Warren v. USA et al

Filing 5

ORDER DISMISSING CASE: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition (Doc. 1) is summarily DISMISSED with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before June 1, 2016, petitioner Warren shall SHOW CAUSE in writing why he should not be sanctioned for f iling this frivolous, harassing action. If no response to the show cause order is received, or if, after considering Warren's response, an order and final judgment will be entered. (Action due by 6/1/2016). Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 5/10/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JACK WADE WARREN,
No. 13477-077,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
MAUREEN P. BAIRD, and
JEFFREY POWERS,
Respondents.

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Case No. 16-cv-00390-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Petitioner Jack Wade Warren is an inmate currently housed at the United States
Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois.

He has filed a “Bill in Equity: Petition for Specific

Performance” regarding “property” being held by the respondent government officials in a
“trust/estate … for commercial purpose” (Doc. 1). The property at issue is Jack Wade Warren
himself, and the trust/estate was supposedly created by the judgments entered in multiple federal
criminal cases in which Warren was convicted and for which he is currently incarcerated: Case
No. 4:83-cr-138-A-1 (N.D. Tex); and Case Nos. 95-cr-209-ACC and 95-cr-1153 (M.D. Fla.).
Warren further contends that a series of documents he recently sent to Respondents created a
binding agreement and/or contract, which is in default. Warren is now demanding specific
performance, including vacating all judgments against him, return to him of title to “the
property,” and “disincarceration of the property.”

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From Warren’s perspective, a contract linked to his criminal convictions was created in
February 2016 pursuant to a “Notice:

Private International Remedy Demand-Tender of

Performance-Purge of Contempt-Prayer for Forgiveness” that he served upon Respondents (Doc.
1-3). Perceiving his criminal convictions as being in violation of “applicable law,” Warren gave
Respondents 10 days to respond and cure the situation, warning them that failing to respond
would automatically result in a consent decree in Warren’s favor, which would result in the
release of the property and all debts (see Docs. 1-3, 1-4). Put another way, Warren insisted that
if Respondents did not set him free in 10 days they would be agreeing to set him free. Of course,
he cites no legal authority in any of his documents or this action.
Discussion
Jurisdiction
As a preliminary matter, the Court must discern a basis for jurisdiction. Jack Wade
Warren has characterized himself as a “petitioner,” and he has (when given the choice) submitted
the $5 filing fee associated with a habeas corpus action (see Doc. 2 (notification to pay either
$400 for a civil case, or $5 for a habeas corpus action).

See Bunn v. Conley, 309 F.3d 1002,

1006-7 (7th Cir. 2002) (involving a similarly confusing pro se pleading blurring the line between
habeas and other civil relief; the appellate court advised that the litigant’s characterization should
control, even if legally incorrect)).
The caption “Bill in Equity: Petition for Specific Performance” suggests contract and
commercial law. However, it is clear that Warren is seeking to vacate his convictions and
achieve his release from prison. He states, “The property is being held, without consent, in
breach of agreement (in violation of the applicable law)…” (Doc. 1, p. 3). The reasonable
translation: Warren is imprisoned in violation of the law. The use of the terms “petitioner” and

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“respondent,” the filing fee submitted and the remedy sought are consistent with a habeas
petition. 1 “Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration
are the province of habeas corpus.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750–51 (2004) (citing
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)). Accordingly, this case will be treated as a
habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 based on Warren’s apparent intentions. 2
Merits Review
As a general matter, Section 2241 is the appropriate means by which to challenge the fact
or duration of confinement, while Section 2255 is properly invoked when challenging the
validity of a conviction and sentence. Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012); Hill v.
Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2012); Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir.
2003); Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 2000). Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, the petition shall undergo
preliminary review. Rule 4 provides that upon preliminary consideration by the district court
judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to
notify the petitioner.” Rule 1(b) of those Rules gives this Court the authority to apply the rules
to other habeas corpus cases.

