Jenkins et al v. Burkey et al

Filing 109

ORDER, The Court DENIES Jenkins' motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b) (Doc. 94). The Court further DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to send this order to the Court of Appeals for its consideration in connection with Appeal No. 18-2222. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 7/16/2018. (jdh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SCOTT JENKINS and RHONDA
STEPHANIE ALEXANDROPOULOS,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 16-cv-792-JPG-SCW
v.
BRUCE BURKEY, TAYLOR LAW FIRM
PC, JOICE BASS, JENNIFER HOSTETLER
and LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER LLP,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the motion to reconsider filed by plaintiff Scott
Jenkins, which the Court construes as a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b) (Doc. 94). Jenkins asks the Court to reconsider its May 2, 2018, order
(Doc. 92) granting summary judgment for defendants Bruce Burkey and Taylor Law Offices, PC
(collectively, the “Illinois defendants”) on the claims that remained against them and its June 14,
2017, order (Doc. 51) dismissing all claims in this case against defendants Jennifer Hostetler,
Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, and Joice Bass (collectively, the “Nevada defendants”) for
lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court entered final judgment on May 2, 2018 (Doc. 93). The
Illinois defendants (Doc. 104) and the Nevada defendants (Doc. 105) have responded to Jenkins’
Rule 60(b) motion, and Jenkins has replied to those responses (Docs. 106 & 107).
It is well settled that Rule 60(b) relief is an extraordinary remedy and is granted only in
exceptional circumstances. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 535 (2005); McCormick v. City
of Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Dickerson v. Board of Educ., 32 F.3d 1114,
1116 (7th Cir. 1994)). Rule 60(b) allows a court “to address mistakes attributable to special

circumstances and not merely to erroneous applications of law.” Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of
Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995). The rule authorizes a Court to grant relief
from judgment for the specific reasons listed in the rule but does not authorize action in response
to general pleas for relief. See Young v. Murphy, 161 F.R.D. 61, 62 (N.D. Ill. 1995). It is also
not an appropriate vehicle for addressing simple legal error, for rehashing old arguments, or for
presenting arguments that should have been raised before the court made its decision. Russell,
51 F.3d at 749; Rutledge v. United States, 230 F.3d 1041, 1052 (7th Cir. 2000); Young, 161
F.R.D. at 62; In re Oil Spill by “Amoco Cadiz,” 794 F. Supp. 261, 267 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff’d, 4
F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 1993) (Table). Rather, it is a collateral attack on a judgment, and the grounds
for that attack must be something other than an argument that could be used to obtain reversal on
direct appeal. Kiswani v. Phoenix Sec. Agency, Inc., 584 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2009).
Illinois Defendants
As for the Illinois defendants, Jenkins takes issue with the Court’s finding that the release
in a May 2015 amendment to a September 2014 settlement agreement settling prior related
litigation released all of Jenkins’ claims against Burkey. Jenkins notes that the original
September 2014 settlement agreement released only attorneys of record in the settled case
(which did not include Burkey) and denies that the May 2015 amendment broadened the scope
of the release despite its plain language to that effect. He claims the Court’s “patent
misunderstanding of the facts” justifies Rule 60(b) relief. In support of this argument, he restates
the position he took on summary judgment, this time citing additional evidence that was
available to him, but which he did not cite, at that time. Jenkins also repeats the argument from
his summary judgment brief that the May 2015 amendment is void because the amendment,

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prompted by a dispute over the sale of property in Illinois, was not drafted by an attorney
licensed to practice in Illinois.
Jenkins has not pointed to any mistake attributable to special circumstances, only to his
belief that the Court erred in its interpretation and application of the release in the May 2015
amendment. He calls this a “misunderstanding of the facts” by the Court, but in reality, it is
simply a disagreement about what the facts in evidence show. And in his attempt to convince the
Court to change its mind about what the evidence shows, he does nothing more than assert legal
error that can be argued on appeal or rehash arguments he already made unsuccessfully using
evidence he could have and should have cited the first time around. Nothing he says now,
however, amounts to the kind of exceptional circumstances justifying the extraordinary relief of
vacating the judgment.
Nevada Defendants
As for the Nevada defendants, Jenkins asserts that they breached the confidentiality
agreement in the September 2014 settlement agreement by using that agreement to question
Jenkins in his June 8, 2017, deposition in this case. They did so in an effort to show that the
release in the settlement agreement provided them a defense in this case. Jenkins claims that
such conduct gives the Court personal jurisdiction over the Nevada defendants because their
conduct occurred in Illinois, where the deposition was conducted.
Again, Jenkins raises no exceptional circumstances warranting Rule 60(b) relief. The
conduct to which he points—the June 8, 2017, disclosure of a confidential settlement agreement
in an effort to enforce in this litigation the rights contained in that agreement—is irrelevant to
whether the Court had personal jurisdiction over the Nevada defendants for the claims asserted in
this lawsuit nearly a year before the deposition occurred. Additionally, Jenkins could have raised

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that conduct in his June 26, 2017, motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order of dismissal
(Doc. 54), but he failed to do so. Other than that, Jenkins has pointed to nothing more than his
belief that the Court erred in its personal jurisdiction ruling, a matter than can be adequately
addressed on direct appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Jenkins’ motion to vacate the judgment
under Rule 60(b) (Doc. 94). The Court further DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to send this order
to the Court of Appeals for its consideration in connection with Appeal No. 18-2222.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 16, 2018
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

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