Brock Industrial Services, LLC v. Laborers International Union of North America, Construction & General Laborers Local #100
Filing
49
ORDER GRANTING 42 Motion for Summary Judgment; DENYING 43 Motion for Reconsideration. The Court finds the April 14, 2016 decision by the GRS (Doc. 1-3, pp. 2-3) enforceable. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Laborers International Union and against Plaintiff Brock Industries, in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 7/5/17. (jkb2)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
BROCK INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL
UNION OF NORTH AMERICA,
CONSTRUCTION & GENERAL
LABORERS LOCAL #100,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 16-CV-780-NJR-DGW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Two motions are pending before the Court: a Motion for Reconsideration
(Doc. 43) filed by Brock Industrial Services, LLC (“Brock”) and a Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 42) filed by Laborers International Union of North America,
Construction & General Laborers Local #100 (“Laborers”). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court denies Brock’s Motion for Reconsideration and grants Laborers’
Motion for Summary Judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This action arises out of a contract dispute between Brock and Laborers.
Specifically, Brock seeks to have the April 14, 2016 decision by the National
Maintenance Agreement Policy Committee, Inc. (“NMAPC”) Grievance Review
Subcommittee (“GRS”) vacated by this Court.
Page 1 of 20
The facts leading to the GRS decision are largely uncontested. Brock and
Laborers agreed to the National Maintenance Agreement collective bargaining
agreement (NMA) with an effective date of January 7, 2016. (Doc. 1-3, p. 11). The NMA
provides in pertinent part that “[e]xcept for jurisdictional and general wage rates
disputes…all disputes and grievances arising out of work performed under this
Agreement…shall be resolved…”through the procedure outlined in Article VI—
Grievances of the NMA (Article VI). (Doc. 1-3, p. 15). Article VI requires the parties to
submit any unresolved grievances to the NMACP for arbitration. (Doc. 1-3, p. 15). For
work jurisdictional disputes, a different procedure under the NMA applies. (Doc. 1-3,
p. 12-13, specifically, Article I, Sections 6-12). A work jurisdiction dispute is “a dispute
between two or more groups of employees over which are entitled to do certain work
for an employer.” Hutter Const. Co. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 139, AFL-CIO,
862 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1988).
Brock employed Laborers to construct scaffolding at the Afton Chemical Plant.
(Doc. 1-3, p. 56). However, on January 8, 2016, Brock notified Laborers that they were
laid off and that scaffolding work at the Afton Chemical Plant would be assigned to the
International Brotherhood of Carpenters (“Carpenters”). (Doc. 18-1; Doc. 1-3, p. 56).
Laborers notified the NMAPC via letter on January 11, 2016, that Brock violated the
NMA when it wrongfully terminated Laborers and subsequently awarded the
scaffolding work to Carpenters. (Doc. 1-3, pp. 34-35). On January 21, 2016, Laborers also
notified Carpenters that there was a work jurisdiction dispute between their respective
organizations over the scaffolding work. (Doc. 1-3, p. 37).
Page 2 of 20
In accordance with Article VI, Laborers filed a grievance with the NMAPC
alleging that a wrongful termination of Laborers’ members had occurred on January 8,
2016, and seeking the reinstatement of those members. (Doc. 1-3, p. 39). Brock
responded to the grievance, asserting that the dispute relating to the January 8, 2016
layoff was a work jurisdiction dispute and was therefore beyond the scope of the
NMAPC’s arbitration authority. (Doc. 1-3, pp. 54-56). Brock further requested that the
grievance be dismissed and denied. (Doc. 1-3, p. 56).
The GRS denied Brock’s request to dismiss, and on April 14, 2016, sustained the
grievance finding a violation of Article I, Section 5, of the NMA. (Doc. 1-3, p. 3). Article
I, Section 5, states that “[d]uring the existence of the Agreement, there shall be no
strikes, lockouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising out of any jurisdictional dispute.
Work will continue as originally assigned, pending resolution of the dispute.” (Doc. 1-3,
p. 12). The GRS concluded that Brock violated that section when it made a “change of
assignment.” (Doc. 1-3, p. 3).
