Suggs v. Lashbrook et al

Filing 10

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 11/21/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
QUENTIN SUGGS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACQUELINE LASHBROOK,
BETSEY SPILLER,
CHRISTINE BROWN, and
DR. SHAH,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:16-cv-0944-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
Plaintiff Quentin Suggs is currently incarcerated at the Pinckneyville Correctional Center
in Pinckneyville, Illinois. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Proceeding pro se, Suggs has filed a complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that medical staff and prison officials at Pinckneyville have failed to
provide proper treatment for his chronic hemorrhoid condition from at least 2015 to the present.
(Id. at 5-7.) Suggs seeks punitive and compensatory damages. (Id. at 6.)
This matter is now before the Court for a review of Suggs’ complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court shall review a “complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a government
entity.” During the § 1915A review, the court “shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint,” if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim” or if it “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune.”

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Background
According to Suggs’ complaint and the grievances he attached to it, Suggs has been
incarcerated at Pinckneyville since at least 2015. (Doc. 1-1 at 3.) From early 2015 to June 2015,
Suggs met with Dr. Shah about his chronic hemorrhoid problem, and while Dr. Shah did not
completely ignore his problem during those visits, he persisted in the use of “medication and
hemorrhoidal creams” and other treatment that had no effect on his condition. (See id. at 3-4.)
Dr. Shah’s attitude towards treatment evidently continued into late 2015—Suggs saw Dr. Shah
again on October 19, 2015 and reported that his hemorrhoids were flaring, and Dr. Shah told
Suggs that the next time his condition flared up that he should “stick [his] but[t] in the toilet.”
(Id. at 6.) Suggs told Dr. Shah that he could not fit his backside into the toilet, but Dr. Shah
suggested a sitz bath and then told Suggs that he could leave. (See id.)
On January 28, 2016, Suggs saw Dr. Scott, another physician at the prison, and told him
that he had not received the medications that Dr. Shah had prescribed for some time and that the
medications that he had received were not working. (Id. at 1.) Suggs also told Dr. Scott that he
had requested through Dr. Shah to be sent to an outside hospital, but that request was denied.
(Id.) Dr. Scott gave Suggs the medications that Dr. Shah had previously prescribed and he was
slated to see Dr. Scott again in February 2016. (Id. at 2.) Suggs saw Dr. Scott two more times
and, when Suggs told Dr. Scott that the medications still were not helping him, Dr. Scott wrote a
“note for general surgery.” (Id.) On March 7, 2016, the order for general surgery was denied by
unspecified officials at Pinckneyville. (Id.) On October 19, 2016, Suggs saw Dr. Shah again,
and while the complaint is a bit vague about the content of that meeting, Suggs apparently
complained to Dr. Shah about the pain caused by his hemorrhoid condition, his need to have
surgery to treat his condition, and the ongoing ineffectiveness of the medications that had been

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used to date. (See Doc. 1 at 5.) Again, while the complaint is unclear, it appears as if surgery
was denied again by Dr. Shah and that there was no change in treatment. (See id.)
Throughout his tenure at Pinckneyville, Suggs claims that he filed grievances concerning
his hemorrhoid care. (Id. at 4.) Unsatisfied with the prison’s response, he filed suit in this Court
on August 24, 2016. Before the Court could conduct a threshold review of his complaint, the
Court advised Suggs that his complaint could not be assessed because it was unsigned. (Doc. 7.)
Suggs has since submitted a signed complaint, so his case is ready for threshold review.
Discussion
The Court begins its § 1915A review with a note about the parties at issue in this case. In
the grievances attached to his complaint, Suggs references the conduct of Dr. Scott, who seems
to have provided some treatment for Suggs in early 2016. Because Dr. Scott is not listed in the
caption or the defendant list, he will not be treated as a defendant in this case, and any claims
against him should be considered dismissed without prejudice. See Myles v. United States, 416
F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (defendants must be “specif[ied] in the caption”).
Turning to the substantive allegations in Suggs’ complaint, the Court finds it proper to
divide the claims in the complaint into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use
these designations in all pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by the Court.
COUNT 1:

From 2015 to October 2016, Dr. Shah failed to properly treat Suggs’
hemorrhoid condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.

