Goings v. Baldwin et al

Filing 80

ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 41 ), Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 51 ), Motion to Strike Answer, Motion to Reconsider the Denial of Entry of Default (Doc. 59 ), and Motion to Clarify Docket Text (Do c. 61 ) are DENIED. Plaintiff's Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 45 ), Motion for an Extension of Time to Reply in Support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 54 ), and Motion for Extension of Time to Reply to Defendant's Answer (Doc. 58 ) are DENIED as MOOT. Plaintiff's Motions for Clarification (Docs. 27 , 50 , 63 ), Motions for Copies (Docs. 35 , 53 ), and Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Strike Answer (Doc. 60 ) are GRANTED. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 3/27/2017. (tfs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
FREDRICK GOINGS,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN BALDWIN, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:16 CV 489 SMY/RJD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court are eleven pending motions filed by Plaintiff Fredrick Goings. (Docs.
27, 35, 41, 45, 50, 51, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63.) Plaintiff, an inmate with the Illinois
Department of Corrections, brought this action asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state
law claims. (Doc. 1.) The Court screened Plaintiff’s initial Complaint and severed the claims
into separate actions. (Doc. 11.) On March 27, 2017, the Court screened Plaintiff’s amended
complaint (Doc. 79.)

Plaintiff’s remaining claims pertain to his incarceration at Menard

Correctional Center and are as follows:
Count 1: An Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Benefield for
setting in motion the violent attack by inmate David Sesson.
Count 3: An Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force and unconstitutional
conditions of confinement against Benefield for subjecting Plaintiff to dangerous
or restrictive conditions and guard brutality.
Count 4: An Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Butler,
Schoenbeck, Tracy Lee, Jeannette Hecht, Michael Hof, Aaron Runge, Erin Carter,
Lance Phelps, Andrew Dillingham, Andrew Spiller, and Brandon Anthony.1
Count 5: A claim of state law defamation against Benefield for telling other
inmates that Plaintiff dropped a kite about an incident and referring to Plaintiff as
a rat and stool pigeon.

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Although the Court has omitted references to the unidentified defendants here, the Court will allow the claims
against such defendants to remain at this stage of the proceedings to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to identify them.

Count 6: A claim of state law defamation against Bennette and former Illinois
Department of Corrections Director Stolworthy for written findings following a
protective custody hearing.
Count 12: An Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference towards
medical needs against Warden Butler for denying Plaintiff medical care following
the attack by inmate David Sesson.
Count 16: A state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against
Benefield for setting in motion the attack by inmate David Sesson.
Count 17: A state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against
Butler, Spiller, Tracy Lee, Schoenbeck, Jeannette Hecht, Michael Hof, Aaron
Runge, Erin Carter, Andrew Dillingham, and Brandon Anthony for allowing the
attack by inmate David Sesson.
Motions for Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction to prevent harassment and retaliation at
Pontiac Correctional Center. (Doc. 41.) Plaintiff transferred from Menard Correctional Center to
Pontiac Correctional Center on June 1, 2016. He alleges that the Pontiac staff members have
denied him cleaning supplies and hygiene products, tampered with his legal mail and filings,
failed to provide proper medical care and mishandled his grievances. Plaintiff has also moved
for a temporary restraining order to prevent harassment and retaliation. (Doc. 51.) He alleges
that he was assaulted as he slept in his cell at Pontiac Correctional Center.
“The purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to minimize the hardship to the parties
pending the ultimate resolution of the lawsuit.” Platinum Home Mortg. Corp. v. Platinum Fin.
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir.1998). “In this circuit, the standards for a TRO and a
preliminary injunction are functionally identical.” Crue v. Aiken, 137 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1082–83
(C.D.Ill.2001). “In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show that:
(1) they are reasonably likely to succeed on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law exists; (3)
they will suffer irreparable harm which, absent injunctive relief, outweighs the irreparable harm

