Paige v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. et al

Filing 7

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 12/5/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CORY PAIGE, #M02717,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN DOE 1,
KIMBERLEY BUTLER,
STEPHANIE,
JOHN DOES 3-4,
CHRISTOPHER MATHIS,
KELLY PIERCE,
LT. SMOLAK,
ILL. DEPT. OF CORR.,
OFFICER KAREN, and
HOWELL,
Defendants.

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Case No. 16-cv-00858-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Cory Paige, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional
Center (“Menard”), brings this pro se action for alleged violations of his constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). In an initial threshold screening order, this Court severed a
number of Paige’s claims into a separate Complaint. The claims now before the Court for
screening are Counts 1 through 8 of that initial Order.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner
Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to
dismiss any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

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upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Complaint
Plaintiff Paige alleges that from August 14, 2015 through September 5, 2015, he was
housed in a cell at Menard that lacked hot or cold running water (Doc. 1 at 8-9). He notified
Defendants Karen and Howell of the issue, but was not relocated to a functional cell (Id. at 9).
Instead, they told him he would have to await maintenance (Id.). Paige alleges that he was
housed in the cell during very hot weather and had no ability to wash himself or to use water to
regulate his body temperature (Id.). Paige also lodged at least 3 written grievances with John
Doe 3 (lieutenant) about the conditions of the cell, to which he received no response (Id. at 9-10;
Doc. 1-1, 2-4).
In addition to the written grievances to John Doe 3 (lieutenant), Paige personally spoke to
John Doe 3 on multiple occasions while en route to chow (Doc. 1 at 10). John Doe 3 reiterated
that plumbing issues were within the purview of maintenance (Id.). John Doe 3 denied requests
for bottled water or daily showers—solutions Paige proposed while awaiting maintenance (Id.).
Paige also attempted written and verbal correspondence with John Doe 4 (major) in an effort to
address the water issue (Id. at 10-11; Doc 1-1 at 5-8). John Doe 4 also responded that water
issues were a problem reserved for maintenance (Doc. 1 at 11).
Paige decided to take his issue to Warden Butler via written grievances (Id.; Doc. 1-1 at
9-11). Butler never responded (Id.). Paige then lodged written grievances with John Doe 1
(medical director), Dr. Trost and health care administrator Gail Walls (Doc. 1 at 12; Doc. 1-1 at
12-17). In the letters, Paige stated his belief that IDOC and Wexford were responsible for

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providing him with sanitary living conditions, something that was not being done in his
condemned cell (Doc. 1 at 12; Doc. 1-1 at 12-19).
Paige generally alleges that the Defendants’ failure to respond to his grievances
constituted deliberate indifference because, as a result of the non-response, he was continually
subject to inhumane living conditions (Doc. 1 at 13).
On August 31, 2015, Paige resorted to submitting a grievance to his counselor (Mathis)
via the traditional institutional grievance form (Id. at 13-15; Doc. 1-1 at 21-22). Responses to
the grievance suggest that he was relocated by September 15, 2015 and that the institution
concluded that a faster response by maintenance either was not required or was infeasible (Doc.
1 at 13-15; Doc. 1-1 at 20-22). Paige alleges that counselor Mathis’s negative attitude tainted
Defendant Pierce’s response and lead her to pass over his grievances without taking action (Id. at
15).
Paige claims that once he was finally moved out of his condemned cell (West cell house
1005), he found himself in another cell with no water or cable plug (East cell house 823) (Doc.
15). He believes the move was retaliatory (Id.). He aired the issues about the cell to the gallery
officer, a sergeant and others, but was again told he would have to await maintenance (Id.). The
condemned cell prolonged Paige’s inability to maintain appropriate personal hygiene (Id. at 16).
Paige raised his issues with cell 823 to Defendant Smolak via written grievance (Id. at 17; Doc.
1-1 at 23-24).
Paige’s hygiene issues also interfered with his ability to practice his religion because he
was unable to wash himself daily before saying his call to prayer—as is typically required by the
Muslim faith (Doc. 1 at 17). Paige alerted Defendants Karen, Howell, Mathis and Lt. Smolak to
this problem and was told he should change his religion (Id. at 17-18).

