Peters v. Butler et al
Filing
239
ORDER GRANTING 198 202 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Wexford Healthcare; GRANTING in part and DENYING in part 199 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Baldwin, Beltz, Butler, Gibson, Lindenberg, Mason, McFarland, Ripley, Rolland, Smith, and Westfall; and GRANTING 203 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Trost. Count 1 and Wexford shall be DISMISSED without prejudice from this case. Peters's claims under Title II of the ADA shall only proceed against Baldwin, in his official capacity as the Director of the IDOC. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 3/21/2019. (jmp2)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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KIMBERLY BUTLER, DR. JOHN
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TROST, KIETH GIBSON, ALLAN
RIPLEY, DONALD LINDENBERG,
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WEXFORD HEALTHCARE, INC.,
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MATTHEW MASON, CHAD BELTZ,
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CARL MCFARLAND, JEFFREY
ROLLAND, JOHN BALDWIN, MAJOR )
BILL WESTFALL, and VIRGIL SMITH, )
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Defendants.
SCOTT PETERS,
Case No. 16-CV-382-NJR-MAB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Pending before the Court are four motions to dismiss, filed by Defendants John
Baldwin, Chad Beltz, Kimberly Butler, Kieth Gibson, Donald Lindenberg, Matthew
Mason, Carl McFarland, Allan Ripley, Jeffrey Rolland, Virgil Smith, Dr. John Trost, Major
Bill Westfall, and Wexford Healthcare, Inc. (“Wexford”) (Docs. 198, 199, 202, & 203). For
the following reasons, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Scott Peters is an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”)
(Doc. 193, p. 2). He brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for violations
of his constitutional rights (Id.).
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According to the Third Amended Complaint, Peters is a disabled veteran who
sustained severe injuries while on duty in the United States Army that have resulted in
restricted ambulation and chronic pain (Id. at p. 3). While incarcerated at Stateville
Correctional Center (“Stateville”), Peters received a wheelchair to help him ambulate, as
well as medications for nerve damage, arthritis, and back spasms (Id. at pp. 3-4). On or
about March 11, 2016, Peters was transferred to Menard (Id. at p. 4). He alleges he was
assaulted and denied handicap assistance devices during his transfer, and that he also
was denied medications, a wheelchair, and adequate healthcare once he arrived at
Menard (Id. at pp. 4-5).
Peters proceeds on the following claims: violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments against Wexford for denying him access to handicap assistance devices
(Count 1); violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against Baldwin for denying access to handicap
assistance devices (Count 2); violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and
Title II of the ADA against all Defendants for abusing, mistreating, and denying handicap
assistance devices to Peters during his transfer from Stateville to Menard (Count 3); and
violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Title II of the ADA against
Baldwin, Dr. Trost, and Wexford for denying Peters medical treatment and handicap
assistance devices (Count 4). Peters seeks compensatory damages, along with costs and
attorney’s fees.
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LEGAL STANDARDS
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to decide the adequacy of the complaint,
not to determine the merits of the case or decide whether a plaintiff will ultimately
prevail. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff only needs to allege enough facts to state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
A plaintiff need not plead detailed factual allegations, but must provide “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements.” Id. For purposes of a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as
true and draw all possible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch
& Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 2012).
DISCUSSION
Wexford argues Peters’s claims against Wexford under Section 1983 must be
dismissed because they are based on respondeat superior liability. Private corporations, like
Wexford, cannot be held liable for respondeat superior claims under Section 1983. Iskander
v. Vill. of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Instead, a private corporation will generally only be held liable
under Section 1983 when it maintains an unconstitutional policy or custom that results in
the plaintiff’s injury. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 780 (7th Cir. 2015).
Here, Peters alleges Wexford denied him medication, a wheelchair, and adequate
healthcare, through its physician, Defendant Dr. Trost (Doc. 193, pp. 3-5). But Wexford is
a corporation, not a physician, so Peters’s allegations necessarily (and improperly) rest
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on a theory of respondeat superior. Peters also states Wexford condoned and approved
constitutional violations, failed to properly train its employees, and had a practice of
denying care to inmates with serious medical needs (Doc. 193, p. 8). But Peters does not
identify a specific policy, practice, or custom that is responsible for the alleged
constitutional violations. See Harper v. Wexford Health, Sources Inc., 2017 WL 2672299, at *3
(N.D. Ill. June 21, 2017) (where the plaintiff stated a Section 1983 claim against Wexford
by alleging, with detailed facts, that a cost-cutting policy resulted in inadequate
healthcare on repeated occasions). Instead, Peters makes vague and conclusory
allegations against Wexford and fails to demonstrate the allegedly deficient healthcare
was more than a random event. See Arita v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 2016 WL 6432578,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2016) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against Wexford because the
plaintiff’s “conclusory allegation that Wexford has a policy of treating other inmates in
the same fashion as he has been treated [was] insufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss.”).
Peters also brings a claim against Wexford under Title II of the ADA, which
requires him to allege he is a “qualified individual with a disability, that he was denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or otherwise
subjected to discrimination by such an entity, and that the denial or discrimination was
by reason of his disability.” Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). The ADA defines “public entity” as “(A) any State or
local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
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instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
Peters baldly alleges Wexford is an entity of Menard. But the majority of courts
refuse to recognize that a private corporation is an instrumentality of the State of Illinois
just because it contracts with the IDOC to provide medical services to inmates. Morris v.
Baldwin, 2018 WL 6682838, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2018) (and cases cited therein); Hogle v.
Baldwin, 2017 WL 4125258, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2017); McIntosh v. Corizon, 2018 WL
1456229, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 23, 2018). Accordingly, Wexford, along with Count 1, must
be dismissed without prejudice from this case for failure to state a claim.
The remaining Defendants argue Peters’s claims under the ADA must be
dismissed because Defendants cannot be held liable under the ADA in their individual
capacities. Title II of the ADA does not permit suits against defendants in their individual
capacities. Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012). The proper
defendant is the agency or its director in his or her official capacity. Id. at 670 n.2. Here,
Peters seeks compensatory damages under Title II of the ADA against Kimberly Butler,
the Warden of Menard; John Baldwin, the Director of the IDOC; several IDOC
correctional officers; and a Wexford-contracted doctor. Peters does not distinguish
whether he brings his claims against Defendants in their individual or official capacities.
Nonetheless, because there is no personal liability under Title II of the ADA, any claims
under the Act shall proceed only against Baldwin, the highest ranking official in the
IDOC, in his official capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (“As long as the
government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit
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is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”); Johnson v.
Godinez, 2015 WL 135103, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2015) (dismissing individual IDOC
employees in their official capacities as redundant and unnecessary). 1
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the motions to dismiss filed by Defendant Wexford Health
Sources, Inc. (Docs. 198 & 202) are GRANTED. Wexford is DISMISSED without
prejudice from this case. The motion to dismiss filed by Defendants John Baldwin, Chad
Beltz, Kimberly Butler, Kieth Gibson, Donald Lindenberg, Matthew Mason, Carl
McFarland, Allan Ripley, Jeffrey Rolland, Virgil Smith, and Major Bill Westfall is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion to dismiss filed by Dr. John Trost
is GRANTED. Peters’s claims under Title II of the ADA shall proceed only against
Baldwin, in his official capacity.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 21, 2019
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
When a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, it is proper to permit the suit to proceed against both the Warden
and the IDOC Director, because the Warden “would be responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief
is carried out.” Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011). But here, Peters is only seeking
compensatory damages, so Warden Butler is an unnecessary defendant.
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