Mahoney v. Monroe County, Illinois et al
Filing
60
ORDER denying 51 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Further, defendant Monroe County, Illinois is DISMISSED FROM COUNT 1 of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint 45 . Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 12/20/2017. (kmb2)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TONI MAHONEY,
Personal Representative of the Estate
of Devin C.M. York, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 3:16-cv-01312-DRH-SCW
MONROE COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
NEAL ROHLFING, STEVE MUENCH,
BEN ETTLING, and JUSTIN FRUTH,
Defendants.
ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Before the Court is defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint (Doc. 51).
Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 53).
Based on the
following, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 18, 2017, plaintiff Toni Mahoney (“plaintiff”) filed an eight-count
Second Amended Complaint naming defendants Monroe County, Illinois, Sheriff
Neal Rohlfing (“Sheriff Rohlfing”), and correctional officers Steven Muench (“CO
Muench”), Ben Ettling (“CO Ettling”), and Justin Fruth (“CO Fruth”) (Doc. 45).
Specifically, plaintiff alleged on December 12, 2015, Devin C.M. York (“Decedent”)
was arrested by the Waterloo Police Department and was subsequently
transported to Monroe County Jail (Doc. 45 at 3).
During the intake process
Decedent completed a medical questionnaire administrated by CO Fruth (Id.). In
response Decedent advised the following: he recently attempted suicide; he was a
daily user of heroin; he recently had been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder;
and, that he was currently under the influence of heroin while undergoing the jail
intake process (Id. at 4).
Plaintiff contended that although above listed declarations were made, CO
Fruth’s intake assessment of Decedent indicated the presence of no risk factors;
and as a result, Decedent was assigned to a general population housing cell,
instead of an insolation/observation safety cell (Id.). On the morning of December
14, CO Muench discovered Decedent hung himself in his cell with a bedsheet (Id.
at 6). Decedent was then rushed to a local hospital where he was pronounced
dead shortly thereafter (Id.).
Expressly, plaintiff alleged all defendants are required to undergo Mental
Health and Suicide Prevention training annually pursuant to Title 20, Section
701.90 of the Illinois Administrative Code (Id. at 5); and as a result, CO Fruth
failed to properly screen, examine, assess and evaluate Decedent before placing
him in general population; and, COs Muench and Ettling failed to refer Decedent
to available psychological resources, as well as, identify Decedent’s high risk
factors (Id.).
Plaintiff asserted claims of violation of the Fourth Amendment against all
defendants; violation of the American Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the 1973
Rehabilitation Act, and the Illinois Local Government and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act against Sheriff Rohlfing and Monroe County,
Illinois; violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and respondeat
superior claims against Sheriff Rohlfing; and wrongful death, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and conspiracy claims against all individual defendants (Id.
at 6-20). For relief, plaintiff requested compensatory damages, and costs and fees
(Id.).
On July 24, 2017, defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant
to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 51). Defendants argue plaintiff failed to plead
sufficient facts in order to articulate asserted claims; Monroe County is not liable
for alleged actions of its defendant employees; and, Sheriff Rohlfing cannot be
held liable for alleged misconduct of subordinate defendant correctional officers
(Id.). As a result, defendants request dismissal of plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint (Id.).
II. ANALYSIS
A. FED. R. CIV. P Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police Chi.
Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court explained in
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), that Rule 12(6)(b)
dismissal is warranted if the complaint fails to set forth “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Notice pleading remains all that is
required in a complaint, even though federal pleading standards were overhauled
by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). “A plaintiff still must
provide only ‘enough detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests and, through his allegations, show that it is
plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he is entitled to relief.’ ” Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
The Seventh Circuit offers further instruction on what a civil action must
allege to endure 12(b)(6) dismissal. In Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 699
(7th Cir. 2008), the Court reiterated the standard: “surviving a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion requires more than labels and conclusions”; the complaint’s allegations
must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” A plaintiff’s claim “must
be plausible on its face,” that is, “the complaint must establish a non-negligible
probability that the claim is valid.” Smith v. Med. Benefit Adm’rs Grp., Inc., 639
F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 2011).
