Adams v. Shah et al

Filing 14

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 6/21/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAVID A. ADAMS, # M-45508,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DR. VIPEN SHAH,
WEXFORD MEDICAL SOURCES,
WARDEN LASHBROOK,
JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2,
MENTAL HEALTH DOCTOR AT
SHERIDAN, and
IDOC DIRECTOR,
Defendants.

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Case No. 16-cv-00311-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff David Adams, who is currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional
Center, filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against seven Illinois Department of
Corrections’ (“IDOC”) officials who allegedly denied him prescription medication for his
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) (Doc. 1).
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was diagnosed with ADHD when he was eight
years old (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7). He continues to suffer from the condition (id.). When Plaintiff was
taken into IDOC custody on June 9, 2014, he informed the mental health doctor at Sheridan
Correctional Center (“Sheridan”) of his diagnosis.

Plaintiff explained that he had taken

prescription medication to manage the condition for the preceding ten years. His request for
medication was nevertheless denied. An unknown nurse at Sheridan told Plaintiff that his
prescription medication was too expensive. Wexford Medical Sources (“Wexford”) would not

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authorize it. Wexford also discouraged its employees from creating a “paper trail” of requests
for such medications.
When Plaintiff arrived at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”), he met
with Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, two unknown mental health workers, to discuss his ADHD.
They refused to provide him with prescription medication or to recommend that the prison
physician do the same. When Plaintiff complained directly to the prison physician, Doctor Shah,
he simply told Plaintiff to “drink more water” (id.).
Sheridan’s doctor, Doctor Shah, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 all told Plaintiff that the State
of Illinois would not approve treatment for ADHD. In addition, both prisons posted a list of
medications that were deemed to be “too expensive” and would not be authorized by Wexford
under any circumstances. The list included Plaintiff’s medication.
Plaintiff filed two rounds of grievances to complain about the denial of his medication.
He filed the first round on June 11 and July 3, 2014. He filed a second round on February 11 and
20, 2015.

Plaintiff received no response.

He also spoke with Warden Lashbrook and

complained in writing to Wexford and the IDOC Director. Once again, he received no response.
Meanwhile, Plaintiff continued to struggle with his ADHD. After he was abruptly taken
off of his prescription medication, Plaintiff suffered from a month-long depression and
headaches. Without medication, he could not focus or sit still. He also suffered from an
overactive imagination and lost the ability to differentiate between fact and fiction (id.).
Plaintiff claims that the denial of medication amounts to a conspiracy on the part of all
seven defendants to violate his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In connection with these claims, he now sues Wexford, the IDOC Director, Sheridan’s Mental

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Health Doctor, Doctor Shah, Nurse Doe 1, Nurse Doe 2 and Warden Lashbrook for monetary
damages (id. at 8).
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner

complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to
dismiss any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Plaintiff’s Complaint survives preliminary
review under this standard.
Discussion
To facilitate the orderly management of future proceedings in this case, and in
accordance with the objectives of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(e) and 10(b), the Court has
organized the claims in Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint into the following enumerated counts.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these counts does not
constitute an opinion regarding their merit.
Count 1:

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs
claim against Defendants for denying Plaintiff medication for
his ADHD.

Count 2:

Conspiracy claim against Defendants for denying Plaintiff
medication for his ADHD in an effort to save money.

Count 3:

Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants.

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Claims Subject to Further Review
Count 1
The Complaint articulates a colorable Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to
medical needs claim (Count 1) against each of the defendants. To establish a claim for the
denial of medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants were aware of and
disregarded a substantial risk of harm from an objectively serious medical condition. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 204 (7th Cir. 2012);
Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830-31 (7th Cir. 2007). A medical condition is “serious,” if it
has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or is so obvious that a layperson would
recognize the condition as requiring treatment.

Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373

(7th Cir. 1997). Deliberate indifference is intentional or reckless disregard of a substantial risk
of harm posed by the condition; negligence does not support a claim of deliberate indifference.
Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010).
For screening purposes, Plaintiff’s ADHD satisfies the objective component of this claim.
Plaintiff alleges that his ADHD was diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment when he
was eight years old and that he never outgrew the condition. He took prescription medication to
manage his ADHD for ten years prior to his incarceration.
The allegations also satisfy the subjective component of this claim by suggesting that
each defendant responded to Plaintiff’s ADHD with deliberate indifference. The defendants
were allegedly aware of Plaintiff’s diagnosis and his need for prescription medication to control
his symptoms. Even so, they denied or ignored Plaintiff’s requests for medication because it was
too expensive. Accordingly, Count 1 shall receive further review against the defendants.

