Brooks v. Mich et al

Filing 10

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Brooks is GRANTED leave to file his First Amended Complaint within twenty-eight days. (Amended Pleadings due by 10/20/2016). Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 9/22/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EMANUEL BROOKS, #B-90011,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LT MICH, KENNETH DONNALS, and
KIM BUTLER,
Defendants.

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CIVIL NO. 16-cv-00818-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of Plaintiff Emanuel Brooks’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Upon review of the complaint, the Court finds
that Brooks has not provided enough information for the Court to commence with an adequate
review, and thus the complaint is being dismissed with an opportunity to amend.
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In his one-page complaint, Brooks makes numerous broad legal allegations that he
associates with September 24, 2015, at 9 a.m. at the Menard Correctional Center (Doc. 1 at 5).
Specifically he mentions a failure to protect and deliberate indifference. He also lists the names
of the three defendants, Lt. Mich, Kenneth Donnals, and Kim Butler (Id.). However, he does not
provide any facts tending to show a connection between the named defendants and the proffered
legal theories (Id.). In addition to the brief written statement of his claim, Brooks appended a
handful of grievances to his complaint, purporting to support his allegations of failure to protect
and deliberate indifference (Doc. 1 at 7-9). In connection with his claims, Brooks seeks monetary
compensation and screening for H.I.V. or hepatitis C (Doc. 1 at 6).
Discussion
Throughout the complaint, Brooks fails to allege any facts or state any claim explicitly
linking the named defendants to the two harms he identifies. The reason that plaintiffs, even
those proceeding pro se, for whom the Court is required to liberally construe their complaints,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), are required to associate specific defendants
with specific claims is so these defendants are put on notice of the claims brought against them
and so they can properly answer the complaint. See Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th
Cir. 2003) (a “short and plain” statement of the claim suffices under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 if it
notifies the defendant of the principal events upon which the claims are based); Brokaw v.
Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000) (notice pleading requires the plaintiff to
allege just enough to put the defendant on notice of facts providing a right to recovery).
According to the Supreme Court, the threshold pleading requirement of FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE 8 requires a complaint allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face” in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a
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claim for which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (1955).
(clarifying that a “heightened fact pleading of specifics” is not required) (emphasis added). In
other words, the Supreme Court explained it was “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’” by providing “more than labels and conclusions,”
because “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . .” Id. at 555
(alteration in original). The plaintiff must plead factual allegations which show the right to relief
exists beyond mere speculation by “rais[ing] a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence” to substantiate the plaintiff’s claims. Id. Thus, the Seventh Circuit has interpreted Bell
as imposing a two-tiered requirement for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: (1) it
“must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant ‘fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” and (2) the “allegations must plausibly suggest
that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising the possibility above a ‘speculative level.’” E.E.O.C.
v. Concentra Health Serv., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell, 550 U.S. at 573).
Furthermore, merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim
against that individual. Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot
state a claim against a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”)
Brooks’s complaint contains minimal factual information with regard to two potential
harms of failure to protect and deliberate indifference. None of the named defendants are tied to
these claims with particularity. As a general rule, section 1983 creates a cause of action based on
personal liability, so to plead a claim under section 1983 a plaintiff must identify actions by an
individual that violate his constitutional rights. See Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805,
810 (7th Cir. 2005) (“to be liable under [Section] 1983, an individual defendant must have
caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation”). Though Brooks may be able to tie
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specific defendants to specific conduct that caused him harm, he simply has not done so in his
initial complaint as drafted. Accordingly, Brooks’s complaint is subject to dismissal. Rather than
dismiss the entire action, however, the Court will allow Brooks an opportunity to correct the
deficiencies through an amended complaint. In drafting his amended complaint, should he
choose to do so, Brooks should avoid using conclusory language and vague allegations of fact.
Rather, he should follow the instructions on the Court’s complaint form, which directs a plaintiff
to state “when, where, how, and by whom” his rights were violated. While Brooks may attach
exhibits to his complaint, he may not rely on exhibits alone to satisfy his obligations; instead, he
must include sufficient factual detail in his actual complaint so that defendants can respond.
Pending Motions
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Brooks’s “Motion for Sentence Reduction” (Doc. 6) is
DENIED because it is irrelevant to this case. The Motion, filed on a fill-in-the-blank document
for in forma pauperis status on appeal, does not appear to pertain to this case. In any event,
Brooks has already been granted IFP status before the Court for this matter, and there was no
appealable order at the time he filed the Motion, so the Motion was irrelevant and moot.
Likewise, Brooks’s second Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. 8) is hereby DENIED because it is
duplicative. Brooks was already granted leave to proceed IFP, thus he need not continue to file
documents addressing this issue.
IF IS FURTHER ORDERED that Brooks’s “Motion to Submit Exhibits” (Doc. 9) is
hereby DENIED as moot in light of the total dismissal of his complaint. Brooks may append
these exhibits to his amended complaint if he chooses to file one.

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Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Brooks is GRANTED leave to file his “First Amended Complaint” within twenty-eight
days (on or before October 20, 2016). Should Brooks fail to file his First Amended Complaint
within the allotted time or consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the entire case
shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). See also Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Johnson
v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Further, the dismissal shall count
as one of Plaintiff’s allotted “strikes” under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Should Plaintiff decide to file an amended complaint, it is strongly recommended that he
use the forms designed for such use in this District. He should label the form, “First Amended
Complaint,” and he should use the case number for this action. The amended complaint shall
present each claim in a separate count, and each count shall specify, by name, each defendant
alleged to be liable under the count, as well as the actions alleged to have been taken by that
defendant. Plaintiff should attempt to include the facts of his case in chronological order,
inserting each defendant's name where necessary to identify the actors. Plaintiff should refrain
from filing unnecessary exhibits. Plaintiff should include only related claims in his new
complaint. Claims found to be unrelated to one another will be severed into new cases, new case
numbers will be assigned, and additional filing fees will be assessed.
To enable Plaintiff to comply with this order, the Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a
blank civil rights complaint form.

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An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering the
original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n. 1
(7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original complaint.
Thus, the “First Amended Complaint” must stand on its own, without reference to any previous
pleading, and Plaintiff must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with the
amended pleading. The “First Amended Complaint” is also subject to review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was
incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due and payable,
regardless of whether Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1);
Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want
of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 22, 2016
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
U.S. District Judge

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