On July 12, 2016, Brock filed suit against Laborers pursuant to Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking to have the GRS
decision vacated on the basis that it was outside the scope of the GRS’s arbitration
authority. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Subsequently, the parties filed four motions with the Court, one
by Brock and three by Laborers, all of which were interrelated. Specifically, on August
2, 2016, Laborers filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15), seeking dismissal of the Complaint
for failure to state a claim. On September 19, 2016, Brock filed a Motion to Vacate
(Doc. 18), seeking to have the GRS arbitration decision vacated. On September 30, 2016,
Page 3 of 20
Laborers filed a Motion to Dismiss the Motion to Vacate (Doc. 26), seeking to have
Brock’s Motion to Vacate dismissed on timeliness grounds, as well as being redundant
with Brock’s Complaint. Lastly, on November 28, 2016, Laborers filed a Motion to
Enforce (Doc. 30), seeking to have the GRS arbitration decision enforced.
On March 27, 2017, the Court denied all four motions. (Doc. 37). The claims
presented by the parties appeared to involve a disagreement over whether Brock’s
January 8, 2016 assignment of scaffolding work to Carpenters involved solely a work
jurisdiction dispute, or alternatively, two separate disputes—one a work jurisdiction
dispute and the other for wrongful termination. (Doc. 37, p. 7). The Court noted that if
the grievance involved solely a work jurisdiction dispute, then it was improper for the
GRS to arbitrate the dispute under Article VI of the NMA. (Doc. 37, p. 14). Conversely,
if the grievance involved both wrongful termination and jurisdictional claims, then the
GRS had authority to resolve the dispute under Article VI. 1
The Court found it was unable to make a determination regarding which
arbitration process applied, however, due to the existence of disputed issues of material
fact. 2 (Doc. 37, p. 16). Specifically, the Court identified a factual disagreement between
the parties as to whether Laborers were ever assigned the scaffolding work. (Doc. 37,
1
As a point of clarification, the Court recognizes that the GRS would only have authority to arbitrate the
wrongful termination grievance under Article VI. The separate jurisdictional grievance would need to be
arbitrated pursuant to the procedure contained in Article I, Sections 6-12. (Doc. 1-3, pp. 12-13).
2
The Court noted that although neither party explicitly moved for summary judgment in order to vacate
or enforce the GRS decision, application of the standard for summary judgment was appropriate. Par-Knit
Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 54 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1980)(applying summary judgment
standard because district court’s order to arbitrate is summary disposition of whether there had been a
meeting of the minds on agreement to arbitrate); In re Frascella Enterprises, Inc., 349 B.R. 421, 426-27
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (motion to enforce an arbitration agreement reviewed under standard for summary
judgment).
Page 4 of 20
p. 16). If assigned to perform the scaffolding and then terminated from that assignment,
the Court reasoned Laborers would have both a wrongful termination and a separate
jurisdictional dispute. (Doc. 37, p. 16). If Laborers were not assigned the scaffolding
work in the first place, however, then Brock’s choice to assign the work to Carpenters
would only constitute a jurisdictional dispute outside the authority of the GRS to
arbitrate. (Doc. 37, p. 16). As a result of the apparent disputed facts, the Court denied
Brock’s Motion to Vacate and Laborers’ Motion to Enforce. (Doc. 37, p. 17). 3
On April 24, 2017, Brock filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the Court to
revisit its denial of Brock’s Motion to Vacate the arbitration decision. (Doc. 43, p. 1). On
the same day, Laborers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 42).
ANALYSIS
I.
Motion for Reconsideration
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows a court to alter or amend a judgment
in order to correct manifest errors of law or fact, to present newly discovered evidence,
or where there has been an intervening and substantial change in the controlling law
since the submission of the issues to the district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); See also Bank
of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va.
1983)). Motions to reconsider under Rule 59(e) should only be granted in rare
3 The two additional motions filed by the parties were denied on separate grounds. The Motion to
Dismiss filed by Laborers was denied based on the Court’s finding that Brock had stated a plausible claim
that the GRS decisions should be vacated because it was outside the essence of the parties’ agreement.
(Doc. 37, pp. 11, 17). The Motion Dismiss the Motion to Vacate (Doc. 26) filed by Laborers was denied as
both undeveloped and inappropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)(2). (Doc. 37, p. 5).
Laborers has not requested reconsideration of the denial of these two motions.
Page 5 of 20
circumstances. Id. The decision whether to grant a Rule 59(e) Motion to Reconsider lies
in the sound discretion of the Court. Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996).
A manifest error of law includes the “disregard, misapplication, or failure to
recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th
Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). A manifest error is not demonstrated by
the disappointment of the losing party. Id.
