Goings v. Jones et al

Filing 128

ORDER: The 87 Motion for Reconsideration filed by Plaintiff Fredrick Goings is DENIED. Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate Judge Wilkerson's denial of his Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 109 ) and the Amended Scheduling Order (D oc. 122 ) are also DENIED. Plaintiff's 123 Motion for Copy is GRANTED. The Clerk's Office is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a copy of Judge Rosenstengel's Case Management Procedures. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 5/7/2018. (mlp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
FREDRICK GOINGS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ANTHONY JONES, ANDRES SPILLER, )
FRANK EOVALDI, SGT. ENGELAGE,
)
REVA ENGELAGE, MARTHA
)
OAKLEY, REBECCA STEFANI,
)
CHRISTI RAYBURN, JEANNE
)
SAUERHAGE, BRENDA OETJEN,
)
CHARLES COMPTON, CHRISTOPHER )
STOREY, JUSTIN HECHT, TONYA
)
SMITH, JAMES BEST, JOHN DOES 1-8, )
and UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 16-CV-00833-NJR-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This matter is currently before the Court on several objections filed by Plaintiff
Fredrick Goings to orders entered by Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson.
Specifically, Goings objects to Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s partial denial of his Motion
for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 87), Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s denial
of his motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 109), and the amended scheduling order
(Doc. 122). The Court discusses each order in turn.
BACKGROUND
Goings, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections housed at Stateville
Correctional Center, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his
constitutional rights as well as Illinois state law (Doc. 2). After threshold review of his
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complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A (Doc. 9), Goings was permitted to proceed on the
following claims:
Count 7:

A state law battery claim against Big E for grabbing Plaintiff
by the neck and shoving his face into the wall;

Count 8:

An excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment
against Big E for grabbing Plaintiff by the next and shoving
his face into the wall;

Count 10:

Deliberate indifference claim against unknown correctional
staff, Jones, unknown health care staff assigned to 5 gallery in
North II cell house for refusing Plaintiff medical care after he
was attacked by Big E and incarcerated in a cell that elevated
his blood pressure;

Count 12:

Fourth Amendment violation against Spiller and Big E for
conducting an “unreasonable search” of Plaintiff’s body by
subjecting him to multiple strip searches and forcing him to
spread his butt cheeks; and

Count 14:

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Big
E, Jones, unknown correctional staff and unknown medical
staff for depriving Plaintiff of access to his blood pressure
medication.

On March 16, 2017, Goings filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add
a number of claims and defendants (Doc. 58). Magistrate Judge Wilkerson denied the
motion in part, disallowing certain claims that he found to already have been articulated
in the original complaint, had no basis in the law, or were insufficiently pleaded
(Doc. 76). Goings filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s order on October 18,
2017 (Doc. 87), which the Court construes as an appeal of the order pursuant to Rule 72
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
On January 2, 2018, Goings filed a motion for recruitment of counsel arguing that
the case is complex and will require substantial discovery, he has limited access to legal
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research and his legal materials in prison, and his reasonable attempts to secure counsel
have failed (Doc. 95). On January 16, 2018, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson denied the
Motion for Recruitment of Counsel without prejudice, finding that while Goings has
made reasonable attempts to obtain counsel on his own, he is more than competent to
litigate his own claims at this time due to his education, training in the legal system, and
ability to understand the legal issues and litigation process (Docs. 96). Goings filed an
appeal of Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s Order on February 26, 2018 (Doc. 109).
Finally, on March 30, 2018, Goings filed an objection to the Amended Scheduling
Order (Doc. 121), which the Court again construes as an appeal under Rule 72, arguing
he needs additional time to produce his initial disclosures to Defendants (Doc. 122).
DISCUSSION
The Court may modify or reverse a decision of a magistrate judge on a
non-dispositive issue upon a showing that the magistrate judge’s decision is “clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). See also
SDIL-LR 73.1(a). A decision is clearly erroneous “only if the district court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Weeks v. Samsung Heavy
Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling
Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988) (“To be clearly erroneous, a decision must
strike [the Court] as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must . . . strike [the
Court] as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.”).
I.

Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint
Goings appeals several rulings within Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s September

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28, 2017 Order granting in part and denying in part his Motion to Amend the Complaint.
Count Four: A violation of § 501.30 of the Illinois Department of
Corrections Rules prohibiting corporal punishment against
Lt. Frank Eovaldi for his wrongful use of force that
amounted to corporal punishment.
Goings objects to Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s decision not to allow a claim
against Defendant Eovaldi (“Big E”) for his “wrongful use of force that amounted to
corporal punishment in violation of Ill. Admin. Code. Tit. 20 § 501.30.” Goings disagrees
with the conclusion that prison regulations, as codified in the Illinois Administrative
Code, were never meant to confer rights on inmates or serve as a basis for constitutional
claims, but rather were intended to guide prison officials in the administration of
prisons. Goings criticizes Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s reliance on Ashley v. Snyder, 739
N.E.2d 897, 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), an Illinois state appellate court case, because it is not
controlling precedent for this Court.
This Court notes that the same language in Ashley that was cited by Magistrate
Judge Wilkerson has been cited with approval by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in determining that Illinois courts do not infer a damages remedy from statutes
regulating the Department of Corrections. See Ambrose v. Godinez, 510 F. App’x 470, 471
(7th Cir. 2013) (citing Ashley, 739 N.E.2d at 902, and explaining that Unified Code of
Corrections was “designed to provide guidance to prison officials in the administration
of prisons,” not to confer rights on inmates). Moreover, Goings’s assertion that this
Court should not rely on an Illinois state court’s interpretation of the regulations is
wrong. See Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000) (“federal courts should defer
to state court interpretations of state laws”). Because a violation of the Illinois

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Administrative Code, which regulates the Department of Corrections, does not give rise
to a constitutional claim or a claim under state law, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson properly
determined that Count Four had no basis in the law.
Count Five: Failure to protect claim against all unknown defendants
who stood by and watched Lt. Frank Eovaldi commit an
assault and battery on Plaintiff and failed to intervene.
With regard to Count 5, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson found that allowing Goings
to proceed on this claim would be futile, as he failed to allege sufficient facts to plead a
failure to protect claim when there was no indication the unknown defendants actually
witnessed any actions taken by Eovaldi or had time to prevent the harm.
In his proposed amended complaint, Goings alleges that he was handcuffed in
back and escorted to the North II Cell House, where he was met by at least six men he
presumed to be correctional officers, including Defendant Eovaldi. He claims that, while
he was handcuffed in back, Eovaldi grabbed him by the neck and squeezed really hard,
then shoved his face and forehead into the brick wall. He then asserts in Count 5 that the
unknown correctional officers who watched Eovaldi assault him failed to intervene and
are liable for failing to protect him. On appeal, Goings argues that while Eovaldi was
swift with his actions, he “did not move at the speed of light.”
An officer can be liable for failure to intervene if he had reason to know that
excessive force was being used by another officer (or any other constitutional violation
was being committed) and if he had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm from
occurring. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2005). “A realistic
opportunity to intervene may exist whenever an officer could have called for a backup,

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called for help, or at least cautioned the violating officer to stop.” Miller v. City of Harvey,
No. 13–CV–9257, 2014 WL 3509760, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 2014) (citing Yang v. Hardin, 37
F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994)).
In this case, the Court finds Magistrate Judge Wilkerson did not clearly err in
finding this claim to be futile when there was no realistic opportunity for the officers to
intervene. Goings claims Eovaldi grabbed his neck and squeezed, then shoved his face
and forehead into a brick wall. Goings admits that Eovaldi acted swiftly. Under these
circumstances, the contact between Eovaldi and Goings was not so prolonged that the
other officers realistically could have taken any action to intervene in the situation. See
Lanigan v. Vill. of E. Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 478 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, Magistrate
Judge Wilkerson’s decision was not clearly erroneous.
Count 7:

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendants Smith, Rayburn, Sauerhage, and Oetjen for
depriving Plaintiff of access to his blood pressure
medication.

Goings next objects to Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s finding that his deliberate
indifference claim against Defendants Smith, Rayburn, Sauerhage, and Oetjen in Count 5
was futile. Goings claims he adequately alleged that he complained to these Defendants
about the deprivation of his blood pressure medication.
“Deliberate indifference occurs when a defendant realizes that a substantial risk
of serious harm to a prisoner exists, but then disregards that risk.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792
F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015). Deliberate indifference may occur where a prison official,
having knowledge of a significant risk to inmate health or safety, acts in a manner
contrary to the recommendation of specialists or delays a prisoner’s treatment for

