Jenkins et al v. Burkey et al

Filing 51

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, The Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss filed by those defendants (Docs. 15, 36 & 39); DISMISSES defendants Bass, Hostetler and LRRC from this case without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction; and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly at the close of the case. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 6/14/2017. (jdh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SCOTT JENKINS and RHONDA
STEPHANIE ALEXANDROPOULOS,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 16-cv-792-JPG-SCW
v.
BRUCE BURKEY, TAYLOR LAW FIRM
PC, JOICE BASS, JENNIFER HOSTETLER
and LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER LLP,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on three motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction filed by defendants Jennifer Hostetler (Doc. 15), Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP (n/k/a
Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP; “LRRC”) (Doc. 36); and Joice Bass (Doc. 39). LRRC
also seeks dismissal for insufficient service of process. Plaintiff Scott Jenkins has responded to
the motions (Docs. 32, 46 & 47). Plaintiff Rhonda Alexandropoulos has not responded to the
motions, so under Local Rule 7.1(c) the Court finds she has admitted they have merit.
Jenkins originally filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, which described this litigation as follows:
This litigation arises from a prior lawsuit plaintiff Jenkins filed against his
daughters in Nevada to regain control of a family-owned company in Nevada (the
“Nevada Lawsuit”). In that lawsuit, Jenkins’ daughters retained defendants Bass
and Hostetler of the Nevada law firm Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP as
their attorneys. In addition, plaintiff Jenkins’ daughters retained defendant
Burkey of the Taylor Law Firm, P.C. in Illinois.
***
Plaintiffs have now brought a variety of claims against the named
attorneys and law firms, which all relate to the defendants’ work representing
their clients opposite plaintiff Jenkins in the Nevada Lawsuit. These claims
include intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, intentional interference with a prospective economic

advantage, defamation, negligent supervision, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs
have also alleged that defendants committed fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation,
conspiracy, theft, the unauthorized practice of law, illegal possession of personal
credit file information, violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practice Act, blackmail, extortion, coercion, mail fraud, and sending
threatening communications by mail. Plaintiffs also allege that defendants Bass
and Hostetler illegally filed or threatened to file lis pendens in Illinois and
Missouri.
The Eastern District of Missouri court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. Jenkins and Alexandropoulos have filed a very similar suit in this Court. Bass,
Hostetler and LRRC now ask the Court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against them because
they lack sufficient contacts with the state of Illinois to be brought into court here. LRRC also
complains that it was not served properly.
I.

Personal Jurisdiction
When personal jurisdiction is challenged under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2),

the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Purdue
Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). If there are
material facts in dispute regarding the Court’s jurisdiction over a defendant, the Court must hold
an evidentiary hearing at which the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. (citing Hyatt Int’l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Alternatively, the Court may decide the motion to dismiss without a hearing based on the
submitted written materials so long as it resolves all factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor.
Purdue Research, 338 F.3d at 782 (citing RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1276
(7th Cir. 1997)). If the Court consults only the written materials, the plaintiff need only make a
prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Purdue Research, 338 F.3d at 782 (citing Hyatt,
302 F.3d at 713). In this case, the Court consults only the written materials to determine whether
Jenkins has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.
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A federal court sitting in diversity looks to the personal jurisdiction law of the state in
which the court sits to determine if it has jurisdiction. Hyatt, 302 F.3d at 713(citing Dehmlow v.
Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 945 (7th Cir. 1992)). Thus, this Court applies Illinois law.
Under Illinois law, a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant if an Illinois statute grants
personal jurisdiction and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction is permissible under the Illinois
and United States constitutions. RAR, 107 F.3d at 1276; Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman), Ltd.,
916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990).
1.

Illinois Statutory Law

Under Illinois law, the long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction over a party to the
extent allowed under the due process provisions of the Illinois and United States constitutions.
735 ILCS 5/2-209(c); Hyatt Int’l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 714 (7th Cir. 2002); Central
States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 940 (7th
Cir. 2000). Therefore, whether the Court has jurisdiction over a defendant depends on whether
such jurisdiction is permitted by federal and state constitutional standards.
2.

