Scott v. Lochead et al

Filing 17

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 2/2/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAVID SCOTT,
# M-20737,
Plaintiff,
vs.
J. LOCHEAD and
P. H. KEHOE,
Defendants.

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Case No. 16-cv-00844-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
This matter is now before the Court for consideration of the Second Amended Complaint
(Doc. 16) filed by Plaintiff David Scott. Plaintiff, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at
Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
two prison eye doctors who refused to treat his glaucoma. (Doc. 16, pp. 1-33). As a result,
Plaintiff has suffered from vision loss and pain. Id. He claims that this denial of medical care
violates his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. In connection with these
claims, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the two doctors, J. Lochead and P.H. Kehoe.
(Doc. 16, p. 6).
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Second Amended
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in
any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
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(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim
that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th
Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations are to
be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir.
2009). The Second Amended Complaint survives preliminary review under this standard.
Second Amended Complaint
In 2012, Plaintiff was diagnosed with glaucoma in his left eye. (Doc. 16, p. 9). Doctors
Lochead and Kehoe, who were both employed as eye doctors at Menard, made the diagnosis. Id.
However, they would not treat his condition or any associated pain. Id.
As a result, Plaintiff has suffered from vision impairment, eye pain, headaches and
depression on a daily basis ever since his diagnosis.

(Doc. 16, p. 8).

He has regularly

complained about these symptoms to prison medical staff, including the defendants, to no avail.
(Doc. 16, pp. 9, 13-33). Doctors Lochead and Kehoe have “largely ignored” the complaints and
grievances. (Doc. 16, p. 8). They characterize Plaintiff’s condition in his medical records as a
“slight glaucoma,” but this does not accurately reflect Plaintiff’s pain and vision loss. (Doc. 16,
p. 11).

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Although he attends monthly appointments to monitor his glaucoma, Plaintiff claims that
this is not enough. Id. No meaningful action has been taken to treat his glaucoma or associated
pain. Id. His requests for eye drops and surgery have been ignored. (Doc. 16, p. 12, 15-25).
Plaintiff has resorted to the use of daily cold compresses on his eyes, but fears that the denial of
care will result in further vision loss and pain. (Doc. 16, p. 11).
Merits Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
To facilitate the orderly management of future proceedings in this case, and in
accordance with the objectives of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(e) and 10(b), the Court has
organized the claims in Plaintiff’s pro se Second Amended Complaint into the following
enumerated counts:
Count 1 -

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for denying Plaintiff
medical care at Menard for his glaucoma and associated
complaints of vision loss and pain since 2012.

Count 2 -

Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants for ignoring
Plaintiff’s grievances addressing the denial of medical care for his
glaucoma at Menard since 2012.

The parties and the Court will continue using these designations in all future pleadings and
orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.
After carefully considering the allegations, the Court finds that the Second Amended
Complaint articulates a viable Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Lochead and Kehoe,
but fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim against them. Accordingly, Count 1 shall
receive further review, and Count 2 shall be dismissed with prejudice.
Discussion
Count 1
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners from cruel

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and unusual punishment. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). The Supreme
Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2006) (per curiam).
To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on the denial of medical care, a plaintiff must show
that (1) he suffers from a serious medical need (i.e., an objective standard), and (2) state officials
acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs (i.e., a subjective standard). Sherrod v.
Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2000).
With regard to the objective component of this claim, a medical need is considered
“serious” where it has either “been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment” or is “so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit has held that
glaucoma is “manifestly a sufficiently serious medical condition” because it causes severe
migraine headaches as the condition progresses and eventually leads to blindness. O’Banner v.
Bizzell, 151 F.3d 1033, *2 (7th Cir. 1998). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that
vision loss associated with cataracts meets this standard. Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595
(7th Cir. 2009).

Moreover, when the failure to treat a condition could “result in further

significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” the condition is sufficiently
“serious” to support an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. Plaintiff’s complaints of glaucoma and
associated vision loss and pain satisfy the objective component of this claim for screening
purposes.
With regard to the subjective component, prison officials exhibit deliberate indifference
when they “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health” by being “‘aware of facts

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from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’” and
“‘draw[ing] the inference.’” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). At this stage, the allegations state a deliberate indifference claim
against both defendants in their individual capacities for denying Plaintiff adequate medical care
for his glaucoma and associated pain.
Having satisfied both the objective and subjective components of this claim, Plaintiff
shall be allowed to proceed with Count 1 against Defendants Lochead and Kehoe.
Count 2
It is unclear why Plaintiff invoked the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in the
Second Amended Complaint. Protections afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment are no
greater than those extended under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment provides a more explicit source of protections. Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). The Eighth Amendment is “specifically concerned with the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions.” Id. It therefore serves as the
primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners. Id. The Court has analyzed
Plaintiff’s medical needs claim above under the Eighth Amendment.
To the extent Plaintiff invoked the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause based on
the mishandling of his grievances, the Second Amended Complaint states no independent due
process claim against either defendant. “[A] state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise
to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,
1430 (7th Cir. 1996). The Constitution requires no procedure at all, and the failure of state
prison officials to follow their own procedures does not, of itself, violate the Constitution. Maust
v. Headley, 959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1992); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th

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Cir. 1982). As such, the alleged mishandling of grievances “by persons who otherwise did not
cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950,
953 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008).
Accordingly, Count 2 shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense (Doc. 4)
which is DENIED as unnecessary. Because Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, the Court will order service of this suit as a matter of course on all defendants who
remain in this action pursuant to this screening order.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 2 is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 1 is subject to further review against
Defendants LOCHEAD and KEHOE. With regard to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall
prepare for Defendants LOCHEAD and KEHOE: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request
to Waive Service of a Summons) and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 16) and this
Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a
Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk
within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect
formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs
of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendant or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Each Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Second Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Reona J. Daly for further pre-trial proceedings, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and
28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral. Further, this entire matter shall be
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Daly for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule
72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

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cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 2, 2017

s/ STACI M. YANDLE
Honorable Staci M. Yandle
United States District Judge

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