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non-medical reasons, thereby exacerbating his pain and suffering. Id. at 777.
Here, Goings alleges he was denied his blood pressure medicine for days while he
was in segregation in cell 503 (Doc. 79, p. 17). He claims he experienced dizziness,
headaches, numbness, blurred vision, difficulty speaking, and confusion as a result of
the harsh and cruel conditions he was subjected to (Id.). He also asserts he suffered a
mild stroke as a result of Defendants’ refusal to give him access to his medicine (Id.). He
then claims he complained to Defendants Smith, Rayburn, Sauerhage, and Oetjen
(among others) “about his injuries and his pain and suffering he endured from the
battery inflicted upon him by Lt. Frank Eovaldi.”(Id., p. 18).
Because Goings never alleges that he complained to Defendants Smith, Rayburn,
Sauerhage, and Oetjen about the lack of access to his blood pressure medication,
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s determination that a deliberate indifference claim against
these Defendants would be futile was not clearly erroneous.
Count 8:

Fourth Amendment claim against Does 1-9 for conducting
excessive strip searches unrelated to any penological
interest.

As to Count 8, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson determined that Goings failed to
allege that any John Doe Defendants were personally involved in “excessive strip
searches” because it was unclear whether any one John Doe Defendant was involved in
more than one of the strip searches. Magistrate Judge Wilkerson relied on Peckham v.
Wisconsin Department of Corrections, in which the Seventh Circuit stated: “[G]iven the
considerable deference prison officials enjoy to run their institutions it is difficult to
conjure up too many real-life scenarios where prison strip searches of inmates could be

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said to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Peckham v. Wisconsin Dep't of
Corr., 141 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 1998); but see Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 505 (7th Cir.
2004) (finding the plaintiff could recover if he could show the strip search was conducted
in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and inflict psychological pain).
Goings argues that while these Defendants were not present for all of the strip
searches, “information to one prison official is information to all prison officials.” Goings
cites no authority for this assertion. He also argues that the words, actions, inactions,
mannerisms, and body language of the John Doe Defendants established that they
acquiesced in the conduct complained of. Even if true, this does not change the fact that
Goings failed to allege that any one of the John Doe Defendants were personally
involved in conducting excessive strip searches. See Terry v. Spencer, No. 17-2331, 2018
WL 1978927, at *3 (7th Cir. Apr. 27, 2018) (a plaintiff in a Section 1983 case “must explain
how each [Defendant] personally participated in violating his rights”); Sheik–Abdi v.
McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a cause of action
based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach
unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”).
Thus, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s decision was not clearly erroneous.
Count 9:

Intentional infliction of emotional distress against all
Defendants

As to Count 9, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson found that Goings failed to set forth
sufficient particularized allegations to state a claim against Defendants for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, Goings failed to adequately allege how each
named Defendant engaged in “extreme and outrageous” conduct intended to cause him
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severe emotional distress. Goings argues his claim is not futile, as he alleged Defendants
engaged in unlawful and intentional conduct that caused him severe emotional distress.
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois law, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, the
defendant knew it was highly probable that his conduct would cause the plaintiff severe
emotional distress, and the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional
distress. See, e.g., Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 842 (7th Cir. 2010). Liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress “does not extend to mere insult, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty oppressions or trivialities” and can attach “only in circumstances
where the defendant’s conduct is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Davenport v. City of Chicago, 653 F. Supp.
2d 885, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Davenport v. Dovgin, 545 F. App’x 535 (7th Cir.
2013). “The distress inflicted must be so severe that no reasonable person could be
expected to endure it.” Id (citation omitted).
Here, Goings alleges that “each defendant engaged in unlawful, and intentional
conduct as shown through their actions, words, gestures, conduction, or inaction, or
they acquiesced in the violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Because of the defendants’
conduct—individually and collectively, Plaintiff suffered severe and extreme emotional
distress.” (Doc. 79, p. 29). As noted by Magistrate Judge Wilkerson, however, Goings
failed to set forth particularized allegations of extreme and outrageous conduct as to
each individual Defendant. Furthermore, Goings makes no allegations whatsoever that
each Defendant knew it was highly probable his conduct would cause Goings severe

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emotional distress. See Terry, 2018 WL 1978927, at *3; Sheik–Abdi, 37 F.3d at 1248. For
these reasons, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson did not err in finding this claim futile.
Count 10:

False imprisonment against Lt. Frank Eovaldi, Andrew
Spiller, Does 1-9, et al.

