Vaughn v. Murray Development Center et al
Filing
63
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 51 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court GRANTS summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for non-economic damages related to emotional distress and punitive damages, and DENIES summary judgment on plaintiff's FMLA interference claim. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 3/23/2018. (lmp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JULIA VAUGHN
Plaintiff,
vs.
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT
OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Case No. 16-cv-624-DRH-SCW
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
I.
Introduction
Now before the Court is defendant’s Illinois Department of Human
Services (hereinafter “DHS” or “defendant”) motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 51), to which plaintiff filed a response (Docs. 59), and defendant replied
(Doc. 62). For the reasons explained below, the Court grants in part and denies
in part defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 51).
II.
Background
Plaintiff Julie Vaughn was employed by DHS at Murray Developmental
Center as a Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN II) from September 19, 2011, until
her discharge on May 27, 2015 (Doc. 52-1, pg. 9). Murray Developmental
Center (hereinafter “Murray”) is operated by Illinois Department of Human
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Services and provides medical and behavioral services to developmentally
disabled individuals.
Murray’s employees are subject to the DHS Employee Handbook section
regarding time and attendance. DHS had an attendance policy which defined
unauthorized absences as those for which the time off was not approved (Doc.
52-2, pg. 45). Employee requests for leaves of absence needed to be supported
with a written request to the employee’s supervisor, unless an emergency
condition prevented a timely request (Doc. 59-3). An employee who missed
work due to a medical illness, and received an unexcused absence, could have
the absence later treated as excused by providing the proper medical
certification to his or her supervisor. In an emergency, DHS asserts that their
affirmative attendance policy allows an employee to call in that day and later
submit a formal request for time off after returning to work.
When employing the “call-in” notification policy, an employee who
planned to miss work was required to call in to notify their supervisor at least
one hour before their shift started (Doc. 52-2, pg. 46). According to DHS,
failure to comply with these procedures forced employees to accumulate
unexcused absences, ultimately leading to “progressive disciplinary action”,
depending on the number of unexcused absences (Doc. 52-2, pg. 47).
On January 27, 2015, plaintiff was injured by a patient at Murray.
Initially, plaintiff’s physician recommended that she be placed on light-duty
work at Murray until February 6, 2015. However, on February 6, 2015,
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plaintiff’s physician prohibited her from work for two weeks — from February
6, 2015 to February 24, 2015— as a result of the injury. Plaintiff later
submitted a Physician Statement Authorization for Disability Leave and Return
to Work (CMS-95) indicating her need to be off work. Her medical leave was
extended by DHS until March 9, 2015. Plaintiff later returned to her physician,
and he recommended that plaintiff’s medical leave be extended to March 13,
2015. As a result, DHS extended plaintiff’s medical leave.
On March 18, 2015, plaintiff submitted a CMS-95 to Murray, which
indicated she should be off work from March 13, 2015 to an unknown date.
Prior to that date, DHS alleges that her March 16, 2015 and March 17, 2015
absences were unexcused. In late March 2015, plaintiff received notice by mail
that Murray Developmental Center had instituted disciplinary proceedings
against her as a result of her absences from work on March 16, 2015, and
March 17, 2015. Plaintiff’s pre-disciplinary hearing was scheduled for March
31, 2015. However, plaintiff did not attend the hearing because she was
physically unable to do so.
On April 2, 2015, despite plaintiff’s failure to submit an FMLA
certification, Murray Developmental Center sent plaintiff an FMLA designation
notice indicating that she had been approved for FMLA starting on February 5,
2015 through an unknown time. Thereafter, on April 21, 2015, Plaintiff
obtained a CMS-95 from her physician indicating a need to be off work from
March 13, 2015 to April 21, 2015, due to her injury.
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Despite the aforementioned CMS-95 and prior FMLA certification, DHS
placed plaintiff on a suspension pending discharge effective April 28, 2015.
