Hoskins v. Dilday et al
Filing
105
ORDER: For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum and Order, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motions for a preliminary injunction. As soon as practicable, but no later than March 24, 2017, Director John Baldwin is ORDERED to TRA NSFER Plaintiff Joshua Hoskins away from Menard Correctional Center to another facility. Baldwin SHALL file a written notice of compliance upon Plaintiff's transfer. Plaintiff shall not be transferred back to Menard during the pendenc y of this case. At the end of this case, this injunction will either: (1) become a permanent injunction, should Plaintiff prevail at trial and show continued, serious threat to his safety; or (2) expire, should Plaintiff lose on the merits or fail to show a continuing risk of harm. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 3/10/17. (rah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOSHUA HOSKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JUSTIN DILDAY, JOSHUA
SHOENBECK, CORY BUMP, AIMEE
LANG, REVA ENGLEAGE, CHAD
FRIEDRICH, MAYNARD HUDSON,
BRUCE GRUTREUTER, CLINT
MAYER, FRANK EOVALDI, DAMON
MAPLE, ZACHARY HARVEY, CALEN
LALIS, WILLIAM SPILLER,
RAYMOND ALLEN, SARAH WOOLEY,
SHAUN GEE, JOHN DOE #1, JOHN
DOE #2, and JOHN R. BALDWIN
Defendants.
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Case No. 16-CR-334-MJR-SCW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
The Court is cognizant of its duty to avoid entanglement in the day-to-day affairs
of prison administrators, as modern prison administration is an “inordinately difficult
undertaking.” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)(citation omitted).
Nevertheless, federal courts are under a duty to ensure that the constitutional rights of
prisoners are not violated. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011). Plaintiff Joshua
Hoskins, an inmate incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, alleges that he was
attacked by another inmate on February 13, 2016, and that Defendants allowed the
attack to happen before joining in and embarking on a course of serious misconduct in
the months that followed.
1
Hoskins filed multiple complaints in this case before the Court conducted a
preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In the Court’s threshold order (Doc.
22), the Court adopted Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Doc. 23) as the operative
pleading, narrowing the scope of the complaint to include Plaintiff’s allegations of
being attacked in February 2016 and the aftermath. Hoskins has also filed a series of
motions for preliminary injunction (Docs. 14, 18, 21, 29, 35) seeking a transfer from
Menard Correctional Center. Granting preliminary injunctive relief to a prisoner
seeking a transfer is extremely rare, but in certain circumstances it is warranted. The
instant case is the second time in sixteen years on the federal bench that the
undersigned has ordered a transfer.
BACKGROUND
On February 13, 2016, Hoskins was exiting the West Cell House at Menard when
an unnamed inmate called out to him and threatened to attack him for being a snitch.
According to Hoskins, several of the defendants were present before, during, and after
the attack. Hoskins asked Defendant Dilday, the officer on duty, if he could return to
his cell because he was threatened by the inmate or if he could have some form of
protection. Dilday refused and told Hoskins that he would have to endure the attack
because Dilday believed Hoskins was sent to Menard for assaulting a corrections officer
at another institution. Dilday expressed to Hoskins that he was not happy about
Hoskins filing grievances against Menard staff and that Dilday would like to hit
Hoskins himself.
According to Hoskins, he then ran into Defendant Shoenbeck outside the west
2
cell house and told Shoenbeck about his concerns for his immediate safety. Shoenbeck
dismissed his concerns and voiced complaints similar to Dilday’s. Hoskins claims that
Shoenbeck told him he would either have to endure the attack from the inmate or fight
back. At that point, an inmate ran up to Hoskins and punched him twice in the face,
causing injuries to his nose, face, and mouth. Shoenbeck then threatened to falsify
disciplinary reports to make Hoskins look culpable for the fight. Hoskins alleges that
Dilday then stepped in to stop the fight, handcuffed him, and then beat him at
Shoenbeck’s direction. Dilday walked away, and Defendant Hudson began beating
Hoskins while Defendant Mayer encouraged Hudson, saying that Hoskins deserved
payback for assaulting a correctional officer at Stateville.