Brock alleges the Court committed a manifest error of law in three ways: (1) by
failing to follow William Charles Construction Co., LLC v. Teamsters Local Union, 827 F.3d
672 (7th Cir. 2016), when denying the Motion to Vacate; (2) by mischaracterizing the
dispute as involving either a lockout or wrongful termination; and (3) by coming to the
wrong conclusion because, even if a termination or lockout occurred, a separate and
distinct contractual procedure for addressing lockouts existed in the contract, which
should have led the Court to the find the GRS did not have jurisdiction to arbitrate.
(Doc. 43, p.2).
A. William Charles v. Teamsters Local Union.
Brock’s first argument for reconsideration is that the Court erred by failing to
“address or apply the principal and controlling legal authority governing this matter,”
which Brock identifies as being William Charles v. Teamsters Local Union, 827 F.3d 672
(7th Cir. 2016). (Doc. 43, p. 4). Failure to recognize controlling precedent qualifies as a
manifest error of law that is properly addressed through a Rule 59 motion for
reconsideration. Oto, 24 F.3d at 606. In order to assess the applicability of William
Page 6 of 20
Charles, the Court first reviews the United States Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit
precedent related to enforcement of arbitration awards.
The principles for reviewing arbitration awards were first set out by the United
States Supreme Court in a trilogy of cases commonly referred to as the Steelworkers
Trilogy. 4 In those cases, the Court held the question of whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate a particular grievance qualifies as an issue for judicial review. Warrior & Gulf,
363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). The scope of that judicial review is extremely narrow,
however. Courts are limited to determining whether the terms of the contract indicate
the parties agreed to arbitrate. Id. They are not empowered to weigh the merits of the
underlying claim. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S.
643, 649 (1986). The Supreme Court has been clear that where the contract contains an
arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability, and any doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage. Id. at 650. This presumption of arbitrability may only be
overcome by ‘forceful evidence’ of intent to exclude the claim.” Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers Int’l Union v. Amoco Oil Co., 883 F.2d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 585).
Once a court determines a grievance was arbitrable, its analysis ends. See United
Steel Workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
Interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement is an issue solely for
the arbitrator. Id. As long as the arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the
The Steelworkers’ Trilogy includes: Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
4
Page 7 of 20
contract, the courts have no authority to overrule the arbitrator simply because their
interpretation is different. Id.
Where a party raises multiple claims, those grievances that are severable from
the jurisdictional issues are individually arbitrable. Hutter Constr. Co. v. Int’l Union of
Operating Eng’rs, Local 139, 862 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1988). The Seventh Circuit in
Hutter Constr. Co. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 139 found that the union had
raised distinct contractual and jurisdictional claims, each of which was arbitrable
through different procedures. See Hutter, 862 F.2d at 644. There, the state of Wisconsin
awarded a general contractor, Hutter, the contract to build a medium security prison.
Id. at 642. Hutter was party to a collective bargaining agreement that required it to
assign all forklift work to Operators, a union representing mason-tending forklift
workers. Id. The agreement also stipulated that any sub-contracting of work could only
be made to signatories of the agreement. Id. Despite that provision, Hutter subcontracted the masonry work to Bill Dentinger Inc. (BDI), who was not a signatory. Id.
BDI then awarded the forklift work to a different union (Laborers), instead of
Operators. Id. As a result, Operators filed a grievance against Hutter, claiming Hutter
violated the sub-contracting provision of the collective bargaining agreement.5 Id.
Hutter objected to the arbitration procedure used, claiming the grievance was
jurisdictional in nature and therefore the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 643. The
Seventh Circuit found that because Hutter could have violated the sub-contracting
5
Subsequently, both Hutter and BDI filed separate claims with the NLRB against Laborers, claiming
unfair labor practices. Hutter, 862 F.2d at 643. The NLRB dismissed the unfair labor practices claims
against Laborers based on its finding that the Laborers had the superior claim to the forklift work. Id.
Page 8 of 20
provision of the agreement, regardless of a finding about which union should have
been was awarded the work, the sub-contracting claim raised a separate grievance
distinct from the jurisdictional question. See Id. at 644. As a result, the Court upheld the
arbitrator’s finding that the dispute between Hutter and Operators was nonjurisdictional in nature, and therefore separately arbitrable. Id. at 646.
