Davis et al v. Baldwin

Filing 71

ORDER denying 22 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 3/10/2017. (anj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
HENRY DAVIS, DOUGLAS COLEMAN,
AARON FILLMORE, JEROME JONES,
DESHAWN GARDNER, and PERCELL
DANSBERRY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN BALDWIN,

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Case No. 16-cv-600-SCW

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge:
INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 2016, Plaintiffs Henry Davis, Douglas Coleman, Aaron Fillmore,
Jerome Jones, Deshawn Gardner, and Percell Dansberry filed a class action complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement
resulting from what they characterize as “extreme isolation” during their times in
extended segregation and for due process violations associated with their placement in
segregation. This matter is before the Court on Defendant John Baldwin’s motion to
dismiss (Docs. 22 and 23). Plaintiffs have filed a response (Doc. 31) in opposition to the
motion. Defendant has filed a reply (Doc. 36). Based on the following, the Court
DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed their purported class action complaint on June 2, 2016 seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief for conditions of confinement, including deprivation of
basic human needs and disproportionate punishment by placement in “extreme
isolation” sentences in segregation.

Plaintiffs also allege that their placement in

segregation violated the due process clause.

The five individual purported class

representatives are all currently serving time in IDOC prisons. Some of the five are
currently in segregation while the others were previously in segregation and, as
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges, are at risk of being placed back in segregation given their
backgrounds and reasons for being placed in segregation initially.
Plaintiff Henry Davis is currently serving time in segregation at Lawrence
Correctional Center (Doc. 1, p. 5).

Davis was previously sentenced to six months

disciplinary segregation for alleged gang leadership (that sentence was later expunged)
and, at the time of the filing of the complaint, was serving an additional six month
sentence for gang leadership (Id. at p. 5-6). Defendant notes in his motion that Davis’
segregation term was set to end on September 11, 2016. Davis alleges that he has been
in some form of “extreme isolation” on various occasions since 2011 (Id. at p. 23-25) and
during his time in disciplinary segregation he was subject to limited, no contact visits
and had limitations placed on his phone calls, delays with his mail, interruption of his
GED program, was unable to participate in religious activities and courses, and was only
provided access to a law library that contained torn and tattered books and no inmate
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helpers (Id. at p. 25). While in disciplinary segregation he was subjected to smaller food
portions, cells with bugs and freezing cold temperatures, and an inability to visit the
commissary (Id. at p. 26). He spends 23 to 24 hours a day in his cell and for the majority
of the time he has been single celled. He is unable to communicate with individuals
outside of the cell and the addition of an air-blowing machine makes any
communication difficult (Id.). He is only allowed access to a yard for two hours each
week, usually on the same day (Id.).
Plaintiff Douglas Coleman is currently housed in “X house” in Stateville
Correctional Center and has been subject to approximately fourteen months of
disciplinary segregation (Doc. 1, p. 26-27). While in various disciplinary segregations,
his cells were filthy, sometimes infected with bugs and rodents, he had little air
circulation, and his food portions were smaller (Id. at p. 27-28). He was only permitted
yard privileges once a week (Id. at p. 27). In the winter months, the cells were extremely
cold and his cell in F-House segregation at Stateville had a broken window pane,
allowing additional cold air into his cell (Id. at p. 28).

Coleman had little

communication with other inmates, was confined for twenty-four hours a day, and at
one point was housed with a mentally ill inmate (Id. at p. 28-29). While in F-House,
Plaintiff, who suffered from a stroke and is confined to a wheelchair, was denied use of
his wheelchair (Id. at p. 29). Plaintiff had limited yard privileges and was unable to
access the yard many times due to being denied a wheelchair, was not allowed phone
calls, and had little access to programs including religious and psychological services (Id.
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at p. 30). He was subject to no contact visits (Id.).
Plaintiff Aaron Fillmore is currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center
and has been in various forms of segregation for the past seventeen years (Doc. 1, p. 38).
Plaintiff Fillmore originally spent approximately five years in disciplinary segregation at
Tamms Correctional Center (Id. at p. 39).