Illinois Constitutional Law

The Illinois Constitution’s due process guarantee, Ill. Const. art. I, § 2, permits the
assertion of personal jurisdiction “when it is fair, just, and reasonable to require a nonresident
defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of the defendant’s
acts which occur in Illinois or which affect interests located in Illinois.” Rollins v. Ellwood, 565
N.E.2d 1302, 1316 (Ill. 1990). When interpreting these principles, a court may look to the
construction and application of the federal due process clause. Id. In fact, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has suggested that there is no operative difference between Illinois and federal
due process limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Hyatt Int’l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d

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707, 715 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir.
1997)). The Court sees nothing in this case indicating that in the situation presented the federal
and state standards should reach a different result. Therefore, if the contacts between the
defendants and Illinois are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of federal due process, then the
requirements of both the Illinois long-arm statute and the Illinois Constitution have also been
met, and no other inquiry is necessary.
3.

Federal Constitutional Law

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits when a state may assert
personal jurisdiction over nonresident individuals and corporations. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 733 ), overruled on other grounds by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Under
federal due process standards, a court can have personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if the
defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)). The defendant must have “purposely established minimum contacts with the forum
state such that he or she ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court’ there.” Tamburo v.
Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 474 (1985)).
What this standard means in a particular case depends on whether the plaintiff asserts
“general” or “specific” jurisdiction. Specific, or case-linked, jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction
over a defendant in a suit arising out of or in connection with the defendant’s purposeful contacts
with the forum. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923-24
(2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn. 8, 9 (1984).

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General, or all-purpose, jurisdiction, on the other hand, may exist even in suits that do not arise
out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts so long as the defendant has “continuous and
systematic” contacts with the forum state. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924; Helicopteros Nacionales,
466 U.S. at 416. No party in this case seriously contends the Court has general jurisdiction over
Bass, Hostetler or LRRC; the issue is whether specific jurisdiction exists.
The specific jurisdiction inquiry “focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (internal quotations
omitted). First, there must be “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); accord Goodyear, 564
U.S. at 924. Second, the lawsuit must arise out of or be related to the defendant’s contact with
the forum. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923-24; Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414 n. 8.
In a case like this asserting a defendant committed an intentional tort, the constitutional
requirements supporting specific jurisdiction are satisfied “only when the defendant expressly
aims its actions at the state with the knowledge that they would cause harm to the plaintiff there.”
Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Houston Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d
440, 445 (7th Cir. 2010). The defendant must have known that the effects would be felt by the
plaintiff in the forum state. Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2010). “‘[E]xpress
aiming’ remains the crucial requirement when a plaintiff seeks to establish personal jurisdiction”
over a defendant accused of an intentional tort. Mobile Anesthesiologists, 623 F.3d at 445-46.
This requirement “ensure[s] that an out-of-state defendant is not bound to appear to account for
merely random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts with the forum state.” Tamburo, 601 F.3d at
702 (internal quotations omitted).

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For example, in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984), the Supreme Court held
that a California court had personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants because they “wrote
and . . . edited an article that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon [the
plaintiff]. And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State
[of California] in which she lives and works and in which the [publication containing the article]
has its largest circulation.” Similarly, in Tamburo, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that a federal court in Illinois had personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants under
Calder’s test because “although they acted from points outside the forum state, these defendants
specifically aimed their tortious conduct at [the plaintiff] and his business in Illinois with the
knowledge that he lived, worked, and would suffer the ‘brunt of the injury’ there.” Tamburo,
601 F.3d at 706.
To determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice, the Court should also consider “the burden on the defendant, the
forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (internal quotations omitted).
II.

Analysis
1.

