Watford v. Ellis et al
Filing
67
ORDER ADOPTING 65 Report and Recommendation and GRANTING 48 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Kellie Ellis, Brad Bramlett, Tonya Knust, and Lacy Reams. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to correct Defendants' names on the docket as reflected in footnote 1 and enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Chief Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 9/16/2019. (mlp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARLON WATFORD,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:16-CV-582-NJR-GCS
v.
KELLIE ELLIS, BRAD BRAMLETT,
TONYA KNUST, and LACY REAMS,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate
Judge Gilbert C. Sison (Doc. 65), which recommends the undersigned grant the Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Kellie Ellis, Brad Bramlett, Tonya Knust, and
Lacy Reams (Doc. 48). 1 Plaintiff Marlon Watford timely filed an objection to the Report
and Recommendation (Doc. 66). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the
Report and Recommendation and grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Marlon Watford is an inmate confined in the Illinois Department of
Corrections. Marlon is a member of the Al-Islam faith, a tenet of which is the belief that
his body is “a gift from his Lord to hold in trust during this life.” (Doc. 2 at p. 7; Doc. 491 at p. 19-25). Watford alleges in his amended complaint that he “has a spiritual obligation
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to correct Defendants’ names on the docket as follows: Kellie Ellis for
Officer Ellis, Brad Bramlett for Brad Bramlet, and Lacy Reams for Lacy Ream.
1
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to maintain his body and keep it free from strains.” (Id.). At the same time, Watford has
H. Pylori 2 and irritable bowel syndrome, resulting in a need to frequently use the
bathroom (Id.).
On August 23, 2013, Watford had a call pass to attend the law library for an hour
and a half (Doc. 49-1 at p. 21). Before going to the library, Watford and other inmates
were placed in a bullpen area for about 45 minutes (Id.). Once the inmates arrived in the
law library, they were given an assigned seat and were not allowed to get up (Id. at p. 23).
Watford testified that inmates were not allowed to leave the law library to use the
bathroom (Id. at pp. 24-25).
About 15 minutes after entering the law library, Watford felt the urge to use the
bathroom and had a burning sensation in his side and kidney area (Id. at 29). He also had
spasms in his bowels and pain in his stomach (Id.). Watford testified that he told
Defendant Kellie Ellis that he needed to use the restroom, but she told him “no, you just
got here.” (Id. at p. 30). Defendants Brad Bramlett and Tonya Knust, assistant paralegals,
also told him no (Id.). Watford then “just sat there and suffered” until he could return to
his cell (Id. at pp. 32-33).
Defendant Ellis attested that prior to about May or June 2013, inmates could freely
walk around the library and use the restroom without permission (Doc. 49-2). The policy
changed, however, when inmates were found destroying and defacing law books and
2
H. pylori is a bacterial stomach infection that can cause abdominal pain, nausea, loss of appetite, bloating,
frequent burping, and unintentional weight loss. See Helicobacter pylori (H. pylori) infection, MAYO CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/h-pylori/symptoms-causes/syc-20356171 (last visited
Sept. 11, 2019).
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library equipment (Id.). Inmates could no longer use the bathroom because officers could
not maintain sight of inmates using the restroom, creating a security issue (Id.). Inmates
also had fought and committed assaults or security threat group violations on other
inmates in the restroom (Id.). Accordingly, the administration at Menard deemed the
bathroom in the law library closed until the area could be remodeled (Id.). She further
attested that only one correctional officer was assigned to the library at a time and that
she could not leave the law library to escort an inmate out of the building (Id.). Instead, if
an inmate needed to use the restroom, she would call the school sergeant who would
have an officer escort the inmate back to his cell house (Id.). She also attested that Watford
never told her he had irritable bowel syndrome or that it was against his religion not to
use the restroom immediately (Id.).
On May 14, 2015, Watford filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and on May
25, 2016, the claim in this case was severed into its own matter (Doc. 1). After preliminary
review of the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court permitted
Watford to proceed on his claim that Defendants violated his First Amendment right to
freely exercise his religious beliefs by denying him access to the bathroom while in the
law library.
On April 16, 2018, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
Defendants lacked the requisite personal involvement to be held liable under § 1983
(Doc. 49). It was undisputed that Defendant Reams was not present in the law library on
August 23, 2013. Furthermore, Defendants Bramlett and Knust were working as assistant
paralegals, were not members of the security staff, and they had no discretion to allow
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Watford to use the restroom or leave the law library. Finally, Defendant Ellis had no
discretion to decide when an inmate could be taken back to their cell house to use the
restroom. Defendants further argued that the prison regulation regarding the law library
bathroom was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest and that they were
entitled to qualified immunity.
On August 28, 2019, Judge Sison entered the Report and Recommendation
currently before the Court (Doc. 65). Judge Sison first found that summary judgment
should be granted to Defendant Reams, as there is no dispute that she was not present in
the law library on August 23, 2013, and there is no evidence of her personal involvement
in any alleged constitutional violation.
