Rippley v. Teamsters Local 525 et al
Filing
10
ORDER DISMISSING CASE: For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum and Order, Rippleys Second Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to file an amendment. In light of the dismissal of Rippleys Complaint , the Court finds it appropriate to DENY his pending motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3 ) and for service of process at government expense (Doc. 4 ). The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 1/19/17. (rah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
GLENN RIPPLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 525,
PRECISION PIPELINE, LLC, and
NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD.
REGION #14
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 16-cv-0845-MJR-DGW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
I.
Introduction
On July 26, 2016, Plaintiff Glenn Rippley filed an employment discrimination claim
against the Teamsters Local 525 (the “Teamsters”), Precision Pipeline LLC (“Precision”), and the
National Labor Relations Board Region #14 (“NLRB”) (Doc. 2). The Court conducted an initial
screening of the complaint, dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, and subsequently
conducted a second initial screening on the First Amended Complaint (Docs. 2, 5, 6, 8). After
reviewing the First Amended Complaint, the Court determined that it still lacked sufficient
factual or legal grounds to proceed beyond screening (Doc. 8). The Court dismissed the First
Amended Complaint and allowed Plaintiff Rippley an additional 35 days to file an amendment,
which he did in a timely fashion (Doc. 9). The Second Amended Complaint is now before the
Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) because Rippley seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis (Doc. 9).
Page | 1
In his Second Amended Complaint, filed using four copies of this Court’s standard
employment discrimination complaint form, Plaintiff Rippley claims that he was discriminated
against based upon: his race, pursuant to Title VII, or 42 U.S.C. § 1981; his age, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 621; and his religion, pursuant to Title VII; and, that he was retaliated against for acting
as a whistleblower (Doc. 9 at 2, 10, 14). He also alleges that his due process rights were violated
because he was terminated without any warning or opportunity to defend himself (Id. at 6). In
connection with his claims, he names Teamsters and Precision (Id. at 1-16).1
He seeks
compensation for lost wages, reinstatement, and monetary damages (Id. at 4, 8, 12, 16).
In addition to his written complaint, Rippley has resubmitted 39 pages of exhibits,
which are comprised of various documents he previously submitted to the EEOC and the
Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) (Doc 9 at 17-55). The exhibits include “witness
affidavits” containing his own statements about claims he made with various agencies in
relation to his employment (Id.).
The Second Amended Complaint, and the attached exhibits, are now before the Court
for screening pursuant to § 1915A because Rippley seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. Section
1915(e)(2) requires a court to dismiss any complaint if (a) the allegation of poverty is untrue; (b)
the action is frivolous or malicious, (c) the action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted; or, (d) the action seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Rippley’s previous two complaints have been dismissed pursuant
1
Rippley’s Second Amended Complaint does not name the National Labor Relations Board, Region 14
(Doc. 9). In the Order dismissing Rippley’s First Amended Complaint, and allowing him leave to file a
Second Amended Complaint, the Court clearly explained that the Second Amended Complaint would
fully supersede prior complaints (Doc. 8). Thus, the Court is treating the Second Amended Complaint as
a voluntary dismissal of any claims by Rippley against the National Labor Relations Board, Region 14.
Page | 2
to § 1915(e)(2) because the Court has determined that he has failed to state a claim (Docs. 5, 8).
After screening Rippley’s Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds that Rippley has still
failed to state a claim for the reasons set forth below.2
II.
Legal Analysis
As a part of the § 1915(e)(2) screening, the Court is required to determine if the
complaint presents any potentially meritorious factual and legal grounds. The standards for
deciding whether to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are the
same as those for reviewing claims under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dewalt
v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 611-12 (7th Cir. 2000). The complaint must contain allegations that go
beyond a merely speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A
complaint “that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). Pro se plaintiffs’ allegations are given particular lenience, and they need not be artfully
pled, so long as they present a basic story that holds together. See e.g. Swanson v. Citibank,
N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). However, if the lack of organization or coherence is too
confusing to determine which facts allegedly constitute wrongful conduct, dismissal is
appropriate.
Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that a second
amended complaint was too verbose and convoluted to justify allowing it to proceed beyond
screening even if it did present potentially meritorious claims buried as a needle amongst a
haystack).