Bass

Bass asks the Court to dismiss her from this case because she is not subject to the
personal jurisdiction of the Court. Jenkins argues that Bass’s conduct in the Nevada Lawsuit
related to Illinois subjects her to specific jurisdiction in Illinois for a case about that conduct.
The Court first turns to the allegations against Bass in Jenkins’ Second Amended

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Complaint. He claims that Bass, who was representing Jenkins’ daughters in the Nevada
Lawsuit, wrote threatening letters and emails to Jenkins’ Nevada attorney in the Nevada
Lawsuit.1 Jenkins alleges Bass or Hostetler threatened to file notices of lis pendens – notices of a
pending lawsuit – on all real estate owned by CSRESL, LLC and did, in fact, file such notices on
two Illinois properties owned by CSRESL in the counties in which the properties were located.
Jenkins alleges the filings kept him from doing his job as manager of CSRESL and borrowing
money to fund its operations. He also alleges that Bass’s conduct caused him emotional distress
and the loss of the love and contact of his two daughters and one grandchild. Jenkins has sued
Bass for:


“The crimes of Blackmail, Extortion, Coercion and Defamation” for accusing Jenkins of
conducting criminal activities (forging and filing documents with a court; identity theft
by forging signatures) without any proof of those crimes and stating that the daughters
will be looking into pursuing other remedies through governmental agencies such as the
Missouri Attorney General, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Internal
Revenue Service (Count XI);



intentional infliction of emotional distress for disturbing Jenkins’ relationship with his
daughters (Count XII);



negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count XIII);



unauthorized practice of law for filing notices of lis pendens in Illinois and Missouri
without being licensed to practice law in Illinois (Count XIV); and



“The crime of Mail Fraud” for mailing documents described in the Second Amended
Complaint (Count XV).
In her motion (Doc. 39), Bass points out that she is a Nevada attorney who worked for

LRRC in Nevada at all times and in all conduct relevant to this lawsuit. LRRC is headquartered
in Arizona and has no offices or members in Illinois. Bass has presented affidavit testimony of
her lack of connections with Illinois. Specifically, she resides in Nevada and has never resided
The letters are attached to the pleading and do not actually make the threats that Jenkins claims
they do.
1

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in Illinois. She has never traveled in Illinois for any appreciable length of time. She has never
consented to being sued in Illinois. She has never personally transacted any business in Illinois.
She has never entered into or performed any contract in Illinois. She has never knowingly
committed any tort in Illinois or otherwise caused any act to be done, or consequences to occur,
in Illinois. She has never owned, used or possessed any real or tangible personal property in
Illinois. She has never contracted to insure any person, risk or property situated in Illinois. She
has never obtained any professional license in Illinois.
She explains that her sole connection with the state of Illinois stemmed from her
representation of Jenkins’ daughters Rebecca Frausto and Christina Jenkins, both of whom are
Illinois citizens, in the Nevada Lawsuit. In that suit, Jenkins, a Missouri citizen, sued his
daughters in Nevada over the ownership of CSRESL, a Nevada company, which owned property
in Illinois. Represented by Bass and her colleague Hostetler, the daughters countersued Jenkins
and CSRESL. Bass signed lis pendens notices for CSRESL’s Illinois properties (Doc. 32-1 at 47). The agreement settling the Nevada Lawsuit mentions the Illinois properties.
In response to Bass’s motion (Doc. 46), Jenkins argues that the filing of the lis pendens
notices in Illinois is sufficient to support specific personal jurisdiction over Bass in the case at
bar. He claims he was damaged by the filings because they prevented him, as manager of
CSRESL, from taking out mortgages on the properties to obtain funds to manage that real estate.
Jenkins also claims somewhat cryptically that Bass used the Illinois real estate “as a ransom in a
blackmail scheme.” Pl.’s Resp. at 3 (Doc. 46).
Viewing all disputes of fact in Jenkins’ favor, the Court finds Jenkins has not made a
prima facie showing that Bass expressly aimed her actions at the state of Illinois knowing they
would cause harm to Jenkins there. The vast majority of Bass’s conduct about which Jenkins