Defendant Grutreuter was present and directed that Hoskins be taken to the
healthcare unit for further beating. Two unknown correctional officers shoved and
choked Hoskins, twisting his handcuffs and threatening to break his arms. Hoskins was
taken to a room in the healthcare unit with Defendants Grutreuter, Eovaldi, Allen, and
Engelage. Defendant Allen told Hoskins that he was on Allen’s radar for filing
grievances and for allegedly assaulting an officer at Stateville. Allen then directed
Grutreuter and Eovaldi to attack Hoskins. Engelage echoed Allen’s sentiment and said
she would not report the other defendants or provide Hoskins with medical care for his
injuries. Defendants Grutreuter and Eovaldi severely beat Hoskins and dragged him
from the healthcare unit to the North 2 Cell House, where they continued beating him
and sprayed him with pepper spray. Defendants Lalis and Maple, along with other
unknown officers, eventually joined in the attack.
3
When the attack stopped, Hoskins was taken to a cell where Eovaldi told him
that his correspondence would be monitored for grievances and destroyed if he tried to
file any. Hoskins later recounted the details of his beating to Defendant Spiller, who
allegedly told Hoskins that he was aware of it and that he directed security and medical
staff not to provide care to Hoskins after the attack. Spiller also told Hoskins that he had
directed the staff to make it impossible for Hoskins to document or grieve his beating.
He threatened to have Defendants Eovaldi, Gutreuter, and Dilday, along with other
staff, attack Hoskins again if he attempted to file any grievances.
On February 16, 2016, Hoskins attempted to get medical attention from
Defendant Freidrich, but Friedrich told him that he had been instructed not to treat
Hoskins. On February 17, Hoskins attempted to tell Defendant Bump about his beating
and need for medical care while Bump was asking Hoskins about gang activity at
Menard. Bump allegedly acknowledged that it was wrong for staff to beat Plaintiff but
refused to help him get medical treatment. He also advised Hoskins that he would help
Spiller prevent Hoskins from filing grievances. On February 21, Defendant Lang, a
medical technician, walked by Plaintiff’s cell and expressed similar displeasure with
Plaintiff’s use of grievances, refusing him medical treatment.
On May 19, 2016, Hoskins had a run-in with Defendants Allen, Ward, and
Wooley from the internal affairs and investigations unit. Ward told Hoskins that he
would not succeed in trying to grieve his February beating, and Allen laughed. Wooley
told Hoskins that Defendants Spiller and Bump told her about Plaintiff’s requests for
actions against the officers who attacked him and that a letter he wrote to an
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investigatory entity was intercepted and destroyed. During a June 3, 2016, conversation,
Wooley again told Plaintiff that he would not succeed in filing a grievance and that his
beating was deserved. Defendant Gee also told Hoskins in a June 2013 conversation that
Gee was preventing him from filing grievances about the February attack.
Hoskins filed a number of motions seeking a preliminary injunction ordering
that he be transferred out of Menard. Magistrate Judge Williams held a hearing on the
motions on September 26, 2016. At the hearing, Hoskins presented testimony describing
the allegations in his motions for a preliminary injunction and the ongoing issues he
faces in routinely encountering the defendants while incarcerated at Menard. Hoskins
testified that Defendant Spiller prevented him from sending mail and from receiving
healthcare treatment even during a writ to a facility in Chicago. According to Hoskins,
when he returned from Chicago, Defendant Grutreuter told another officer that
Hoskins was not allowed a meal tray even though he had missed meals due to his
travel.
Hoskins recalled another time when Defendant Eovaldi pressured him to tell a
worker in the healthcare unit that he had no mental health issues and to decline
treatment. Hoskins testified that Eovaldi watched the entire encounter to ensure that he
declined treatment. Hoskins said that he suffers from bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia,
and depression and that Defendant Engelage refuses to give him his medication, so he
can only receive his needed medication when she is not there. According to Hoskins,
this began after Defendant Eovaldi assaulted him. Engelage works five days per week,
and Hoskins cannot receive medication on those days.