1

Warren’s lengthy litigation history reflects that he is quite familiar with the differences
between habeas and general civil litigation. A search of PACER reveals 17 district court cases
(including actions under Section 2255, Section 2241 and civil rights cases).
2

In accepting he filing fee and characterizing this action as a Section 2241 petition the
court is cognizant of the potential prejudice to Warren that could result from the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, which precludes prisoners from filing second or successive
Section 2255 habeas motions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Rule 9, Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings for the United States District Courts.
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It is also worth noting that, had Warren’s pleading been characterized as a civil case
seeking redress from a government entity, officer or employee of such an entity, 28 U.S.C. §
1915A similarly dictates that a preliminary review of the pleading be performed and the pleading
dismissed if it if frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Regardless of the nature of suit, this action is clearly frivolous on its face and without legal
merit—but isn’t it every prisoner’s dream to be able to write his own “get out of jail free card”?
Warren has not presented any argument regarding the execution of a sentence, or even
the validity of his conviction and sentence. See Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012)
(framing the focus of Section 2241 and 2255 petitions).

Furthermore, as in Calderon v.

Ashumus, 523 U.S. 740, 746-47 (1998), the case is not judiciable. Calderon was an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief, but the Supreme Court held that the issue upon which the action
was premised was collateral to the ultimate relief sought, which lay in the realm of habeas
corpus. Any way this action is viewed, it must be dismissed.
Dismissal on the merits would typically be without prejudice, in anticipation of a habeas
corpus petition. However, dismissal will be with prejudice in this situation in light of the
obvious frivolity of Warren’s position. Dismissal with prejudice may also be warranted as a
sanction for the reasons that follow. See El v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc., 710 F.3d 748, 751,
754 (7th Cir. 2013).
Sanctionable Behavior
The present amorphous pleading is just the latest in a disturbing pattern of vexatious
cases filed by Warren. Most recently, in Warren v. Walton, Case No. 14-cv-1412-SMY, Doc.
16 (S.D. Ill. April 30, 2015), this district court sanctioned Warren with $500 fine and a filing ban
until the sanction was paid. See also Warren v. United States, Case No. 11-cv-149-JPG (S.D. Ill.

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2011) (dismissing action as a sanction for a pattern of frivolous and harassing filings). Despite
repeated warnings about filing frivolous, harassing and threatening pleadings, and despite
sanctions being imposed twice, Warren remains undeterred. He paid the $500 sanction and the
filing ban was lifted on April 8, 2016 (Case No. 14-cv-1412-SMY, Doc. 17), thereby allowing
this action to be filed that same day.
Here, Plaintiff has invited another sanction. Courts have inherent authority to protect
themselves from vexatious litigation by imposing fines and filing bans. See Alexander v. United
States, 121 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 1997), and Support Systems International, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d
185 (7th Cir. 1995). Although Warren has received multiple warnings about filing frivolous,
harassing filings, he will be afforded notice and an opportunity to show cause why, as a sanction,
the Court should not dismiss this action with prejudice, and impose a monetary fine of $1,500, to
be paid before any other civil litigation will be allowed to be filed; the Clerk of Court would be
directed to return all civil filings unfiled until the sanction is paid, and all habeas corpus filings
would be summarily dismissed thirty days after filing unless otherwise ordered by the Court.
Documents submitted in connection with any appeal would be excluded from the sanction.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the foregoing reasons, the petition (Doc. 1) is
summarily DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before June 1, 2016, petitioner Warren shall
SHOW CAUSE in writing why he should not be sanctioned for filing this frivolous, harassing
action.
If no response to the show cause order is received, or if, after considering Warren’s
response, an order and final judgment will be entered. Petitioner Warren is ADVISED that if he

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wishes to appeal the dismissal and/or any sanction ultimately imposed, he may file a notice of
appeal with this court within sixty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(B). A
motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues petitioner plans to
present on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If petitioner does choose to appeal and is
allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, he will be liable for a portion of the $505.00 appellate
filing fee (the amount to be determined based on his prison trust fund account records for the
past six months) irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181
F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Petitioner is further advised that a motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment—a deadline
that cannot be extended. A proper and timely Rule 59(e) motion may toll the 30-day appeal
deadline, but a motion for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding does not toll the
deadline for an appeal.
It is not necessary for petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability from this
disposition of his Section 2241 petition. Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 10, 2016
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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