Hensler v. Amsted Rail Company, Inc. et al

Filing 35

ORDER: The Court GRANTS the 21 Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Counts I, II, V, and VI of Plaintiff's Complaint. Counts I, II, V, and VI are DISMISSED without prejudice. The Court REMANDS this action to Madison County, Illinois and DENIES as moot the pending 34 Motion for Leave to Take Additional Depositions. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 112/16/2016. (bak)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL HENSLER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMSTED RAIL COMPANY,
INC./ASF-KEYSTONE, INC., and
MATT FERGUSON,
Defendants.

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Case No. 16-CV-348-NJR-RJD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Hensler’s Motion to Voluntarily
Dismiss Counts I, II, V, and VI (Doc. 21). The motion seeks to dismiss all claims brought
pursuant to federal statutes, leaving four Illinois Human Rights Act claims and two
Illinois common law claims, one for intentional interference of economic advantage and
the other for retaliatory discharge after requesting workers’ compensation benefits.
On December 1, 2016, Amsted Rail Company, Inc. and Matthew Ferguson
(“Defendants”) filed a response to Hensler’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss, indicating
that they do not oppose dismissal of Counts I, II, V, and VI (Doc. 28). Defendants argue,
however, that federal question jurisdiction continues on the basis of the intentional
interference of economic advantage claim. Specifically, Defendants argue for the first
time that the intentional interference of economic advantage claim is in reality an

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intentional interference of a contractual relationship claim, and it is preempted by the
Labor Management Relations Act.
Since Defendants have indicated that they have no objection to dismissal of the
federal claims (Counts I, II, V, and VI), the Court GRANTS the Motion to Voluntarily
Dismiss Counts I, II, V, and VI of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 21). Counts I, II, V, and VI
are DISMISSED without prejudice.
Although Defendants argue that the Court has federal jurisdiction based on
preemption, the Notice of Removal alleges as the sole basis for this Court’s federal
question jurisdiction that Hensler asserts claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”) (in Counts I and II) and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) (in Counts V and VI). These claims have now been dismissed. Preemption of
the intentional interference of economic advantage claim (Count X) was never raised in
the Notice of Removal as a basis for federal jurisdiction, and Defendants have failed to
show (or even argue) why they would be permitted to amend the Notice of Removal to
add preemption as a basis for jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); see also Simmons ex rel.
Simmons v. COA, Inc., Civil No. 2:12 cv 39, 2012 WL 1947172, at *1 (N.D. Ind. May 30,
2012) (after the thirty day removal period provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), substantive
amendments—such as those that state a new basis for exercising jurisdiction—are
prohibited); see also Brown v. Alter Barge Line, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 781, 785 (S.D. Ill. 2006).
Considering the current posture of this case, the Court is not confident that it has federal
subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, now that Counts I, II, V, and VI have dropped out, the

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Court would need to retain its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims for this case to proceed in federal court.
A district court is permitted to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
over related claims once the federal claims have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The decision to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction is “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad
Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). “Although the decision is
discretionary, ‘[w]hen all federal claims in a suit in federal court are dismissed before
trial, the presumption is that the court will relinquish federal jurisdiction over any
supplemental state-law claims.’” RQJ Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. BP Prod. N. Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476,
479 (7th Cir. 2012). The presumption may be rebutted when certain exceptions are
present, such as: “(1) the statute of limitations has run on the pendent claim, precluding
the filing of a separate suit in state court; (2) substantial judicial resources have already
been committed, so that sending the case to another court will cause a substantial
duplication of effort; or (3) when it is absolutely clear how the pendent claims can be
decided.” Id. at 480. The Court finds that none of these exceptions applies. The statute of
limitations is irrelevant because the case would be remanded and not dismissed,
substantial federal resources have not been expended, and it is not obvious how the
claims should be decided.
Also, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, district courts
should consider and weigh “the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S 156, 173 (1997); Wright v.
Associated Ins. Companies, Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994). In this instance, a balance

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of the common law factors warrants remand. The Court has expended relatively
minimal resources on this case, and dispositive motions have not yet been filed. In the
interest of comity, Illinois courts should resolve the six remaining claims that involve
matters of state law. Accordingly, the Court relinquishes its supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law claims and REMANDS this action to the Circuit Court for the Third
Judicial Circuit, Madison County, Illinois.1 The Court DENIES as moot the pending
Motion for Leave to Take Additional Depositions (Doc. 34).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 16, 2016
s/ Nancy J. Rosenstengel___________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

1

  The Court points out that, although Hensler has not formally filed a motion to remand, Hensler
suggested as much when he referenced that the Court could decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state law claims in his Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Counts I, II, V, and VI (and the
Court gave Defendants ample time to address this argument in their Response). Nonetheless, a formal
motion to remand is not required, because the Court may remand this action sua sponte pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See e.g., Miller v. Hypoguard USA, Inc., No. 05-CV-0186-DRH, 2006 WL 1285343, at *9
(S.D. Ill. May 8, 2006) (remanding remaining state law claims sua sponte to Madison County state court
after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction).

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