Judge Sison next found that while the prison’s restroom-use policy was
implemented to promote security and inmate safety, there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Watford was provided with alternative means to exercise his religious
beliefs, including that he remain free from physical strain. Specifically, Judge Sison noted
that while Defendant Ellis attested that she would call the school sergeant to contact a
correctional officer if an inmate needed to use the restroom, Watford testified that she did
not follow that policy and instead told him he could not use the restroom. He also testified
that he tried to ask Defendants Bramlett and Knust for permission to use the bathroom,
but these Defendants deny being involved in any requests for restroom access.
Despite these disputed issues of material fact, Judge Sison found that Defendants
were entitled to summary judgment under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Judge
Sison found there is no evidence that Defendants knew denying Watford access to the
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restroom would result in a strain on his body that would violate his religious beliefs.
While Watford argues there is a clearly established constitutional requirement not to
deprive inmates of their First Amendment rights to practice their religion, Judge Sison
noted that there is no particularized, clearly established right that would allow a
reasonable person to know, or even to suspect, that denying Watford access to the
restroom during his time in the law library would violate such a right.
Watford objected to the Report and Recommendation on September 11, 2019
(Doc. 66). His objection is brief; he argues only that there is a clearly established
constitutional requirement not to deprive inmates of their First Amendment rights to
practice religion, which includes the ability to keep one’s body free from strains pursuant
to his religious beliefs. Because Defendants failed to provide an alternative, Watford
asserts his ability to practice his religion was unreasonably burdened and qualified
immunity is inappropriate.
LEGAL STANDARDS
When timely objections are filed, the Court must undertake de novo review of the
Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); SDIL-LR
73.1(b); Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 824 F. Supp. 786, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see also Govas
v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). This requires the Court to look at all evidence
contained in the record, give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific
objections have made, and make a decision “based on an independent review of the
evidence and arguments without giving any presumptive weight to the magistrate
judge’s conclusion.” Harper, 824 F.Supp. at 788 (citing 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3076.8, at p. 55 (1st ed. 1973) (1992 Pocket Part));
Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2013). If only a “partial objection is
made, the district judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.” Johnson v.
Zema Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734,739 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court may then “accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes
Wheels Int’l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). The Court must construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986);
Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2008). The moving party bears the burden
of establishing that no material facts are in genuine dispute; any doubt as to the existence
of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970).
In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not
simply rest upon the allegations contained in the pleadings, but must present specific
facts to show a genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–26; Anderson,
477 U.S. at 256–57. A genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere
existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247,
or by “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
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Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact only
exists if “a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the
evidence presented.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
DISCUSSION
Because Watford only objects to Judge Sison’s conclusion regarding qualified
immunity, the Court reviews only that portion of the Report and Recommendation de
novo. Judge Sison found that while there is a clearly established First Amendment right
to freely exercise one’s religion, the right was not so particularized in this case such that
existing precedent placed the constitutional question beyond debate. In other words, a
reasonable person, under these circumstances, would not have known that denying
Watford access to the restroom violated his right to freely exercise his religion.
In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court
must consider whether the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right and whether
the right in question was clearly established. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009);
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 2012). With
respect to whether the right was clearly established, the inquiry is specific to the
circumstances of the case: “The relevant dispositive inquiry in determining whether a
right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The
plaintiff has the burden of establishing that a constitutional right is clearly established.
Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000). While a plaintiff need not present a
“case directly on point,” he must show that “existing precedent must have placed the
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statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 335, 341
(1986); Humphries v. Milwaukee Cty., 702 F.3d 1003, 1006 (7th Cir. 2012).
Qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Estate of Escobedo v. Martin, 702 F.3d 388, 404 (7th Cir. 2012)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). “If officers of reasonable competence could
disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986).
Here, Watford has presented no factually similar case demonstrating that it was
clearly established that refusing access to the restroom is a violation of an inmate’s First
Amendment right to freely exercise his religion—especially where there is no evidence
that Defendants were aware of Watford’s religious beliefs or his medical issues. The
Court also was unable to find any case that would have informed Defendants that their
actions were unlawful in these specific circumstances. Instead, the Court has found only
cases holding similar actions were not a violation of the plaintiff inmate’s rights. See Bryan
v. Capers, No. CA 806CV-2515-GRA-BH, 2007 WL 2116452, at *7 (D.S.C. July 19, 2007),
aff'd, 252 F. App’x 546 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[A] reasonable official in the defendants’ positions
would not have known that denying the plaintiff’s . . . access to a bathroom during weekly
congregational prayers violated clearly established law under . . . the First
Amendment.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that reasonable officials in Defendants’
positions would not have known that failing to provide Watford access to a restroom
violated clearly established law under the First Amendment. Defendants are, therefore,
entitled to qualified immunity.
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The Court has reviewed the remaining portions of Judge Sison’s Report and
Recommendation for clear error and finds none.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of Judge
Sison in its entirety (Doc. 65) and GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Kellie Ellis, Brad Bramlett, Tonya Knust, and Lacy Reams (Doc. 48). This
action is DISMISSED with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter
judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 16, 2019
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge
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