Bumphus, Jr. v. Unique Personnel Consultants et al

Filing 137

ORDER GRANTING Defendant Unique Personnel Consultants Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 97 ). Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. All pending motions are TERMINATED as MOOT. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 8/30/2018. (mah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JOHN DAN BUMPHUS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNIQUE PERSONNEL CONSULTANTS,
KRISTA FINDLAY,
JENNIFER KATHERINE YATESWELLER, HENNESSY AND ROACH
P.C., ANDREW G. TOENNIES, and
SYNERGY COVERAGE SOLUTIONS,
LLC,
Defendants.

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Case No. 16-CV-312-SMY-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff John Dan Bumphus Jr. filed this lawsuit pro se against numerous defendants
alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”), and asserting unlawful discharge from
employment, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois state law. 1
Now before the Court is Defendant UniQue Personnel Consultant's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 97). Bumphus filed a response (Doc. 110). For the following reasons, the
motion is GRANTED.

1

On March 30, 2018, this Court dismissed Bumphus's claims under Title VII, the ADEA, the GINA, and
his state law claims. The Court also dismissed his claims against Defendants Synergy Coverage
Solutions, L.L.C., Jennifer Katherine Yates Weller, Hennessy & Roach, P.C., Andrew Toennies, and
Krista Findlay (see Doc. 126).
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Background
Plaintiff John Dan Bumphus, Jr. was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder
("PTSD") in 2001 (Doc. 97-1, p. 116). His treatment consists of counseling with a therapist once
every two or three months. Id. In addition to PTSD, Bumphus suffers from spinal stenosis and
underwent a spinal fusion surgery in 2006. Id. During his deposition, Bumphus testified that no
medical professional has precluded him from seeking work due to health reasons or concluded
that he is incapable of working. Id. at p. 78.
In June 2015, Bumphus applied for a position with UniQue Personnel Consultants
("UniQue") (Doc. 97-1, p. 21; pp. 24-25; see also Doc. 97-2). UniQue is a placement agency
that offered permanent as well as short or long-term temporary assignments to its applicants
(Doc. 97-2). Unique would contact the applicant with more information regarding a position
should a match be made.

Id.

An applicant was not under any obligation to accept any

assignment or position recommended by UniQue. Id. UniQue applicants were required to call
UniQue offices once per week when looking for work (Doc. 97-1, pp. 23-24; Doc. 97-2).
On the application, Bumphus indicated that he could perform work during any shift and
was able to lift up to 40 pounds (Doc. 97-1, p. 22; Doc. 97-2). Bumphus did not indicate that he
had any physical or mental limitations (Doc. 97-1, p. 24; Doc. 97-2). On June 17, 2015,
Bumphus accepted a job at the Yazaki Warehouse (“Yazaki”) that paid $10.50 per hour (Doc.
97-1, pp. 27-29). He again did not mention any physical or mental limitations at the time. Id.
Bumphus began working the third shift at Yazaki on the evening of June 21, 2015 (Doc.
97-1, pp. 29-30). His work involved various tasks, including the removal of automotive parts
from crates and repacking them. Id. at pp. 30-32. Bumphus testified that, at some point during
the shift, he felt pain in his back when manipulating what he described as a large harness. Id. at

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pp. 30-31, 37-38. Bumphus was able to perform all other aspects of his job, including moving
smaller objects and completing paperwork. Id. Bumphus informed his shift supervisor, Dana
Felton, about his back pain and difficulty maneuvering the harnesses. Id. at pp. 30-34. He was
able to complete his work assignments. Id.
On July 13, 2015, Bumphus moved to the second shift, as the third shift had been
discontinued (Doc. 97-1, pp. 39-40). He testified that, at the beginning of the shift, he was
informed by supervisor Donna May that there was mandatory overtime. Id. at p. 42. An hour
later, Bumphus approached May and told her that he had to leave due to pain in his back. Id. at
pp. 44-46. According to Bumphus, May responded that she would have to “write him up,” to
which Bumphus replied, “that sounds fair.” Id.
The following morning, Bumphus spoke with UniQue's Krista Findlay about his back
issues and the mandatory overtime (Doc. 97-1, pp. 47-50). According to Bumphus, Findlay
assured him that “the conversation” about his back “would never come up again,” and that it was
“totally unacceptable” for him to work through his pain to complete a task. Id. at pp. 49-50.
Bumphus continued to work on the second shift at Yazaki from July 14, 2015 until July
16, 2015 (Doc. 97-1, p. 50). During this time, Bumphus was able to complete his assignments,
including “running” two tables one night, and three tables another night, which involved walking
and moving parts around. Id. at p. 51. On July 16, 2015, Bumphus spent an hour “pulling boxes
out” and “recounting pieces” while in search of a missing piece of equipment. Id. at pp. 51-52.
As he was preparing to leave for the day, May questioned him about leaving when there was still
work to complete. Id. at p. 52. In response, Bumphus asked if she had spoken with Findlay, and
May indicated that she did not know what he was referring to. Id. at p. 52. Bumphus then
reiterated that he was leaving and left the facility. Id. at pp. 52-53.