8

complains had nothing to do with Illinois. The communications between Bass and Jenkins’
Nevada attorney that offends Jenkins were sent and received in Nevada and concerned the
Nevada Lawsuit about control of a Nevada company. To the extent these communications
caused Jenkins harm, he suffered that harm in Missouri, where he was at all relevant times a
citizen.
Perhaps the strongest connection to Illinois is that Bass signed the notices of lis pendens
and filed them in Illinois. However, any harm caused by the alleged wrongful or unauthorized
filing of such notices would be suffered only by CSRESL, the owner of the Illinois property, not
Jenkins, who purports only to be the manager of CSRESL.
In sum, Bass’s purposeful connections with Illinois are extremely attenuated: she
accepted representation of Illinois clients in litigation about a non-Illinois company that
happened to own two pieces of property in Illinois, and she prepared and filed notices that the
litigation might affect the title to or possession of those properties. Simply agreeing to represent
clients about control of a corporate entity that happens to own Illinois property, and then giving
notice that litigation may have an impact on that property, does not indicate Bass was
purposefully availing herself of the benefits and protections of Illinois law such that she should
reasonably expect to be brought into court by Jenkins in this lawsuit. Bass’s relationship with
Illinois in the context of this litigation is simply too attenuated to support specific personal
jurisdiction.
The Court further finds that Illinois has minimal interest in adjudicating this dispute
between citizens of Missouri and Nevada over conduct nearly exclusively occurring in Nevada
and only tangentially involving Illinois property owned by a Nevada company. It would be a
substantial burden on Bass, who resides in Nevada and has no substantial connection to Illinois,

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to litigate in this forum, while Jenkins has already expressed a willingness and ability to litigate a
case in Nevada – the Nevada Lawsuit. Furthermore, a Nevada court would presumably be more
familiar with the Nevada Lawsuit from which this case stems as well as Nevada law, which
would apply to many of the asserted causes of action. Proceeding on this case in Illinois risks
unnecessarily expending judicial resources where another court is better suited to decide the
relevant issues and would provide an adequate forum for Jenkins to obtain any relief to which he
is entitled.
For all of these reasons, the Court will dismiss Bass from this case for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
2.

Hostetler

The Court turns to Jenkins’ allegations against Hostetler. He alleges that Hostetler wrote
threatening letters and emails to Jenkins’ Nevada attorney in the Nevada Lawsuit, although the
letters attached to the pleading reveal they were actually from Bass, not Hostetler.2 Jenkins
alleges Hostetler also threatened to file notices of lis pendens on all CSRESL’s real property and
did so on the two Illinois properties, which kept him from properly managing CSRESL. He also
alleges that Hostetler breached the confidential settlement agreement that resolved the Nevada
Lawsuit when she made public filings in an attempt to reopen the case and to further harm
Jenkins by protracting the litigation. He complains that because the settlement agreement
involved Illinois legal issues, Hostetler, who is not licensed to practice in Illinois, was not
qualified to advise her clients on those matters and should not have attempted to bring those
matters before the Nevada court. He also alleges that Hostetler’s conduct caused him emotional

2

“Where an exhibit and the complaint conflict, the exhibit typically controls.” Forrest v.
Universal Sav. Bank, F.A., 507 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2007).
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distress and the loss of the love and contact of his two daughters and one grandchild. Jenkins has
sued Hostetler for:


“The crimes of Blackmail, Extortion, Coercion and Defamation” for accusing Jenkins of
not participating in good faith in mediation of the Nevada Lawsuit and threatening to
instigate litigation using improper filings (Count XVI);



intentional infliction of emotional distress for sending threatening letters and for
disturbing Jenkins’ relationship with his daughters (Count XVII);



negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count XVIII);



unauthorized practice of law for attempting to litigate Illinois legal matters without an
Illinois law license and filing notices of lis pendens in Illinois and Missouri without
being licensed to practice law in Illinois (Count XIX);



breach of contract for disclosing confidential matters within the settlement agreement
and attempting to reopen the settled Nevada Lawsuit (Count XX); and



