Cesal v. Kruse et al

Filing 63

ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's Motions to Vacate (Docs. 59 and 60 ). Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 9/5/2019. (mah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CRAIG CESAL,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
DOUGLAS ANTHONY KRUSE,
)
KIM SCHNEIDER, ELIZABETH MILLS, )
RENNA KELLY, J. JOLLIFF,
)
TASHA JOHNSON, ASHLEY KNEBEL, )
BETTY ULMER, PAUL KELLEY, and
)
LOUISE BOWEN
)
)
)
Defendants.

Case No. 16-CV-1064-SMY-RJD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Craig Cesal, an inmate in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"),
filed this lawsuit pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution at
Greenville, Illinois ("FCI Grenville").

Specifically, Plaintiff alleged medical staff were

deliberately indifferent in their treatment of his diabetes and pain.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the evidence established that
Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical condition (Doc. 46). Magistrate
Judge Daly issued a Report and Recommendation ("Report") recommending that the undersigned
grant Defendants' Motion. Plaintiff did not file an objection (Doc. 55). 1 On February 4, 2019, this

1

Although Plaintiff contends he moved for an extension of time to object, neither the Court nor defense counsel
received any such motion.

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Court adopted Judge Daly's Report and granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (see
Doc. 58). Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 59). For
the following, the Motion is DENIED.
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party relief from a judgment
for a number of reasons including mistake or “any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). However, relief under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy
and is only granted in exceptional circumstances. United States v. 8136 S. Dobson St., Chicago
Ill., 125 F.3d 1076, 1082 (7th Cir. 1997).
When neither timely nor specific objections to a Report and Recommendation are made,
the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation for clear error. Johnson v. Zema Systems
Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court found no clear error in Judge Daly's wellreasoned Report and adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety.
Even assuming Plaintiff's objections were considered timely, a de novo review would yield
the same result. In his objections, Plaintiff asserts that Judge Daly's findings were erroneous in
several respects: (1) he was unable to purchase and was denied cost-free diabetic snacks at FCI
Greenville; (2) Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by denying him
adequate supplies of insulin; and (3) he was denied adequate pain medication for a 2008 spinal
injury.
Prison officials have an obligation under the Eighth Amendment to provide adequate
medical care to the incarcerated. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). A prisoner can
show that this obligation has been breached by establishing, first, that the “deprivation alleged [is],
objectively, sufficiently serious” and, second, that the depriving official had a “sufficiently
culpable state of mind.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation

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marks omitted) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). This subjective element
requires more than a showing of mere negligence or inadvertent error; it demands “the denial or
delay of medical care” in the face of “a defendant's actual knowledge of, or reckless disregard for,
a substantial risk of harm.” Vance, 97 F.3d at 992 (explaining that Supreme Court has adopted
recklessness standard used in criminal law).
There is no question that Type 2 Diabetes presents a serious medical need. However,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court agrees with Judge Daly that
there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude the Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's diabetic needs. Plaintiff was able to purchase diabetic snacks
from commissary, was provided cost-free snacks in the health care unit when he experienced
hypoglycemic events, and his diabetes was consistently monitored over the six months in which it
was uncontrolled. Defendants prescribed Plaintiff various types of insulin to control his diabetes
and modified his treatment plan at least 17 times in the course of six months to control Plaintiff's
blood glucose. Defendants further counseled Plaintiff as to how he could better control his blood
glucose with his diet – advice, based on commissary records, that Plaintiff regularly disregarded.
Additionally, the evidence is insufficient to support Plaintiff's claims that he was denied
adequate pain medications. Defendant Schneider discontinued Plaintiff's ibuprofen and placed
him on Tylenol in an effort to decrease his rising creatine levels in his kidneys caused by continual
use of ibuprofen. There is no evidence from which a jury could find that Schneider acted with
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s pain by discontinuing his ibuprofen.
Plaintiff has presented no facts or evidence that would warrant Rule 60(b) reconsideration
of the Report and Recommendation. After thoroughly reviewing the record before it, the Court
finds Judge Daly's factual findings and analysis to be thorough and accurate. Accordingly,

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Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 5, 2019

STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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