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Count 2
At this early stage, the Court will also allow Plaintiff to proceed with his conspiracy
claim (Count 2) against the defendants. “To establish the existence of a conspiracy, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the conspirators ha[d] an agreement to inflict injury or harm upon him.”
Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 304-05 (7th Cir. 2011). The agreement “may be
inferred from circumstantial evidence, but only if there is sufficient evidence that would permit a
reasonable jury to conclude that a meeting of the minds had occurred and that the parties had an
understanding to achieve the conspiracy’s objectives.” Id. at 305 (quoting Hernandez v. Joliet
Police Dep’t, 197 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1999)). However, the mere mention of a conspiracy is
insufficient to satisfy basic pleading requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 or
Bell v. Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring a plaintiff to plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
Here, the Complaint suggests that the defendants had an agreement to deny inmates
access to expensive medications, regardless of need, in an effort to save costs. Based on this
alleged agreement, the Court will allow Count 2 to proceed against the defendants.
Claim Subject to Dismissal
Count 3
The Complaint supports no Fourteenth Amendment claim (Count 3) against the
defendants.

Plaintiff does not indicate why he has invoked the Fourteenth Amendment.

However, he complains that each of the defendants ignored his grievances. To the extent that
this claim arises from a failure to respond to grievances, it is subject to dismissal.
Prison grievance procedures are not constitutionally mandated and thus do not implicate
the Due Process Clause per se. As such, the alleged mishandling of grievances “by persons who

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otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim” upon which
relief may be granted. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Grieveson
v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2008); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir.
2007); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). In other words, the fact that the
defendants may have ignored Plaintiff’s grievances does not give rise to a due process claim
against them, even at this early stage. To the extent that Count 3 refers to some other legal basis
for relief, Plaintiff has not included sufficient allegations to support a claim against any
particular defendant. Bell v. Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Accordingly,
Count 3 shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
Identification of Unknown Defendants
Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Counts 1 and 2 against the unknown defendants
who are identified in the Complaint as the “Mental Health Doctor at Sheridan,” “Jane Doe 1,”
“Jane Doe 2” and “IDOC Director.” However, these parties must be identified with particularity
before service of the Complaint can be made on them.
Where a prisoner’s complaint states specific allegations describing conduct of individual
prison staff members sufficient to raise a constitutional claim, but the names of those defendants
are not known, the prisoner should have the opportunity to engage in limited discovery to
ascertain the identity of those defendants. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d
816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, Warden Lashbrook is already named as a defendant in the
action and shall respond to discovery aimed at identifying these unknown defendants.
Guidelines for discovery will be set by the United States Magistrate Judge. Once the names of
the unknown defendants are discovered, Plaintiff shall file a motion to substitute each newly

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identified defendant in place of the generic designations in the case caption and throughout the
Complaint.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3) shall be REFERRED to
United States Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier for a decision.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense (Doc. 4) is hereby
GRANTED. Service will be ordered on all known defendants at this time and on the unknown
defendants once they are properly identified in a motion for substitution.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Change of Counsel (Doc. 12), in which he notifies the Court that he
is no longer using the services of a jailhouse lawyer is noted, but DENIED as MOOT. The
Court has received no filings that appear to be from anyone other than Plaintiff. Further, his
request for counsel is appropriately stated in a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3) that
shall be referred for a decision.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) is DENIED without
prejudice. Plaintiff did not submit a proposed Amended Complaint along with his motion and
piecemeal amendments are not accepted. If he wishes to replace unknown defendants who are
already referred to in the Complaint with properly identified individuals, Plaintiff must file a
motion to substitute each newly identified defendant in place of the generic designations in the
case caption and throughout the Complaint.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 3 is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that with respect to COUNTS 1 and 2, the Clerk of Court

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shall prepare for Defendants DOCTOR VIPEN SHAH, WEXFORD MEDICAL SOURCES
and WARDEN LASHBROOK: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service
of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to
mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order to each
Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and
return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant,
and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that service shall not be made on Defendants MENTAL
HEALTH DOCTOR AT SHERIDAN, JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2 and IDOC DIRECTOR
until such time as Plaintiff has identified them by name in a properly filed motion for
substitution. Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the Court with
the names and service addresses for these individuals.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a

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true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Philip M. Frazier for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision on the Motion for
Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3).

Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to

United States Magistrate Judge Frazier for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and
28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, even though his
application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

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cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 21, 2016
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
District Judge
United States District Court

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