Thereafter, on May 5, 2015, Murray sent plaintiff another FMLA designation
notice indicating she had been approved for FMLA beginning February 5, 2015
through April 27, 2015. The notice informed her that she had used 56 days of
FMLA leave. Subsequent to receipt of the designation notice, plaintiff was
discharged from Murray Developmental Center effective May 27, 2015.
Plaintiff was not medically cleared to return to work until September 20,
2016. Following her discharge from Murray Developmental Center, plaintiff
began working at Shepard of the Hills, located in Branson, Missouri, in October
2016.
Prior to returning to work, plaintiff filed the underlying lawsuit on June 9,
2016, alleging that Murray interfered with her rights under the FMLA and also
alleging a state law retaliatory discharge claim (Doc. 1). Defendant moved to
dismiss the case, asserting that Murray Developmental Center was not an
employer and also that plaintiff’s state law claim was barred by sovereign
immunity (Doc. 11). Thereafter, on August 23, 2016, plaintiff filed an amended
complaint asserting one count of FMLA interference against DHS (Doc. 27).
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s FMLA interference
claim (Doc. 51).
III.
Motion for Summary Judgment
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Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery, and
disclosures establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Winsley v. Cook Cnty., 563
F.3d 598, 602–03 (7th Cir. 2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists if
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Pugh v. City of Attica, Indiana, 259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir.
2001); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court
must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, as well as resolve all factual
disputes in favor of the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007);
Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 519 F.3d 393, 401 (7th Cir. 2008).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
establishing the absence of factual issues and entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law. Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir.
1997) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). In response, the non-moving party may
not rest on bare pleadings alone, but instead must highlight specific material
facts to show the existence of a genuine issue to be resolved at trial. Insolia v.
Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000). The Court will enter
summary judgment against a party who does not “come forward with evidence
that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in [its] favor on a
material question.” McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1995).
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IV.
Analysis
In defendant’s motion for summary judgment, DHS argues that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s interference claim because
plaintiff did not follow DHS’s policies regarding medical leave and absences.
DHS alleges that plaintiff’s termination was warranted because she failed to
comply with DHS policies, and this, coupled with her previous attendance
violations, ultimately resulted in her termination. 1
In response, plaintiff points to the fact that she was granted FMLA leave
beginning February 5, 2015, through an indeterminate date, which covered all
days that plaintiff was allegedly in violation of DHS policies, and the
indeterminate time was consistent with DHS policies. Further, plaintiff
contends that DHS’ argument that plaintiff could have been terminated because
she had exhausted her FMLA leave, despite the fact that DHS knew Vaughn was
not medically cleared to return to work, was not offered as a basis for
termination until now. See Stalter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 291
(7th Cir. 1999)(finding the employer's changed reason for firing the employee to
be “evidence of pretext, and entitles [the employee] to a trial on the issue of the
reason for his termination”); Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d
449, 456 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1205, 112 S.Ct. 2995, 120
L.Ed.2d 871 (1992) (when employer gives one reason at the time of the adverse
1
Defendant alleges that because plaintiff was on the eleventh step of the progressive discipline
chart, having served a 20-day suspension in July 2014, her two alleged unexcused absences
from March 2015 – which totaled four steps on the progressive discipline chart – justified
plaintiff’s discharge. (Doc. 52-2, pg. 24),
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employment decision, and at trial gives another reason unsupported by the
documentary evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that the new reason
was a pretextual after-the-fact justification); Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Chicago, 95 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir.1996) (failure to express nondiscriminatory explanation earlier despite several opportunities to do so gives
rise to inference that later expressed reason is pretextual).
It is true that FMLA regulations generally permit an employer to enforce
notice and other procedural requirements for invoking FMLA leave: “An
employer may require an employee to comply with the employer's usual and
customary notice and procedural requirements for requesting leave, absent
unusual circumstances.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(d). The FMLA provides eligible
employees with the right to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave due to a
serious health condition. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The FMLA also allows
an employee to take intermittent leave or work on a reduced schedule when
necessary because of a medical condition. Id. at § 2612(b). It is unlawful for an
employer to interfere with an employee's rights under the FMLA by terminating
her employment. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). However, a plaintiff has the burden to
prove that her employer interfered with her FMLA rights. See, e.g., Simpson v.
