Felts-Ping et al v. Williamson County Education Services et al

Filing 56

ORDER GRANTING 31 Motion to Dismiss; GRANTING 33 Motion for More Definite Statement; DENYING as untimely 42 Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs are GRANTED leave to file an Amended Complaint in accordance with the instructions provided in this Order on, or before, July 24, 2017. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 6/21/17. (jkb2)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
J.P., a minor, and MARIONNA
FELTS-PING,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
WILLIAMSON COUNTY EDUCATION )
SERVICES, WILLIAMSON COUNTY
)
SPECIAL EDUCATION DISTRICT,
)
MARION COMMUNITY UNIT
)
SCHOOL DISTRICT #2,
)
CHRISTOPHER ROBERTS, CYNTHIA )
ALLEN, JAMI HODGE, MELISSA
)
COCKBURN, CHUCK WILLIAMSON, )
BECKY MOSS, and KEITH OATES,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 3:16-CV00879--NJR-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Pending before the Court are three motions: (1) a Motion to Dismiss, alleging
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, filed by Defendants Williamson
County Education Services, Williamson County Special Education District, Christopher
Roberts, Cynthia Allen, Jami Hodge and Melissa Cockburn (collectively “Williamson
County”) (Doc. 31); (2) a Motion to Make More Definite, Strike, and Dismiss, filed by
Defendants Marion Community Unit School #2, Chuck Williamson, Becky Moss, and
Keith Oates (collectively “Marion School”) (Doc. 33); and (3) a Motion to Strike filed by
Williamson County (Doc. 42). For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) grants both
Williamson County’s Motion to Dismiss and Marion School’s Motion to Make More
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Definite, Strike and Dismiss; (2) denies Williamson County’s Motion to Strike as
untimely 1; (3) dismisses the Complaint; and (4) grants Plaintiff (Felts-Ping) leave to file
an Amended Complaint consistent with the instructions listed in the “Expectations for
Refiling” section below.
ANALYSIS
This case arises out of a dispute between the minor plaintiff, J.P., his mother,
Marionna Felts-Ping, and Defendants Williamson County and Marion School. Felts-Ping
alleges federal law and constitutional violations of her son’s rights under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12132, as well as the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. (Doc. 1, pp. 11-17). In addition, Felts-Ping alleges nine separate but related
state law violations. (Doc. 1, pp. 17-32). All of the claims appear to be based on a series of
incidents at J.P.’s school, allegedly involving a teacher and aide repeatedly grabbing J.P.
and locking him in a closet for extended periods of time, causing him physical,
emotional, educational, and behavioral injuries. (Doc 1. ¶¶ 54-64).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” Here, the
Complaint is thirty-two pages long, contains fourteen separate legal claims, and over 182
paragraphs. Although the first eighty-six paragraphs are dedicated to a statement of the
1

On September 12, 2016, Williamson County filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Answer or
Otherwise Plead. (Doc. 29). The Court granted an extension of time, up to and including October 11, 2016,
for Williamson County to either file an Answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff’s complaint.
(Doc. 30)(emphasis added). While Williamson County filed a Motion to Dismiss prior to the October 11,
2016 deadline (Doc. 31), the Motion to Strike (Doc. 42) was not filed until two weeks after. As a result, the
filing was untimely and is therefore denied by the Court. Further, even if the Motion to Strike was filed in
a timely manner, given the Court’s granting of Williamson County’s Motion to Dismiss, the Motion to
Strike is moot.

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facts, either no, or very few, of those facts are included in twelve of the fourteen counts.
Rather, Felts-Ping simply incorporates by reference all of the prior paragraphs and
leaves the Court and opposing parties to determine which facts are relevant to a
particular claim. Further, while the title of each count identifies a legally cognizable
claim, Felts-Ping does not list the relevant legal standard in all but one of the fourteen
counts.
The various motions to dismiss identify eleven bases for dismissal (not including
additional arguments related to the prayer for relief). (Doc. 31, pp. 2-19; Doc. 34, pp. 1-5).
As a threshold issue, however, both the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Make More
Definite allege Felts-Ping’s entire Complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. (Doc. 31 ¶ 7 ; Doc. 33 ¶ 5).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) requires plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies under
the Individual with Disabilities Act (IDEA) before filing an action under either the
Americans with Disabilities Act or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act—but only if the
plaintiff seeks “relief” that is also “available” under the IDEA. Fry v. Napoleon Community
Schools, 137 S.Ct. 743, 752 (2017). A plaintiff cannot avoid the requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies simply by bringing her claim under a different statute. Id. at
754.
The parties properly briefed the exhaustion issue. However, since filing their
memorandum of law, the United States Supreme Court in Fry v. Napoleon Community
Schools abrogated the seminal Seventh Circuit case. See Fry, 137 S.Ct. at 755 (abrogating
Charlie F. v. Board of Ed. of Skokie School Dist., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996)). Under Fry, the