5
Hoskins also testified that Defendant Spiller prevents him from being allowed to
shower and that he had not showered since before the February 13, 2016, assault. In
order to bathe, Hoskins must use the sink in his cell. Hoskins said that because he is
indigent, he is supposed to be provided with hygiene necessities, like soap and
toothpaste, but he is not. Hoskins testified that he bathes at the sink in his cell with soap
that his cellmate gives him. According to Hoskins, he is on restriction, which makes it
difficult to purchase sufficient hygiene items from the commissary. Hoskins testified
that his cellmate shares food with him because he is not given meal trays if Defendants
Spiller or Hudson are watching.
Hoskins further testified that he was physically attacked again in June 2016 and
that there have been times when guards spit on him, though he said that had not
happened since July 2016. Hoskins indicated that he is routinely threatened with
physical harm by guards and prevented from going outside to the yard. Hoskins is not
allowed to file grievances. Defendant Spiller has threatened to destroy all of his
grievances. According to Hoskins’s testimony, he sent one grievance directly to the
Administrative Review Board but had not attempted to file any further grievances after
Spiller’s threat.
Plaintiff’s testimony was unrebutted at the hearing. Counsel for the defendants
presented no testimony or evidence, instead requesting leave to supplement their
response to Plaintiff’s motions with documents. Judge Williams granted counsel five
days to file a motion justifying why Defendants should be allowed to supplement the
record after appearing at the hearing without evidence to present. Defendants filed a
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motion for leave to file supplemental record on October 3, 2016. Judge Williams, in a
memorandum and order denying the motion (Doc. 59), noted that the motion was only
three paragraphs long and included no proposed affidavits or indication as to the
affidavits would show. Defense counsel offered no argument in favor of allowing the
defendants to submit further evidence. Meanwhile, Plaintiff filed several supplemental
documents after the hearing alleging that he had additional confrontations with
Defendants Spiller and Engelage and that various people warned him of threats made
against Plaintiff by Defendants.
Judge
Williams
submitted
a
report
and
recommendation
(“R&R”)
recommending that the Court grant Plaintiff’s motions for a preliminary injunction
(Doc. 81). Plaintiff filed objections (Doc. 86), and Defendants filed a response in which
they raise a number of issues (Doc. 87). Timely objections having been filed, the Court
undertakes de novo review of the portions of the report to which the parties specifically
objected. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), SDIL-LR 73.1(b). The undersigned
can accept, reject, or modify Judge Williams’ recommendations, receive further
evidence, or recommit the matter with instructions.
LEGAL STANDARDS
1. Preliminary Injunction Standard
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)(emphasis in original).
Accord Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary
7
injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right”)(citation omitted).
To secure a preliminary injunction, the movant must show (1) that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm without the
injunction, (3) that the harm he would suffer is greater than the harm a preliminary
injunction would inflict on defendants, and (4) that the injunction is in the public
interest. Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010)(citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).
The “considerations are interdependent: the greater the likelihood of success on the
merits, the less net harm the injunction must prevent in order for preliminary relief to
be warranted.” Judge, 612 F.3d at 546. (citation omitted)
In the context of prisoner litigation, there are further restrictions on courts’
remedial power.
The scope of the court’s authority to enter an injunction in the
corrections context is circumscribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary
injunction relief “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct
the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means
necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(2). See also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683
(“[T]he PLRA enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases
challenging prison conditions: prison officials have broad administrative and
discretionary authority over the institutions they manage.”)(internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has described injunctions like the one sought
here, where an injunction would require an affirmative act by the defendant, as a
mandatory preliminary injunction. Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 295
8
(7th Cir. 1997). Mandatory injunctions are “cautiously viewed and sparingly issued,”
since they require the court to command a defendant to take a particular action. Id.
