Johnson v. Meuller et al

Filing 10

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 7/1/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHAZ L. JOHNSON, # K-02792,
Plaintiff,
vs.
M. MEULLER,
VENERIO SANTOS,
and LISA CRIBS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 16-cv-326-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center (“Lincoln”),
brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His claims arose while he was
confined at Centralia Correctional Center (“Centralia”). Plaintiff claims that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition. The complaint is now before the Court
for a preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the
complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d

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1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if
it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the
line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its
face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith
v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or
implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578
F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract
recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same
time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See
Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,
577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Applying these standards, the Court finds that one of Plaintiff’s claims survives threshold
review under § 1915A.
The Complaint
On September 20, 2015, Plaintiff was working in the Centralia kitchen cooking oatmeal.
While he was draining the oatmeal, the master kettle ring popped off, and Plaintiff sustained
severe burns from the hot food on his forearms, fingers, and face (Doc. 1, p. 6). He requested
medical treatment and was sent to the health care unit, where he was given pain pills and
scheduled to see the doctor later in the morning.
When Plaintiff was examined by Defendant Dr. Santos, the doctor said that the injury

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was “equivalent to a first degree sunburn.” Id. Defendant Santos gave Plaintiff no treatment at all
for the painful burns.
Three days later, on September 23, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred to Lincoln. He sought
medical care for the burns, which by that time had blistered and were discolored. The blisters
also had become infected. Lincoln health care providers gave Plaintiff a tetanus shot, antibiotics,
and cleaned and wrapped the wounds on a daily basis. Plaintiff experienced pain, numbness, and
a tingling sensation in his fingers due to the burn injuries.
Plaintiff now seeks money damages from Defendant Santos, as well as from Defendants
Meuller (warden) and Cribs (health care administrator) (Doc. 1, p. 5).
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit. Any other claim that
is mentioned in the complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant
Santos, for failing to provide any medical treatment for Plaintiff’s severe burns;
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendants
Meuller and Cribs, in connection with Defendant Santos’ failure to provide
Plaintiff with medical treatment for his severe burns.
Count 1 shall proceed for further review. Count 2, however, shall be dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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Count 1 – Deliberate Indifference – Defendant Santos
In order to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, an inmate
must show that he (1) suffered from an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) that the
defendant was deliberately indifferent to a risk of serious harm from that condition. “Deliberate
indifference is proven by demonstrating that a prison official knows of a substantial risk of harm
to an inmate and either acts or fails to act in disregard of that risk. Delaying treatment may
constitute deliberate indifference if such delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged
an inmate’s pain.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994); Perez v. Fenoglio,
792 F.3d 768, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2015). However, the Eighth Amendment does not give prisoners
entitlement to “demand specific care” or “the best care possible,” but only requires “reasonable
measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th
Cir. 1997). Further, a defendant’s inadvertent error, negligence or even ordinary malpractice is
insufficient to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment constitutional violation. See Duckworth
v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff’s burn injury appeared to be serious enough to require medical attention. The
complaint thus satisfies the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. The remaining
question is whether the various Defendants acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to a
known risk of serious harm.
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Santos compared his injury to a mild sunburn and did
nothing at all to treat him. Plaintiff’s condition soon became worse and required treatment for
some period of time to relieve the pain and infection. At this early stage of the case, it is not clear
whether Defendant Santos knowingly failed to treat Plaintiff’s serious burn or whether his failure

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to render treatment was due to mere negligence or malpractice. Further factual development is
appropriate to determine whether Plaintiff’s constitutional claim may be sustained. Therefore,
Count 1 against Defendant Santos shall proceed for further consideration.
Dismissal of Count 2 – Defendants Meuller and Cribs
While Plaintiff included Defendants Meuller and Cribs as parties to the action, he failed
to mention them at all in his statement of claim. Plaintiff’s recitation of the facts does not suggest
that either of these Defendants was involved in treating or failing to treat Plaintiff’s injury, or
that they were personally involved in any way in responding to Plaintiff’s attempt to receive
medical care.
Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon
fault; thus, “to be liable under § 1983, the individual defendant must have caused or participated
in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir.
2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In order to state a claim against a Defendant, a
plaintiff must describe what each named Defendant did (or failed to do), that violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Further, the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory
liability) is not applicable to § 1983 actions. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir.
2001). Thus, Defendant Meuller’s position as warden, and Defendant Cribs’s role as health care
administrator, do not confer any liability on them for the alleged misdeeds of Defendant Santos.
Count 2 against Defendants Meuller and Cribs shall therefore be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) shall be referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson for further consideration.

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Disposition
COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. Defendants MEULLER and CRIBS are DISMISSED from this action
without prejudice.
With reference to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendant SANTOS:
(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified
by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to
the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps
to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs
of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the Defendant cannot be found at the address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall
furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s
last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above
or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the
Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the
Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on
which a true and correct copy of any document was served on Defendant or counsel. Any paper
received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails
to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.

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Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings, which shall include a
determination on the pending motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3).
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all
parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 1, 2016

__________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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