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the respondent will suffer if the injunction is granted; and (4) the injunction will not harm the
public interest.” Joelner v. Village of Washington Park, Illinois, 378 F.3d 613, 619 (7th Cir.
2004).
“A court issues a preliminary injunction in a lawsuit to preserve the status quo and
prevent irreparable harm until the court has an opportunity to rule on the lawsuit’s merits.”
Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). “Thus, a party moving for a preliminary
injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's
motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Id. “A preliminary injunction is appropriate
only if it seeks relief of the same character sought in the underlying suit and deals with a matter
presented in that underlying suit.” Welch v. Tritt, 2015 WL 6971312, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 9,
2015) (citing Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir.1997)). “[A] District Court
does not have jurisdiction to award a preliminary injunction for an injury unrelated to any cause
of action found in the complaint.” Johnson v. City of Rock Island, Ill., 2012 WL 5425605, at *2
(C.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2012) (citing Stewart v. U.S. I.N.S., 762 F.2d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 1985)); see also
Lake v. Robert, 2014 WL 3610405, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 22, 2014); Jackson v. Welborn, 2013 WL
1287369, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2013).
Plaintiff has not demonstrated a relationship between the allegations asserted in support
of the instant motions and those set forth in his Complaint. Significantly, Plaintiff’s motions for
injunctive relief relate to Plaintiff’s incarceration at Pontiac Correctional Center while his
Complaint allegations pertain to his incarceration at Menard. Plaintiff asserts his belief that the
correctional staff at Pontiac is acting on behalf of or in concert with the Menard defendants.
However, he does not elaborate on the basis for this belief. More is required for the Court to find
the necessary relationship between the instant action and the requests for injunctive relief. In the

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absence of any such allegations, Plaintiff must file another lawsuit against the Pontiac
Correctional Center staff to pursue the injunctive relief he seeks.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 41) and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc.
51) are DENIED.
Motions for Clarification and Motions for Copies
Plaintiff has requested clarification regarding his obligations with respect to service.
(Doc. 27.)

He references the Screening Order, which states, “Plaintiff shall serve upon

Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or
other document submitted for consideration by the Court.” Here, where counsel has appeared for
each defendant remaining in the case, the obligation is satisfied by filing a document with the
electronic filing system. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b).
Plaintiff has also seeks clarification regarding the Docket Text Order entered on
December 12, 2016 (Doc. 48). The record reflects that, on December 9, 2016, Defendants
moved for an extension of time to file an answer, which the Court granted and extended the
deadline to December 23, 2016. (Docs. 46, 47.) On December 12, 2016, the Court inadvertently
set the discovery deadline for that date rather resetting the deadline for the answer. On the same
day, the Court recognized the error and corrected it by striking the discovery deadline and
replacing it with a deadline for an answer.
Plaintiff requests copies of Defendant’s motions for extensions of time to file an answer
and to confirm that Defendants properly filed the motions. (Docs. 35, 53.) The Court charges
fifty cents per page for copies. However, as a one-time courtesy, the Court will send Plaintiff a
copy of these motions.

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Plaintiff further requests that the Court direct the Clerk of Court to clarify the docket text
for Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Motion for Entry of Default at Docket No. 59. (Doc. 61.)
Plaintiff describes the docket text as “uncertain and misleading”. However, considering the
context of the docket – the surrounding entries and the text of the motion itself – the procedural
history of the case and the nature of the motion are clear and unambiguous. As such, Plaintiff’s
request is denied.
Plaintiff also requests that the Court modify the docket text for his motion for extension
of time to file a reply, stating that he intended to request a motion for an extension only with
respect to the motion for a preliminary injunction and not with respect to his motion for a
temporary restraining order. (Doc. 63.) Plaintiff’s request is granted.
Motion to Strike Answer and Motion to Reconsider the Denial of Entry of Default
Plaintiff moves to strike Defendants’ Answer, arguing that they failed to respond to his
first Amended Complaint, that the affirmative defenses are unresponsive and irrelevant, that the
Answer is untimely and contains bare denials without factual support, that Defendants
improperly allege that they have insufficient information, and they have denied allegations they
know to be true.2
The Court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); Delta

Consulting Group, Inc. v. R. Randle Const., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009). Motions
to strike are disfavored, however, and will generally be denied unless the portion of the pleading
at issue is clearly prejudicial and of no possible relevance to the controversy at issue. Heller v.

