Garcia v. Spiller et al

Filing 8

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 2/25/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOAN GARCIA,
Plaintiff,
–1345 DRH

vs.
WILLIAM M. SPILLER,
KENT BROOKMAN,
TERRANCE JACKSON,
KIMBERLY BUTLER,
MS. BEABOUTT,
LORI OAKLEY,
SHERRY BENTON, and
JOHN R. BALDWIN
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Herndon
Plaintiff Joan Garcia, an inmate in Menard Correctional Center, brings this
action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff requests monetary compensation and injunctive relief. This case is now
before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, which provides:
(a)
– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible
or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a
civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b)
– On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint–

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

Frivolousness is an

objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find
meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

The claim of entitlement to relief must

cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture,
the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the
Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; portions of this
action are subject to summary dismissal.

On December 7, 2015, Plaintiff was on the west recreation yard at Menard
Correctional Center when a fight broke out. (Doc. 1 at 6). Shots were fired and
Plaintiff immediately got down on his knees. Id. Plaintiff was handcuffed and
taken to North 2 for allegedly disobeying a direct order by kneeling instead of
lying all the way down on the ground. Id.

Beboutt, the internal affairs officer, interviewed Plaintiff.

Id.

Plaintiff

alleges that Beboutt started to ask him questions about the altercation, but
Plaintiff insisted he had been brought to North 2 only because he refused to obey
a direct order, and that he was not involved in the altercation and did not know
anything about it. Id. Beboutt then told Plaintiff that staff at Menard had been
plotting to write false tickets on all the Hispanic inmates in the Latin Folks gang
because of an incident in which Latin Folks members had attacked two guards in
the chapel. Id. Beboutt then went on to tell Plaintiff that she hates Mexicans and
Latinos.

Id.

She also said that Spiller had agreed to write Latin Folks false

tickets, and that Plaintiff would be getting one. Id.
Plaintiff responded that if he got a false disciplinary report, he would write
grievances on Beboutt and Spiller and file a complaint. (Doc. 1 p. 7). Beboutt
told him that he would never finish the grievance procedure and that staff would
destroy any grievances they found. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Beboutt told
him that Butler, the warden, was in on the scheme to write false disciplinary
reports and that Butler had specifically instructed Spiller to grab all the Hispanic
inmates he could, regardless of whether they were involved in the altercation. Id.
On December 15, 2015, Plaintiff received a disciplinary report for fighting
authored by Spiller, exactly as Beboutt had said. Id. Plaintiff appeared before the
adjustment committee, which was comprised of Kent Brookman and Terrance
Jackson. Id. The disciplinary report states that Plaintiff pled guilty, which he
alleges is false. (Doc. 1 at 7-8).

(Doc. 1-1 at 2).

Plaintiff alleges that if the

adjustment committee had reviewed the video, they would have seen that Plaintiff
was not involved in the altercation. (Doc. 1 at 7). Plaintiff also alleges that if the
adjustment committee had investigated him, they would have discovered that he
was not a “Disciple,” 1 presumably a member of the Gangster Disciples.

Id.

Plaintiff alleges the adjustment committee found him guilty when there was no
substantiated evidence to support the Spiller’s report, and no indication that the
confidential sources were reliable. Id. Plaintiff also states that Brookman had
“personal reasons” for finding him guilty. Id. Plaintiff was sentenced to 1 year
segregation, 1 year C-grade, 1 year commissary restriction, 1 month yard
restriction, and 6 months no contact visits. Id. Butler signed off on the ticket on
December 31, 2015, allegedly despite knowing that the ticket was unsubstantiated
and that the adjustment committee had relied on Spiller’s report alone. (Doc. 1 at
8).
Plaintiff wrote a grievance on the false disciplinary report, which Lori
Oakley reviewed.

Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Oakley knew that the ticket was

unsubstantiated and that the reviewing officers had relied on the reporting officer
alone. Id.