In this case, Laborers’ grievance for improper termination was separately
arbitrable from any claims regarding jurisdiction, and therefore it was properly decided
by the GRS. In Hutter, the sub-contracting grievance could be (and was) resolved
regardless of which union was ultimately awarded the work. Similarly, here, Laborers’
improper termination grievance could be resolved regardless of whether Laborers were
ultimately awarded the work. Article I, Section 5 of the agreement states “there shall be
no strikes, lockouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising out of any jurisdictional
dispute. Work will continue as originally assigned, pending resolution of the dispute.”
(Doc. 1-3, p. 12). The first sentence of the provision appears designed to prevent the
parties from participating in any disruptive behavior while a jurisdictional dispute is
being resolved. It is therefore possible that an arbitrator could find an employer
improperly locked out union employees, or that a union improperly picketed an
employer, without having to determine who was entitled to the underlying disputed
work assignment. The mere fact that the prohibited behavior is in response to
Page 9 of 20
disagreement over assignment of work does not make the prohibited behavior itself a
jurisdictional issue. 6
Further, the second sentence of Article I, Section 5 requires work to continue as
originally assigned, pending resolution of a jurisdictional dispute.” (Doc. 1-3, p. 12). In
other words, the employer is required to maintain the status quo. It is therefore possible
that an arbitrator could find an employer improperly discontinued the original work
assignment, without having to assess who was ultimately entitled to the final work
assignment. Because the arbitrator could find for or against Laborers under Article I,
Section 5—regardless of whether they were ultimately successful on a jurisdictional
claim—Laborers’ grievance for improper termination was separately arbitrable by the
GRS.
Brock disagrees, essentially arguing that the termination grievance filed by
Laborers did not have a separate contractual basis and therefore was not severable from
the jurisdictional issue. (Doc. 43, pp. 13-15). To support this contention, Brock relies on
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in William Charles v. Teamsters Local Union (Doc. 43, p. 10).
In William Charles, a dispute arose between the Teamsters and Engineers unions over
which entity was entitled to be assigned work under a labor agreement. William Charles,
827 F.3d at 675. William Charles, the employer, had assigned the work to the Engineers
union. Id. The Teamsters union objected and brought a jurisdictional complaint against
6
Brock makes an argument that Hutter is not applicable because, among other reasons, the claim by
Laborers did not involve a sub-contracting claim. (Dec. 43, p. 13). The Court does not read Hutter as being
limited to those cases involving sub-contracting clauses. Rather, the Court understands Hutter to more
broadly hold that where a contractual basis exists, independent of a jurisdictional grievance, the two
issues are separately and individually arbitrable.
Page 10 of 20
the Engineers under the Project Labor Agreement (Agreement). Id. The grievance was
arbitrated under the Agreement’s jurisdictional dispute process, resulting in a finding
for the Teamsters. Id. However, the arbitration decision did not award the Teamsters
any back pay or benefits. Id. at 676. Five days later, the Teamsters filed a second
grievance, this time against the employer, William Charles. Id. William Charles objected
to the arbitration process, claiming the arbitrator did not have authority to hear the
issue because the second grievance was purely jurisdictional in nature. Id. The Seventh
Circuit agreed. Id. at 680-81.
Two reasons support the Court’s determination that the second grievance was
jurisdictional. First, the sole rationale that was the basis for the second grievance was the
decision in the earlier arbitration. William Charles, 827 F.3d at 676. Presumably, because
the earlier arbitration was purely jurisdictional, the second grievance’s complete
reliance on that determination meant the claims could also only be jurisdictional.
Second, the Seventh Circuit looked to the contractual language that was the basis for the
Teamsters’ claim. Id. at 680. The relevant provision stated only that “[t]he operation of
all equipment shall be assigned to the proper craft jurisdiction.” Id. The contract
provision at issue had one goal—to ensure the correct union (craft jurisdiction) received
the contract. The Court reasoned that because the language of the contract relied on by
the Teamsters explicitly concerned jurisdiction, the claim was jurisdictional in nature.
Id.
Given the significantly different factual circumstances, William Charles is not
applicable in this case. In William Charles, the union’s grievance against the employer
Page 11 of 20
was based solely on a prior jurisdictional decision in its favor—as a result there could
only be a jurisdictional basis for the second claim. Conversely, here there is no prior
decision at all. Despite Brock’s claims to the contrary, the mere fact that Laborers
believed they had a separate jurisdictional grievance against Carpenters does not make
their claim against Brock automatically jurisdictional in nature.
