Muenstermann v. USA, et al

Filing 61

ORDER GRANTING Defendant Totall Metal Recycling Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19 ). Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 3/6/2017. (tfs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ANTON MUENSTERMANN,
administrator of the Estate of TYLER
MUENSTERMANN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
TOTALL MATAL RECYCLING, INC.,
DARAN, INC., and VERSAR, INC.,

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Case No. 16-CV-932-SMY-SCW

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Totall Metal Recycling’s (“TMR”) Motion
to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
(Doc. 19). TMR asserts this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim against
them because it is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Illinois Workers’
Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/5(a). Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. 35). TMR filed a
Reply with leave of the Court (Doc. 46). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff filed this wrongful death action, alleging that the USA and TMR caused a live
mortar shell to be transferred from the U.S. Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin,
California to TMR’s facility in Granite City, Illinois. The mortar shell eventually exploded at
TMR’s facility, killing Plaintiff’s decedent.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), “[i]f the court determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” At the motion to
dismiss stage, the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and draw
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir.

1995). “A plaintiff need not put all of the essential facts in the complaint; he may add them by
affidavit or brief in order to defeat a motion to dismiss if the facts are consistent with the
allegations of the complaint.” Help At Home Inc. v. Med. Capital, L.L.C., 260 F.3d 748, 752–53
(7th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).
When an injury occurs in the workplace, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820
ILCS 305/1 et seq., provides the exclusive remedy for accidental injuries. Under the Act, “an
employee has no right to recover damages from the employer or its agents or employees for
accidental injuries incurred in the course of employment.” Hunt-Golliday v. Metro. Water
Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 104 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1997).

To avoid

preemption by the Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate one of the following: (i) the injury was not
accidental, (ii) the injury did not arise from her employment, (iii) the injury was not received
during the course of her employment, or (iv) the injury is not compensable under the Act. Id.
Plaintiff’s sole argument is that the death was not accidental because “TMR knew that it
was transporting unexploded mortars and ordnance . . . in violation of 18 USC § 842(a)(3)(A).”
(Doc. 35 p. 3). “As a result of TMR’s intentional and illegal action, one of the mortars received
from Ft. Irwin exploded and killed Tyler Muenstermann.” Id. TMR correctly points out that, in
order for the “not accidental” exception to apply, “the employer must specifically intend that its
actions would injure the employee.” See Glasgow v. Associated Banc-Corp, 2012 IL App (2d)
111303, ¶ 20, 980 N.E.2d 785, 790.
Here, Plaintiff merely alleges TMR acted intentionally in transporting dangerous
materials, not that TMR acted intentionally in injuring Plaintiff’s decedent. Moreover, any
allegation of TMR’s intent to injure Tyler Muenstermann would fly in the face of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, which alleges a claim of negligence. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against TMR is
preempted by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and TMR’s Motion to Dismiss is

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GRANTED. Count II of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 6, 2017
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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