He alleges that Oakley turned a blind eye to those issues, failed to

investigate, and recommended that the grievance be denied. Id. Butler concurred
with Oakley’s conclusion. Id. Both Oakley and Butler allegedly denied Plaintiff’s
request for his ticket to be expunged without good reason. Id. Plaintiff appealed
the denial to the Administrative Review Board, where Sherry Benton and John

1

The disciplinary report does not mention Disciples; Plaintiff is identified as a Latin Folk. (Doc. 1-1, p. 2).

Baldwin denied Plaintiff’s grievance. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Baldwin and Benton
knew that the ticket was unsupported by substantial evidence and that the
adjustment committee had relied on Spiller’s report alone. (Doc. 1 at 8-9).
Plaintiff was housed in segregation at Menard from December 7, 2015 until
December 7, 2016. (Doc. 1 at 9). Plaintiff received less food in segregation and
had fewer opportunities to shower. Id. There was excrement smeared in his cell,
which smelled. Id.

Plaintiff suffered from sleep deprivation and bed sores. Id.

The cell was too small to exercise in, lacked ventilation, and was filthy. (Doc. 1 at
10).

Plaintiff also lost many privileges, including exercise, audio-visual, visits,

religious services, and law library.

Id. The cells had mold.

Id.

Plaintiff

repeatedly injured his face on the walls of his cell when he jumped off the top
bunk because the cells were too small.

(Doc. 1 at 11).

Despite his repeated

injuries, he never received medical treatment. Id.

Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to
divide the pro se action into 7 counts. The parties and the Court will use these
designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a
judicial officer of this Court. The following claims survive threshold review:
1 – Brookman, Jackson, and Butler violated Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when they found him
guilty of an unsubstantiated disciplinary infraction without properly
investigating the offense, and while relying entirely on the
investigating officer’s report alone;

–
Beboutt, Spiller, Butler, Brookman, and Jackson
conspired to violate Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights when they agreed to bring and convict him on false disciplinary
charges.
Plaintiff has also attempted to bring other Counts, but for the reasons
elucidated below, these claims do not survive threshold review.
– Spiller wrote Plaintiff a false disciplinary report in
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights;
– Plaintiff suffered from unconstitutional conditions of
confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
5 – Oakley, Butler, Benton, and Baldwin denied Plaintiff’s
grievances regarding the improper discipline in violation of Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights;
6 – Nippe and Vasquez improperly denied Plaintiff’s
grievances regarding his conditions of confinement in violation of the
Eighth Amendment
7 Nippe, Vasquez, unknown cell house nurses, and
unknown cell house med techs were deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment when
they ignored his repeated complaints that he hit his head while
jumping off the top bunk.
As to Plaintiff’s

, prison disciplinary hearings satisfy procedural

due process requirements where an inmate is provided: (1) written notice of the
charge against the prisoner twenty four (24) hours prior to the hearing; (2) the
right to appear in person before an impartial body; (3) the right to call witnesses
and to present physical/documentary evidence, but only when doing so will not
unduly jeopardize the safety of the institution or correctional goals; and (4) a
written statement of the reasons for the action taken against the prisoner. See

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139,
1145 (7th Cir. 1988).
Not only must the requirements of Wolff be satisfied, but the decision of the
disciplinary hearing board must be supported by “some evidence.”

Black v.

Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994). To determine whether this standard
has been met, courts must determine whether the decision of the hearing board
has some factual basis. Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000). Even a
meager amount of supporting evidence is sufficient to satisfy this inquiry.
Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007).

The adjustment

committee must adequately identify the evidence it relies on for its decision; it is
constitutionally insufficient to merely incorporate the investigating officer’s report.
Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1114-15 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Hayes v.
Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 1977)).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that his disciplinary hearing was constitutionally
deficient because he was falsely listed as having pleaded guilty, thus depriving him
of the opportunity to present a defense, and because the committee relied solely
on the investigating officer’s report in lieu of conducting their own investigation.
This is particularly problematic here because Plaintiff has alleged that the
reporting officer was engaged in a conspiracy against Hispanics, like himself.
Plaintiff has made a plausible allegation that the adjustment committee failed to
accord him due process.

To state a due process claim, a plaintiff must also show that the state
deprived him of a constitutionally protected interest in “life, liberty, or property”
without due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). An
inmate has a due process liberty interest in being in the general prison population
only if the conditions of his or her confinement impose “atypical and significant
hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”

Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
adopted an extremely stringent interpretation of Sandin.

