Collier v. Godines et al

Filing 7

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 11/9/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
GREGORY COLLIER, # M-31061,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALVADOR GODINES,
S. FURLOW,
and T.A. SPILLER,
Defendants.

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Case No. 16-cv-807-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Robinson Correctional Center (“Robinson”), has
brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His claims arose while he
was incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”).

He seeks

compensation for having been wrongfully confined in disciplinary segregation on a misconduct
charge that has since been expunged. The Complaint is now before the Court for a preliminary
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the
Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers

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to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000).
An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters,
631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible
that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of
the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time,
however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Arnett v.
Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Applying these standards, the Court finds that some of Plaintiff’s claims survive
threshold review under § 1915A.

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The Complaint
According to Plaintiff, he was on the yard at Pinckneyville 1 when a fight began (Doc. 1,
p. 5). Later on, after Plaintiff had returned to his cell, he was “picked up” by Internal Affairs and
charged with disciplinary infractions connected to the fight.

Despite the lack of evidence

connecting Plaintiff to the incident, he was found guilty by the disciplinary committee and
punished with one year in segregation as well as the revocation of one year of good conduct
credits. The Director later reduced the loss of good time credits to three months (Doc. 1, pp. 5,
9).
Plaintiff spent the entire year in segregation as originally ordered, but pursued his
grievance over the disciplinary action. Ultimately, on August 1, 2014, the ticket was expunged
by the Administrative Review Board, which found the charges to be unsubstantiated (Doc. 1, pp.
5, 11). Plaintiff’s lost good conduct credits were fully restored (Doc. 1, pp. 5, 12). However,
Plaintiff claims that due to the “unjust atrocities” he suffered during his segregation time, he is
under a doctor’s care for “mental imbalances” (Doc. 1, p. 5). He requests unspecified monetary
compensation (Doc. 1, p. 6).
According to the Complaint, Defendant Furlow was the officer who wrote Plaintiff’s
disciplinary ticket and Defendant Spiller signed off on the ticket charging Plaintiff with the
offenses (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 8). Defendant Godines is sued because he was the Director of the
Illinois Department of Corrections at the time (Doc. 1, p. 1).
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
1

Plaintiff’s brief statement of claim does not specify the location of the events that gave rise to his claim.
However, his attached exhibits disclose that the disciplinary ticket was issued to him at Pinckneyville in
September 2013.
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future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit. Any other claim that
is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants Godines, Furlow,
and Spiller, for depriving Plaintiff of a liberty interest without due process by
confining him in punitive segregation for one year based on an unsubstantiated
disciplinary charge;
Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Godines, Furlow, and
Spiller, for subjecting Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment by wrongfully
confining him in disciplinary segregation for one year.
Count 1 shall proceed for further consideration in this action. Count 2 shall be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count 1 – Deprivation of a Liberty Interest Without Due Process
Because Plaintiff’s “conviction” for the 2013 prison disciplinary infraction was
expunged, and his lost good time restored, the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487
(1994), does not present a bar to him seeking damages in a civil rights action. See Moore v.
Mahone, 652 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2011) (the ruling in a prison disciplinary proceeding is a
conviction for the purposes of Heck analysis). Plaintiff claims that he was required to spend a
year in punitive segregation before the charge was expunged. The decision that his disciplinary
charge was “unsubstantiated” came too late to release him from any part of that punishment.
Under certain limited circumstances, an inmate punished with segregation may be able to
pursue a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of law. See Marion v.
Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff does not mention any
denial of procedural due process in the conduct of his disciplinary hearing.

See Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974) (to satisfy due process concerns, inmate must be given
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advance written notice of the charge, the right to appear before the hearing panel, the right to call
witnesses if prison safety allows, and a written statement of the reasons for the discipline
imposed). Rather, he focuses on the lack of evidence against him, which ultimately led to the
charge being expunged. See Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994) (disciplinary
decision must be supported by “some evidence”); see also Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941
(7th Cir. 2007) (“once the meager threshold has been crossed our inquiry ends” . . . reviewing
court need only consider prisoner’s exculpatory evidence to the extent that it undermines the
reliability of the evidence relied upon to find him guilty). The decision in August 2014 to
expunge the September 2013 disciplinary infraction and the one year of segregation indicates
that Plaintiff eventually received due process – but not swiftly enough to relieve him from
serving the full segregation term. The lack of evidentiary support to sustain the disciplinary
charges against Plaintiff suggests a possible due process deprivation in the first instance when
the charges were originally brought and adjudicated.
However, based on the factual information in the Complaint, it is not clear whether
Plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty interest. The length of a segregation term is only
one factor in the due process analysis. The other factor is the conditions under which the inmate
was confined in segregation.
An inmate has a due process liberty interest in being in the general prison population only
if the conditions of his or her disciplinary confinement impose “atypical and significant
hardship[s] . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 484 (1995); see also Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997) (in light of
Sandin, “the right to litigate disciplinary confinements has become vanishingly small”). For
prisoners whose punishment includes being put in disciplinary segregation, under Sandin, “the

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key comparison is between disciplinary segregation and nondisciplinary segregation rather than
between disciplinary segregation and the general prison population.” Wagner, 128 F.3d at 1175.
The Seventh Circuit has articulated two elements for determining whether disciplinary
segregation conditions impose atypical and significant hardships: “the combined import of the
duration of the segregative confinement and the conditions endured by the prisoner during that
period.” Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in
original). The first prong of this two-part analysis focuses solely on the duration of disciplinary
segregation.