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Paige also requested and was denied cleaning supplies he felt he needed to keep his cell
sanitary (Id. at 18-19). Consequently, he was forced to utilize soap he bought at commissary and
water from the toilet to wash himself or his cell (Id. at 19). Paige alleges that during this
timeframe, several inmates and staff contracted MRSA—giving rise to the risk of contagion (Id.
at 19-20). Paige himself contracted a rash and was called out for sick call (Id. at 20).
While he was in the waiting area, Defendant Stephanie approached him and publicly
stated “are you the one with the rash” in violation of inmate privacy (Id.). Paige protested such
treatment which annoyed Stephanie and led to poor medical care (Id. at 20-21). Stephanie
allegedly told Paige he had a skin irritation without examining him (Id. at 20-22). Paige alleges
this was due in part to her attitude and in part due to her lack of adequate training or expertise
(Id.). Records Paige appended to his Complaint suggest that he was prescribed antibiotics (Doc.
1-1 at 25-28).
Paige generally alleges that the IDOC has a burden to provide inmates with the basic
necessities of life (Id. at 23). He claims that IDOC and John Doe 1 (director) have known for
some time that Menard is an insufficient facility, and yet they continually have failed take action
(Id. at 24).

Previous lawsuits as well as reports by organizations like the John Howard

Association serve as evidence of the inadequacy of Menard (Id. at 24; Doc. 1-1 at 31-58).
Discussion
Based on the allegations, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro se Complaint into
the following enumerated claims. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion regarding their merit.

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Count 1:

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against
Defendants Karen and Howell for keeping Paige in a cell without
running water from August 14, 2015, through September 5, 2015;

Count 2:

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against John
Does 3 and 4 for ignoring Paige’s grievances about his lack of
water;

Count 3:

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against
Warden Butler for failing to address his grievances regarding the
lack of running water;

Count 4:

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against
Defendants Mathis and Pierce for their responses to Paige’s
grievances about his lack of running water;

Count 5:

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against
Defendant Smolak for his failure to address Paige’s lack of running
water in his second cell placement;

Count 6:

First Amendment restriction of religious freedom claim against
Defendants Karen, Howell, Mathis, and Smolak for interfering in
his ability to practice his religion by depriving him of daily access
to running water,

Count 7:

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendant Stephanie for improperly treating a rash he contracted
as a result of the conditions in his cell;

Count 8:

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against
Defendants IDOC and John Doe 1 (director) for knowingly
maintaining a substandard facility;

All of the claims remaining in this case are related to Paige’s conditions of confinement.
Under the Eighth Amendment, life’s necessities include shelter and heat, as well as
hygiene items. See Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Determining what conditions might constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment is a
very factually nuanced inquiry. See id. at 492-495 (collecting cases). While certain

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conditions in isolation may not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, those same
conditions taken together may state a claim. Id. at 493.
The Seventh Circuit has found that conditions such as confinement in a cold cell
without bedding or clothing, confinement without a bed for two days, denial of
clothing for three days and denial of any human interaction or personal property for
three days or more could be conditions that contribute to the existence of an Eighth
Amendment violation. See id. at 492-95. For example, in Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d
923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff identified conditions
sufficient to proceed beyond summary judgment where he alleged that he was stripped
of his clothing, was separated from his personal property and was placed in a filthy
disciplinary cell for three days.
Very recently, the Seventh Circuit found that being held in a cell with a leaky
window and no heat for 3 to 4 days in the dead of winter could amount to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. See Haywood v. Hathaway, No. 12-1678 (7th
Cir. Nov. 29, 2016). By contrast, the Seventh Circuit has found that temporary
discomforts or inconveniences are not sufficient to rise to the level of a Constitutional
violation. See e.g. Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that
being detained for five days in a roach infested cell without hygiene items was not an
Eighth Amendment violation where the incident was isolated to just one inmate);
Stewart v. Wright, 101 F.3d 704 (Table), *1, *1-2 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that three days in