The dismissal of this case has no bearing on Rippley’s other matter pending before this Court—16-cv0049-MJR-SCW.
2
Page | 3
Race Discrimination:
As the Court previously stated, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination via
indirect evidence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he
performed his job satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) his
employer treated similarly situated employees outside of his protected class more favorably.”
Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, Rippley alleges that as a
black man he is a member of a protected class, that he performed his job satisfactorily, that he
was terminated, and that other white males were not terminated. In support of his allegation
that there was differential treatment, Rippley alleged that white males “were catered to with
smoking breaks lunch breaks where plaintiff received none as a Black male. Plaintiff was not
allowed to congregate with other (Black males)” (Doc. 9 at 3). Rippley also contends that there
was a pattern of harassment and racial actions which “caused all protected classes to
discontinue participation and union activities, left union membership” (Id. at 11).
Rippley’s newest allegations in his Second Amended Complaint come closer to stating a
claim than his previous assertions in the sense that he attempts to set forth the clearly defined
elements—that he is a protected class member, that he performed his work satisfactorily, that he
was terminated, and that others were not. However, Rippley still fails to state a claim because
he has not indicated how there is any connection between the alleged differential treatment
(smoke breaks for others, or ‘racial actions’), his job performance, his protected status, and his
termination.
For example, it is not as if he contends that he performed poorly and was
terminated because he never got a smoke break or lunch break. Plaintiff fails to weave these bare
assertions into any sort of story that holds together.
Page | 4
Additionally, Rippley fails to provide any specifics about the job duties of the white
employees, so it is not clear that other employees performing comparable job duties were treated
differently than him. See Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 981 (7th Cir. 2014)
(noting that plaintiffs satisfied the similarly situated employee prong by comparing their
treatment to the preferential treatment of other cocktail waitresses who were given more
preferable floor assignments despite holding the same position and possessing the same
capabilities of plaintiffs). It is not enough to state a claim to merely identify facts that could be
consistent with racial discrimination practices, which is exactly what Plaintiff has done here.
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (“’naked assertions’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement’” are not sufficient to state a claim). He has identified factual
components that match the basic tenants of a race discrimination claim, but he has not provided
any story as to how these factual elements come together to constitute actual discrimination.
Given these ambiguities, the Court finds that Rippley still has not stated a proper prima facie
case of race discrimination. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed.
Age Discrimination:
Rippley’s age discrimination claim was initially dismissed because he failed to meet a
technical filing requirement involving the EEOC. His First Amended Complaint surmounted
this problem with the mere passage of time, but in that Complaint, Rippley still failed to make
out the components of an age discrimination claim, omitting critical information, such as his
own age. Here, Rippley primarily adds his own age to his age discrimination claim, alleging
that he is 58 years old, that he performed his work satisfactorily, and that younger white
employees were allowed to continue their employment. Plaintiff alleges that these facts support
Page | 5
finding a violation of his rights under the age discrimination act. However, these allegations
suffer from the same infirmity as his race discrimination claims because he fails to present a
plausible story as to how or why his age was held against him in a discriminatory fashion. The
bare legal allegation that he was discriminated based on his age, coupled with the rudimentary
facts of his own age, and the allegation that younger workers got better treatment is not enough
for this claim to proceed.
Religious Discrimination:
Rippley has checked the box for religious discrimination on one of the four forms he has
filed with this Second Amended Complaint, but he made no factual assertions or other
narrative in support of a religious discrimination claim.
Accordingly, this claim may not
proceed.
Retaliation:
Rippley conclusively asserts that he was retaliated against for acting as a whistleblower
or for filing past complaints about his work environment. Plaintiff attempted to make this same
claim in his Complaint and his First Amended Complaint. In the original screening Order, this
Court found that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim for retaliation because he did not identify
any prior EEOC filings that he was retaliated against for filing (Doc. 5 at 5-6). In the second
screening Order, this Court found that although Plaintiff had appended a variety of EEOC and
Illinois Human Rights Commission documents to his complaint, he had failed to provide any
story as to how those documents led to eventual retaliation. Thus, the Court dismissed his
retaliation claim because it was impossible to decipher what, if any, claim he was making.