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Supreme Court held that the test for determining whether exhaustion of the IDEA’s
administrative process is required hinges on whether the lawsuit “seeks relief for denial
of a free and appropriate public education” (FAPE). Fry, 137 S.Ct. at 754. Contrary to the
Seventh Circuit’s approach under Charlie F., the Supreme Court requires courts to
specifically look at the type of relief requested.
That inquiry makes central the plaintiff’s own claims, as
§ 1415(l) explicitly requires. The statutory language asks
whether a lawsuit in fact “seeks” relief available under the
IDEA – not, as a stricter exhaustion statute might, whether
the suit “could have sought” relief available under the IDEA
(or, what is much the same, whether any remedies ‘are”
available under that law)…[The plaintiff] is the “master of
the claim”… she identifies its remedial basis – and is subject
to exhaustion or not based on that choice.
Id. at 755 (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 and n.7 (1987)).
This does not mean the court should look solely at labels or terms listed in the
plaintiff’s complaint. Fry, 137 S.Ct. at 755. Rather, the question is whether the gravamen
of the complaint seeks redress for a school’s failure to provide a FAPE. Id. If so, then
exhaustion of administrative remedies is required. Id. Since an administrative hearing
officer is only authorized to grant relief for violations of a child’s FAPE, any claims
requesting relief unrelated to a FAPE do not require the plaintiff to exhaust
administrative remedies. Id. at 754 (emphasis added). As an example, the court notes
that the IDEA guarantees individualized instruction and related services to children
with certain disabilities, while § 504 and the ADA prohibits discrimination against
individuals based on their disability. Id. Presumably, if a plaintiff is seeking redress for
violations of discriminatory behavior only precluded by § 504 and the ADA, a FAPE is

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not implicated and exhaustion is not required. Id. at 756.
In order to determine whether a plaintiff seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE, the
Fry court anticipated asking two questions. Fry, 137 S.Ct. at 755. First, could the plaintiff
have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public
facility that was not a school? Id. Second, could an adult at the school have raised
essentially the same grievance? Id. If the answer to those questions is “yes,” a complaint
is unlikely to truly be about a FAPE, and exhaustion is not required. Id. However, if the
answer is “no,” then the complaint probably does concern a FAPE, regardless of whether
it is expressed under that theory. Id. Here, as pled, the Court is unable to determine from
the Complaint how to answer the two Fry questions.
A third issue the Fry court considered is whether a plaintiff has previously
invoked the IDEA’s administrative process to handle the dispute. Fry, 137 S.Ct. at 755.
Filing an administrative complaint, and then switching to a judicial proceeding before
exhausting that administrative process, could be evidence that the underlying claims
relate to a FAPE. Id. The court noted, however, that the decision to switch to a judicial
complaint could also be based on a plaintiff’s recognition that the school had in fact
provided a FAPE, and that their claims therefore fall under a different legal theory. Id.
As a result, this third analysis is a very fact specific inquiry. Id.
Here, according to Felts-Ping’s response to the various motions, an IDEA
administrative hearing appears to be pending. (Doc. 44, p. 8). Felts-Ping states that
administrative remedies have been pursued under ISBE Case No. 2017-0002. (Doc. 44, p.
8). Based on the cause number alone, it appears that the administrative complaint was

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filed in 2017, after this cause of action was initiated. Further, Felts-Ping’s request that
they be allowed to “amend their Complaint so that they may add allegations regarding
the current state of their efforts to exhaust…” suggests that the administrative process is
still underway. (Doc. 44, p. 8). Because the facts and reasoning underlying the
administrative claims are unknown, it is impossible for the Court to engage in the fact
specific analysis required of the third Fry topic.
Given the significant change to the law, and the current state of the pleadings, the
Court is unable to determine the threshold question of whether exhaustion of
administrative remedies is required in this case. Accordingly, the Court grants both
Williamson County’s and Marion School’s requests to dismiss the complaint. As
previously indicated, however, Felts-Ping is given leave to file an Amended Complaint
consistent with the expectations listed in the next section.
EXPECTATIONS FOR REFILING
In order for the Court to understand and efficiently resolve the dispute between
the parties, the following guidelines should be adhered to by the parties when filing
pleadings:
1. Each claim for relief or affirmative defense shall identify the legal authority that
is the basis for the claim (e.g., a citation to the statute that is the basis for a battery claim
under Illinois law);
2. Each claim for relief or affirmative defense shall include a statement of the legal
test that is the basis for the claim (e.g., the elements of the prima facie case for battery
under Illinois law);

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3. Each claim for relief or affirmative defense shall list specific facts supporting a
plausible claim to relief. The Court expects that the parties will do more than simply
incorporate all facts listed in a statement of facts section or prior arguments; and
4. Each claim for relief shall include sufficient facts for the court to assess whether
the exhaustion of administrative remedies is required pursuant to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 137 S.Ct. 743, 752 (2017).
CONCLUSION
The Motion to Dismiss filed by Williamson County (Doc. 31) is GRANTED. The
Motion to Make More Definite, Strike and Dismiss filed by Marion School (Doc. 33) is
GRANTED. The Motion to Strike filed by Williamson County (Doc. 42) is DENIED as
untimely. Plaintiffs J.P and Felts-Ping are GRANTED leave to file an Amended
Complaint in accordance with the instructions provided in this Order on, or before, July
24, 2017.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 21, 2017
/s/Nancy J. Rosenstengel
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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