Dufresne-Hopkins v. Carlyle Community Unit School District No 1

Filing 9

ORDER OF REMAND: Following a sua sponte review of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court concludes that federal-question jurisdiction does not exist and removal of this case was improper. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Illinois. Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 1-1) and Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) are DENIED without prejudice subject to refiling in the state court following remand, if appropriate. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 9/8/16. (klh2)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ELIZABETH DUFRESNE-HOPKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CARLYLE COMMUNITY UNIT
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1,
Defendant.

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Case No. 16-CV-965-NJR-SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court sua sponte to determine whether the removal of
this case to federal court was proper. Voelker v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 521
(7th Cir. 2003) (“Federal courts are obliged to inquire sua sponte wherever the propriety
of the removal of a claim to federal court is in question”); Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., 725
F.3d 795, 800 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The federal courts have an independent obligation at each
stage of the proceedings to ensure that [they] have subject matter jurisdiction over the
dispute.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff Elizabeth Dufresne-Hopkins filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court
of Clinton County, Illinois, on July 15, 2016, seeking judicial review under the Illinois
Administrative Review Law, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-101, et seq., of the disciplinary
decision by the Carlyle Community Unit School District No. 1 School Board (the “School
Board”) against her child (Doc. 1-1). In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the School
Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious “because said decision is not in
accordance with school policy” (Doc. 1). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff apparently retained
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counsel, who filed a motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 1-1). In a nutshell, the
motion alleges that Plaintiff’s child was essentially expelled from Carlyle High School
and the expulsion was in violation of the child’s “due process rights” and was
“completely arbitrary, unreasonable, and excessive” and “an extreme abuse of
discretion” (Doc. 1-1). Plaintiff asks the Court to prohibit the school district from
enforcing the expulsion and preventing her son from enrolling in classes at Carlyle High
School (Doc. 1-1). Defendant apparently took Plaintiff’s use of the words “due process”
in her motion to mean that she was asserting “a cause of action pursuant to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and Defendant removed the case to this
Court based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), with
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Doc. 1).
This Court’s determination of jurisdiction on removal begins with § 1441(a),
which permits a defendant to remove any civil action filed in state court over which the
federal district court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Nelson v. Stewart, 422 F.3d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 2005) “The
propriety of removal thus depends on whether the case originally could have been filed
in federal court.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (citing
Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392). Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over
cases that present a federal question, meaning cases “arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Nelson, 422 F.3d at 466. As the
party asserting federal jurisdiction, Defendant bears the burden of establishing it. Ne.
Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc., 707 F.3d 883, 893 (7th Cir.

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2013). The removal statutes are to be construed strictly and any genuine doubts as to the
propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand to state court. Id.; Syngenta
Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002).
In this instance, the Court concludes that Defendant has not established a basis for
federal-question removal jurisdiction. “It is long settled law that a cause of action arises
under federal law only when the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint raises issues of
federal law.” City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 163 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987)). “As the master of his own complaint, [Plaintiff] may avoid
federal jurisdiction by pleading only state-law claims.” Nelson, 422 F.3d at 466;
Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392. See also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478
U.S. 804, 809, n. 6 (1986) (“Jurisdiction may not be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff
has not advanced.”); Bastien v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 205 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir.
2000). “[T]he paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule . . . [are]
that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that a federal question must appear on
the face of the complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on
federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court.”
That being said, a plaintiff “may not avoid removal to federal court by omitting
necessary federal questions from their complaints through artful pleading.” Ne. Rural
Elec. Membership, 707 F.3d at 893. “Put another way, a ‘plaintiff cannot frustrate a
defendant’s right to remove by pleading a case without reference to any federal law
when the plaintiff’s claim is necessarily federal.’” Id. (quoting 14B Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3722 (4th ed.)). Therefore, in certain

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limited circumstances, an action will be deemed to arise under federal law and
federal-question removal jurisdiction will be upheld even if there is no federal question
apparent on the face of the complaint. For example, removal is allowed “where federal
law completely preempts an asserted state-law claim.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana,
522 U.S. 470, 471 (1998). 1 Removal is also allowed in cases where a “disputed question of
federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims.” City of
Chicago, 522 U.S. at 164. 2
Here, Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff’s original complaint presents any
federal question on its face (see Doc. 1). And in fact, it does not. It asserts exactly one
claim for judicial review under the Illinois Administrative Review Law (Doc. 1-1, p. 1).
The complaint does not in any manner state a federal due process claim, present any
issues of federal law, or make any allegations that could possibly be construed as a
federal constitutional claim (see Doc. 1-1). Thus, the Court cannot conclude that
federal-question jurisdiction exists based on the well-pleaded complaint rule.
The Court also cannot conclude that federal-question jurisdiction exists based on
one of the exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Specifically, Defendant makes
no argument that Plaintiff’s state law claim is completely preempted by federal law (see
1See

also Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 393 (“Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any
claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim,
and therefore arises under federal law.”); 14B Federal Practice and Procedure § 3722.2 (explaining that
complete preemption has been extended to certain claims under the Labor Management Relations Act,
ERISA, the National Bank Act, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).
2 See also Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983)
(“[A] case might still ‘arise under’ the laws of the United States if a well-pleaded complaint established
that its right to relief under state law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law in dispute
between the parties.” (quoting); Ne. Rural Elec. Membership, 707 F.3d at 890 (“When a plaintiff omits from
its pleadings federal questions that are necessary elements of a claim, courts will read the necessary
federal elements into the complaint.”); 14B Federal Practice and Procedure § 3722.1 (explaining that artful
pleading doctrine has been applied to situations in which significant federal issues are embedded within
state law causes of action).

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Doc. 1), and the Court knows of no basis for concluding as much. Defendant also does
not assert that a significant constitutional issue is embedded within Plaintiff’s state law
claim (see Doc. 1), and it seems rather obvious to the Court that Plaintiff’s state law claim
does not depend on resolving whether her son’s federal due process rights were
violated.
Instead, as previously mentioned, Defendant asserts that federal question
jurisdiction exists based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction (Doc. 1). But Defendant does not argue (much less cite to any supporting
authority) that allegations in a motion for preliminary injunction can somehow be used
to add a new claim that was not been pleaded in the complaint (see Doc. 1). The Court’s
own research suggests that it cannot be done.3
Even if that were not the case, after reviewing Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction, the Court believes the allegations in that motion are far too ambiguous to be
construed as stating a federal due process claim. In the motion, the words “due process”
are mentioned only twice (Doc. 1-1, p. 3 ¶¶8, 9). Plaintiff never mentions the United
States Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (which is, of course,

Cf. Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1094 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that motion to amend complaint
seeking to add a federal claim cannot serve as a basis for federal-question removal jurisdiction until the
state court judge grants the motion because “[u]ntil then, the complaint did not state a federal claim. It
might never state a claim, since the state judge might deny the motion.”); Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prod.,
Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2008) (same); Eggert v. Britton, 223 F. App’x 394, 398 (5th Cir. 2007)
(constitutional claims purportedly raised in interrogatory response were not pled in the complaint and
therefore could not serve as a basis for removal under § 1446(b)(3)); Trotter v. Steadman Motors, Inc., 47 F.
Supp. 2d 791, 794 (S.D. Miss. 1999) (deposition testimony relating to a putative federal claim that has not
yet been pled cannot be used as a basis for removal under § 1446(b)(3)); Breiding v. Wilson Appraisal Servs.,
Inc., No. 5:14CV124, 2016 WL 1175257, at *4 (N.D.W. Va. Mar. 23, 2016) (same); Blanding v. Bradley, No.
CIV. SAG-14-337, 2014 WL 1514675, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 15, 2014) (same); Watson v. City of Meridian, MS, No.
4:08CV4 DPJ-JCS, 2008 WL 907655, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2008) (constitutional claims purportedly
raised in responses to requests for admission were not pled in the complaint and therefore could not serve
as a basis for removal under § 1446(b)(3)).
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the vehicle for bringing a Fourteenth Amendment claim), or even the word “federal” (see
Doc. 1-1). Instead, both times the words “due process” are used, they are surrounded by
references to procedural requirements listed in the Illinois School Code and the School
Board’s own Policy Manual and by details as to how the disciplinary decision was made
in contravention of those requirements (see Doc. 1-1, p. 3 ¶¶8–15). Against this backdrop,
it seems pretty clear that Plaintiff is challenging the denial of process guaranteed to her
and her son by the law of Illinois and the School Board’s own policies, not the federal
constitution. Accordingly, the motion for preliminary injunction cannot fairly be read to
assert a federal due process claim. 4
Consequently, the Court concludes that there is no claim that arises under federal
law, federal-question jurisdiction does not exist, and removal of this case was improper.
Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Illinois.
Plaintiff’s pending motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 1-1) and Defendant’s
pending motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) are DENIED without prejudice subject to refiling in
the state court following remand, if appropriate.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 8, 2016
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
See, e.g., Pleasants v. Eastfield Police Dep’t of Dallas Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 3:13-CV-02797-N-BK, 2014 WL
292061, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2014) (“[T]he undersigned does not find that Plaintiff’s scattered reference
to the term ‘due process’ in the 24–page petition . . . is sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction.”); Anthon v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 09-CV-975, 2009 WL 3739435, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 4, 2009) (“[T]he mere
mention of the phrase “due process” is not sufficient to state a claim.”); In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. Tires
Prod. Liab. Litig., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1036 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (“A rule providing that mere mention of a
federal statute in a complaint based on a state cause of action confers federal question jurisdiction would
be a simple rule to apply, but it is not the law and cannot aid Ford’s removal effort.”)

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