When Tamms closed, Plaintiff was

transferred to Lawrence Correctional Center, where he remains in isolation almost
twenty-four hours a day (Id.). Plaintiff has no access to natural light, his one window is
covered by a metal box, and a large amount of bird feces is directly outside the window
preventing him from opening the window to allow air circulation (Id.). The constant
noise outside the cell makes it difficult to communicate with any other inmates on the
wing (Id. at p. 40). Plaintiff rarely leaves his cell, only for meetings with his attorneys,
an annual tuberculosis vaccination, and a weekly ten-minute shower (Id.). Plaintiff
only is allowed two no contact visits a month and in disciplinary segregation he is not
allowed to make phone calls (Id.). In administrative segregation he is only allowed one,
thirty-minute phone call per week (Id. at p. 40-41). Fillmore alleges that he is only
allowed one or two hours of yard each week and the yard consists of a barren concrete
floor with no equipment, games, or activities (Id. at p. 41).

He has no access to

programs at the prison, including education programs, and he has been denied access to
reading materials from the library as well as access to his personal property (Id.).
Fillmore alleges that he is not allowed to present evidence or call witnesses when he is
charged with disciplinary actions which cause him to be placed in segregation and that
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he is subject to “sham hearings” (Id. at p. 43).
Plaintiff Jerome Jones is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center.
While at Stateville and Lawrence Correctional Centers in 2013 through 2015, Plaintiff
was placed in administrative detention for having involvement in a gang or STG (Doc. 1,
p. 46). Although he was told the segregation was for “non-disciplinary” purposes, he
had many rights and privileges that are afforded general population inmates taken away
from him (Id. at p. 47). He was confined to a dark cell for almost 24 hours a day, his
toilet was on a timer, and he was completely isolated from general population, including
being served meals in his cell (Id.). The portion size of his meals was smaller than those
served in general population (Id.). Jones only was permitted no contact two-hours
visits while in administrative detention and his phone privileges were limited (Id. at p.
47-48).

Plaintiff received access to the yard only three times a week and “yard”

consisted of a concrete slab with no access to weights, phone, or other materials and
activities (Id. at p. 48). He shared his small cell with a second inmate for almost a year
(Id.). He was not allowed to attend religious services, was denied religious materials,
denied access to the general and law libraries, and denied access to his personal property
(Id. at p. 48-49). Jones was released from administrative detention on February 3, 2016
but fears being arbitrarily placed back in isolation (Id. at p. 49).
Plaintiff DeShawn Gardner is currently housed in administration detention at
Lawrence Correctional Center (Doc. 1, p. 49-50). He was initially housed at Tamms
Correctional Center from 2006 to 2012 and was transferred to Menard Correctional
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Center in 2012 (Id. at p. 50). Plaintiff, while at Stateville Correctional Center, was placed
in investigative status on November 19, 2013 and did not receive a disciplinary ticket or
told the reason for his placement in investigation (Id.). He was transferred to Lawrence
Correctional Center twenty-six days later and placed in administrative detention (Id. at
p. 51). Plaintiff remains in administrative detention, although he has progressed from
Phase I to Phase III allowing him additional privileges than what are allowed in Phases I
and II (Id. at p. 51). In Phase III Plaintiff has no access to rehabilitative programs,
educational programs, the law library, or religious services (Id.). He has restricted
phone privileges and his mail access is delayed (Id. at p. 51-52). He is housed in a small
cell, with toilets that are on a timer, and housed near the mentally ill wing where inmates
scream and throw feces (Id. at p. 52). He has limited communications with inmates
outside of his cell (Id.). He is limited to yard privileges which consist of two hour, three
times a week access to a cage that contains no activities (Id.). His meal portions are
smaller than general population and he is only allowed four no contact visits a month
(Id.).
Plaintiff Percell Dansberry is currently housed at Menard Correctional Center
(Doc. 1, p. 54).