Further, the contractual language here is clearly distinguishable from the
language contained in William Charles. In William Charles the contract stated that “[t]he
operation of all equipment shall be assigned to the proper craft jurisdiction.” William
Charles, 827 F.3d at 680. This language created only one possible basis for a grievance—
jurisdiction. Conversely, the language here creates several possible bases for a grievance
completely unrelated to which union properly has jurisdiction to do the work.
Specifically, the language of Article I, Section 5, states that “[d]uring the existence of the
Agreement, there shall be no strikes, lockouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising out
of any jurisdictional dispute. Work will continue as originally assigned, pending
resolution of the dispute.” (Doc. 1-3, p. 12). Brock reads the “any jurisdictional dispute”
language of Section 5 to limit the entire Section to jurisdictional issues. 7 (Doc. 1-3, p. 13).
As discussed above, however, the plain meaning of the first sentence creates a
prohibition on certain types of behaviors during a jurisdictional dispute. The second
sentence creates an obligation on the part of the employer to maintain the employment
7
In order to read the contract provision to create only a jurisdictional issue, the Court would have to
interpret the Seventh Circuit’s use of the term “explicitly” in William Charles to mean that any overt
reference to “jurisdiction” in a contract provision would render that entire provision solely jurisdictional
in nature regardless of the intent of the parties. The Court declines to adopt such an interpretation.
Giving William Charles such a reading would be inconsistent with the holding in Hutter that recognizes
parties may raise distinct jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims. Hutter, 862 F.2d at 644.
Page 12 of 20
status quo. Whether one of the parties participated in prohibited activity, and whether
the employer maintained the employment status quo, could both be determined
regardless of the outcome on the jurisdictional issue.
Article I, Section 5 creates several cognizable claims unrelated to jurisdiction,
thus the language cannot be said to be either explicitly or exclusively concerned with
jurisdiction, and therefore William Charles is not controlling.8 As a result, the Court did
not commit a manifest error of law, and Brock’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied
on those grounds.
B. Characterization of the Dispute Between the Parties as Including a
“Lockout” or Wrongful Termination.
Brock’s second argument for reconsideration is that the Court erred by
characterizing the dispute between the parties as involving a “wrongful termination” or
“lockout.” (Doc. 43, p. 2). Brock is correct that the Court framed Laborers’ argument as
being a “two-part wrongful termination (or lockout)” claim. (Doc. 37, p. 13). In
retrospect, the language of the Court’s order could have been clearer. But the purpose of
the Court’s reference was not to identify a particular type of legal claim, but rather to
illustrate that Laborers had two distinct grievances—one against Brock related to the
termination of Laborers and their exclusion from the work site, and the other a
8
At best, Brock’s reading of Article I, Section 5, provide a second alternative interpretation of the parties’
intent. The Supreme Court has been clear, however, that where the contract contains an arbitration
clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability, and any doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 650. Further, this presumption of arbitrability may only be overcome by
‘forceful evidence’ of intent to exclude the claim.” Amoco Oil, 883 F.2d at 587 (quoting Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 585). Here, the Court’s reading of the language of Section 5 as creating a
separate non-jurisdictional grievance resolves the conflict in favor or arbitrability. The alternative reading
of the language urged by Brock also cannot be said to create “forceful evidence” of the intent to limit
Article I, Section 5, to jurisdictional grievances. Therefore, the Court declines to interpret the language as
narrowly as Brock demands.
Page 13 of 20
jurisdictional grievance against Carpenters. The substance of the legal claim is not
relevant, except in so far as it helps the Court determine whether the issues were
arbitrable by the GRS. AT&T Technologies, 475 US at 649-50. As discussed above, if
Laborers raised a grievance distinct from the jurisdictional issue, that non-jurisdictional
claim was arbitrable under Article VI. Because the framing of Laborers’ claim as a
“wrongful termination (or lockout)” did not impact the underlying analysis of
arbitrability, there is no manifest error.
Brock further argues that the Court erred because there was “no lockout as a
matter of law, 9 and any finding to the contrary [was] in error.” (Doc. 43, p. 2). The Court
notes, however, that its Order did not make any finding as to whether or not a lockout
occurred in this case (Doc. 37, pp. 1-17), nor was it authorized to do so, AT&T
Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649-50 (courts are not empowered to weigh the merits of the
underlying claim).
