Maclin v. Butler et al

Filing 5

ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This dismissal counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 9/9/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JONATHAN MACLIN
#S13329,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KIMBERLY BUTLER,
D.D.,
JOHN DOE 1,
JOHN DOE 2,
BEEBOP, and
MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
INTERNAL AFFAIRS SUPERVISOR,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL NO. 16-cv-814-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff, an inmate at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action for deprivations of
his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks equitable relief and
damages for deprivations of his constitutional rights. This case is now before the Court for a
preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Page 1 of 5

An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 590 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint is plausible on its
face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, some
factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of
a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, courts
“should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or
conclusory legal statements.” Id . At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
THE COMPLAINT
On March 9, 2016, Plaintiff was told by John Doe 1 to pack his property because he was
going to segregation. (Doc. 1, p. 2). On March 11, 2016, John Doe 2 came to Plaintiff’s cell to
administer a urine analysis test, which allegedly came back negative for illegal substances. (Doc.
1, p. 2). In spite of the negative test, Plaintiff remained in segregation. Plaintiff asked Defendant
Beebop on March 18, March 25, and April 4, 2016, why he was still in segregation, but Beebop
refused to take any action. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Plaintiff then wrote an emergency grievance and a
grievance on lined paper on April 12, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 2). He was released from segregation on
April 14, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Defendant Butler rejected Plaintiff’s emergency grievance on

Page 2 of 5

April 16, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Defendant D.D. rejected Plaintiff’s handwritten grievance on April
20, 2016, for failure to use the proper grievance form. (Doc. 1, p. 12).
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the failure to release him from segregation, he lost
privileges, including audio/visual privileges, phone calls, and the ability to eat in community and
attend religious services. (Doc. 1, p. 3). He also was housed in a smaller cell and had fewer
recreational opportunities. (Doc. 1, p. 3).
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide
Plaintiff’s pro se action into three counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in
all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit.
COUNT 1:

Defendants John Doe 1, John Doe 2, Beebop, and the Menard
Internal Affairs supervisor violated Plaintiff’s rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when they did not
promptly release Plaintiff from segregation;

COUNT 2:

Defendants John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 failed to properly issue
Plaintiff an investigative report regarding their conduct
towards Plaintiff;

COUNT 3:

Defendants Butler and D.D. improperly denied Plaintiff’s
grievances, thus causing him to spend more time in
investigative segregation.
DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has no due process claim based on his time in segregation, and therefore this
action must be dismissed. Illinois statutes and correctional regulations do not place limitations on
the discretion of prison officials to place inmates in administrative segregation, including
investigative or temporary lockdown or confinement and involuntary protective custody;
accordingly, there is no liberty interest implicated by an inmate’s placement in these forms of
segregation. Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246, 1248 (7th Cir. 1995); Pardo v. Hosier, 946 F.2d
Page 3 of 5

1278, 1281-84 (7th Cir. 1991); Kellas v. Lane, 923 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1991); see
generally Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995).
While Plaintiff’s allegations, which the Court takes as true, are unfortunate, “being
placed in segregation is too trivial an incremental deprivation of a convicted prisoner’s liberty to
trigger the duty of due process.” Holly v. Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 678, 679 (7th Cir. 2005), citing
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485–86 (1995); Paige v. Hudson, 341 F.3d 642, 643 (7th Cir.
2003). An inmate has no due process liberty interest in remaining free from administrative
segregation because such segregation does not impose an “atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484;
Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2001). An inmate also has no liberty
interest in remaining in the general prison population. Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246, 1248
(7th Cir. 1995). Administrative segregation placement for the purposes of institutional safety and
security does not trigger a due process right to a hearing. See Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438
(7th Cir. 2002). Thus Plaintiff’s claims that he was placed in segregation for 36 days without
receiving formal discipline do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff has alleged that the prison guards also violated the Illinois Administrative Code
by failing to issue a disciplinary or investigative report. Even if officials violated departmental
rules, the matter does not implicate the Constitution. Violations of state law are not, in and of
themselves, actionable as constitutional violations. See, e.g., Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752,
760 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations,
not violations of state statutes and regulations); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1216–
17 (7th Cir. 1988) (a violation of state law does not give rise to an actionable § 1983 claim unless
it independently violates the Constitution or federal law). Plaintiff’s due process claim relating to

Page 4 of 5

his placement in segregation on the basis of an incident that was never subject to formal
discipline is accordingly dismissed.
Because there is no underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Butler and D.D. must also fail. See Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir.
2005) (“In order for there to be a failure to intervene, it logically follows that there must exist an
underlying constitutional violation.”). A plaintiff may state a claim for failure to intervene by
showing that “any constitutional violation has been committed by a law enforcement official;
and the [defendant] had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.”
Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted). Where there is no due
process claim, there can be no claim for failure to intervene in the alleged due process violation.
DISPOSITION
The Court finds that the facts alleged by Plaintiff do not state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, and further, that Plaintiff could not plead facts that would make these claims
viable.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This dismissal
counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter
judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 9, 2016
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

Page 5 of 5