Hatfield v. Sessions

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, Defendant's reply (Doc. 21) is STRICKEN for failure to comply with Local Rule 7.1(c). Defendant Loretta Lynch's, in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States,Motion (Doc. #13 ) to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint is DENIED. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 12/20/2016. (jdh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LARRY EDWARD HATFIELD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LORETTA LYNCH, in her capacity as
Attorney General of the United States,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16-cv-00383-JPG-RJD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Loretta Lynch’s, in her official
capacity as the Attorney General of the United States, Motion (Doc. 13) to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed a
timely Response (Doc. 17) and the Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 21).

Reply briefs are

discouraged under Local Rule 7.1(c) and should only be filed only in exceptional circumstances.
Further, a party is required to state the exceptional circumstance in its brief. Defendant’s reply
brief does not state an exceptional circumstance and therefore, is stricken for failure to comply
with Local Rule 7.1(c).
1. Background.
The Plaintiff is a convicted felon having pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, one count
of making false statements with regard to benefit claims under the Railroad Unemployment
Insurance Act in violation of Title 18, United States Code, § 1001 on February 28, 1992. See
Untied States v. Hatfield, 91-cr-30093-WLB, SDIL. As such, plaintiff is an individual convicted
of a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one year.

Page 1 of 11

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) states that it shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a
crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year to possess a firearm or ammunition.
Plaintiff brings this action to challenge the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) arguing that if he
had been convicted in state court, he could seek relief in order to reinstate his right to possess a
firearm. He further argues that federal law provides a means to restore civil rights, but that lack
of funding restricts the Department of Justice from processing any such petitions except for
corporations.
Therefore, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he has a fundamental right to “keep and bear
arms in the home for self-defense” and that as an individual with a, “relatively minor non-violent
felony, nearly 25 years ago, who has not had any trouble with the law in the intervening 25
years, and who would be eligible to go through a process to restore his civil right, and thereafter
to lawfully possess arms, were he convicted in state court” should have a federal means to
restore his civil rights. As such, plaintiff is seeking this court to declare 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff. (Doc. 1).
Defendant moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint on two grounds. First, defendant
argues that the plaintiff lacks standing and as such, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Second,
defendant argues that categorical bans on felony possession of firearms are not barred by the
Second Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is constitutional as-applied to the plaintiff as it
relates to a compelling governmental interest.
2. Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(1) - Standing.
The doctrine of standing is a component of the Constitution’s restriction of federal courts’
jurisdiction to adjudicate actual cases or controversies. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “In essence the question of standing is

Page 2 of 11

whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or particular
issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Standing
contains three elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact – an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. . . . Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of – the injury has to
be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court. . . ..
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal citations, quotations and footnotes omitted); accord Sierra
Club v. Franklin County Power of Ill., LLC, 546 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 2008).
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements of
standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. “Since [the elements of standing] are not
mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element
must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of
litigation.” Id. In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the well-pleaded allegations
of the complaint must be accepted as true. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197.
However, “[w]here standing is challenged as a factual matter, the plaintiff bears the burden
of supporting the allegations necessary for standing with ‘competent proof.’” Retired Chicago
Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 76 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 1996). “Competent proof” requires a
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that standing exists. Id. “[S]tanding goes to the

Page 3 of 11

jurisdiction of a federal court to hear a particular case, it must exist at the commencement of the
suit.” Perry v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 186 F.3d 826, 829-830 (7th Cir. 1999).
Defendant argues that the Plaintiff lacks standing because, “invalidating § 922(g)(1) is
unlikely to redress his alleged injury (the inability to possess a firearm) because it would still be
unlawful for the Plaintiff to possess a firearm under Illinois law.” (Doc. 13-1, pg 12).
The statutory scheme of federal and Illinois state law with regard to the possession of a
firearm or ammunition by an individual convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year is as follows:
18 U.S.C.A. § 922 provides that, “it shall be unlawful for any person …who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for term exceeding one year …to
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime

shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were
held.”
The only exception to § 922 is that “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside
or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a
conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil
rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.”
18 U.S.C.A. § 921 (West)
Federal law does provide a means of relief from § 922. 18 U.S.C.A. § 925 states that:
A person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving
firearms or ammunition may make application to the Attorney General for relief
from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition,
Page 4 of 11

receipt, transfer, shipment, transportation, or possession of firearms, and the
Attorney General may grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that
the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant's record and
reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner
dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary
to the public interest.
Further, “[a]ny person whose application for relief from disabilities is denied by the
Attorney General may file a petition with the United States district court for the district in which
he resides for a judicial review of such denial. The court may in its discretion admit additional
evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 925.
It would appear that there is a federal procedure, along with a means of review, to seek
restoration of an individual’s right to possess a firearm. However, since 1992, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”) who has delegated authority to act on § 925
applications, has been barred by appropriations from investigating or acting upon applications by
individuals for relief under § 925.

(“That none of the funds appropriated herein shall be

available to investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal firearms disabilities under
18 U.S.C. 925(c)”. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act,
1993, Pub.L 102–393, October 6, 1992, 106 Stat 1729.1) Therefore, such relief is actually
unavailable to the plaintiff due to appropriation restrictions.
With regard to Illinois state law, “[i]t is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or
about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any weapon
prohibited under Section 24-1 of this Act or any firearm or any firearm ammunition if the person
has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction. This Section
shall not apply if the person has been granted relief by the Director of the Department of State
1

To date, Congress has subsequently retained the restrictions of funds.
Page 5 of 11