The Court’s Order solely addressed the question of whether the GRS had
authority to arbitrate the dispute and thus characterization of Laborers’ position as
involving a “termination (or lockout)” for purposes of determining that authority was
not a manifest error of law.
9
Brock admits that there is no uniform definition of a “lockout.” (Doc. 43, p. 14). But Brock then goes to
great pains to develop a definition by cobbling together language form Roberts Industrial Dictionary (3rd
Ed.), the 1951 decision of the N.L.R.B. in Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268, 282-83 (1951), and the
Eighth Circuit decision Brady v. National Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 674 (8th Cir. 2011). (Doc. 43, pp. 1718). The Court declines to apply Brock’s creative elements test, as the Court does not need to determine
whether a lockout in fact occurred.
Page 14 of 20
C. Had Laborers’ Raised a “Lockout” Claim, the GRS would have had
Jurisdiction to Arbitrate.
Brock’s final argument is that even if a lockout did occur, the GRS did not have
arbitration authority because lockouts were intended by the parties to be arbitrated
through a different process. (Doc. 43, p. 2). As stated above, the Court did not find that
a lockout occurred, and the GRS decision was based on an improper “change of
assignment,” not a lockout. (Doc. 1-3, p. 3).
But even if the claim involved a “lockout,” the GRS had authority to arbitrate the
grievance. As stated in the March 27 Order (Doc. 37, p. 19), the Court views the
procedures listed in the NMA as creating two different arbitration agreements—the
procedure for jurisdictional disputes under Article I, Sections 6-12, and the procedure
for all other disputes and grievances under Article VI. (Doc. 37, p. 8). Brock now claims
that a third mandatory arbitration clause exists under Article XXII. (Doc. 43, p. 16).
Article XXII, Section 8 states “a party or the NMAPC may institute the following
procedure, in lieu of, or in addition to, any other action at law or equity.” (Doc. 1-3,
p. 23) (emphasis added). The Court reads this language as permissive, not mandatory. If
the grievance had related to a lockout, and one of the parties or the NMAPC had
desired, they could have availed themselves of a different arbitration procedure.
Nothing in this language requires the parties to do so, however, nor does it strip the
GRS of its authority to hear a grievance even if it is premised on the theory of a
“lockout.”
Page 15 of 20
The language of Article VI further supports the Court’s finding that Article XXII
does not create a separate mandatory arbitration process for lockout claims. Article VI
provides the primary method for resolving disputes under the NMA. (Doc. 1-3, p. 15).
Article VI only recognizes exceptions to its terms for claims involving jurisdiction or
general wage rates. (Doc. 1-3, p. 15). The fact that Article VI does not list the lockout
hearing procedures in Article XXII as a mandatory exception to its arbitration terms
indicates the parties intended that section to be optional.
The broad language of Article VI, combined with the plain language of Article
XXII, Section 8, led to the conclusion that even if a lockout was involved in this case, the
GRS still retained jurisdiction to decide that claim under the provisions of Article VI. As
a result, the Court did not commit a manifest error of law because, even if a lockout
claim was raised, the GRS had authority to arbitrate that dispute.
For these reasons, Brock’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 43) is denied.
II.
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42)
Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Spurling v. C &
M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). The
Court found in its March 27 Order that material issues of fact existed as to whether
Laborers were assigned the scaffolding work prior to Brock’s award of that work to
Carpenters. (Doc. 37, pp. 14, 16). As a result, the Court denied both Brock’s Motion to
Vacate and Laborers’ Motion to Enforce. (Doc. 37, p.17). In the Motion for Summary
Judgment, however, Laborers now allege there is no material dispute of fact because
Page 16 of 20
Brock has admitted to laying off Laborers. (Doc. 42, pp. 1- 2). Supporting this
contention, Laborers point to Exhibit H in the original Complaint, containing a letter
from the Assistant General Counsel for Brock to the NMAPC. (Doc. 42, p. 2). That letter
contains three statements directly supporting Laborers’ contention that they were
terminated. First, the letter contains the statement that “Brock admits that laborers
attended a meeting on January 8, 2016 and were informed that they would be laid off on
that date.” (Doc. 1-3, p. 56). The letter further includes an admission that on January 18,
2016, Brock informed Laborers’ Business Manager by phone that “laborers were laid
off.” (Doc. 1-3, p. 56). Finally, in the letter Brock argues that it “exercised its legitimate
management right to layoff Laborers.” (Doc. 1-3, p. 55). Laborers argues that the
language of Exhibit H shows that no material issue of fact exists as to whether Laborers
were employed and subsequently laid off at the January 8, 2016 meeting. (Doc. 42-1, p.