Office of Chief Judge of Circuit Court of Will Cnty., 559 F.3d 706, 712 (7th
Cir.2009).
“To prevail on an FMLA interference claim, an employee must show
that: (1) she was eligible for FMLA protection; (2) her employer was covered by
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the FMLA; (3) she was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) she provided
sufficient notice of her intent to take FMLA leave; and (5) her employer denied
her the right to FMLA benefits.” Nicholson v. Pulte Homes Corp., 690 F.3d 819,
825 (7th Cir. 2012). The parties do not dispute that plaintiff was eligible for
protection under the FMLA, that DHS was covered by the FMLA, or that
plaintiff was entitled to leave under the FMLA. The key element in dispute is
whether plaintiff’ provided sufficient notice of her intent to take FMLA leave on
both the March 16, 2015, and March 17, 2015. DHS argues that plaintiff did
not follow DHS’s policies regarding medical leave and absences, culminating in
her termination.
Upon review of the record, the Court notes that the parties stipulate to
the fact that on April 2, 2015, Trisha Shipley, FMLA Coordinator at Murray
Developmental Center, sent plaintiff an FMLA designation notice indicating that
she had been approved for FMLA beginning February 5, 2015 through an
unknown time (Doc.52-2, pg. 26). However, in its motion, DHS argues that
plaintiff failed to comply with DHS’ policies regarding leave requests, when she
failed to submit a newCMS-95, and this ultimately resulted in her termination
effective May 27, 2015.
Plaintiff, however, argues that not only was DHS aware that she had not
yet been medically cleared to work, but DHS had, in fact, approved FMLA leave
starting February 5, 2015, through an unknown time. Further, with regard to
plaintiff’s specific absences that allegedly contributed to her termination,
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plaintiff contends that both the March 16, 2015, and March 17, 2015,
unexcused absences charged against her were covered under her approved
FMLA leave. As mentioned above, plaintiff had been approved for FMLA
beginning February 5, 2015, through an unknown time, and on April 2, 2015,
Ms. Shipley certified that plaintiff was approved for FMLA protection,
backdated to include all working days since February 5, 2015. (Doc.52-2, pg.
26). Again, on May 5, 2015, Murray sent Plaintiff another FMLA designation
notice indicating that she had been approved for FMLA beginning February 5,
2015 through April 27, 2015, and this notice also covered the March 16, 2015,
and March 17, 2015 dates in question.
Plaintiff believes her March 2015 unexcused absences were covered by
the FMLA after she received the FMLA designation notice from Ms. Shipley.
Had those absences been covered by the FMLA, plaintiff would not have
accumulated her twelfth unexcused absence, which ultimately was the original
reason given for her termination as part of plaintiff’s alleged failure to comply
with DHS policies. In DHS’ motion, it also raises exhaustion of FMLA leave as a
basis for plaintiff’s termination. However, plaintiff maintains that this
explanation was not offered until the pending litigation.
Accordingly, because plaintiff established that DHS would have lacked
grounds to terminate her employment had she received FMLA leave for her
March 16-17, 2015, absences, and given the disputed basis for her termination,
the Court finds that, construing the facts in plaintiff’s favor, there are disputes
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of material fact surrounding plaintiff’s termination. Therefore, the Court
DENIES the motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s FMLA
interference claim.
Finally, defendant argues that punitive and emotional distress damages
are not recoverable under FMLA. Plaintiff concedes this point (Doc. 59, pg. 13).
The Court agrees that the FMLA does not allow for the recovery of noneconomic or punitive damages. See, e.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary
judgment on plaintiff’s claim for damages related to emotional distress and
punitive damages.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES
in part defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 51). The Court
GRANTS summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for non-economic damages
related to emotional distress and punitive damages, and DENIES summary
judgment on plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim. The parties shall contact
Magistrate Judge Williams if a settlement conference would be beneficial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Judge Herndon
2018.03.23
13:26:19 -05'00'
United States District Judge
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