
the named Defendants were deliberately indifferent.
Plaintiff’s alleges that he personally notified Defendants John Doe #1-3 (correctional
officers), Hill (grievance officer), and Butler (warden) about the lighting issue and requested
assistance from each of them while the situation was ongoing, yet they all delayed in addressing
the problem. Prison officials who are made aware of an ongoing constitutional violation and
have a reasonable opportunity to prevent the violation, yet deliberately or recklessly fail to do so
may be held personally liable. See Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 439-40 (7th Cir. 2015);
see also Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, Plaintiff may
proceed on his Eighth Amendment conditions claim against Defendants John Doe #1-3, Hill, and
Butler at this time.

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Plaintiff may not, however, proceed on his claims against Defendants John Doe #4
(grievance officer), Baldwin (director of the Illinois Department of Corrections), and Greer (staff
member at the Administrative Review Board). The exact claim against these individuals is
unclear, but it appears to boil down to an assertion that they mishandled or otherwise did not
properly respond to his grievances. The fact that a counselor, grievance officer, or even a
supervisor received a complaint about the actions of another individual does not alone create
liability.

Instead, in order to be held individually liable, a defendant must be “personally

responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724,
740 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). See
also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). As discussed above, a grievance
officer, like Defendant Hill, may be held personally liable if she had actual knowledge of a
constitutional deprivation, yet failed to intervene to address the violation. See Perez v. Fenoglio,
792 F.3d 768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015) (reversing dismissal of claims against grievance officers). But
the alleged mishandling of grievances “by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in
the underlying conduct” cannot be a basis for liability under § 1983. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d
950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff does not claim that Defendants John Doe #4, Baldwin, or
Greer were made aware of the alleged unconstitutional conditions at a time when they would
have realistically been able to do anything about it. Any alleged mishandling of his grievances
once the condition had been addressed does not state a constitutional claim. As such, Defendants
John Doe #4, Baldwin, and Greer are dismissed from this action without prejudice.
One final note regarding identifying the John Doe defendants: these individuals must be
identified with particularity before service of the complaint can occur on them. Where a
prisoner’s complaint states specific allegations describing the conduct of unknown corrections

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officers sufficient to raise a constitutional claim against them, the prisoner should have the
opportunity to engage in limited discovery in order to ascertain the identity of those defendants.
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case,
guidelines for discovery aimed at identifying the unknown parties will be set by the Magistrate
Judge. Once the unknown parties are identified, Plaintiff shall file a motion to substitute the
named individuals in their place.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants JOHN DOE #4, BALDWIN, and
GREER are DISMISSED without prejudice from this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may proceed on his Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim against Defendants JOHN DOE #1-3, HILL, and BUTLER.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants HILL and BUTLER: (1) Form 5
(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of
Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint,
and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of employment as identified by Plaintiff.
If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk
within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect
formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of
formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service shall not be made on the JOHN DOES #1-3 Defendants until such time as
Plaintiff has identified these individuals by name in a properly filed motion for substitution.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the Court with the name and
service address for these individuals.

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With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Williams for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Williams for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties
consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for

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leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 13, 2016
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court

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