In August 2013, Dansberry was sentenced to three months in

disciplinary segregation while at Pontiac Correctional Center for membership in an STG.
He was transferred to Menard Correctional Center on December 4, 2013 and placed in
administrative detention where he remained for two years until November 2015 (Id.).
Dansberry alleges that he did not receive notice prior to his placement in administrative
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detention or notice of any charges against him (Id.). He alleges that he has never been
provided a reason for his placement in administrative detention during the two years he
was housed there (Id.). He was granted an informal hearing in April 2014 but was
never given a reason for his continued placement; he was only told he was being kept in
administrative detention (Id. at p. 54-55). While in administrative segregation, he was
treated the same as disciplinary segregation inmates (Id. at p. 55). He was only given
access to a barren yard once per week for five hours (Id.). In Phase II and III he was only
allowed access to the yard twice a week (Id.). Most of the cells had metal boxes
covering the windows and the doors were solid steel with only a chuck hole and small
window (Id.). He was only given one small cup of watered-down disinfectant to clean
his cell and the cell was infested with bugs and rodents (Id.). The cell was drafty in
winter and in the summer was very hot and had little air circulation (Id. at p. 55-56).
The food portions were smaller than general population (Id. at p. 56). His visits were
limited; he was only allowed two 1-hour visits per month in Phase I, three 2-hour visits
in Phase II, and five 2-hour visits in Phase III, all of which were no contact visits (Id.).
He was permitted only one 30-minute phone call per week (Id.). In Phase I, Plaintiff
also lost his audio-visual privileges and he could not participate in any educational and
religious opportunities or other IDOC programming during his entire stay in
administrative detention (Id. at p. 56-57).
Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss seeking to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant initially argued that
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the claims filed by Coleman, Fillmore, and Jones were barred by the doctrine of res
judicata but has since withdrawn that argument (See Doc. 36). Defendant, however,
continues to argue that Plaintiffs have failed to statement a claim for unconstitutional
conditions of confinement and due process. Defendant also argues that the claims of
Coleman, Jones, and Dansberry are moot as they are not currently in disciplinary
segregation or administrative detention and that the there is no jurisdiction to award
injunctive relief as they are not currently confined to any type of segregation or
detention. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs Davis, Fillmore, and Gardener possess
no liberty interest in avoiding placement in administrative detention.

In the

alternative, Defendant seeks to sever the Plaintiffs’ claims.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Defendant brings his motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to decide the adequacy of the complaint, not the
merits of the case. See Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In
assessing a complaint or count under Rule 12(b)(6), the District Court accepts as true all
well-pled factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PriceWaterhouseCooper, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir.
2007); Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2006); Corcoran v. Chicago Park
Dist., 875 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1989). Courts must determine whether the factual
allegations in a complaint plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Munson v. Gaetz,
673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)).
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Dismissal is warranted “only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove
any facts that would support his claim for relief.” Hayes v. City of Chicago, 670 F.3d
810, 813 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Thomas v. Guardsmark, Inc., 381 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir.
2004)). For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations of a pro se complaint,
which this case was originally filed as, are to be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2006); Jones v.
Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 162 (7th Cir. 1994).
ANALYSIS
A. Conditions of Confinement
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

Specifically, Defendant argues that

Plaintiffs fail to allege that their placement in segregation or detention deprives them of
basic human needs or that Baldwin was aware of the issues alleged by Plaintiffs.
The Eighth Amendment requires a minimum standard for treatment of prisoners
including that prisoners are provided with humane conditions of confinement. Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (citing Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993)). Inmates must be
provided with “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. (citations omitted). In
order to succeed on a claim for inhumane conditions of confinement, an inmate must
establish: (1) that he was housed under conditions that were “‘sufficiently serious’ so
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that ‘a [jail] official’s act or omission results in the denial of the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities’”, and (2) the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that
risk. See Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008); Grieveson v. Anderson,
538 F.3d 763, 775 (7th Cir. 2008). In order to prove deliberate indifferent, the plaintiff
must show that the officials actually knew of the condition but refused to take
reasonable steps to resolve it. Townsend, 522 F.3d at 773; Grieveson, 538 F.3d at 775.
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have stated a claim for unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged that being
subject to “extreme isolation” deprived them of their basic needs and cites to Wilkinson
v. Austin, 545. U.S. 209, 214, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) to support his
position. Defendant notes that the Supreme Court in Wilkinson found that inmates in
Ohio’s supermax prison were deprived of environmental and sensory stimuli and
human contact, noting that the “cells have solid metal doors with metal strips along their
sides and bottoms which prevent conversation or communication with other inmates.
All meals are taken alone in the inmate’s cell instead of in a common eating area [and]
[o]pportunities for visitation are rare and in all events are conducted through glass
walls.”

Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174.

All true.

