Pegues v. Unknown Party et al

Filing 48

ORDER-Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 41 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 6/19/2018. (njh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ADAM PEGUES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNKNOWN PARTY, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 16-cv-503-SMY-RJD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Adam Pegues, a former inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights
were violated while he was incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”).
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to provide him with access to bathroom facilities
at certain times. Following threshold review, Plaintiff proceeds on one Count:
Count 1:

ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against Director of Illinois
Department of Corrections (official capacity only) for failing to
accommodate Plaintiff’s need for bathroom access while in the prison
dayroom.

This matter is currently before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 41). Plaintiff failed to timely respond to the Motion. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c), the
Court considers Plaintiff’s failure to respond an admission of the merits of the motion. For the
following reasons, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Adam Pegues was housed in segregation at Lawrence from May 6, 2015 through
June 6, 2015 (Plaintiff’s Deposition, Doc. 41-1 at 20). During this time, Pegues was taking the
prescription drug Lactulose, which caused him to have frequent bowel movements (Id. at 25).
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On May 18, 2015, Pegues was in the dayroom to take a shower and requested permission
to be let back into his cell to use the bathroom (Id. at 28). He was denied access to his cell and
had an uncontrollable bowel movement resulting in diarrhea on his body and clothing (Id. at 29).
He had to stand by the steps in segregation for approximately 30 minutes before being allowed
back into his cell to wash up and change his clothes (Id. at 30).
After Pegues was released from segregation and back in the general population, he
continued to have issues with being denied bathroom access while in the dayroom (Id. at 40).
When he complained to staff that he needed access to the washroom in his cell, he was told that
it was a security risk for him to come and go from his cell during his time in the dayroom (Id. at
26-27).
Pegues sometimes takes the Lactulose in the morning and sometimes in the afternoon,
depending on what time he wakes up (Id. at 43). He generally has a bowel movement within 20
to 30 minutes of taking the medication (Id. at 23). Even if he uses the bathroom before he leaves
his cell for dayroom, he often needs to use the bathroom again before dayroom time ends (Id. at
57). Pegues is permitted to miss dayroom if he needs to be close to a bathroom (Id. at 61).
Dayroom time alternates every other day – one day it will be an hour and a half in the morning,
the next day it is two hours and a half in the afternoon (Id. at 66). When Pegues is in the
dayroom and his bowels move before he can get to a bathroom, he goes to the shower and
washes his boxers out (Id. at 52, 57). Pegues was not aware of any other inmates with ADA
accommodations being granted a permit to use the bathroom whenever they wanted (Id. at 69).
He has not experienced any skin irritation as a result of his bowel movements (Id. at 53).
At the time he filed suit, Pegues was seeking money damages and a permit to be able to
use the bathroom whenever he needed while he was in the dayroom (Id. at 68). Since filing suit
however, he has been released from prison, rendering his request for injunctive relief moot.

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Discussion
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also RuffinThompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is
made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact
exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248). When considering a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the
light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party.
Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits any
agency that receives federal funds from excluding, subjecting to discrimination, or denying the
benefits of any of their programs to otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities. 29 U.S.C. §
794(a). Failure to make reasonable accommodations to ensure participation in the public entity’s
programs or services by a person with a disability qualifies as “discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A); Wisc. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 753 (7th Cir.
2006).

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In the prison context, a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case of discrimination under
both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by showing: (1) he is a qualified person (2) with a
disability and (3) the Department of Corrections denied him access to a program or activity
because of his disability. Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012),
citing 29 U.S.C. § 705(2)(B); Wis. Cmty. Serv. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 746 (7th
Cir.2006); Foley v. City of Lafayette, 359 F.3d at 928 (7th Cir.2004); Grzan v. Charter Hosp. of
Nw. Ind., 104 F.3d 116, 119 (7th Cir.1997). Refusing to make reasonable accommodations is
tantamount to denying access. Although the Rehabilitation Act does not expressly require
accommodation, “the Supreme Court has located a duty to accommodate in the statute
generally.” Id. In the prison setting, accommodations should be judged in light of overall
institutional requirements which include safety, security, and feasibility.

Love v. Westville

Correctional Center, 103 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff’s alleged disability is a side effect of his medication, which causes him to have
bowel movements suddenly and more often. Defendant argues that side effects from prescription
medication are not a serious medical condition. Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff had a
diagnosed irritable bowel condition, but argues that the medical records show it was being
treated and was stable. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff had the choice of when to take the
medication knowing the effects that would occur and, therefore, did not suffer from a disability.
With regard to the failure to accommodate, Pegues specifically mentions the May 18,
2015 incident. He contends that in order to prevent from him from soiling himself, he should
have been granted access to his cell from the dayroom. However, Defendant asserts that Pegues
was housed in segregation on that date and did not qualify to attend dayroom. In other words,
his movement from the cell was restricted because he was in segregation.

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Next, Defendant argues that when Pegues was housed in general population and allowed
to attend the dayroom, he was not denied access to facility toilets because of his disability.
Rather, he was denied access because at the time, all inmates were denied access to their cells
during dayroom based on institutional policies established to maintain safety and security.
Defendant also maintains that accommodations were made for Pegues in December 2016
when the policy was changed to allow inmates to return to their cell one time during dayroom.
However, in his deposition, Pegues claimed that the allowance of one return to the cell was not
enough. Therefore, he requested a permit to come and go whenever he chose from the dayroom
to the bathroom in his cell.
Pegues’ request for unrestricted access to his cell during dayroom time does not meet the
requirements for an ADA claim. The facts of this case are distinguishable from Jaros in which
the plaintiff’s physical ailments severely restricted his ability to physically access certain
facilities. Pegues’ physical access to the bathroom was not restricted because of his alleged
disability. Instead, the evidence shows that his access to his cell bathroom during dayroom time
was restricted based on institutional polices established to maintain order and security.
Even if Pegues can show the side effects of his medication are a disability, as an inmate,
he was not entitled to access his cell whenever he chose. Moreover, Defendant’s refusal to
accommodate Pegues by allowing him to come and go from his cell did not keep him from
accessing dayroom time because he could choose what time of day to take his medication.
The record is devoid of any evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that
IDOC denied Pegues accommodations that were needed as a result of an alleged disability.
Therefore, Defendant Baldwin, in his official capacity, is entitled to summary judgment.

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Conclusion
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 41) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
enter judgment and to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 19, 2018
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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