4).
Brock agrees. In its response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Brock admits
that there are “likely no genuine issues of material fact excluding the issue of
damages.”(Doc. 47, p. 1). Further, Brock admits that Exhibit H to the Complaint
contains the statements referenced above regarding layoff of the Laborers. (Doc. 47,
p. 2). As a result, the Court accepts as uncontested fact that Laborers were employed by
Brock to perform scaffolding work prior to January 8, 2016, when they were laid off by
Brock. Since no material issues of fact exist, the Court turns to whether Laborers are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Page 17 of 20
The question for the Court is whether, as a matter of law, the arbitrator’s award
is enforceable. An arbitrator’s award must stand unless a reviewing court finds the
parties did not agree to arbitrate the subject of the claim, AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at
648, or the award does not to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement,
Alberici-Eby, 992 F.2d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1993). So long as the arbitrator’s interpretation
can in some rational manner be derived from the agreement, the decision will stand.
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Miscellaneous Warehousemen’s Union, Local 781, 629 F.2d 1204, 1215
(7th Cir. 1980).
Here, the parties agreed to arbitrate this dispute under Article VI of the NMA.
Article VI provides the general process for arbitration under the NMA. (Doc. 1-3, p. 15).
The only exceptions to that process exist for “jurisdictional disputes and those involving
general wage rates.” (Doc. 1-3, p. 15). As fully discussed above in the Court’s analysis of
the Motion for Reconsideration, the terms of Article I, Section 5, are such that an
arbitrator could sustain a grievance regarding the behavior of the parties, without
coming to any determination about which union was ultimately entitled to the
underlying work. As a result, claims under Article I, Section 5, do not automatically
relate to jurisdiction. Because the Court finds the improper termination claim here does
not relate to either jurisdiction or general wage rates, the GRS had authority to resolve
the grievance under Article VI of the NMA.
The award by the arbitrator also is enforceable because it drew its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement. As long as the arbitrator’s decision concerns
construction of the contract, courts may not overrule the arbitrator just because their
Page 18 of 20
interpretation is different. United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 599. The reviewing court must
not replace the arbitrator’s interpretation with its own even if the arbitrator’s
interpretation is plainly wrong. Alberici, 992 F.2d at 733.
Here, the GRS sustained the grievance based on its finding that Brock violated
Article I, Section 5, because of a change of assignment. (Doc. 1-3, p. 3). Although Section
5 does not specifically contain the language “change of assignment,” the Seventh Circuit
has held that arbitrators are not required to read contract provisions literally. Ethyl Corp.
v. United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 7441, 768 F.2d 180, 186 (7th Cir. 1985). Rather,
because contracts have both express and implied terms, the arbitrator has authority to
interpret the contract as including implied terms so long as those terms can be
rationally derived from some plausible theory of the general framework or intent of the
agreement. Id. at 186.
Here, the GRS decision finding a violation of Article I, Section 5, due to a
“change of assignment” is rationally derived from a plausible theory of the framework
or intent of the agreement. Section 5 contains a listing of different behaviors parties are
expected to refrain from during a jurisdictional dispute. (Doc. 1-3, p. 12). The arbitrator
was not required to read this list literally or exhaustively, but rather could reasonably
interpret the list as representational of the types of behaviors that are proscribed by the
NMA. Exclusion of employees from the work site is clearly intended by the parties to be
prohibited behavior—as evidenced by the “lockout” language listed in Article I, Section
5. The arbitrator could reasonably determine that a “change of assignment” that
similarly excluded Laborers from the work site was an implied term of the agreement.
Page 19 of 20
Therefore, the GRS’s interpretation of Article I, Section 5, to apply to a “change of
assignment” was rationally derived from a plausible theory of the framework or intent
of the agreement.
Because the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute under the NMA, and the
arbitrator’s decision drew its essence from the agreement, the award is enforceable as a
matter of law. Therefore, the Court grants Laborers’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Brock
(Doc. 43) is DENIED. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Laborers (Doc. 42) is
GRANTED; the Court finds the April 14, 2016 decision by the GRS (Doc. 1-3, pp. 2-3)
enforceable.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Laborers
International Union and against Plaintiff Brock Industries, in accordance with this
Memorandum and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 5, 2017
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
Page 20 of 20
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?