However, Wilkinson did not deal with 8th Amendment claims and it therefore does not
control this Court’s analysis. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 218, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d
174. Nevertheless, the allegations raised in Plaintiffs’ complaint are very similar to
those Defendant points to in Wilkinson. Plaintiffs allege that they were housed in small
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cells behind a solid steel door with only a chuck hole and a small window, making
communication with inmates outside the cell difficult. Windows to the outside were
often covered with a metal box. The named Plaintiffs were provided with limited
opportunities to have outside visitation and even then, they were only allowed no
contact visits with family. They were provided with limited access to the yard, only
once or twice a week or one to two hours a week and the “yard” was a barren concrete
slab with no access to recreational activities. They also allege that they were provided
with smaller meal portions, exposed to bugs, rodents and other vermin, and exposed to
harsh temperatures. The Court finds that these allegations certainly establish the denial
of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” See Townsend, 522 F.3d at 773.
See also Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 683-84 (7th Cir. 2001)(deprivation of
exercise); Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005-1006 (7th Cir. 2016) (cell infested with
roaches and birds flying in through broken window).
The Court, additionally, finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged the requisite
state of mind for Defendant Baldwin. As Plaintiffs point out, their complaint alleges
that Plaintiffs filed numerous grievances which were reviewed by Baldwin. Further,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant had studies and data in his possession showing that
IDOC’s policies regarding segregation and detention caused “pain, suffering, mental
deterioration, and physical injury.” (Doc. 1, p. 21). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’
complaint adequately alleges deliberate indifference on Baldwin’s part. As such, the
Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
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B. Due Process
In raising a procedural due process claim, an inmate must show that “(1) he has a
liberty or property interest that the state has interfered with; and (2) the procedures he
was afforded upon that deprivation were constitutionally deficient.” Scruggs v. Jordan,
485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047, 1052 (7th Cir.
1994)). “An essential component of a procedural due process claim is a protected
property or liberty interest.” Domka v. Portage Cnty, Wis., 523 F.3d 776, 779 (7th Cir.
2008) (internal citations omitted). It is well-established that a transfer from one prison
to another with more adverse conditions of confinement generally does not affect a
protected liberty interest. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d
451 (1976). A protected liberty interest arises only if the transfer “imposes atypical and
significant hardships on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed. 2d 174 (2005) (quoting
Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 116 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)).

The

Supreme Court has noted that the baseline for determining whether conditions of
confinement are atypical or constitute a significant hardship are difficult because courts
are inconsistent in applying a formula. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162
L.Ed. 2d 174. In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court noted that the conditions in Ohio State
Penitentiary (OSP), Ohio’s super max prison, met any plausible baseline for atypical and
significant hardship due to the conditions that inmates were subjected to.

Those

conditions included limited human contact, no permitted conversations with other
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inmates, lights on in cells for twenty-four hours, and only one hour of exercise per day in
a small, indoor gym. Id. at 223-24, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174. Further, the Court
noted that placement in the OSP was indefinite and only reviewed on an annual basis.
Id.
Prison disciplinary hearings satisfy procedural due process requirements where
an inmate is provided: (1) written notice of the charge against the prisoner twenty-four
(24) hours prior to the hearing; (2) the right to appear in person before an impartial body;
(3) the right to call witnesses and to present physical/documentary evidence, but only
when doing so will not unduly jeopardize the safety of the institution or correctional
goals; and (4) a written statement of the reasons for the action taken against the prisoner.
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–69 (1974); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1145
(7th Cir. 1988).
Defendant takes issue with Plaintiff Davis’ allegation that he was housed in
segregation for six months, arguing that the six month term would not implicate a
procedural due process right. Defendant also argues that neither Fillmore nor Gardner
can allege a liberty interest in their placement in administrative segregation. But as
Plaintiffs point out, there is no hard rule that a six month term of segregation does not
implicate a liberty interest. Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]his
need not imply that a rigid six-month period of inhuman confinement is a condition
precedent to a deprivation of a prisoner’s constitutionally protected liberty.”). The
Seventh Circuit has noted that “considerably shorter period[s] of segregation may,
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depending on the conditions of confinement and on any additional punishments,
establish a violation.” Kervin, 787 F.3d at 836 (collecting cases). And while Defendant
relies on Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 772 (7th Cir. 2008) for the proposition that
there is no liberty interest in discretionary segregation, more recent Seventh Circuit cases
have found that other forms of detention beyond disciplinary segregation can implicate
a liberty interest, depending on the length of and conditions in detention. Compare
Townsend, 522 F.3d at 722 (“established position that inmates have no liberty interest
in avoiding placement in discretionary segregation”) with Marion v. Columbia
Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing from Townsend
case noting that it involved a relatively short period of segregation); Earl v. Racine
County Jail, 718 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2013) (although finding that inmate’s placement
on suicide watch did not implicate a liberty interest, the Seventh Circuit noted that
when an inmate is placed in more restrictive conditions, whether through protective
custody or discretionary administrative segregation, “his liberty is affected only if the
more restrictive conditions are particularly harsh compared to ordinary prison life or
if he remains subject to those conditions for a significantly long time.”).
Instead, the Court must look at both the duration and the conditions presented
while in segregation to determine whether a liberty interest arises. Marion, 559 F.3d at
697.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges significant periods of detention and segregation

which the named Plaintiffs were subjected to. As Plaintiffs point out, they have alleged
periods of time in isolation ranging from six months to seventeen years.
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And as

previously stated, Plaintiffs have alleged that they were subject to extreme isolation with
many privileges and basic life necessities allegedly denied to them during those time
periods. Such conditions state a claim for an “atypical and significant hardship” at this
stage of the case.
Further, Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Defendant failed to provide them with
their due process protections. Plaintiffs allege that they did not have advance notice or
an opportunity to be heard before placement in detention, were not provided with an
explanation for the detention while housed in isolation, and subjected to “sham”
hearings.

