Jones v. Estes et al
Filing
10
ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 11/7/2016. (tjk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOSEPH JONES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ESTES,
WOLFE,
HILL, and
STACY
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Case No. 16−cv–0835−SMY
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Joseph Jones, an inmate in Pickneyville Correctional Center, brings this action
for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff requests
compensatory and punitive damages. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review
of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
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to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that he informed Defendant Stacy on February 6, 2016 that his former
cellmate, Courtney Tolbert, was threatening him. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff told Defendants Hill,
Estes and Wolfe about the threat on February 7, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 5-6). Tolbert attacked
Plaintiff the same day. Defendants Estes and Wolfe then denied Plaintiff access to the health
care unit. (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into two counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The following
claims survive threshold review:
Count 1 – Defendants Stacy, Hill, Estes and Wolfe failed to protect Plaintiff from his
former cellmate, Courtney Tolbert, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
Count 2: Defendants Estes and Wolfe were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
serious medical needs after the assault in violation of the Eight Amendment where they
filed to allow him to go to the health care unit.
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As to Count 1, in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court held that
“prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Id. at 833 (internal citations omitted); see also Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 889
(7th Cir. 2006). However, not every harm caused by another inmate translates into constitutional
liability for the corrections officers responsible for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at
834.
In order for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim for failure to protect, he must show that he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the defendants
acted with “deliberate indifference” to that danger. Id.; Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889. A plaintiff
also must prove that prison officials were aware of a specific, impending, and substantial threat
to his safety, often by showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his
safety. Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996). In other words, Defendants had to know
that there was a substantial risk that those who attacked Plaintiff would do so, yet failed to take
any action. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733-34 (7th Cir. 2001). However,
conduct that amounts to negligence or inadvertence is not enough to state a claim. Pinkston, 440
F.3d at 889 (discussing Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 172 (7th Cir. 1985)).
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains minimal factual content. However, he has identified the
source of a specific threat, his former cellmate, and has articulated a timeline that suggests that
the defendants could have acted to prevent the harm from occurring. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is
plausible and at this stage, it will be allowed to proceed so that Plaintiff may further develop his
claims.
Count 2 likewise survives threshold review. In order to state a deliberate indifference
claim, an inmate must show that he (1) suffered from an objectively serious medical condition;
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and (2) that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to a risk of serious harm from that
condition. “Deliberate indifference is proven by demonstrating that a prison official knows of a
substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either acts or fails to act in disregard of that risk.
Delaying treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if such delay exacerbated the injury or
unnecessarily prolonged an inmate's pain.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir.2012)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842
(1994); Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 777–78 (7th Cir.2015). Here Plaintiff has alleged that
he requested medical care after the attack by Tolbert, but Defendants Estes and Wolfe declined
to provide it. That is sufficient to state a claim at the pleading stage and Count 2 shall be
permitted to proceed.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNTS 1-2 survive threshold review against
Defendants Estes, Wolfe, Hill, and Stacy.
IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants Estes, Wolfe, Hill
and Stacy: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and
(2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a
copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of
Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the
Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will
require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to a Defendant who no longer can be
found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the
Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This
information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting
service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address
information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon
defense counsel once an appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or other document
submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be
filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of the document was served
on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has
not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by
the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Reona J. Daly for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Daly for
disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the
parties consent to such a referral.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the
judgment includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the
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full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has
been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1)
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 7, 2016
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge
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