Thomas v. Bost et al

Filing 1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER severing case number 15-988-NJR. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 8/8/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
FRANK THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH SPLITTORFF,
BOST,
LAKIN,
ROBERT A. HOLLENBECK,
ROBERT BLANKENSHIP, and
VALERIE BASSETT,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15 cv–0988 NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Frank Thomas brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning events that allegedly occurred while he
was a pretrial detainee at the Madison County Jail. Plaintiff seeks compensatory
damages and injunctive relief. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening.– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in
any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.– On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or
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(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although
the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d
418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that
they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, courts “should not accept as adequate abstract
recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the
same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
This is not Plaintiff’s first bite at the apple. Plaintiff originally filed his complaint
on September 4, 2015. The Court dismissed that complaint on October 5, 2015, for
failure to state a claim and directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint no later than
November 2, 2015. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on October 21, 2015,
along with a motion seeking leave to file it. (see Docs. 9, 10). As the Court previously
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directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, and the amended complaint has been
filed on the docket, Plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to file is moot.
Also, after reviewing records from the Illinois Department of Corrections, it
appears that Plaintiff has been transferred to Robinson Correctional Center as of
January 8, 2016. Although previously directed to keep the Court informed of his
whereabouts, Plaintiff has not filed a notice of change of address. Plaintiff is once again
reminded of his obligation to keep the Court informed of his current address. Also,
Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief regarding certain Madison County Jail policies are
now moot because he is no longer subject to those policies, and those claims will not be
addressed further.
Upon careful review of the complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court
finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; portions of this action are
severable.
The Amended Complaint
Although initially Plaintiff attempted to bring claims on behalf of both himself
and his adult daughter, the amended complaint lists only Frank Thomas in the case
caption. (Doc. 10, p. 1). The Court takes that to mean that Thomas is now bringing
claims only on his own behalf.
Plaintiff alleges that on July 27, 2015, detectives with the Alton police
department, including Splittorff, arrested Plaintiff and his daughter, Rashonda Barnes
without a proper warrant. (Doc. 10, p. 1, 7). Plaintiff alleges that the Alton police acted
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without warrants and improperly coerced Plaintiff and Barnes into making statements
without Miranda warnings, in violation of their constitutional rights. (Doc. 10, p. 1).
Plaintiff alleges he told Splittorff twice that he did not want to speak, but that Splittorff
continued to ask him questions anyway. (Doc. 10, p. 4). Splittorff also allegedly coerced
Plaintiff into confessing by threatening to put charges on his daughter if he did not
confess. (Doc. 10, p. 7). Plaintiff also alleges that his personal property was searched and
confiscated in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 10, p. 1).
Plaintiff was eventually transferred to the Madison County Jail. (Doc. 10, p. 1).
While at the jail, Plaintiff alleges that Bost denied him access to legal materials and the
lack of access interfered with his ability to prepare his defense along with his appointed
attorney. (Doc. 10, p. 1; Doc. 10-2, p.1). Along with access, Bost also denied Plaintiff
paper, stamps, envelops, and free copies. (Doc. 10, p. 2, Doc. 10-2, p. 1). Hollenbeck also
refused to notarize Plaintiff’s legal papers. (Doc. 10-3, p. 4). Hollenbeck also cracked
jokes about the charges on Plaintiff on July 31, 2015. (Doc. 10-3, p. 5).
Further, Plaintiff has been denied a copy of the Qur’an, a prayer rug, and porkfree meals, which he needs in order to exercise his religious beliefs. (Doc. 10, p. 2). There
were also no services for Muslim inmates at the Madison County jail. (Doc. 10-1, p. 1).
Plaintiff specifically requested this relief from Lakin, only to be denied. (Doc. 10-1, p. 1).
In October 2015, Richert cursed at Plaintiff. (Doc. 10-3, p. 3). Plaintiff responded
in kind. (Doc. 10-3, p. 3). Richert then retaliated against Plaintiff for cursing by
summoning Court and Schmidt and placing Plaintiff in the day room. (Doc. 10-3, p. 3).
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The officers then shook down Plaintiff’s cell, confiscating his legal papers and personal
property, and placing him on lockdown for 48 hours. (Doc. 10-3, p. 3).
Plaintiff alleges that when he arrived at Madison County Jail, he underwent a
medical screening at which Plaintiff told Blankenship that he suffered from
hemorrhoids, scoliosis, arthritis, and that he has an allergy to Motrin and Ibuprofen.
(Doc. 10-3, p. 6). Nonetheless, Plaintiff was given Motrin and Ibuprofen for three and a
half weeks, which caused him to develop a rash on his back. (Doc. 10-3, p. 6).
Blankenship also failed to respond to Plaintiff’s complaints that he was bleeding from
his nose and anus and failed to adequately treat Plaintiff’s rash from the medication.
(Doc. 10-3, p. 7). Bassett also failed to adequately treat Plaintiff. (Doc. 10-3, p. 7).
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide
the pro se action into eight counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations
in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this
Court.
Count One:

Splittorff arrested Plaintiff without a warrant or
probable cause in violation of the Fourth
Amendment;

Count Two:

Splittorff improperly interrogated Plaintiff
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights;

Count Three:

Splittorff searched and confiscated Plaintiff’s property
without a warrant or probable cause, in violation of
the Fourth Amendment;
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in

Count Four:

Bost and Hollenbeck denied Plaintiff access to the
courts when they refused to provide him with law
library access or adequate supplies, and refused to
notarize his papers;

Count Five:

Hollenbeck cracked jokes at Plaintiff’s expense;

Count Six:

Lakin interfered with Plaintiff’s First Amendment
rights to practice his religion by denying him a copy
of the Qur’an, a prayer mat, a religious diet, and by
declining to hold services for inmates of the Muslim
faith;

Count Seven:

Richert retaliated against Plaintiff for cursing and
using profanity by shaking down his cell in October
2015; and

Count Eight:

Blankenship and Bassett were deliberately indifferent
to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

Here, Plaintiff has brought several discrete groups of claims. Counts One-Three
all stem from Plaintiff’s initial arrest and detention, and there is no allegation that any
of the Madison County jail defendants had anything to do with the conduct about
which Plaintiff complains. Additionally, Plaintiff’s Madison County Jail claims do not
appear to have any relationship with each other. There is no allegation that Plaintiff
believes that his access to court claim is connected to his deliberate indifference claim or
his free exercise claim. The claims mostly involve different defendants and different
discretionary decisions. For these reasons, the Court finds that it is appropriate to sever
claims into new cases pursuant to George v. Smith
In George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit emphasized
that unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate lawsuits, “not only
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to prevent the sort of morass” produced by multi-claim, multi-defendant suits, “but
also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees” under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act. George, 507 F.3d at 607 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(g)). Claims against
different defendants, which do not arise from a single transaction or occurrence (or a
series of related transactions/occurrences) and do not share a common question of law
or fact, may not be joined in the same lawsuit. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2). Further, a
prisoner who files a “buckshot complaint” that includes multiple unrelated claims
against different individuals should not be allowed to avoid “risking multiple strikes
for what should have been several different lawsuits.” Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005,
1011 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court has broad discretion as to whether to sever claims
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 or to dismiss improperly joined
defendants. See Owens v. Hinsely, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); Rice v. Sunrise Express,
Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff’s claims fall roughly into five groups: (1) claims against Splittorff for
events that happened related to his arrest; (2) claims against Defendants Bost and
Hollenbeck; (3) a free exercise claim; (4) a retaliation claim; and (5) deliberate
indifference claims. There are different defendants across the five claim groupings, and
none of the groups shares a common nucleus of facts or events. For these reasons, the
Court shall sever Plaintiff’s claims into four other cases and assess a new filing fee as to
the other cases.

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Consistent with the George decision and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, the
Court shall sever the claims in Counts Four and Five (which are unrelated to Counts
One-Three or Six-Eight) into a separate action. The Court also shall sever Count Six into
its own case, Count Seven into its own case, and Count Eight into its own case; all cases
to contain one count each. The four severed cases shall have newly-assigned case
numbers. Plaintiff shall be assessed four more filing fees for the newly severed cases.
The severed cases shall undergo preliminary review pursuant to 1915A after new case
numbers and judge assignments have been made.
Counts One, Two, and Three shall remain in this action. A separate order shall be
issued in this case to review the merits of these claims. Plaintiff shall be provided with a
copy of the merits review order as soon as it is entered. No service shall be ordered on
any defendant at this time.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims in COUNTS FOUR and FIVE
and COUNTS SIX, SEVEN, and EIGHT which are unrelated to the claims in COUNTS
ONE, TWO, and THREE are SEVERED into four new cases, with one case to contain
Counts Four and Five together against Defendants BOST and HOLLENBECK, and the
other cases to contain Count Six singly against LAKIN alone, Count Seven against
REICHERT, and Count Eight against BLANKENSHIP and BASSETT.

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The claims in the newly severed cases shall be subject to merits review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A after the new case number and judge assignment is made. In the
new cases, the Clerk is DIRECTED to file the following documents:
This Memorandum and Order
The Amended Complaint (Doc. 10)
Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 13)
Plaintiff will be responsible for an additional $350.00 filing fee in all four of the
newly severed cases. No service shall be ordered in the severed cases until the § 1915A
review is completed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the only claims remaining in this action are
Counts One, Two, and Three against Defendant Splittorff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants BOST, LAKIN, HOLLENBECK,
BLANKENSHIP, and BASSETT are TERMINATED from this action with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend his
Complaint (Doc. 9) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 8, 2016
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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