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint suffers the same infirmity as the First Amended
Page | 6
Complaint. Once again he has appended approximately 30 pages of documentation that appear
to document past dealings with the EEOC and the Human Rights Commission, but he has failed
to explain how any of these documents are tied to later ‘retaliatory’ conduct by the Defendants.
Such ambiguity renders his pleading insufficient as to any claim of retaliation.
Related to his retaliation claim, Plaintiff also raised allegations in his First Amended
Complaint that he was terminated for acting as a whistleblower. The Court addressed this
potential claim in its Order dismissing the First Amended Complaint, noting that Plaintiff had
failed to provide sufficient detail to illustrate a story that held together regarding
whistleblowing (Doc. 8). In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has again included the
label “whistleblower,” but he has not included any additional explanation about the factual or
legal nature of this claim. Mere labels are insufficient to state a claim, so this claim will be
dismissed.
Due Process:
Finally, Rippley continues to allege that his due process rights were violated because he
was terminated without any warning or an opportunity to be heard. Surely the Plaintiff has
identified the basic tenants of a due process violation—that he did not get any warning or
opportunity to change his workplace conduct; that he did not get an explanation of his
employer’s potential reasons to terminate him; and, that he did not get an opportunity to tell his
side of the story prior to being terminated—but these naked assertions are not sufficient to state
a claim at this juncture. See Bodenstab v. Cnty. of Cook, 569 F.3d 651, 664 (7th Cir. 2009)
(setting forth the elements of a due process claim in the employment context); Ashcroft, 556
U.S. at 678. After reviewing his due process allegations in the First Amended Complaint, this
Page | 7
Court indicated that it was possible Rippley could make out a claim for a due process violation,
but that he would be granted leave to further develop the claim. Plaintiff has failed to abide
this directive, instead presenting the Court with the same basic facts he previously identified,
along with a citation to the case this Court identified as setting the standard for procedural due
process claims. Such threadbare pleading is not acceptable because it does not show that there
are any actual facts involving the Plaintiff’s own termination to support such a theory.
Accordingly, the Court hereby dismisses the Second Amended Complaint as to any theory of a
due process violation.
III.
Conclusion
In sum, after multiple opportunities to amend his pleadings, Plaintiff has failed to come
forth with sufficient factual and legal allegations to present any plausible claim for relief.
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is essentially a recitation of the various legal ‘elements’
of discrimination claims this Court has identified in its previous screening orders, accompanied
by a thin smattering of threadbare factual allegations that closely mirror the wording of the
elements themselves. What Rippley lacks is any sort of plausible story that explains how and
when discriminatory or violative actions were taken by the Defendants against him. The Court
warned in its prior Order that Rippley’s failure to remedy the infirmities of his First Amended
Complaint would lead to dismissal of this action with prejudice. At this juncture, the Court
finds that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate because Rippley has failed to identify any
claim sufficient to get beyond the threshold of § 1915(e) screening.
Though disfavored, dismissal with prejudice may be permissible where a plaintiff has
been given numerous chances to amend his or her pleadings and has failed to provide any
Page | 8
plausible grounds upon which a claim may proceed. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 347 (7th Cir. 2012); Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
499 F.33d 663, 666-68 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming a district court’s dismissal of a third amended
complaint where the plaintiff failed to follow very explicit directions as to how to plead their
claims in compliance with Rule 8). Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has held that dismissal is
appropriate where a plaintiff fails to remedy a precise deficiency the district court previously
identified with the plaintiff’s pleadings. General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp.,
128 F.3d 1074, 1085 (7th Cir. 1997).
Here, Rippley has been warned several times of the
deficiencies with his pleadings, and he has failed to make any indication that facts exist
sufficient to remedy the deficiencies.
Accordingly, Rippley’s Second Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED with
prejudice and without leave to file an amendment.
In light of the dismissal of Rippley’s Complaint, the Court finds it appropriate to DENY
his pending motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) and for service of process at
government expense (Doc. 4).
The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 19, 2017
s/ Michael J. Reagan
Michael J. Reagan
United States District Judge
Page | 9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?