B. Fourth Amendment Violation under Section 1983
In order to assert a section 1983 claim plaintiff must establish that
individual defendants: “(1) acted under the color of state law; and (2) deprived
[Decedent] of a constitutional right.” Estate of Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 452
(7th Cir. 2017); see also Westfield Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Decorating Serv., Inc., 863 F.3d
690, 695 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining all facts are construed in the light most
favorable to non-moving party). It is undisputed named defendants were acting in
official capacity as state actors during events at issue. E.g., Estate of Perry, 872
F.3d at 452. Further, the Fourth Amendment governs claims brought by pretrial
detainees who are challenging conditions of confinement, and who have yet been
afforded a probable cause hearing. See Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 629 (7th
Cir. 2013). The “objectively unreasonable” standard is applied to conditions of
confinement and medical care claims asserted by pretrial detainees who have not
had a probable cause hearing under Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). See
id.
i. Matos Standard Inapplicable
Defendants contend plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege necessary facts
outlined by the Seventh Circuit in Matos, to wit: demonstration of knowledge that
Decedent was subjected to objectively serious risks of harm, and that defendants
intentionally disregarded said risk. Cf. Matos ex rel. Matos v. O’Sullivan, 335 F.3d
553, 556-57 (7th Cir. 2003).
However, defendants are misguided; the Matos
standard is inapplicable here because in the instant claim Decedent was a
“pretrial detainee” whose claims are governed by the Fourth Amendment—not the
Eighth Amendment. See id. at 556 (explaining standard for successful § 1983
claim based on violation of Eighth Amendment).
Therefore, “the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonable standard governs this inquiry, rather than the deliberate
indifference standard derived from the Eighth Amendment and applied to claims
from detainees awaiting a trial by virtue of the Due Process Clause.” Ortiz v. City
of Chi, 656 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 2011) (where defendant has not yet benefitted
from judicial determination of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment applies).
The following four factors determine whether defendants’ response to
Decedent’s medical needs was objectively unreasonable: (1) notice of arrestee’s
medical need, whether by word or through observation of the arrestee’s physical
symptoms; (2) seriousness of the medical need; (3) scope of requested treatment;
and (4) police interests, wide ranging in scope, including administrative,
penological, and investigatory concerns. See Florek v. Vill. of Mundelein, Ill., 649
F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining courts should not fixate on factors;
main principle is that police must do more to satisfy reasonableness inquiry when
medical condition confronted is apparent and serious and interests of law
enforcement in delaying treatment are low).
Defendants were given notice of Decedent’s medical need by his responses
to the questionnaire filled out during the intake process. Next, “[i]t goes without
saying that ‘[s]uicide is a serious harm[,]” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724,
733 (7th Cir. 2001); and, the admission of a recent suicide attempt coupled with
ongoing hardcore drug abuse fulfils remaining factors of scope of requested
treatment and police interests. Therefore, the Second Amended Complaint, which
the Court accepts as true and construes in the light most to plaintiff, see Tamayo,
526 F.3d at 1081, satisfies the objectively reasonable standard in stating a
cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs—in violation
of section 1983. E.g., Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 403 (7th 2007).
ii. Fourth Amendment Applies pre-Gerstein
Here, defendants make the bare unsupported allegation that Decedent was
not a pre-Gerstein arrestee at the time of the alleged incident, and therefore
reason the Fourth Amendment does not apply to plaintiff’s claim.
However,
“[c]onsideration of matters outside the pleadings without allowing opposing
litigants to supplement the record constitutes error.” Wright v. Associated Ins. Co.
Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Santana v. Cook Ct. Bd. of
Review, 679 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gen. Elec. Capital v. Lease
Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997), stating “[i]t is true that
consideration of [an] outside matter without converting [a] motion may result in
reversible
error”)
(internal
citations
omitted)).
Defendants
provide
no
documentation to support their assertion, see, e.g., Venture Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith
Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating documents defendant
attaches to motion to dismiss are considered part of pleadings); therefore the
Court will not entertain this theory at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage of litigation.
iii. Monroe County, IL Dismissed from Count I
Defendants argue Monroe County, Illinois should be dismissed from this
action because a county cannot be held liable via respondeat superior for actions
of Sheriff Rohlfing and COs Muench, Ettling, and Fruth pursuant to Moy v. Cty. of
Cook, 159 Ill.2d 519, 640 N.E.2d 519 (1994) 1. Affirmatively, a sheriff in Illinois
is an independent elected official who is not subject to country control. See
Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1989) (explaining county jail
and department of corrections are solely under supervision and control of county
sheriff; the sheriff is independently elected and only answers to electorate, not
county board of commissioners). As a result, defendant Monroe County, Illinois
is hereby dismissed from Count I of plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.