“The crime of Mail Fraud” for mailing documents described in the Second Amended
Complaint (Count XXI).
In her motion to dismiss (Doc. 15), Hostetler states that, like Bass, she is a Nevada

attorney who also worked for LRRC at all relevant times and who, along with Bass, represented
Jenkins’ two daughters in the Nevada Lawsuit. Hostetler has presented affidavit testimony of
her lack of connections with Illinois, which is identical in all material respects to Bass’s
affidavit. Like Bass, Hostetler’s sole connection with Illinois is the representation of Jenkins’s
daughters in the Nevada Lawsuit. The only difference in the connections is that Hostetler did not
sign the notices of lis pendens filed on CSRESL’s Illinois properties, although her name appears
as an attorney for the daughters on the document below Bass’s signature.
In his response to Hostetler’s motion (Docs. 32 & 46), Jenkins asserts several other
connections between Hostetler and Illinois, although he presents no evidence in support of those
assertions. He speculates that Hostetler performed research in Illinois to find an accurate
property description of CSRESL’s Illinois property and asserts that she used mail or email to file
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the lis pendens notices in Illinois. He also claims without factual details that Hostetler used the
Illinois real estate “as a ransom in a blackmail scheme.” Pl.’s Resp. at 3 (Doc. 46). Jenkins
notes that Hostetler used email to forward to him the notices of lis pendens and to communicate
with him and Alexandropoulos while they were at an Illinois residence. He claims that Hostetler
asked Jenkins, a resident of Illinois at the time, to file releases of the lis pendens notices for the
Illinois properties because she did not have time to do so, thus making him her Illinois agent.
Finally, Jenkins alleges Hostetler was responsible for arranging for his daughters to be deposed
in Illinois in connection with the Nevada Litigation, although the transcript excerpt he cites does
not reflect that Hostetler was present either in person or by teleconference at the deposition.
Jenkins believes this is sufficient to support specific personal jurisdiction over Hostetler in this
lawsuit.
Viewing all factual disputes in Hostetler’s favor, the Court finds Jenkins has not shown
that Hostetler expressly aimed her actions at the state of Illinois knowing they would cause harm
to Jenkins there. As with Bass, the vast majority of Hostetler’s conduct about which Jenkins
complains had nothing to do with Illinois and everything to do with her Nevada conduct in
connection with the Nevada Lawsuit and its settlement. To the extent these actions caused
Jenkins harm, he suffered that harm in Missouri.
The strongest connection Hostetler has with Illinois is through the lis pendens notices and
the Nevada Lawsuit settlement agreement that mentions CSRESL’s Illinois property. Although
Hostetler did not sign the lis pendens notices, Jenkins claims she and Bass were responsible for
filing them in Illinois. However, as noted in the Court’s discussion of Bass, any harm caused by
the alleged wrongful or unauthorized filing of such notices would be suffered only by CSRESL,
the owner of the Illinois property, not Jenkins, who purports only to be the manager of the

12

company.
As for the other so-called Illinois connections, Jenkins provides only speculation, not
evidence, that Hostetler performed legal research in Illinois regarding property descriptions for
CSRESL’s Illinois property. Such information is available from numerous sources, likely
including CSRESL, that are not in Illinois. Similarly, communication with Jenkins via email
while he was in Illinois is a weak connection because it depends on the fortuitous physical
location of the recipient when he opens the email. As for Jenkins’ assertion that he became
Hostetler’s Illinois agent by agreeing to file documents in Illinois County Clerks’ offices that she
was too busy to file, that contention is absurd in light of the fact that he was a litigation adversary
at the time. Finally, participation in the arrangement of two depositions in Illinois in connection
with the Nevada Lawsuit is not sufficiently connected to the alleged wrongs in this case, which
have nothing to do with the depositions. See, e.g., Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391 (7th Cir.
1985) (under Indiana law, finding no personal jurisdiction over defendant lawyer who came to
forum state to take one deposition where controversy did not arise from that deposition).
In sum, Hostetler’s purposeful connections with Illinois are extremely attenuated. Like
Bass, she accepted representation of Illinois clients in litigation about a company that happened
to own two pieces of property in Illinois, she filed notices that the litigation might affect the title
to or possession of those properties, and she participated in negotiating a settlement that covered
those properties in some fashion. Simply agreeing to represent clients about a corporate entity
that owns Illinois property, giving notice of the potential impact of the litigation on the property,
and including the property in a settlement negotiation and agreement does not indicate Hostetler
was purposefully availing herself of the benefits and protections of Illinois law such that she
should reasonably expect to be brought into court by Jenkins in this lawsuit. Hostetler’s