(citing Jordan v. Wolke, 593 F.2d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 1978); and W.A. Mack, Inc. v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 260 F.2d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1958)). The evidence that Plaintiff was
attacked, denied food and medication, and is under constant threat of harm to his
health and safety is, as discussed below, largely unrebutted. The likelihood of his
success on the merits weighs heavily on whether an injunction should issue, and that
question hinges largely on the Eighth Amendment caselaw that protects prisoners from
abuse at the hands of correctional officers.1
2. Eighth Amendment Standard
Unnecessary, wanton infliction of pain on a prisoner violates that prisoner’s Eighth
Amendment rights. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 475 (7th Cir. 2009). Non-de minimus
force runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment when it is intended maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Id. at 476
(citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)). Serious threats need not manifest
themselves into actual harm to be actionable. “[O]ne does not have to await the
consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 845 (1994) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Inmates may, in
seeking an injunction against a contemporary constitutional violation of a nature likely
to continue, rely on developments that postdate the pleadings and pretrial motions. Id.
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, as limited by the Court’s threshold order, contains non-Eighth
Amendment claims, as well. Based on the record related to the Eighth Amendment claims, the Court
does not need to address the likelihood of success of Plaintiff’s other claims at this time.
1
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at 845-46.
ANALYSIS
1. Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report & Recommendation
Hoskins objected to the report and recommendation, seeking to correct factual
errors. He argues that some of his allegations, including that Defendant Spiller told him
that he would not be sent to other institutions for court writs to prevent Hoskins from
receiving medical treatment, showers, yard time, and access to the grievance
procedures, are not included in the R&R. He also claimed that he never said that he did
not want to be housed at Pontiac Correctional Center. Hoskins also argued that, despite
the R&R stating otherwise, he has filed documents since the evidentiary hearing
complaining about harsh treatment by the defendants that is ongoing. Finally, Hoskins
asks that he be permanently transferred from Menard rather than merely during the
pendency of this case. The defendants did not respond to Plaintiff’s objections.
The findings of fact in the R&R are thorough and descriptive. Though not every
fact alleged in this case is recounted, the description of Plaintiff’s testimony and the
evidence is an accurate, detailed recitation. Despite arguing otherwise in his objections,
Hoskins did say that he does not want to be housed at Pontiac. (Doc. 52, p.1), and the
R&R reflects that the threats to Hoskins are ongoing. Additionally, though Hoskins may
prefer a permanent transfer, it would be premature to grant permanent relief before a
full decision on the merits of this case is reached. An order that he be transferred during
10
the pendency of the rest of the case is the appropriate at this stage. Accordingly, the
Court REJECTS Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R but notes that, as this review is de novo,
the Court does take in account factual allegations that are not included in the R&R.
2. Defendant’s Response to the Report & Recommendation
The defendants filed a response to the R&R arguing that that Magistrate Judge
Williams abused his discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to supplement the
record. Defendants take issue with the finding that Plaintiff’s testimony was credible
during the motion hearing. Defendants also argued that Magistrate Judge Williams
erred in applying the standard of law. Defendants disagree that Plaintiff has
demonstrated his likelihood of success on the merits or that Plaintiff is likely to suffer
harm if he remains at Menard. According to the defendants, the R&R does not address
the remaining factors that are weighed when determining whether to grant a
preliminary injunction, and, as a result, the undersigned should not grant the motions
for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff did not respond to the defendants’ objections.
Magistrate Judge Williams did not abuse his discretion by denying the
Defendants’ motion to supplement the record. On July 28, 2016, this case was referred
to Magistrate Judge Williams after clearing threshold review. By an order dated August
18, 2016, the plaintiff’s several motions for a preliminary injunction were set for hearing
on September 16, 2016. On August 23, 2016, executed waivers of service were docketed
for several defendants. On September 13, 2016, Assistant Attorney General Christopher
Westenberger entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. The motion hearing
was reset to September 23, 2016. Due to a scheduling conflict, the hearing was
11
postponed until September 26, 2016.