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Although Plaintiff’s motion has not been filed at the time of this Order, Plaintiff has moved for leave to file the
motion to strike. (Doc. 60.) Leave to file the motion to strike is granted. For purposes of judicial economy and
because it will not prejudice Defendants, the Court will contemporaneously determine the merits the motion to
strike.

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Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir.1989); Tektel, Inc. v. Maier, 813
F.Supp. 1331, 1334 (N.D.Ill. 1992). Prejudice results, for instance, where the challenged
allegation has the effect of confusing the issues or is so lengthy and complex that it places an
undue burden on the responding party. Cumis Ins. Soc., Inc. v. Peters, 983 F.Supp. 787, 798
(N.D.Ill. 1997). The determination of whether to strike under Rule 12(f) is within the discretion
of the trial court. Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distributing Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff contends that Defendants erred by filing an Answer that addresses the initial
Complaint rather than the Amended Complaint. However, the Court received but did not file the
Amended Complaint until it completed the screening process required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
“[W]hile the Court is screening a prisoner's complaint pursuant to § 1915A, the defendants may
waive their answer until they are ordered to reply by the Court.” Boclair v. Hardy, 2013 WL
427123, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2013). Therefore, Defendants did not err by responding to the
initial Complaint. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint has now been filed and screened and the
Court has ordered Defendants to respond.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ Answer is untimely. Defendants waived service on
September 21 and October 11, 2016, and the Answer was due on November 7, 2016. (Docs. 20,
26.) On November 7, 2016, Defendants timely moved for an extension to December 9, 2016,
which the Court granted. (Doc. 31.) On December 9, 2016, Defendants timely moved for a
second extension to December 23, 2016, which the Court granted. (Doc. 46.) Defendants then
timely filed an Answer on December 23, 2016. (Doc. 52.) Thus, Plaintiff’s argument is without
merit.
In light of the recently screened Amended Complaint and Defendants’ pending response,
the remaining arguments in Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike are moot. In the event Plaintiff seeks to

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strike portions of Defendants’ answer to the Amended Complaint, the Court advises Plaintiff to
review Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b), which details the requirements for an answer. Plaintiff should bear
in mind that motions to strike are disfavored and are not an appropriate vehicle for legal or
factual challenges to any claim or defense. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883
F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989); Husainy v. Allied Collection Serv., Inc., 2016 WL 1604824, at
*2 (N.D. Ind. 2016); Co., Indiana Gas Company v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 1995 WL
866417, *2 (N.D. Ind. 1995). Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is denied.
Finally, Plaintiff moves the Court to reconsider the denial of entry of default, again
arguing that Defendants failed to answer the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 59.) This argument is
addressed above, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider the Denial of Entry of Default is also
denied.
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 41),
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 51), Motion to Strike Answer, Motion to
Reconsider the Denial of Entry of Default (Doc. 59), and Motion to Clarify Docket Text (Doc.
61) are DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants’
Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 45), Motion for an Extension of Time to Reply in Support of the
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 54), and Motion for Extension of Time to Reply to
Defendant’s Answer (Doc. 58) are DENIED as moot.
Plaintiff’s Motions for Clarification (Docs. 27, 50, 63), Motions for Copies (Docs. 35,
53), and Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Strike Answer (Doc. 60) are GRANTED. The
Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to file Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Answer and to mail Plaintiff
copies of Defendants’ Motions for Extensions of Time (Docs. 31, 46). The Clerk of Court is

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further DIRECTED to modify the docket text for Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time to
Reply (Doc. 54) to reflect that Plaintiff requested an extension of time solely with respect to
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 41).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 27, 2017

s/ Staci M. Yandle
U.S. District Judge Staci M. Yandle

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