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relationship with Illinois in the context of this litigation is simply too attenuated to support
specific personal jurisdiction.
The Court further finds for the reasons discussed in connection with Bass that Illinois
does not have a significant interest in litigating this lawsuit against Hostetler where another
forum can provide an efficient, convenient and adequate remedy to the current dispute between
Jenkins and Hostetler.
For all of these reasons, the Court will dismiss Hostetler from this case for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
3.

LRRC

Jenkins’ Second Amended Complaint asserts a cause of action labeled “Negligent
Supervision” against LRRC for negligent failure to supervise Bass and Hostetler in connection
with the Nevada Lawsuit, but within that count it appears to also seek to hold LRRC liable for
Bass’s and Hostetler’s actions under an agency theory (Count XXII). As noted above and as
pled by Jenkins in the Second Amended Complaint, LRRC is a citizen of several states but not of
Illinois, it has no office or contact in Illinois, and it does not advertise its legal services in
Illinois.
In its motion to dismiss (Doc. 36), LRRC argues as one reason for dismissal that the
Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it. It argues that its only connections to Illinois
relating to this lawsuit are the connections of Hostetler, which are insufficient to support specific
personal jurisdiction (Bass had not yet been served with process or filed her motion to dismiss at
the time LRRC filed its motion). It has submitted an affidavit from its general counsel stating
that it has never maintained an office, facility, mailing address or telephone listing anywhere in
Illinois, has no subsidiaries or affiliates in Illinois, has no agent for service of process in Illinois,

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and is not incorporated in Illinois. It has never consented to be sued in Illinois, holds no
registrations or licenses in Illinois, has no agents conducting business in Illinois, has not
contracted to insure any person, risk or property situated in Illinois. The affiant is not aware of
any allegation that LRRC committed any tort in Illinois or otherwise caused any tortious act to
be done, or consequences to occur, in Illinois.
In response (Doc. 47), Jenkins notes that Hostetler and Bass were agents of LRRC and
used its forms and letterhead. He suggests their contacts with Illinois should be imputed to
LRRC for personal jurisdiction purposes.
LRRC’s contacts with Illinois related to this lawsuit are the same as – and no stronger
than – those of Bass and Hostetler, which, as discussed above, are insufficient to support
personal jurisdiction. Even in combination, those contacts do not amount to sufficient contacts
to satisfy due process for the purposes of exercising personal jurisdiction over LRRC. LRRC has
done nothing but represent two Illinois citizens in a Nevada dispute over the ownership and
control of a Nevada company that happened to own two pieces of property in Illinois that could
have been affected by the litigation. This does not demonstrate purposeful availment of the
privilege of conducting activities in Illinois and the benefits and protections of Illinois’ laws such
that LRRC should reasonably anticipate being haled into court here. It is therefore insufficient to
support personal jurisdiction over LRRC. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss LRRC for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
In light of this disposition of the personal jurisdiction issue, the Court need not address
the question of the sufficiency of service of process on LRRC.
III.

Conclusion
Because Jenkins has not carried his burden of making a prima facie showing of personal

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jurisdiction over Bass, Hostetler and LRRC, the Court:


GRANTS the motions to dismiss filed by those defendants (Docs. 15, 36 & 39);



DISMISSES defendants Bass, Hostetler and LRRC from this case without prejudice for
lack of personal jurisdiction; and



DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly at the close of the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 14, 2017
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

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