Leach v. Shaffer et al

Filing 14

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 8/10/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JIMMY W. LEACH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHET SHAFFER,
REX ROBERTS, and
HARTGRAVES
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16−cv–0634−JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Jimmy W. Leach, an inmate in Franklin County Jail, brings this action for
deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case is now before the
Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
Page 1 of 7

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Conversely, a complaint is
plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true,
see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so
sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate
abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At
the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff was booked into the Franklin County Jail on March 18, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 5). He
reported that he was on medication for post-traumatic stress disorder (“PSTD”) and a seizure
disorder. (Doc. 1, p. 5). However, he was not given his medication. (Doc. 1, p. 5). On March
19, 2016, Plaintiff began experiencing flashbacks. (Doc. 1, p. 5). The stress of the PSTD started
triggering seizures as well. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Despite the fact that Plaintiff was on ten-minute
watches, he suffered three seizures, a mini-stroke, and lay in his own urine for approximately 48
hours. (Doc. 1, p. 5).
On March 21, 2016, Plaintiff was taken to the Franklin County Emergency Room, and
subsequently admitted to Good Samaritan Hospital in Mt. Vernon. (Doc. 1, p. 5). By that time,
Plaintiff had lapsed into a coma-like state. (Doc. 1, p. 5). He was hospitalized for one week.
(Doc. 1, p. 5).

Page 2 of 7

Plaintiff alleges that he was not given medical attention despite having seizures and lying
in his own urine. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Defendant Chet Shaffer checked on him three times during that
period and refused to call medical treatment each time. (Doc. 1, p. 5). On April 1, 2016,
Defendants Rex Roberts and Hartgraves told Plaintiff that they deliberately withheld his
medications and that Plaintiff can die for all they care. (Doc. 1, p. 5).
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into two counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The following
claims survive threshold review.
Count 1 – Defendant Shaffer was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs when he refused to secure medical treatment for Plaintiff despite checking on him three
times during a period where Plaintiff was deprived of his medication and suffering from PSTD
and a seizure disorder, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Count 2 – Defendants Roberts and Hartgraves were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
serious medical needs when they deliberately withheld medication for Plaintiff’s seizures and
PTSD, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Although Plaintiff has not explicitly said, his incarceration at Franklin County Jail
suggests that he is a pre-trial detainee. Pre-trial detainees are subject to at least as much Eighth
Amendment protection as a convicted inmate. Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254,
259 (7th Cir. 1996).

Officers can violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel

and unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
A medical condition need not be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it can be a
condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of
Page 3 of 7

pain if not treated. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff’s PTSD and
his seizure disorder are sufficiently serious to state a claim at this time.
Proving deliberate indifference requires more than a showing of negligent or even grossly
negligent behavior; the equivalent of criminal recklessness must ultimately be proved. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-37 (1994). An official may be liable “only if he knows that inmates
face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
Here Plaintiff has alleged that he received no medical treatment from Defendants. He
alleged that Roberts and Hargrave both knew that Plaintiff had prescription drugs to treat his
allegedly serious medical conditions, but deliberately choose not to give them to Plaintiff
because they did not care if he lived or died. If this allegation is true, which the Court assumes
for purposes of this analysis, this is textbook deliberate indifference. While Plaintiff does not
allege that Shaffer deprived him of his medication, Plaintiff alleges that Shafer knew that he was
suffering due to the lack of medication and declined to get Plaintiff any medical help. This is
also deliberate indifference. Plaintiff’s Count 1 and Count 2 survive threshold review.
PENDING MOTIONS
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel, which will be referred to the
Magistrate Judge ultimately assigned to this case. (Doc. 2). He has also filed a Motion for
Service of Process at Government Expense. As Plaintiff has been granted IFP status, and his
claims have survived threshold review, the Court will order service on Defendants. Plaintiff’s
Motion is therefore MOOT. (Doc. 4).
DISPOSITION

Page 4 of 7

IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants Shaffer, Roberts,
and Hargraves: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons),
and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms,
a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of
Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the
Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will
require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to a Defendant who no longer can be
found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the
Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This
information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting
service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address
information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon
defense counsel once an appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or other document
submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be
filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of the document was served
on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has
not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by
the Court.

Page 5 of 7

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for
disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the
parties consent to such a referral.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the
judgment includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the
full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has
been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1)
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
Page 6 of 7

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 10, 2016

s/J. Phil Gilbert
U.S. District Judge

Page 7 of 7