COUNT 2:

From 2015 to October 2016, Lashbrook, Spiller, and Brown failed to
properly treat Suggs’ hemorrhoid condition, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Suggs’ complaint begins with allegations linked to Dr. Shah’s medical care, so the Court
will start there (Count 1). The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution bars the

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cruel and unusual punishment of prisoners, and prison officials violate this proscription “when
they display deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2005). To bring an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a prisoner has
two hurdles to clear: he must first show that his medical condition is “objectively” serious, and
he must then allege that the medical professionals that he has named as defendants acted with the
requisite state of mind. Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2002).
For screening purposes, Suggs has alleged the existence of an objectively serious medical
condition. An objectively serious condition is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001).
Factors that indicate a serious condition include “the existence of an injury that a reasonable
doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a
medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of
chronic and substantial pain.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). Here,
Suggs’ hemorrhoid condition qualifies as serious at this early stage. See id. at 1372 n.7.
Suggs has also sufficiently alleged that Dr. Shah acted with deliberate indifference at the
screening stage. To be sure, “medical malpractice, negligence, or even gross negligence” by a
physician “does not equate to deliberate indifference,” Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001,
1012-13 (7th Cir. 2006). Because deliberate indifference is such a demanding state of mind
requirement, there is no constitutional violation merely because a physician’s treatments
ultimately prove ineffective, Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2008), nor is
there a constitutional violation solely because a doctor refuses to give a prisoner the exact
treatment he wishes, Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). That said, deliberate

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indifference can exist if a professional’s decision represents “such a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Estate of Cole by Pardue v.
Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 261-62 (7th Cir. 1996). It can also exist when an official fails to provide
any treatment for a medical condition, Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 623-24 (7th Cir. 2010),
when an official persists with ineffective treatment for a medical problem, Greeno, 414 F.3d at
655, or when an official delays medical treatment or needlessly prolongs a prisoner’s pain,
Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012). While Suggs’ complaint is sometimes light
on specific dates and content concerning Dr. Shah’s treatment, when the complaint and the
grievances attached to it are construed liberally and all inferences are drawn in Suggs’ favor,
Suggs says that Dr. Shah pressed forward with ineffective treatment for his hemorrhoid problem
and suggested treatment through a toilet that might be so outlandish as to not constitute medical
treatment at all. Those allegations, taken together, are just enough to give Dr. Shah notice of
Suggs’ claim and to state a claim for indifference at this phase, so Count 1 will proceed.
Suggs also claims that Administrator Brown, Warden Lashbrook, and Warden Spiller all
violated his rights by denying his requests for additional hemorrhoid care (Count 2). As the
Court already said, Suggs’ hemorrhoid problem qualifies as objectively serious at this stage of
the case, so the only question is whether those individuals were deliberately indifferent to Suggs’
hemorrhoid problem. Suggs’ complaint and the grievances attached to it do not include enough
information about his interactions with those officials to indicate deliberate indifference on their
part. Suggs only suggests, in an extremely vague fashion, that he told the three of his need for
care but that the three denied some or all his requests.

He does not lay out when he

communicated with the wardens or with Administrator Brown, nor does put forth the content of

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his communications with the three of them. Without that information, he has not put forth
enough factual information to allow those three defendants to capably respond to his complaint,
nor has he included enough information to push a claim of deliberate indifference against them
from the realm of possibility to the solid ground of plausibility. E.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678-79 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Atkins v. City of
Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011). Count 2 must be dismissed without prejudice.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated, COUNT 1 shall PROCEED
against SHAH.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Because there are no further claims against them, LASHBROOK, SPILLER, and BROWN are
DISMISSED without prejudice from this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Suggs’ motion for service of process (Doc. 3) is
GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendant SHAH: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a
Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of
Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this
Order to the Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If the Defendant fails to
sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the
date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service, and the
Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to a Defendant who no longer can be
found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the

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Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This
information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting
service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address
information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon the Defendant (or upon
defense counsel once an appearance is entered) a copy of every pleading or other document
submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be
filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of the document was served
on the Defendant or counsel. Any paper received by a judge that has not been filed with the
Clerk or that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Williams for disposition,
as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all parties consent.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under § 1915 for leave to
commence this action without being required to prepay fees and costs, the applicant and his or
her attorney were deemed to have entered into a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in
the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed
against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff. Local Rule 3.1(c)(1)
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

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independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 21, 2016
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
United States District Judge

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