In this Circuit, a

prisoner in disciplinary segregation at a state prison has a liberty interest in
remaining in the general prison population only if the conditions under which he
or she is confined are substantially more restrictive than administrative
segregation at the most secure prison in that state. Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d
1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997). If the inmate is housed at the most restrictive prison
in the state, he or she must show that disciplinary segregation there is
substantially more restrictive than administrative segregation at that prison. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he was sent to the segregation unit at Menard
for approximately 1 year, a substantial amount of time. During that time, Plaintiff
alleges that he suffered from unconstitutional conditions of confinement,
including exposure to toxic substances like feces and mold, poor ventilation, and
a cell so small that it deprived him of exercise and caused him to suffer physical
deterioration. The exposure to toxic substances and the small cell size articulate
a plausible claim that Plaintiff was in a substantially more restrictive

environment. At this stage, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded that he was deprived
of a liberty interest, and so

will be permitted to proceed.

will also survive. Civil conspiracy claims are cognizable under §
1983. See Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 831 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing
conspiracy claim under section 1983). “[I]t is enough in pleading a conspiracy
merely to indicate the parties, general purpose, and approximate date . . . .”
Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2002). See also Hoskins
v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2003); Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734,
740 (7th Cir. 2002). Conspiracy is not an independent basis of liability in §1983
actions. See Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008); Cefalu v. Vill.
of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 2000). “There is no constitutional
violation in conspiring to cover-up an action which does not itself violate the
Constitution.” Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 1996).
Here Plaintiff has alleged that the due process violations that occurred were
the end result of a conspiracy designed to put Hispanic inmates in segregation.
He alleges that Beboutt, Spiller, and Butler conspired to write false disciplinary
tickets against Hispanic inmates. He further alleges that Beboutt told him that
there was agreement between Beboutt, Spiller, and Butler to effect this result, and
that Jackson and Brookman adopted Spiller’s corrupt report without doing their
own investigation. As Plaintiff has adequately pleaded 1) the violation of his due
process rights; and 2) agreement between conspirators to violate his rights, his

claim for conspiracy survives threshold review.

shall be permitted to

proceed.
But all of Plaintiff’s other claims must be dismissed at this time. Plaintiff’s
claim against Spiller for writing a false disciplinary report will be dismissed with
prejudice, because a false disciplinary report standing alone does not violate
Plaintiff’s due process rights. Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir.
1984). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has reasoned that the due process
safeguards associated with prison disciplinary proceedings are sufficient to guard
against potential abuses. A hearing before a presumably impartial Adjustment
Committee terminates an officer’s possible liability for the filing of an allegedly
false disciplinary report. Hawkins v. O'Leary, 729 F. Supp. 600, 602 (N.D. Ill.
1990), relying on Hanrahan v. Lane, supra, 747 F.2d at 1141. The procedural
requirements of a disciplinary hearing protect prisoners from arbitrary actions of
prison officials. McKinney v. Meese, 831 F.2d 728, 733 (7th Cir. 1987). This
claim is distinguishable from Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim, where the allegedly false
disciplinary report may be used as evidence of the conspiracy claim.

will

be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff has also pleaded certain facts that may establish a conditions of
confinement claim in

. In order to prevail on a conditions of confinement

claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would satisfy the objective and
subjective components applicable to all Eighth Amendment claims.

McNeil v.

Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,

302 (1991).

The objective component focuses on the nature of the acts or

practices alleged to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Jackson v.

Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992). The objective analysis examines
whether the conditions of confinement exceeded contemporary bounds of decency
of a mature civilized society. Id. The condition must result in unquestioned and
serious deprivations of basic human needs or deprive inmates of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

(1981); accord Jamison-Bey v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir. 1989);
Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416 (7th Cir. 1987).
In addition to showing objectively serious conditions, a plaintiff must also
demonstrate the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim.

The

subjective component requires that a prison official had a sufficiently culpable
state of mind. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; see also McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123,
124 (7th Cir. 1994).

The relevant state of mind is deliberate indifference to

inmate health or safety; the official must be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
also must draw the inference. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);
DelRaine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir. 1994).