For relatively short periods of disciplinary segregation, inquiry into specific

conditions of confinement is unnecessary. See Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 2005)
(56 days); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 1997) (70 days) (“a relatively short
period when one considers his 12 year prison sentence”). In these cases, the short duration of the
disciplinary segregation forecloses any due process liberty interest regardless of the conditions.
See Marion, 559 F.3d at 698 (“we have affirmed dismissal without requiring a factual inquiry
into the conditions of confinement”).
In Plaintiff’s case, the one-year term of his punitive segregation is sufficiently long to
trigger due process concerns. Thus, a factual inquiry into the conditions of his segregation is
warranted. See Marion, 559 F.3d at 697-98. Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, provides no factual
information regarding those conditions. He states only that he was subjected to “atrocities,” and
points to the overall injustice of being made to serve a year of segregation without any
justification for that punishment. Therefore, in order to develop the facts relevant to this claim,
Count 1 shall proceed for further consideration against two of the defendants. Defendants
Furlow and Spiller, who brought the disciplinary charges against Plaintiff despite the lack of

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evidence against him, shall remain in this claim.

However, Defendant Godines shall be

dismissed without prejudice.
However, Defendant Godines shall be dismissed without prejudice. Section 1983 creates
a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, “to be liable under §
1983, the individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”
Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). In order to state a claim against a defendant, a plaintiff must describe what
each named defendant did (or failed to do), that violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Nothing in the Complaint indicates that Defendant Godines was personally involved in the
disciplinary proceedings against Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiff does not set forth any facts at all
regarding Defendant Godines’ role in the events giving rise to this claim. It appears that he
included Defendant Godines only because he was the IDOC director. However, this supervisory
position is not enough to impose liability on Defendant Godines. The doctrine of respondeat
superior (supervisory liability) is not applicable to § 1983 actions. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266
F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Because no facts in the Complaint indicate that
Defendant Godines is “personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right,” id, he
shall be dismissed from this action.
Dismissal of Count 2 – Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbids
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and punishment grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Prison conditions that
deprive inmates of basic human needs – food, medical care, sanitation, or physical safety – may

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violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346; see also James v. Milwaukee Cnty.,
956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992).
In order to prevail on a conditions-of-confinement claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that,
if true, would satisfy the objective and subjective components applicable to all Eighth
Amendment claims. McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991).

The objective analysis examines whether the conditions of

confinement exceeded contemporary bounds of decency of a mature civilized society. Jackson
v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992). The condition must result in unquestioned and
serious deprivations of basic human needs or deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities.

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); accord Jamison-Bey v.

Thieret, 867 F.2d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir. 1989); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416 (7th
Cir. 1987).
The subjective component of unconstitutional punishment focuses on the intent with
which the acts or practices constituting the alleged punishment are inflicted; in other words, the
state of mind of the defendant. Jackson, 955 F.2d at 22; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; see also
McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994). In conditions of confinement cases, this is
deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety; the defendant must be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he also
must draw the inference. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Wilson, 501
U.S. at 303; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); DelRaine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024,
1032 (7th Cir. 1994). The deliberate indifference standard is satisfied if the plaintiff shows that
the prison official acted or failed to act despite the official’s knowledge of a substantial risk of

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serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. It is well-settled that mere negligence is not enough.
See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986).
Here, Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because his
unlawful placement in segregation for one year constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Aside
from his statement that he suffered “unjust atrocities” while in segregation, Plaintiff offers no
factual allegations regarding the conditions of his confinement in segregation.

This bald

conclusion, unsupported by any facts, is insufficient to state an actionable Eighth Amendment
claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th
Cir. 2009). Accordingly, Count 2 shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) shall be referred to the United
States Magistrate Judge for further consideration.
The motion for service of process at government expense (Doc. 4) is TERMINATED
AS MOOT. No such motion is necessary for a Plaintiff who has been granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The Court shall order service on all defendants who remain in the
action following threshold review under § 1915A. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
Disposition
COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.

Defendant GODINES is DISMISSED from this action without

prejudice.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants FURLOW and SPILLER: (1) Form 5
(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of

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Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint,
and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by
Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to
the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps
to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the
full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly for further pre-trial proceedings, which shall include a
determination on the pending motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3).

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Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Daly
for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to
such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 9, 2016

s/ STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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