Howard v. Gateway Regional Medical Center et al
Filing
19
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The Court GRANTS the motion as to Count I and dismisses Handfelder as a named defendant in Count I. Further, the Court DENIES the motion as to Count II. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 1/31/17. (klh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CAROL A. HOWARD,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 16-1250-DRH
GATEWAY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
MANDI HANDFELDER, and
JOSHUA LEE CANN,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Introduction and Background
Pending before the Court is defendants Handfelder and Gateway Regional
Medical Center’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II of plaintiff’s complaint (Docs.
11 & 12).
Defendants argue that Count I against Handfelder must be dismissed as
individual supervisors cannot be liable for discrimination under the Americans
with Disabilities Act or alternatively, that the claims contained in Count I against
Handfelder must be dismissed as Howard did not exhaust her administrative
remedies.
Defendants also argue that the Count II should be dismissed as
Howard’s claims for intentional emotional distress are preempted by the Illinois
Humans Right Act (“IHRA”). Howard filed a response to the motion conceding that
Handfelder should not be named as a defendant in Count I and opposing the
arguments regarding preemption in Count II. Based on the following, the Court
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grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss.
On November 15, 2016, Carol A. Howard, a licensed practical nurse, filed
suit against her former employer, Gateway Regional Medical Center (“Gateway”),
her former supervisor, Mandi Handfelder, and Joshua Lee Cann (Doc. 1).
Howard’s complaint contains three counts: Count I, for violations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., against Handfelder and Gateway,
Count II, for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois common law
against Handfelder and Gateway, and Count III, for intentional emotional distress
under Illinois common law against Cann. 1 Howard alleges that Handfelder and
Gateway refused to accommodate her disability, breast cancer, by scheduling
mandatory staff meetings when Howard had scheduled medical appointments, that
Handfelder threatened Howard with possible disciplinary actions for failure to
attend the staff meetings, that Handfelder refused to allow Howard to wear a cap to
work when Howard was losing her hair, and that Howard underwent a radical
mastectomy because she was fearful of taking time off for additional chemotherapy
for fear of her employment. Howard also claims that Handfelder intentionally
disclosed her medical information/diagnosis and her requests for reasonable
accommodations to Joshua Cann, Handfelder’s boyfriend. Lastly, Howard claims
that Cann, while at a Christmas party, told Howard “in a stern voice that she
needed to stop playing the ‘cancer card.’”
(Doc. 1, p. 5).
On December 22, 2016, defendants Handfelder and Gateway filed the
1 As of this date, the record reflects that Cann has not answered or otherwise appeared in this case.
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motion to dismiss (Doc. 11). Howard filed her opposition on January 25, 2017
(Doc. 17). As the motion to dismiss is ripe, the Court turns to address the merits
of the motion.
Motion to Dismiss Standard
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint, not its merits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d
1510, 1520 (7th Cir.1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and draws all
reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor. AnchorBank, FSB v.
Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a claim's basis but
must also be facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.
Analysis
Count I – ADA claim against Handfelder
As stated supra, defendants argue that Count I against Handfelder must be
dismissed as individual supervisors cannot be liable for discrimination under the
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ADA, or alternatively, that the claims contained in Count I against Handfelder must
be dismissed as Howard did not exhaust her administrative remedies.
In
response, Howard “agrees that Mandi Handfelder should not be a named defendant
in Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint and moves the dismissal of Mandi Handfelder in
Count I of said complaint.” (Doc. 17). The Court grants that portion of defendants’
motion to dismiss and dismisses with prejudice Handfelder as a defendant in
Count I of Howard’s complaint.
Count II – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendants contends Howard’s state law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress in Count II is preempted by the IHRA, 775 ILCS §§ 5/8-111(C),
5/2-102(D), and as a result, this Court should dismiss the claim. The Seventh
Circuit has delineated a test for determining when state law tort claims, such
Howard’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, are preempted by the
IHRA:
Whether a state-law tort claim is preempted depends on whether the
IHRA furnishes the legal duty that the defendant was alleged to have
breached. If the plaintiff’s allegations against the defendant implicate
only a duty provided by the IHRA, such as the duty of employers to
refrain from discriminating against employees on the basis of their
race or national origin, then the plaintiff’s claim is preempted. Bannon
et al. v. University of Chicago, 503 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 2007)
(emphasis added)(citations and quotations omitted).
In considering whether an IIED claim was preempted by an IHRA sexual
harassment suit, the Seventh Circuit explained that the proper inquiry is whether a
plaintiff can prove the elements of her state law claim “independent of legal duties
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furnished by the IHRA,” not whether the facts that support the tort claim “could also
have supported a discrimination claim.” Naeem v. McKesson Drug Company, 444
F.3d 593, 604 (7th Cir. 2006). “[I]f the conduct would be actionable even aside from
its character as a civil rights violation because the IHRA did not furnish the legal
duty that the defendant was alleged to have breached, the IHRA does not preempt a
state law claim seeking recovery for it.” Id., quoting Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203
F.3d 507, 516-17 (7th Cir. 2000); see Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 23
(Ill. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff stated independent state law tort claims for
assault, battery and false imprisonment that were not inextricably linked to her
claim of sexual harassment).
To state a claim for IIED, Howard must show that: “(1) the defendant’s
conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendant intended to inflict severe
emotional distress or knew that there was at least a high probability that his
conduct would inflict severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s conduct did
cause severe emotional distress.” Naeem, 444 F.3d at 605. Illinois courts have
required a “heightened level of egregiousness” and conduct that has been
“outrageous” and “extreme” to maintain an IIED claim.
The Court finds that at this stage in the litigation, Howard has set forth the
elements of an IIED claim and that the conduct alleged would be a tort even aside
from its character as a civil rights violation. Thus, the Court finds that Count II is
not preempted and denies the portion of the motion as to this argument.
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Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part defendants’
motion to dismiss Counts I and II of plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 11). The Court
GRANTS the motion as to Count I and DISMISSES with prejudice Handfelder as a
named defendant in Count I. The Court DENIES the motion as to Count II.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 31st day of January, 2017.
Digitally signed by
Judge David R. Herndon
Date: 2017.01.31
11:54:01 -06'00'
United States District Judge
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