West v. Eoavaldi et al

Filing 6

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 10/31/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KENTES WEST,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANK EOAVALDI,
MAJOR PAIGE, and
UNKNOWN PARTY
Defendants.

Case No. 16−cv–0985−MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
Plaintiff Kentes West, an inmate in Menard Correctional Center, brings this
action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in
any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal– On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
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An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard
that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209
F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement
to relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this
juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se Complaint are to be liberally construed. See
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court
finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A.
The Complaint
Plaintiff originally filed this suit on April 11, 2016 in case No. 16-cv-414-SMY.
That case underwent § 1915A screening on August 29, 2016, at which time it was
determined that Plaintiff had stated unrelated claims and the present action was
severed out of Plaintiff’s other claims. (Doc. 1).
As related to the claims present in this case, Plaintiff has alleged that on July 30,
2015, C/O Rakers decided not to feed Plaintiff. (Doc. 2, p. 30). He tried to give Plaintiff
an empty tray, but “due to the fan on the wall being blowing on the tray” Plaintiff knew
something was not right with about the tray, and told Rakers so. (Doc. 2, p. 30). Rakers
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opted not to give Plaintiff the tray. (Doc. 2, p. 30). Plaintiff asked C/O Cutts to look at
the tray when he walked past and Cutts allegedly told Plaintiff the tray was empty.
(Doc. 2, p. 30). Plaintiff then tried to complain to Sgt. Harris, who told him to talk to his
gallery officer about it. (Doc. 2, p. 31). Plaintiff alleges that his gallery officer refused to
give him showers in the past and had previously threatened him. (Doc. 2, p. 31). So
Plaintiff asked to speak to a Lieutenant. (Doc. 2, p. 31). Plaintiff waited a while, but he
still did not get a tray and a Lieutenant never came by. (Doc. 2, p. 31). So Plaintiff
flooded his cell. (Doc. 2, p. 31).
When guards responded to the flooding, they declined to address Plaintiff’s
complaints about not getting a tray or Rakers mistreating Plaintiff. (Doc. 2, p. 31). Lt.
Eoavaldi told Plaintiff that he “was going to get it today” because Eoavaldi was tired of
hearing his name. (Doc. 2, p. 31). Plaintiff refused to cuff up when Eoavaldi ordered
him to because he believed that Eoavaldi would beat him. (Doc. 2, p. 31). Eoavaldi
called Major Paige to the scene, but Plaintiff would not cuff up for him either because he
was even angrier than Eoavaldi. (Doc. 2, p. 31). Eoavaldi and Paige wrote Plaintiff a
disciplinary report and called Orange Crush to Plaintiff’s cell. (Doc. 2, p. 31).
Plaintiff complied with Orange Crush’s orders because he believed that Orange
Crush would not hurt him because they filmed the cell extraction. (Doc. 2, p. 31).
Despite his compliance, Plaintiff was pepper sprayed, thrown to the ground, had his
head forced into the toilet, his hair pulled, and his genitals were rubbed with pepper
spray. (Doc. 2, p. 31). Plaintiff’s clothes and Nike gym shoes were thrown in the trash.
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(Doc. 2, p. 31). He was placed in a cell with no water, no working toilet, no mattress,
and no clothing “for longer than required.” (Doc. 2, p. 31). Plaintiff left on a writ on
August 5, 2015. (Doc. 2, p. 31).
Discussion
The Order severing Plaintiff’s claims divided the Complaint up into nineteen
counts. (Doc. 1). The following Counts were severed into this action:
Count 10 – Eight Amendment Claim against Defendants Eoavaldi and Paige
for sending the Orange Crush team to remove Plaintiff from his cell on July 30, 2015,
and against the Unknown Orange Crush Officers, for subjecting Plaintiff to excessive
force on that date;
Count 11 – Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Eoavaldi and Paige,
for having Plaintiff placed in a cell with no water, no working toilet, no mattress, and
no clothing from July 30 until approximately August 5, 2015.
Count 10 clearly implicates the use of excessive force. The intentional use of
excessive force by prison guards against an inmate without penological justification
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and is
actionable under § 1983. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); DeWalt v. Carter, 224
F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). An inmate must show that an assault occurred, and that
“it was carried out ‘maliciously and sadistically’ rather than as part of ‘a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline.’” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 40 (citing Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)). An inmate seeking damages for the use of excessive
force need not establish serious bodily injury to make a claim, but not “every
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Wilkins, 559
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U.S. at 37-38 (the question is whether force was de minimis, not whether the injury
suffered was de minimis); see also Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2001).
Paige and Eoavaldi must be dismissed from this count without prejudice.
Plaintiff does not allege that either of them was a member of the Orange Crush team or
that Paige or Eoavaldi actually laid hands on him. Plaintiff has not alleged that Paige
and Eoavaldi were present when Orange Crush performed the cell extraction. All
Plaintiff alleges is that they called the Orange Crush team out, however, Plaintiff admits
that he was misbehaving at the time and refusing to follow direct orders, which
suggests that the cell extraction was justified. Even if it was not, there is no respondeat
superior liability in § 1983 actions. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir.
2001) (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). See also Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Eades v. Thompson, 823 F.2d 1055, 1063 (7th Cir.
1987); Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983); Duncan v. Duckworth, 644
F.2d 653, 655-56 (7th Cir. 1981). All Plaintiff has alleged is that Paige and Eoavaldi
ordered the extraction.

Nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint suggests that they were

involved in the extraction after that point or approved or condoned the behavior of the
Orange Crush team. This lack of personal involvement is fatal to Plaintiff’s claims
against Paige and Eoavaldi in Count 1.
As to the Orange Crush Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that he complied with all
their orders, yet was still pepper sprayed and assaulted, and made to undergo
humiliations like having his head shoved into a toilet. This is sufficient to state a claim
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for excessive force. The Court reminds Plaintiff that he has an obligation to identify
these John Doe Defendants, and the only Defendants that the Court recognizes in
connection with this claim are the members of the Orange Crush team who responded
to Plaintiff’s cell on July 30, 2015.
Turning now to Count 11, that claim arises under a conditions of confinement
theory of liability. Not all prison conditions trigger Eighth Amendment scrutiny – only
deprivations of basic human needs like food, medical care, sanitation, and physical
safety. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346; see also James v. Milwaukee Cnty., 956 F.2d
696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992). In order to prevail on a conditions of confinement claim, a
plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would satisfy the objective and subjective
components applicable to all Eighth Amendment claims. McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123,
124 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The objective
component focuses on the nature of the acts or practices alleged to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992). The inquiry
is whether the conditions of confinement exceeded the contemporary bounds of
decency of a mature civilized society. Id. The condition must result in unquestioned and
serious deprivations of basic human needs or deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); accord JamisonBey v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir. 1989); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408,
416 (7th Cir. 1987).

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In addition to showing objectively serious conditions, a plaintiff must also
demonstrate the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. The subjective
component is the intent with which the acts or practices constituting the alleged
punishment are inflicted. Jackson, 955 F.2d at 22. A prison official must have had a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; see also McNeil v. Lane, 16
F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994). The relevant state of mind is deliberate indifference to
inmate health or safety; the official must be aware of facts from which an inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he also must draw the
inference. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303;
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir.
1994). The deliberate indifference standard is satisfied if the plaintiff shows that the
prison official acted or failed to act despite the official’s knowledge of a substantial risk
of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. A failure of prison officials to act in such
circumstances suggests that the officials actually want the prisoner to suffer the harm.
Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992). It is well-settled that mere
negligence is not enough. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he was placed in a cell without running water,
clothing, or a mattress for approximately one week. That is sufficient to state a claim
under a conditions of confinement analysis because the lack of water in particular is a
serious condition of confinement. However, although the threshold order construed
this claim against Paige and Eoavaldi, Plaintiff does not actually allege that either of
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those Defendants were responsible for his cell placement or cell placements generally.
Because Plaintiff has not mentioned Paige and Eovaldi in connection with this claim,
the Defendants must also be dismissed from this claim without prejudice. As there are
no further defendants associated with this claim, the claim will be dismissed with
prejudice.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 10 states a claim upon which relief may
be granted and will proceed. Defendants Eoavaldi and Paige are DISMISSED without
prejudice. COUNT 11 will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to identify a valid
defendant. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to add the Warden of Menard to the
docket, solely for the purpose of identifying the John Doe Orange Crush Defendants in
this case.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for the Warden of Menard: (1) Form 5 (Notice
of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of
Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of
Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the
Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court
will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Service shall not be made on the Unknown (John Doe) Defendants until such
time as Plaintiff has identified them by name in a properly filed amended complaint.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the Court with the
names and service addresses for these individuals.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant (or upon defense counsel once an
appearance is entered), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted
for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed
a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of any document was
served on Defendant or counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate
judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to include a certificate of service
will be disregarded by the Court.
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Williams for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c), should all the parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
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of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will
not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not
later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply
with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may
result in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 10/31/2016
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
U.S. District Judge

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