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On July 17, 2015, Bumphus spoke with Findlay in person (Doc. 97-1, pp. 55-58). During
this conversation, he volunteered to provide proof of his back condition. Id. at pp. 57-58.
Bumphus went to his physician’s office and obtained what he describes as “four or five pages”
containing CT scan results. Id. at pp. 62-64. He gave Findlay the documents along with a copy
of his book, “Necessary Candor.” Id. at pp. 62-64. When Bumphus gave Findlay the records
and book, Findlay told Bumphus that he needed a note from a physician explaining his
limitations. Id. at p. 65.
On July 23, 2015, Bumphus delivered a physician's note to Findlay (Doc. 97-1, pp. 6669, Doc. 97-3). The note stated: "Please exempt patient from mandatory overtime that involves
heavy lifting" (Doc. 97-3). Findlay offered Bumphus another position that paid $8.25 per hour
and he declined (Doc. 97-1, pp. 69-70).
Bumphus did not return to Yazaki after July 16, 2015 (Doc. 97-1, p. 67). Bumphus
testified that no one at UniQue ever told him that he could not inquire about available positions
and no one ever told him that he was terminated. Id. at pp. 70-71, p. 78.
Discussion
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party
bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are in genuine dispute; any doubt as to the
existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Lawrence v. Kenosha
County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law where the non-moving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element
of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the

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evidence is merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986).
The American with Disability Act ("ADA") prohibits discrimination against a disabled
individual “because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). As a threshold
matter, an individual seeking to assert claims under the ADA must show that he or she is
disabled, and that he or she is a “qualified person” for the job position in question. See Hoffman
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 571–72 (7th Cir. 2001). Disability under the ADA is defined
as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A qualified person is one who “satisfies the prerequisites for the position” and “can perform the essential functions of the position held or
desired, with or without reasonable accommodation.” Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc.,
92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996).
Bumphus does not contend that he had a record of an impairment or was regarded as
having an impairment. Thus, the question is whether he actually had a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity under the ADA's first definition of
disability. Major life activities include, but are not limited to, “caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” Steffen v.
Donahoe, 680 F.3d 738, 745–46 (7th Cir. 2012).

When determining whether a disability

“substantially limits” a person from performing such an activity, courts consider “the nature and
severity of the impairment; the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and the

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permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting
from the impairment…generally, short-term, temporary restrictions, with little or no long-term
impact, are not substantially limiting and do not render a person disabled for purposes of the
ADA.” Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 554 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted).
Bumphus maintains that his spinal stenosis and PTSD rendered him disabled under the
ADA.

However, there is insufficient evidence in the record establishing that Bumphus is

disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Bumphus testified that his back pain, not his PTSD,
was the only problem he had while working for UniQue. He further testified that he was able to
perform nearly all aspects of his warehousing job and that his back pain did not hinder his ability
to be productive. Bumphus states that he was able to run multiple tables and he believed that he
was doing a good job in his position. Although Bumphus procured a physician's note requesting
that he be exempt from mandatory overtime "that involves heavy lifting," lifting limitations do
not qualify as a disability under the ADA.
In Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 763 (7th Cir. 2001), the Seventh Circuit
addressed the issue of lifting limitations in the context of the ADA. The plaintiff, an injured
forklift operator, argued that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of working
because he was unable to lift in excess of 45 pounds for a long period of time, unable to engage
in strenuous work, and unable to drive a forklift for more than four hours a day. Id. The Seventh
Circuit disagreed, stating that even after taking the plaintiff's claims as fact, it failed to see “how
such inabilities constitute a significant restriction on one's capacity to work, as the term is
understood within the ADA.” Id. at 763. The court noted that other Circuits have also found

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that weight limitations do not qualify as a substantial limitation on working and, thus, a disability
under the ADA.
Consistent with Seventh Circuit precedent, even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Bumphus, this Court concludes that there is no evidence that his spinal stenosis
substantially limited any major life activities. Because Bumphus has presented no evidence that
even suggests he is precluded from a broad class of jobs, he has failed to establish that he is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. All pending motions are
TERMINATED as MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 30, 2018
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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