As such, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ have adequately alleged a due

process claim. Defendant’s motion as to this claim is also DENIED.
C. Mootness of Claims of Coleman, Jones, and Danberry
Defendant also argues that the conditions of confinement and due process claims
brought by Coleman, Jones, and Danberry are moot because they are no longer being
housed in any type of segregation or detention at their respective institutions.
Defendant also argues that injunctive relief is improper for these three Plaintiffs under
the Eleventh Amendment as there is no continuing violation since they are not currently
housed in “extreme isolation”.
Courts can only hear live controversies which must exist at all stages of the
litigation process. Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. School Corp., 442 F.3d 588, 596 (7th
Cir. 2006) (citing Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108
L.Ed.2d 400 (1990); Jordan by & through Jones v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc.,
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16 F.3d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 1994)). When an action seeks only injunctive relief “this
requirement ordinarily means that, once the threat of the act sought to enjoined
dissipates, the suit must be dismissed as moot.” Id. (citing Wernsing v. Thompson, 423
F.3d 732, 744–45 (7th Cir.2005)). However, a plaintiff’s claims are not moot if he can
show that the defendant’s actions were capable of repetition yet evading review. This
doctrine “applies only in exceptional circumstances, and generally only when the named
plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subject to the alleged
illegality.” Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1669, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). If a
prisoner is transferred from the facility where he seeks injunctive relief, the request for
injunctive relief is usually moot “unless he can demonstrate [with something more than
mere speculation] that he is likely to be retransferred.” Id. (citing Moore v. Thieret, 862
F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir. 1988)).
While Coleman, Jones, and Dansberry have been released from detention, either
prior to the filing of this case or since the complaint was filed, Plaintiffs have alleged that
there is a likelihood that they will be placed back in detention or segregation. Plaintiff’s
complaint alleges that each spent time in extreme isolation and are at particular risk of
being placed back in or subject to extreme isolation sentences (Doc. 1, p. 59).
Specifically, Coleman alleges that he received disciplinary tickets associated with effects
of a stroke which he still suffers from, leaving him vulnerable to such tickets and a
sentence in “extreme isolation” in the future (Id. at p. 31). Jones and Dansberry were
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both placed in administrative detention for gang affiliations, which they both allege they
were not currently involved in at the time of their detention (Id. at p. 46-49, 54-55).
Thus, as Plaintiffs point out, it is likely that they could be placed in detention again for
their prior gang affiliations. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged
that although they are not currently housed in segregation or some other type of
detention there is a reasonable likelihood that they will be subject to said detention again
and the Court finds that those allegations go beyond mere suspicion.

Further,

Plaintiffs’ complaint challenges current policies or procedures and ongoing
constitutional violations related to those policies; thus sovereign immunity does not
apply. As such, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claims against Coleman, Jones, and
Dansberry as moot or barred by the Eleventh Amendment are DENIED.
D. Request to Sever Claims
In the alternative, Defendant seeks to sever the claims of the Plaintiffs, arguing
that Plaintiffs have failed to provide a single, centralized claim and thus are improperly
joined pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. The Court DENIES that request.
The Court notes that the named Plaintiffs have all alleged that they were subject to
similar conditions during their respective stints in “extreme isolation” in segregation or
detention. While these episodes took place at different facilities, Plaintiffs have alleged
similar experiences and conditions such that the Court finds that their rights rise out of
the same “series of transactions or occurrences” for purposes of joinder.

Further, the

Court notes that Plaintiffs bring a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 23 and the determination as to whether such a class is appropriate in this case
is not yet ripe. As Plaintiffs point out, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims might vary,
the Court may later consider dividing the class into subclasses, if the Court finds that
class certification is proper at all. But at this time, the Court finds that Plaintiffs claims
are properly joined.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
March 10, 2017.
/s/ Stephen C. Williams
STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS
United States Magistrate Judge

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