C. ADA/Rehabilitation Act Claim Survives 12(b)(6) Dismissal
In Moy, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a county is not liable under the theory of
respondeat superior for acts of the sheriff because the sheriff is an independently elected county
officer, rather than an employee of the county. See Moy, 640 N.E.2d at 929-31 (stating county is
1
given no authority to control office of the sheriff; sheriff is a county officer and is not in
employment relationship with county; county may not be held vicariously liable for sheriff’s alleged
negligent conduct).
Relief available to plaintiff under the ADA 2 and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (“Rehabilitation Act”) for failure to accommodate physical
impairments is analogous. See Ill. League of Advocates for the Dev. Disabled v. Ill.
Dept. of Human Servs., 803 F.3d 872, 873 (7th Cir. 2015). To state a claim
under either Act—or both Acts—plaintiff must allege Decedent: (1) is a qualified
individual; (2) with a disability; and (3) the Monroe County Jail denied him access
to a program or activity due to his disability. See Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d
586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 672
(7th Cir. 2012)).
After a thorough review of the pleadings, the Court finds that plaintiff has
successfully alleged a claim for failure to accommodate in violation of the
ADA/Rehabilitation Act.
psychiatric
disorder,
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding previous diagnosis of
suicidal
tendencies,
and
denial
of
access
to
an
isolation/observation safety cell after divulging such details during intake is
sufficient to survive Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
D. Monell Claim Adequately Stated
“[A]lthough the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government
body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a
deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local
governments, like every other § 1983 “person,” by the very terms of
the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited
pursuant to governmental “custom” even though such a custom has
2
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) “no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A disability is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities”; “a record of such an impairment”, or “being
regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
not received formal approval
decisionmaking channels.”
through
the
body’s
official
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To state a
section 1983 claim against Monroe County, plaintiff must allege an official policy
or custom was the “moving force” behind the purported constitutional violation.
See Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. Cty of Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir.
2007) (explaining unless there is an unconstitutional policy there can be no
official capacity liability).
This can be achieved by demonstrating “an express
policy, a widespread practice which, although unwritten, is so entrenched and
well-known as to carry the force of policy, or through the actions of an individual
who possesses the authority to make final policy decisions on behalf of the
municipality or corporation.” Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650,
675 (7th Cir. 2012).
Nevertheless, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize the
Court to employ Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a municipal liability claim for lack of
specificity of facts under section 1983. See McCormick v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d
319, 325 (7th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s allegations which proclaim Sheriff Rohlfing—
as chief administrator and commanding officer of all Monroe County sheriff’s
deputies—was responsible for ensuring custody, safekeeping, medical needs, and
housing of all detainees in compliance with state and federal law and
departmental policies is adequate to survive dismissal at this phase.
E. Wrongful Death Claim Properly Alleged
Under Illinois’ Wrongful Death Act “plaintiff must plead facts which, if
proven, would overcome application of the general rule that suicide is deemed
unforeseeable as a matter of law.” Turcios v. DeBruler Co., 2015 IL 117962, ¶ 40.
Decedent’s act of suicide must be a natural consequence of defendants’ negligence
for plaintiff to recover in tort. See Doe v. Doe, 2016 IL App (1st) 153272, ¶ 7. Put
differently, plaintiff must allege Decedent’s suicide was foreseeable. See Turcios at
¶ 40.
While the Court does not accept as true conclusions of fact not supported
by allegations of fact upon which conclusions rest, see Doe at ¶ 9, here plaintiff
alleged facts—namely Decedent’s admission to defendants regarding recent
attempted suicide and diagnosis of psychiatric disorder—which establish
Decedent’s suicide was a foreseeable result of defendant’s failure to act.
F. Sheriff Liability under R espondeat Superior
Although defendants protest plaintiff’s claim based on a theory of
respondeat superior against Sheriff Rohlfing, the law is clear: pursuant to 55
ILCS 5/3-60616, “[t]he sheriff shall be liable for any neglect or omission of the
duties of his or her office, when occasioned by a deputy or auxiliary deputy, in the
same manner as for his or her own personal neglect or omission.” Plaintiff has
properly alleged a respondeat superior claim by alleging negligent actions and/or
omissions of defendant correctional officers; as such, Count VII against Sheriff
Rohlfing survives.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 45) is
sufficient to overcome dismissal pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Based on
the foregoing defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 51) is DENIED. Further, defendant Monroe County, Illinois is
DISMISSED from Count I of plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 45).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Judge Herndon
2017.12.20
16:17:27 -06'00'
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?