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a ‘dry cell’ without running water or amenities did not constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation).
Count 1
Count 1 shall be allowed to proceed against Defendants Karen and Howell
because Paige alleges that these Defendants were on duty in his cell house during the
time that he lacked water and that they ignored his requests for assistance or relocation.
Twenty or more days in a cell without running water far exceeds the conditions
contemplated by Stewart. 101 F.3d 704 (Table), at *1-2. Paige also alleges that he
suffered harm in the form of a skin rash or irritation. Such a potential deprivation is
sufficient to proceed beyond threshold screening.
Count 2
Count 2 shall be allowed to proceed against John Does 3 and 4, the alleged
lieutenant and major of the West cell house. Given the allegations, it is plausible that
further development of the factual record could demonstrate that these defendants
played a role in Paige’s conditions of confinement.
Count 3
As to Count 3, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Butler failed to adequately
respond to Paige’s grievances about the conditions of his cell.

If Warden Butler

affirmatively knew of the conditions in Paige’s cell and failed to take any remedial

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action, there may be a plausible conditions of confinement claim. Accordingly, Count 3
will also be allowed to proceed for further development of the factual record.
Count 4
Supervisory prison officials and grievance officers are not subject to the same
degree of liability as officers interacting with inmates on a daily basis. For example, a
grievance officer reviewing a complaint about medical care or the lack thereof, may
appropriately discharge his or her duty by reviewing the grievance and following up
with medical staff to verify that an inmate is receiving care. See e.g. Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2005). A grievance official may typically assume that if an
inmate is under the care of trained medical staff, medical needs are being properly
addressed. Id.
In the context of generic deliberate indifference, a plaintiff may establish liability
by showing that a grievance officer knew of a violative condition, and deliberately and
intentionally failed to act to remedy the situation. See Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21,
22 (7th Cir. 1992). “The minimum intent required is ‘actual’ knowledge of impending
harm easily preventable.

A failure of prison officials to act in such circumstances

suggests that the officials actually want the prisoner to suffer the harm.” Id..
Here, Paige has alleged sufficient facts for his claim against grievance officials
Mathis and Pierce to proceed beyond threshold screening. Specifically, he explicitly,
alleges that these officials were aware of his confinement in a non-functional cell and

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that they failed to address the issue.

A grievance he appended to his Complaint

suggests that they did not pass judgment on his grievance until after he had already
been moved to a functional cell. If the Defendants did not learn of the conditions of his
cell until after he was relocated, that could jeopardize the viability of a conditions of
confinement claim against them. However, at this juncture, the Court will not dismiss
the claim outright.
Count 5
Paige alleges that once he was moved to a different cell in early September 2015,
the new cell still lacked running water. He reported the issue to Defendant Smolak,
who insisted that he would have to wait for help from the maintenance department. It
is unclear how long Paige was forced to stay in the second cell without running water
or if he suffered specific harm as a result of his confinement in that cell. However, the
Court cannot say at this juncture that there are no facts to support a viable claim.
Accordingly, Count 5 will be allowed to proceed against Defendant Smolak.
Count 6
A prisoner's right to freely exercise his religious beliefs does not depend upon his
ability to pursue each and every aspect of the practice of his religion. See O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987); Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 48 (7th Cir.
1990). A prison may restrict a prisoner's ability to adhere absolutely to a particular
tenet of his religion and if the prison has sound penological interests supporting the

