Murray v. Baker et al

Filing 31

ORDER GRANTING 28 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution filed by Defendants. The case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 4/18/2017. (mlp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EARLTON MURRAY,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
LT. BAKER, AMY CACIOPPO, LT.
)
CLARK, BETSY SPILLER, JACQUELINE )
LASHBROOK, and LARUE LOVE,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 3:16-CV-371-NJR-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to
Rule 41(b) (Doc. 28). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Earlton Murray, a former inmate of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his
constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Pinckneyville
Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville CC”). Murray’s complaint alleges that his cellmate
assaulted him on February 18, 2016, and prison officials failed to protect him from the
assault despite receiving a warning from Murray that such conduct was imminent.
Soon after Murray’s complaint was filed, Murray submitted a notice of change of
address indicating he anticipated being paroled on April 20, 2016, and all documents
should be sent to his new address—321 South Mozart, Chicago, Illinois 60612 (Doc. 11).

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Murray’s address was timely updated in the Court’s docketing system. In fact, Murray’s
notice of change of address is the last filing this Court received from him.
On November 28, 2016, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for extension of
time to file a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion. The basis for
Defendants’ motion was Murray’s failure to provide responses to written discovery on
the issue of exhaustion. On January 5, 2017, Defendants asked the Court to enter an
order compelling Murray to provide his discovery responses, because they had still not
been provided. Defendants’ motion to compel was granted, and on January 10, 2017, the
Court ordered Murray to provide responses to Defendants’ interrogatories and requests
to produce regarding the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies by January 24,
2017. The Court warned Murray “that his failure to abide by this Court’s order and
provide said responses may result in the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal of
this lawsuit” (Doc. 26).
On January 31, 2017, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss for lack of
prosecution. Murray has not filed a response to this motion, despite being provided
ample time and opportunity to do so.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides for involuntary dismissal for
failure to prosecute an action or to comply with court orders. Pursuant to Rule 41(b), an
action may be dismissed “when there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct,
or when other less drastic sanctions have proven unavailing.” Maynard v. Nygren,
332 F.3d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Williams v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 853, 857
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(7th Cir. 1998)) (other citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit has identified several
factors a court should consider before entering an involuntary dismissal, including:
the frequency of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with deadlines; whether
the responsibility for mistakes is attributable to the plaintiff herself or to
the plaintiff’s lawyer; the effect of the mistakes on the judge’s calendar; the
prejudice that the delay caused to the defendant; the merit of the suit; and
the consequences of dismissal for the social objectives that the litigation
represents. Aura Lamp & Lighting Inc. v. Int’l Trading Corp., 325 F.3d 903, 908
(7th Cir. 2003).
Though dismissal is left up to the discretion of district courts, courts are strongly
encouraged to provide an explicit warning before a case is dismissed, especially where
the litigant is pro se. Fischer v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 446 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2006); see
also In re Bluestein & Co., 68 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 1995).
DISCUSSION
Based on a review of the record and upon consideration of the applicable law, the
Court dismisses this action for failure to prosecute. First, Murray has exhibited disregard
for court orders. In particular, Murray was ordered to respond to Defendants’ written
discovery on the issue of exhaustion by January 24, 2017. Defendants assert, and Murray
has not contradicted the assertion, that Murray wholly failed to respond to Defendants’
discovery requests, in contravention of the Court’s order. Due to this failure, Defendants
have been unable to file a dispositive motion on the issue of exhaustion. As a result, this
case is approximately five months behind schedule. The Court also notes that Murray
failed to pay his initial partial filing fee of $13.62 by the deadline of November 4, 2016.
Murray was warned that his failure to do so may result in dismissal of this action (see
Doc. 21, p. 1).
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The Court finds that the conduct described above demonstrates a clear record of
delay and contumacious conduct that has needlessly delayed this litigation. While the
Court acknowledges Murray has been paroled since April 2016, that fact does not excuse
his failure to litigate this matter and respond to Court orders. Significantly, there is no
indication that any of the Court’s mailings have been returned as undeliverable (even if
they had, this would not necessarily relieve Murray of his duties in litigating the matter).
While the Court notes there are lesser sanctions available, those sanctions would
be unavailing, because Murray has clearly lost interest in litigating this case (his last
filing was April 18, 2016). Moreover, the Court finds Defendants would be prejudiced if
this matter was allowed to languish on the Court’s docket any longer. For these reasons,
and after consideration of the relevant factors cited by the Seventh Circuit regarding
involuntary dismissal, the Court finds Murray has clearly delayed this matter and
engaged in contumacious conduct warranting dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b).
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b) (Doc. 28) is GRANTED,
and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The case is CLOSED, and the Clerk of
Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 18, 2017
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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