In Count 10, Goings claims he was falsely imprisoned insofar as he was subjected
to repetitive confinement in segregation without being issued a disciplinary ticket.
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson determined this claim would be futile, as the Seventh
Circuit has determined that prison officials have discretion to place inmates in
administrative segregation, and may assign inmates to any prison within the
Department of Corrections without infringing upon a constitutional right. Because
Goings was lawfully convicted and sentenced, there is no basis on which he can
maintain a false imprisonment claim.
Goings argues that this conclusion was wrong because, while it is accurate he was
convicted and sentenced, he still has a liberty interest when conditions in segregation are
harsh. While that may be true, such a claim would not lie in a state law false
imprisonment claim, which requires an unlawful restraint of an individual’s personal
liberty. Lopez v. Winchell’s Donut House, 466 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (Ill. 1984). Here, Goings’s
period in segregation was not unlawful, at least not in the sense that he was imprisoned
against his will as required to meet the elements of the common law tort. See id.
The Court finds that the claim Goings seeks to make here is more accurately
framed as a due process violation. Under certain limited circumstances, an inmate
punished with segregation may be able to pursue a claim for deprivation of a liberty
interest without due process of law. See Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697–
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98 (7th Cir. 2009). Assignment to disciplinary segregation can implicate a liberty interest
if it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). With regard to
segregation, the Court should consider the length of segregation and the conditions
endured. Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2013); Marion v. Columbia
Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697–98 (7th Cir. 2009) (“a liberty interest may arise if the
length of segregated confinement is substantial and the record reveals that the
conditions of confinement are unusually harsh”). For relatively short periods of
disciplinary segregation, inquiry into specific conditions of confinement is unnecessary.
See Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 2005) (56 days); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d
754, 761 (7th Cir. 1997) (70 days) (“a relatively short period when one considers his 12
year prison sentence”). The short duration of disciplinary segregation forecloses any due
process

liberty

interest

regardless

of

the

conditions.

Martinez

v.

Bebout,

No. 14-CV-453-JPG, 2014 WL 2109778, at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 20, 2014).
Here, Goings alleges he spent “days” in cell 503. While he does not specify the
number of days, he claims that he had no access to his medicine for “days,” that cell 503
had a light that stayed on 24 hours a day causing him to lose sleep for at least three days,
and that he was thereafter transferred to cell 835 where he remained in segregation for
an two additional weeks. A reasonable inference from these allegations is that Goings
experienced a relatively short period of disciplinary segregation, which does not
implicate a liberty interest regardless of the conditions of that confinement. Without a
liberty interest at stake, there can be no due process violation. Thus, Magistrate Judge

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Wilkerson did not err in declining to allow Goings to proceed on this claim.
Count 11:

Campaign of harassment against all Defendants

In this Count, Goings alleges Defendants instituted a “campaign of harassment”
against him for filing grievances and engaging in other constitutionally protected
conduct to redress Defendants’ conduct. On threshold review of this count in the
original complaint (filed in Case No. 16-439-SMY), District Judge Staci Yandle found that
the claim was more properly stated as a First Amendment retaliation claim.
Nevertheless, Judge Yandle noted that while Goings generally alleged that he filed
grievances, he did not identify the specific grievances by date or incident that drew the
alleged retaliation. Having failed to identify his protected conduct, Judge Yandle found
Goings’s claim must be dismissed. On review of his proposed amended complaint,
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson agreed Goings was attempting to bring a First Amendment
retaliation claim against Defendants, but found there were no allegations sufficient to
establish the elements of such a claim.
To demonstrate a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that
(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a
deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the
First Amendment activity was “at least a motivating factor” in the defendant’s decision
to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).
Here, Goings alleges that he filed grievances and engaged in “other lawful
conduct” to redress the issues that were “systematically being perpetuated against him,”
Defendants engaged in adverse conduct to stop him from repeating his First

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Amendment activity in the future, and the fact that he was exercising constitutionally
protected conduct was a motivating factor for Defendants’ retaliatory actions. Goings
also now asserts he filed numerous grievances on particular dates regarding Defendants’
conduct. Specifically, Goings refers to grievances filed regarding Defendants: denial of
his access to his personal and legal property; challenge of his access to a legal book and a
religious publication; failure to protect him; harassment and denial of medical care;
intentional infliction of emotional distress; excessive strip searches; interception or
withholding of Court documents; tampering with the process for his grievances; false
imprisonment and violation of his due process rights; and confiscation his grievances
and legal files, all in an attempt to impede his First Amendment activity in the future.
Although Goings appears generally to have alleged the elements of a retaliation
claim, he has not made any allegations regarding the conduct of each individual Defendant.
As discussed above, a plaintiff in a Section 1983 case “must explain how [Defendants]
each personally participated in violating his rights.” Terry, 2018 WL 1978927, at *3; Sheik–
Abdi, 37 F.3d at 1248. The proposed amended complaint refers only to “Defendants” and
does not identify how each individual Defendant retaliated against him. Thus, it was not
clearly erroneous for Magistrate Judge Wilkerson to find this claim futile.
II.