Police under Section 10 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 5/24-1.1
Section 10 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act provides that:
(c) Any person prohibited from possessing a firearm under Sections 24-1.1 or 243.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or acquiring a Firearm Owner's Identification
Card under Section 8 of this Act may apply to the Director of State Police or
petition the circuit court in the county where the petitioner resides, whichever is
applicable in accordance with subsection (a) of this Section, requesting relief from
such prohibition and the Director or court may grant such relief if it is established
by the applicant to the court's or Director's satisfaction that: when in the circuit
court, the State's Attorney has been served with a written copy of the petition at
least 30 days before any such hearing in the circuit court and at the hearing the
State's Attorney was afforded an opportunity to present evidence and object to the
petition;
(1) the applicant has not been convicted of a forcible felony under the laws of this
State or any other jurisdiction within 20 years of the applicant's application for a
Firearm Owner's Identification Card, or at least 20 years have passed since the
end of any period of imprisonment imposed in relation to that conviction;
(2) the circumstances regarding a criminal conviction, where applicable, the
applicant's criminal history and his reputation are such that the applicant will not
be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety;
(3) granting relief would not be contrary to the public interest; and
(4) granting relief would not be contrary to federal law.
430 ILCS 65/10.
In this case, plaintiff is a person prohibited from possessing a firearm under Section 241.1 and he appears to meet all requirements for requesting relief under Section 10 except – (4)
granting state relief would be contrary to federal law, i.e.,18 U.S.C. § 922. Defendant argues that
the plaintiff’s relief request is only speculative because, regardless of whether the plaintiff meets

Page 6 of 11

all the requirements for state relief, it does guarantee that the state of Illinois will grant the relief
requested.
However, the Court disagrees with the defendant that the only relief sought by the
plaintiff is possession of a firearm within the state of Illinois.

His injury is the alleged

unconstitutional application of § 922 that prohibits him from even seeking state relief. Plaintiff’s
prayer of relief does not request that this Court award him the right to possess a firearm within
the State of Illinois, it requests that this Court find that 18 U.S.C. § 922 is unconstitutional as
applied to the plaintiff. Therefore, it is not speculative that, if successful in this litigation, the bar
to seeking state relief would be redressed and even if Illinois state relief was never granted, the
restrictions of § 922 would no longer apply and plaintiff would be permitted to possess a firearm
under federal law.
As such, the Court finds that the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact

(the federal

prohibition to possess a firearm and the prohibition to seeking state relief) – that is connected to
the challenged action (the alleged unconstitutional application of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) as applied to
the plaintiff) of the defendant in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United
States; and that the plaintiff’s injury would be redressed by a favorable decision (possession of a
firearm under federal law and ability to seek state relief). Therefore, the Court finds that the
plaintiff has standing.
3. Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6) - failure to state a claim.
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all allegations
in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, a
complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

Page 7 of 11

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1)
describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief
above a speculative level. Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009); EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 556).
In Bell Atlantic, the Supreme Court rejected the more expansive interpretation of Rule
8(a)(2) that, “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief,” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at
561–63; Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d at 777. Now “it is not enough for a complaint to
avoid foreclosing possible bases for relief; it must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to
relief . . . by providing allegations that ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’”
Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d at 777 (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555).
Nevertheless, Bell Atlantic did not do away with the liberal federal notice pleading
standard. Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.
2007). A complaint still need not contain detailed factual allegations, Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555,
and it remains true that “[a]ny district judge (for that matter, any defendant) tempted to write
‘this complaint is deficient because it does not contain . . .’ should stop and think: What rule of
law requires a complaint to contain that allegation?” Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir.
2005) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, a complaint must contain “more than labels and

Page 8 of 11

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atl., 550 U.S. at 555. If the factual detail of a complaint is “so sketchy that the complaint does
not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the defendant is entitled under Rule 8,” it is
subject to dismissal. Airborne Beepers, 499 F.3d at 667.
Defendant argues that categorical bans on felony possession of firearms have been found
to be constitutional and as such, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
As noted earlier, Plaintiff is not claiming that § 922 is per se unconstitutional, but instead he
is arguing that it unconstitutional as applied to him. An as-applied challenge is not stating that
the law is unconstitutional as written, but that the law’s application to a particular person under
certain circumstances deprive that individual person of a constitution right.

In this matter,

plaintiff is claiming that § 922, as applied to him individually, violate his Second Amendment
rights.
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” D.C. v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008). However, “[l]ike
most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone
through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was
not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever
purpose. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state
analogues. Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full
scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on

Page 9 of 11

longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,
or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Id. at 626
(internal citations and footnotes omitted – italics added).
Therefore, “we follow the en banc majority's holding that some categorical bans on firearm
possession are constitutional. But the government does not get a free pass simply because
Congress has established a “categorical ban”; it still must prove that the ban is constitutional, a
mandate that flows from Heller itself. Heller referred to felon disarmament bans only as
“presumptively lawful,” which, by implication, means that there must exist the possibility that
the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge. Therefore, putting the
government through its paces in proving the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is only proper.”
United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2010)(referencing D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008)).
The Seventh Circuit has also state that, “[w]e have left open the possibility that a felon
might be able to rebut that presumption [that a categorical ban on firearm possession by a felon
is presumptively valid] by showing that a ban on possession is overbroad as applied to him.”
Baer v. Lynch, 636 Fed. Appx. 695 (7th Cir. 2016).
As such, plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently describes his constitutional claim in sufficient
detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is; the grounds upon which it rests; and
plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level since the
categorical bans on firearm possession are presumptively constitutional valid, but are open to
possible rebuttal. Whether the defendant can meet its burden of demonstrating that § 922, as

Page 10 of 11

applied to the plaintiff, passes constitutional muster goes to the merits of this matter and is not
ripe for analysis within a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
4. Conclusion.
Defendant’s reply (Doc. 21) is STRICKEN for failure to comply with Local Rule 7.1(c).
Defendant Loretta Lynch’s, in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States,
Motion (Doc. 13) to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 12/20/2016
s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 11 of 11