At no time did the defendants file a motion to continue the hearing or suggest
that they needed additional time to prepare. Plaintiff was present at the hearing and
presented testimony in support of his motions. Counsel for the defendants appeared at
the hearing without evidence and without witnesses prepared to testify. At the
conclusion of Plaintiff’s testimony, defense counsel asked to be allowed to supplement
the record later with affidavits and other records to rebut Plaintiff’s testimony.
Magistrate Judge Williams told defense counsel that he would give him “five days to
make a case for being allowed to supplement the record.” (Doc. 66, p. 32).
On October 3, 2016, defense counsel filed a motion for leave to supplement the
record that was three paragraphs with each paragraph consisting of one sentence. The
motion did not provide authority to support granting leave, nor did it provide any
indication as to what evidence would be provided to supplement the record. The
motion was denied. Magistrate Judge Williams’ decision was not clearly erroneous or
contrary to law. Having made an independent review of the record, the Court finds that
the denial of the motion to supplement the record was an exercise, but not an abuse, of
discretion.
Defendants’ next argument is that Magistrate Judge Williams erred in finding
Plaintiff’s testimony credible. Specifically, Judge Williams found that Plaintiff’s
testimony was consistent with his prior filings, that Plaintiff did not attempt to
exaggerate while testifying, and that he made concessions that undermined his position.
In response, Defendants attach exhibits to their objections that they suggest undermine
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the credibility of the plaintiff. Defendants’ exhibits, however, mainly address ancillary
claims or, in some cases, could support Plaintiff’s claims just as easily as they might
rebut his allegations. Plaintiff testified that Defendant Engelage falsified his medical
records to show that he refused his medication. There are medical records with
Defendant Engelage’s signature that show that Plaintiff refused his medicine. While the
Court could find, as Defendants suggest, that this shows Plaintiff is refusing his
medication, the Court could also find that this supports Plaintiff’s claim that his records
are being falsified by Defendant Engelage. Defendants also attach commissary records
and docket sheets from Plaintiff’s other civil cases to show that Plaintiff did have access
to soap, pens, paper, and the mail. Finally, Defendants attach Plaintiff’s disciplinary
records as evidence that he is not credible because he has had disciplinary issues in
three different correctional institutions. None of the provided records negate the heart
of Plaintiff’s claims that he is being harmed physically and is facing ongoing threats of
harm. Judge Williams, who was able to observe and question Plaintiff, determined that
Plaintiff’s testimony was credible regarding the ongoing threats to his safety and as to
his claims that he is not receiving food, medical treatment, and showers. There is not
sufficient justification to set aside the credibility finding.
The heart of Defendants’ response focuses on their claim that the R&R does not
properly apply the preliminary injunction standard. As this review is de novo, the Court
conducts an “independent review of the evidence and arguments without giving any
presumptive weight to the magistrate judge’s conclusion,” and “is free, and
encouraged, to consider all of the available information about the case when making
13
this independent decision.” Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2013).
As the defendants charge that some factors were not weighed in the R&R and that the
examination of other factors was insufficient, the Court will review each factor anew in
determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief.
To establish a likelihood of success on the merits, Hoskins must establish that he
has been subjected to unnecessary, wanton infliction of pain. Threats to his safety that
have yet to manifest into actual, physical harm may be sufficient to establish a
constitutional violation. Plaintiff’s unrebutted allegations indicate that he has been
subjected to a physical attack that several of the defendants participated in. Those that
did not participate in the attack appear to have known about it and to have done
nothing to help Plaintiff in the aftermath. Plaintiff alleges that some of the defendants
endeavor to deprive him of food and medication and threaten him with future physical
harm or pain. These claims are largely unrebutted. The defendants suggest that Hoskins
had pens and occasionally purchased soap or other items and that shows that he is
unlikely to succeed on the merits, but the record before the Court supports Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claims. As a result, the Court finds there is a strong likelihood that
Plaintiff will succeed on the merits as to his Eighth Amendment claims.