Appointment of Counsel
On January 16, 2018, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson denied Goings’s Motion for

Recruitment of Counsel without prejudice, finding that while Goings has made
reasonable attempts to obtain counsel on his own, he is more than competent to litigate
his own claims at this time due to his education, training in the legal system, and ability

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to understand the legal issues and litigation process (Docs. 96). Goings filed an appeal of
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s Order on February 26, 2018 (Doc. 109). Goings argues that
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson failed to consider whether his litigation capabilities were
sufficient for conducting the discovery necessary in this particular case, the complexity
of his legal claims, his inability to sufficiently investigate and research the case from
prison, or his ability to locate and review key evidence.
A plaintiff has no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in a federal civil
proceeding. Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Olson v. Morgan,
750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014)). Therefore, on a 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) motion, it is
entirely within the Court’s discretion whether or not to recruit counsel for civil litigants.
Id. If a plaintiff makes a reasonable attempt to secure counsel, the court must examine
“whether the difficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the particular
plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently present it.” Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692,
696 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). This
inquiry does not focus solely on the plaintiff’s ability to try his case—it also includes
other “tasks that normally attend litigation” such as “evidence gathering” and
“preparing and responding to motions.” Id. When ruling on a motion to recruit counsel,
the court should take account of all evidence in the record relevant to the plaintiff’s
capacity to litigate. Id.
Here, prior to his incarceration, Goings was a practicing attorney with a
significant amount of education and training in the legal system. Based on these facts,
the Court finds Goings has the ability to understand both the litigation process and legal

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issues

in

his

case.

While

he

has

named

many

defendants,

the

claims

themselves—battery, excessive force, deliberate indifference, and an unreasonable
search—are not “overly complex.” See Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1017-18 (7th Cir.
2013) (finding excessive force and spoliation claims were not too legally complex for pro
se litigant). Although Goings asserts that counsel would be helpful in the discovery
process given his restrictions in prison, that “does not mean that the case itself [i]s so
overly complex that counsel [i]s required.” Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir.
2010) (internal quotations omitted). The mere fact that Goings is an inmate is not
sufficient to show an inability to conduct discovery. See Bracey, 712 F.3d at 1018 (“[A]ll
inmates confront the discovery restrictions facing [the plaintiff].”). Thus, Goings has not
established that there are sufficient discovery obstacles that prevent him from
competently litigating his claims. Further, the Court notes that discovery is just now
commencing and dispositive motions are not due until February 2019. Given his
background as an attorney, the Court finds that Goings is competent to litigate his claims
on his own at this stage in the proceeding. His objection is overruled.
III.

Scheduling Order
On March 30, 2018, Goings filed an objection to the Amended Scheduling Order

(Doc. 121), arguing he needs additional time to produce his initial disclosures to
Defendants (Doc. 122). Goings followed up this objection by filing a Motion for
Extension of Time (Doc. 124), which was granted by Magistrate Judge Wilkerson
(Doc. 125). Thus, that portion of Goings’s objection is moot.
Goings also objects to the number of interrogatories and requests for production

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of documents the Amended Scheduling Order permits him to serve on Defendants, to
the extent this number differs from the number permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 33 permits no more than 25 written interrogatories or requests for
product unless otherwise ordered by the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 33. While the Federal Rules set
no limit on the number of requests for production a party may serve, Rule 34(a) does
reference Rule 26(b), which allows the Court to limit the frequency and scope of
discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a), 26(b).
Here, the Amended Scheduling Order allows each party to serve 15
interrogatories, 15 requests for production of documents, and 10 requests for admission.
Importantly, the Order states that these limits “may be increased for good cause shown.”
Because the Federal Rules allow a Court to limit discovery in a case, and because the
Amended Scheduling Order permits the parties to file a motion to increase the number
of requests it may serve, the Court does not find the decision to be “clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Goings’s objection is overruled.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiff Fredrick Goings’s objections (Docs. 87, 109, 122) are
OVERRULED, and Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s orders are AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 7, 2018
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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