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restriction, and if those interests outweigh the prisoner's religious interests, the
restriction does not violate the First Amendment. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 352; Hunafa, 907
F.2d at 48. Paige’s claim for restriction of his religious freedom will be allowed to
proceed beyond screening for development of a more comprehensive factual record
regarding the alleged deprivation, the prison’s justifications (if any) for the deprivation
and the impact of the deprivation on his religious freedom. Thus, Count 6 shall proceed
against all Defendants named in connection with the deprivation—Karen, Howell,
Mathis and Smolak.
Count 7
Paige alleges that Defendant Stephanie exhibited deliberate indifference to his
serious medical condition—a skin rash—that he contracted as a result of his cell
conditions. Specifically, he alleges that Stephanie exhibited deliberate indifference by
failing to examine his skin condition. A rash may or may not be a sufficiently serious
medical condition to state a claim for deliberate indifference, but at this stage of the
litigation, the Court will assume, without deciding, that a rash is sufficient.
In the context of a deliberate indifference claim, “knowledge and intent may be pleaded
generally (which is to say, in a conclusory fashion), [and] the lack of detail does not permit
dismissal.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009). “It is enough to lay out a
plausible grievance. A prisoner’s statement that he repeatedly alerted medical personnel to a
serious medical condition, that they did nothing in response and that permanent injury ensued, is

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enough to state a claim on which relief may be granted—if it names the persons responsible for
the problem.” Id.
However, a claim for medical negligence does not amount to deliberate indifference.
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997). Medical malpractice, negligence and
even gross negligence does not equate to deliberate indifference. Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d
1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006). “It is not enough to show, for instance, that a doctor should have
known that surgery was necessary; rather, the doctor must know that surgery was necessary and
then consciously disregard that need in order to be held deliberately indifferent.” Id.
Based on the facts set forth in the Complaint, the Court will not allow Paige’s deliberate
indifference claim to proceed against Defendant Stephanie.

Paige alleges that she was

deliberately indifferent to his need because she provided an ineffective cream for his rash.
However, the records he appended to his Complaint show that approximately two weeks later, he
received antibiotics for the rash. To the extent Stephanie erred by prescribing a cream, the error
appears to constitute negligence at best and is thus insufficient to state a claim for deliberate
indifference. Additionally, Paige does not allege that he suffered any lasting harm as a result of
the rash incident. Accordingly, Count 7 will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim.
Count 8
Finally, turning to the conditions of confinement claim against IDOC and John
Doe 1 (director), Paige alleges that these defendants were aware of the infirmities of the
Menard facility based on external reports on prison conditions and prior lawsuits. In
support of this claim, Paige attached to his Complaint two recent monitoring reports by
third-parties regarding the conditions of Menard facilities (Doc. 1-1 at 31-58). Paige also
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claims that since at least 2010, these defendants were on notice of the problems in
Menard from a lawsuit he refers to as Lippert v. Wexford (Doc. 1 at 24), wherein a court
allegedly found that Wexford was inadequately staffed to attend to the medical needs
of inmates.
First, as to Defendant IDOC, a claim may only proceed against IDOC to the
extent it seeks injunctive relief. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989); see also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money damages). Here, Paige
does seek injunctive relief in the form of an institutional transfer, but it does not appear
that he is seeking this relief specifically in relation to his conditions of confinement
claim. Rather, it appears that he is seeking injunctive relief due to his ongoing medical
issue (chronic head pain and a brain tumor—claims severed into a separate case). Paige
does not claim that he is still being housed in a cell without running water or that he
specifically fears this harm in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, his conditions of
confinement claim against IDOC shall be dismissed without prejudice because Paige
does not seek the type of relief the Court can grant for this claim.
Second, as to Defendant John Doe 1 (director), the claim for conditions of
confinement will also be dismissed without prejudice. Section 1983 liability is premised
in large part upon personal liability for harm that befalls prisoners. Though, in some
circumstances, a § 1983 claim can be made against a supervisory official, an inmate

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must demonstrate that the official was alerted to the issue and refused or declined to
exercise his or her authority to address the issue. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993-94 (7th
Cir. 1996). The strongest assertion Paige has made in this regard is that there were
reports about the status of Menard and that there were other lawsuits that should have
put John Doe 1 (director) on notice of the problems. However, this allegation is too
conclusory to state a claim.
The reports that Paige appended to his Complaint are from 2011 and 2013 (Doc.
1-1 at 31-58). The date does not invalidate the contents of the reports, but it does leave
open the possibility that in the intervening years from 2013 to 2016, the “director” could
have taken steps to remedy the conditions. Paige does not explain how the director was
personally aware of his conditions of confinement issue. Nor does Paige allege that he
sent correspondence to the director on a specific date or during a specific time frame
and received no response.