Similarly, the undersigned is persuaded that Hoskins is likely to suffer harm if he
remains at Menard. While there, he faces physical threats and is prevented from
receiving needed medications and food trays at times. The actions to which he testified
are egregious, and the apparent involvement of numerous staff members and officials is
deeply troubling. The record raises serious questions as to whether Plaintiff’s safety can
14
be ensured anywhere at Menard should the Court grant a lesser degree of relief.
Without an injunction requiring Plaintiff to be transferred to another correctional
institution, there is a strong likelihood that he faces irreparable harm in the form of
continued, serious threats to his health, safety, and well-being and the denial of basic
necessities. Given the interdependence of the Plaintiff’s likelihood of success and a
likelihood of irreparable harm absent an injunction (i.e., the higher the likelihood of
success, the less net harm must be prevented, Judge, 612 F.3d 546), the balance of the
equities here tips toward injunctive relief, particularly considering that Plaintiff thus far
has introduced largely unrebutted evidence of Eighth Amendment violations.
Defendants describe for the first time in their response to the R&R the difficulties
they would have if the injunction is granted. They argue that Plaintiff is currently
classified to be held at a maximum security institution. There are three maximum
security institutions in Illinois, and, they argue, Menard is the only one where Plaintiff
can be housed because he assaulted a guard at Stateville and has gang-related issues at
Pontiac. However, according to recent filings by the plaintiff, he has been moved
temporarily to Stateville. (See Doc. 102). If Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction is granted,
Defendants argue they would have difficulty finding somewhere to house him and say
they would have to send him to a lower-security facility. Defendants’ issues with
classification do not persuade the Court that Plaintiff should remain housed somewhere
where he is unsafe.
The Court finds that the burden placed on Defendants by mandating Plaintiff’s
transfer is not greater than the risk of irreparable harm to Plaintiff. Defendants suggest
15
that Plaintiff might, in some unspecified way, endanger the public, staff, or other
inmates if he is transferred, but the risk of harm to Plaintiff outweighs that speculative
concern. While the public interest is served by ensuring public safety, the Court must
consider that the public has a similarly strong interest in preventing constitutional
violations. In this case the public interest is best served by ensuring that corrections
officers obey the law. See Joelner v. Village of Washington Park, 378 F.3d 613, 620 (7th
Cir. 2004).
The Court does not come to this conclusion lightly, particularly given the PLRA’s
limits on injunctive relief. Relief less intrusive than mandating his transfer would not be
effective in protecting Hoskins. He faces ongoing threats from officials, including
Defendant Spiller who seemingly instructs others to refuse care to Plaintiff, to deny him
food, to spy on him, and to threaten him. There is no place at Menard where Plaintiff
would be protected from Defendants’ egregious behavior. In most circumstances a
transfer is not the least intrusive means of providing relief to a plaintiff, but, in this case,
the Court sees no other option to adequately protect Plaintiff from ongoing, serious
constitutional violations.
Given the severity of the threats to Plaintiff’s safety and the potential complexity
of this Court having oversight over Menard’s staffing as it relates to Plaintiff, a transfer
from Menard is the least intrusive means of protecting Plaintiff from the risk of
irreparable harm. Plaintiff’s allegations paint a disturbing picture of his life at Menard
that entitle him to the relief he seeks. The Court is not convinced by the arguments
made by Defendants regarding an injunction’s harm to them and the threat to the
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public interest. The Court, having considered the record and the arguments and
objections of the parties, REJECTS the Defendants’ objections to the R&R.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motions for a
preliminary injunction. As soon as practicable, but no later than March 24, 2017,
Director John Baldwin is ORDERED to TRANSFER Plaintiff Joshua Hoskins away
from Menard Correctional Center to another facility. Baldwin SHALL file a written
notice of compliance upon Plaintiff’s transfer. Plaintiff shall not be transferred back to
Menard during the pendency of this case. At the end of this case, this injunction will
either: (1) become a permanent injunction, should Plaintiff prevail at trial and show
continued, serious threat to his safety; or (2) expire, should Plaintiff lose on the merits or
fail to show a continuing risk of harm.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 10, 2017
s/ Michael J. Reagan
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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