Hope v. Baldwin et al

Filing 12

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 4/20/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
GREGORY HOPE,
No. N50178,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN BALDWIN,
NURSE WELTY,
NURSE WOODS,
STEVE DUNCAN,
DOCTOR COE, and
UNKNOWN PARTIES,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16-cv-00327-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Gregory Hope is an inmate currently housed in Illinois River Correctional
Center.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff brings this action for deprivations of his

constitutional rights with respect to his medical care while he was housed at Lawrence
Correctional Center.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court is required to dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money
damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-

Page 1 of 9

27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
According to the complaint, on August 4, 2015, Plaintiff, who was then 62 years old, was
locked in his cell when he began experiencing chest pain and numbness in his extremities. He
repeatedly pushed the panic alarm and called for help, but two hours passed before anyone
responded. C/O Stanley (who is not a defendant) finally appeared and attempted to secure
medical assistance. Nurse Welty responded to Stanley’s request by stating that she would see
Plaintiff in the Health Care Unit when he was there later in the day for his scheduled insulin
shot—an hour and twenty minutes later.
When Plaintiff saw Nurse Welty, despite his symptoms, Welty would not allow Plaintiff
to see a doctor because she believed he had been seen by a doctor earlier in the day. According
to Plaintiff, he had not seen a doctor. Nurse Welty also did not take Plaintiff’s blood pressure or
pulse; instead, Plaintiff was returned to his cell.
At 7 p.m., approximately six hours after he began experiencing symptoms, Plaintiff
stopped Nurse Woods as she made her rounds dispensing medication. Plaintiff explained his
situation and asked for help. Woods replied that Plaintiff would be placed on the doctor’s call
line.

Page 2 of 9

Plaintiff was not seen by any medical personnel until he suffered a major heart attack on
August 11—a week after his initial symptoms and request for medical care.

During that

intervening week, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance and mailed it to Warden Duncan. The
grievance detailed Plaintiff’s situation and sought immediate treatment. The grievance was
rejected as not presenting an emergency.

Plaintiff recognizes that a designee signed the

grievance response on Warden Duncan’s behalf.

Multiple written and oral requests to

unidentified healthcare personnel were to no avail. Some nurses responded by noting that
Plaintiff was on the doctor’s call line. Whether that was true or not, Plaintiff was not seen by the
doctor.
Just 45 minutes before his heart attack on August 11, Plaintiff had seen Nurse Hovey
(who is not a defendant) for his evening insulin shot. Plaintiff presented Nurse Hovey with a
written request to see a doctor regarding his chest pain. Hovey only gave Plaintiff an insulin
injection and returned him to his cell.

Back in his cell, Plaintiff’s symptoms became much

worse. He again pressed the panic alarm. An hour and forty-five minutes later, Lt. Tubbs (who
is not a defendant) responded to the alarm, saw Plaintiff down on his hands and knees, and
broadcasted an emergency.
According to Plaintiff, he “died” and was resuscitated twice that night Plaintiff was
taken to a local hospital and then airlifted to another hospital where he underwent surgery to
alleviate an arterial blockage. His cardiologist told him that, had his week of symptoms not been
ignored, his surgery would have been routine.
The complaint further asserts, “if” Lawrence Correctional Center’s Dr. Coe knew of his
verbal and written requests for treatment, he turned a blind eye (see Doc. 1, p. 11). Plaintiff
further speculates that Dr. Coe “may” have violated his rights (see Doc. 1, p. 2).

Page 3 of 9

Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections John Baldwin is named as a defendant
in his official capacity solely for purposes of responding to discovery aimed at identifying the
multiple individuals who failed to respond to Plaintiff’s verbal and written pleas for medical
treatment.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to frame the
allegations as a single, overarching claim.
Count 1: Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious
medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Discussion
The Substantive
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners from being
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.

U.S. CONST., amend. VIII. See also Berry v.

Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 2010).

Eighth Amendment protection extends to

conditions of confinement that pose a substantial risk of serious harm, including health and
safety. See Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2012). A prison
official may be liable “only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
Prison officials can also violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates “deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A medical condition need not
be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it can be a condition that would result in further
significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated. Gayton v. McCoy,
Page 4 of 9

593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). Even those not directly involved in providing medical care—
“non-medical defendants”—can be liable. See Perez v Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781-782 (7th
Cir. 2015).
The allegations in Count 1 regarding the failure to offer Plaintiff prompt medical care for
what was, according to the Complaint, a readily apparent emergency situation, falls within the
ambit of the Eighth Amendment, but that does not end the analysis.
Personal Involvement
Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon
fault; thus, “to be liable under [Section] 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or
participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810
(7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Allegations that senior officials were personally responsible
for creating the policies, practices and customs that caused a constitutional deprivation can
suffice to demonstrate personal involvement for purposes of Section 1983 liability. See Doyle v.
Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2002). However, the respondeat
superior doctrine—supervisory liability—does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See, e.g., Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008).
The complaint, as summarized above, sufficiently implicates Nurse Welty, Nurse Woods,
and other “unidentified parties” from whom care was sought. Consequently, Count 1 shall
proceed against those defendants. Of course, the unidentified individuals involved will have to
be identified and named an amended complaint.
Dr. Coe must be dismissed as a defendant. The complaint merely speculates that Coe
could be liable. There is no factual underpinning to that assertion, thereby not satisfying the
Twombly pleading threshold.

Page 5 of 9

Relative to Warden Duncan, Plaintiff acknowledges that the grievance sent to the warden
was denied and signed by a designee. Whether Duncan was aware of the grievance remains to
be seen. Therefore Count 1 shall proceed against Duncan in his individual capacity.
Unknown Parties
Insofar as Director John Baldwin is named as a defendant for purposes of responding to
discovery aimed at identifying the unknown parties, he will be dismissed. Given that the
relevant events occurred at Lawrence Correctional Center, the warden is in a better position to
identify the correctional and medical staff involved. See generally Donald v. Cook County
Sheriff's Dept., 95 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 1996).

Although Warden Duncan is already a

defendant in his individual capacity, he shall also be included as a defendant in his official
capacity for purposes of responding to discovery aimed at identifying the “unknown parties.”
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated, Defendant JOHN BALDWIN
is DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant DOCTOR COE is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall otherwise PROCEED against
Defendants NURSE WELTY, NURSE WOODS, STEVE DUNCAN, and UNKNOWN
PARTIES, all in their individual capacities.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Warden of Lawrence Correctional Center, STEVE
DUNCAN (a.k.a. STEPHEN B. DUNCAN), or his successor in office, is ADDED as a
defendant, in his OFFICIAL CAPACITY, for purposes of responding to discovery aimed at
identifying the unidentified correctional and medical employees involved in the incidents at

Page 6 of 9

issue in this case.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants NURSE WELTY, NURSE WOODS,
and STEVE DUNCAN: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a
Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail
these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s
place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver
of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent,
the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court
will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, Plaintiff’s motion for service of process at
government expense (Doc. 5) is DENIED as moot.
Service shall not be made on the unknown “John Doe” defendants until such time as
Plaintiff has identified them by name in a properly filed amended complaint.

Plaintiff is

ADVISED that it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the Court with the names and service
addresses for these individuals.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.

Page 7 of 9

Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings, including consideration of Plaintiff’s motion
for counsel (Doc. 4).
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to a United States Magistrate for
disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to
such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis may have been granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against Plaintiff and remit the balance to Plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).

Page 8 of 9

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 20, 2016
s/J. Phil Gilbert
United States District Judge

Page 9 of 9