Taken together, these deficiencies make Paige’s claim

implausible at this juncture. Accordingly, Count 8 as to John Doe 1 (director) shall be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to allege any causal link between this defendant
and the harm Paige alleges as a result of poor conditions of confinement.
Identification of Unknown Defendants
Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Count 2 against John Does 3 and 4
whose names are currently unknown. However, these parties must be identified with
particularity before service of the Complaint can be made on them. Where a prisoner’s

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complaint states specific allegations describing conduct of individual prison staff
members sufficient to raise a constitutional claim, but the names of those defendants are
not known, the prisoner should have the opportunity to engage in limited discovery to
ascertain the identity of those defendants. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577
F.3d 816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009).
In this case, Paige has attempted to provide identifying information in the form
of the position of these individuals in his housing unit—John Doe 3 (“lieutenant”), and
John Doe 4 (“major”).

To the extent that this information helps to identify the

defendants, officials are urged to cooperate with formal or informal discovery to assist
the Plaintiff in ascertaining the identity of these individuals. Additional guidelines for
discovery will be set by the United States Magistrate Judge.
“Depending on the particular circumstances of the case, the court may assist the
plaintiff by providing counsel for the limited purpose of amending the complaint; by
ordering the named defendants to disclose the identities of unnamed officials involved;
by allowing the case to proceed to discovery against high-level administrators with the
expectation that they will identify the officials personally responsible; by dismissing the
complaint without prejudice and providing a list of defects in the complaint; by
ordering service on all officers who were on duty during the incident in question; or by
some other means.” Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 95 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 1996).

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Under the circumstances presented, the Court finds that the Warden at Menard is best
suited to respond to discovery aimed at identifying the unknown personnel at the
facility. Accordingly, Warden Jeff Hutchinson will be formally added as a defendant, in
his official capacity only, for the sole purpose of assisting in identifying the unnamed
parties. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21; FED. R. CIV. P. 17(d). Once the names of John Does 3-4 are
discovered, Plaintiff shall file a motion to substitute the newly identified Defendants in
place of the generic designation in the case caption and throughout the Complaint.
Upon receipt of said motion, this Court will substitute the names of the parties for John
Does 3 and 4 and service will proceed against those parties. At that time, the Court will
also dismiss the Warden of Menard.
Disposition
IT IS ORDERED that COUNTS 7 AND 8 are DISMISSED without prejudice
against Defendants STEPHANIE, IDOC and JOHN DOE 1 (director) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The CLERK is DIRECTED to ADD Defendant JEFF HUTCHISON, Warden of
Menard, for the sole purpose of assisting in identifying JOHN DOES 3 and 4.
IT IS ORDERED that COUNTS 1-6 shall receive further review against
Defendants KAREN, HOWELL, JOHN DOES 3 AND 4, BUTLER, MATHIS, PIERCE,
and SMOLAK. With respect to COUNTS 1-6 the Clerk of Court shall prepare for
DEFENDANTS KAREN, HOWELL, BUTLER, MATHIS, PIERCE, SMOLAK, and

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JEFF HUTCHISON: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a
Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to
mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each
Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign
and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from
the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal
service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full
costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address
provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current
work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information
shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting
service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address
information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Service shall not be made on the unknown “John Doe” Defendants until such
time as Plaintiff has identified them by name in a properly filed amended complaint.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the Court with the
names and service addresses for these individuals.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an
appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for

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consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a
certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of the document was served
on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge
that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to include a certificate of service will
be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision
on Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 4). Further, this entire matter
shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Daly for disposition, pursuant to
Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
regardless of the fact that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and
costs or give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to
have entered into a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be

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paid to the Clerk of the Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against
plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff. Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the
Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing
and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to
comply with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and
may result in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 5, 2016
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
U.S. District Judge

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