Randle v. Butler et al

Filing 237

ORDER: The 235 Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Randle is ADVISED that he must complete and return the settlement paperwork to Defendants no later than September 1, 2021. (See Doc. 233 ). Randle is WARNED that refusal to sign and return the documents is grounds for sanctions. The Court may vacate the settlement agreement and dismiss this case with prejudice for failure to comply with an order of the court pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Givens v. Vaughn, No. 16-cv-00303-NJR (S.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2019) affd, No. 20-2555, 2021 WL 3661206, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 2021). See also Lewis v. School Dist. #70, 648 F. 3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 2011). Signed by Judge Stephen P. McGlynn on 8/24/2021. (jrj)

Case 3:16-cv-01191-SPM Document 237 Filed 08/24/21 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #1754

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHARLES RANDLE,
#M27372,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-01191-SPM

v.
KIMBERLY BUTLER, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MCGLYNN, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on a motion to reconsider filed by Plaintiff Charles Randle.
(Doc. 235). He asks the Court to reconsider its order granting the motion to enforce the settlement
or, in the alternative, recruit counsel to represent him. (See Doc. 233).
On February 5, 2021, while Randle was housed at Stateville Correctional Center
(“Stateville”), the parties engaged in a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Sison, and
this matter settled in its entirety. (Doc. 221). The parties were given 90 days to finalize the
settlement documents. On April 12, 2021, Randle filed a notice, informing the Court he was
transferred to Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”) and that he no longer intended on signing
the settlement agreement. Defendants filed a motion to enforce the settlement, and the Court held
a hearing on the motion. (Doc. 229). Based on the testimony at the hearing and the transcript from
the settlement conference, the Court determined that on the day of the settlement conference, the
parties entered into a valid and enforceable oral settlement. The transcript from the conference
demonstrated that there was a clear offer and acceptance, the terms were sufficiently definite and
certain, and there was a “meeting of the minds as to the terms of the agreement.” (Doc. 233, p. 3)
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(citing Wilson v. Wilson, 46 F.3d 660, 600 (7th Cir. 1994). The Court further found, based on
Randle’s testimony, that the interruption by Stateville staff during the settlement conference and
Randle’s subsequent transfer to Menard and alleged constitutional violations did not influence his
decision to settle the case. Specifically, Randle stated that he did not have issues with the terms of
the settlement agreement. Randle was directed to complete the settlement paperwork and send the
documents back to Defendants by September 1, 2021. (Id. at p. 4).
Now Randle asks the Court to reconsider the order enforcing the settlement. He argues that
at Stateville he had another inmate, “a prisoner at law (PAL),” assisting him with the settlement
conference and written terms and conditions of the settlement agreement. (Doc. 235). He no longer
has the assistance of a PAL at Menard and is not competent enough to understand the language
drafted in the settlement terms and conditions. He claims he is illiterate with an incomplete high
school education and suffers from mental illness. On the day of the settlement conference, he was
on a hunger and water strike, which exacerbated his mental illness and cognitive functions. Randle
claims that the interruption of the settlement conference by Stateville staff did actually hinder his
ability to make competent decisions. During the conference, staff threatened him, and he feared
for his life. If the Court will not reconsider its order, Randle requests the Court to recruit him
counsel to go over the terms of the settlement agreement with him.
Under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may revise any order
adjudicating fewer than all the claims at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Motions to reconsider an order under Rule
54(b) are judged largely by the same standards as motions to alter or amend a judgment under Rule
59(e), “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Rothwell
Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
“Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or
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arguing matters that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion.” Caisse
Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996). See also
Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F. 3d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 2004).
Randle’s motion does not meet the limited function of a motion for reconsideration. See
Caisse Nationale, 90 F. 3d at 1269 (“motions for reconsideration serve limited function”). Rather,
he incorrectly uses the motion for reconsideration to put forth additional arguments that could have
been presented to the Court prior to the ruling on the motion to enforce. See United States v.
Resnick, 594 F. 3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that a motion for reconsideration is not a
vehicle for introducing new evidence or advancing “arguments that could and should have been
presented” prior to the court’s ruling). A motion to reconsider is not appropriate for making new
arguments, and the Court does not find any manifest error of law or fact that would undermine its
previous decision.
The Court will also not appoint counsel to assist Randle in reviewing the settlement
documents. Randle was previously recruited counsel in this case. Once he received representation,
Randle “repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate with [Counsel] and to follow his
professional advice.” (Doc. 206, p. 2). Despite being advised that if he filed a motion requesting
counsel to withdraw, there was no guarantee that another attorney would be appointed to represent
him, Randle filed two motions to terminate counsel. Ultimately, the Court granted his motion to
terminate counsel, and Randle is currently proceeding pro se at his own request.
As previously observed, Randle failed to take advantage of the privilege of pro bono
counsel, and thus, the Court will not assign him another attorney at this time. (Id. at p. 3). All there
is left to do is execute the settlement documents, and Randle is capable of completing this task.
Although Randle claims to be illiterate, (Doc. 253, p. 2), based on the record, which contains
numerous filings from Randle, and the previous motions for counsel, it is clear that Randle is able
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to read and write. (See Doc. 3, 62, 201). Additionally, in his current motion, he presents his
arguments clearly and even cites to legal citations. Thus, the Court finds that Randle has the ability
to continue representing himself and will not assign counsel.
For these reasons, the Court will not reconsider the order enforcing the settlement or recruit
Randle counsel. The motion to reconsider (Doc. 235) is DENIED. Randle is ADVISED that,
pursuant to the Court’s enforcement order, he must complete and return the settlement paperwork
to Defendants no later than September 1, 2021. (See Doc. 233). Randle is WARNED that refusal
to sign and return the documents is grounds for sanctions. The Court may vacate the settlement
agreement and dismiss this case with prejudice for failure to comply with an order of the court
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Givens v. Vaughn, No. 16-cv00303-NJR (S.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2019) (dismissing case due to plaintiff’s failure to obey a court order
and sign the settlement documents), aff’d, No. 20-2555, 2021 WL 3661206, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug.
18, 2021). See also Lewis v. School Dist. #70, 648 F. 3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[w]hen a district
court judge is unable to dispose of a matter because a recalcitrant plaintiff systematically refuses
to obey the court’s order, dismissal is justified”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 24, 2021
s/Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge

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