The deliberate

indifference standard is satisfied if the plaintiff shows that the prison official acted
or failed to act despite the official’s knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.

A failure of prison officials to act in such

circumstances suggests that the officials actually want the prisoner to suffer the
harm. Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992). It is well-settled
that mere negligence is not enough. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,
347-48 (1986).
While Plaintiff has described certain conditions that may satisfy the
objective component, he has not alleged that he told any of the named defendants
about these conditions or alleged facts which raise an inference that any
defendants were subjectively deliberately indifferent. He has not alleged that any
of the Defendants were responsible for his cell placement or the condition of the
cell. Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead facts that would make it plausible
that any defendant had the relevant state of mind.

will be dismissed

without prejudice at this time for failure to state a claim.
In

, Plaintiff has alleged that he wrote grievances on the conditions

of confinement issue.

The alleged mishandling of grievances “by persons who

otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.”
Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Grieveson v.
Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d
605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir.
1996). Some personal involvement beyond the grievance process is necessary.
Haywood v. Hathaway, 842 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding warden had
personal involvement where, in response to grievance, he gave written instructions
to the prison’s engineering staff, received a report, and visited the scene, after

which he explicitly found no further problems existed). Here, Plaintiff has alleged
that Oakley, Butler, Benton, and Baldwin should be held liable because they
denied Plaintiff’s grievances regarding the improper disciplinary hearing, but
there is no case law that establishes liability for denying a grievance alleging a due
process violation. Although Plaintiff has alleged that Butler was involved in his
other due process Counts, allowing this claim to proceed against her would be
duplicative as those claims are proceeding against her. None of the defendants in
have any personal involvement in the due process violation that Plaintiff
complains of, and this claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
The same analysis holds true for

. As discussed above, Plaintiff

failed to name any defendants in connection with his conditions of confinement
claim. He did allege, however, that he filed grievances on the issue to Vasquez
and Nippe. But that is not sufficient to show personal involvement in this case.
Plaintiff has also failed to allege that any of the defendants named in

took

the kinds of steps that the Seventh Circuit outlined in Haywood that would
establish personal involvement. Specifically, he has not alleged that Nippe and
Vasquez had any authority over Plaintiff’s cell assignment or any ability to address
the issues he raised institutionally. See Estate of Miller by Chassie v. Marberry,
847 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 2017).
Even if the grievances were sufficient to establish personal involvement in a
conditions of confinement case, the Court would still dismiss this claim without
prejudice because Plaintiff did not list Nippe or Vasquez in the caption of this case

or as defendants. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 10, a plaintiff must name all parties
in the case caption. See also Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th
Cir. 2005) (to be properly considered a party a defendant must be “specif[ied] in
the caption”). Therefore, failure to list an actor as a named defendant is grounds
for dismissing any potential claims against that actor.
will also be dismissed in part for the same reason because Plaintiff
failed to name Nippe, Vasquez, or any of the unknown nurses and med techs in
the caption. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10. But more problematically, Plaintiff has failed to
adequately plead that he suffered from a serious medical need. In order to state a
clam for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, an inmate must show
that he 1) suffered from an objectively serious medical condition; and 2) that the
defendant was deliberately indifferent to a risk of serious harm from that
condition.

An objectively serious condition includes an ailment that has been

“diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment,” one that significantly affects
an individual’s daily activities, or which involves chronic and substantial pain.
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997).

“Deliberate

indifference is proven by demonstrating that a prison official knows of a
substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either acts or fails to act in disregard of
that risk. Delaying treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if such delay
exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.” Gomez v.
Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotations
omitted); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). The Eight

Amendment does not give prisoners entitlement to “demand specific care” or “the
best care possible,” but only requires “reasonable measures to meet a substantial
risk of serious harm.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that his cell was so small that when he jumped off the
top bunk, he was at risk for hitting his head against the wall. Plaintiff suggests
this happened multiple times, but as the means of injury was entirely within his
control, the Court finds that it is not plausible that Plaintiff suffered from a
serious medical need, if the injury was so slight as to cause him to continue with
the behavior causing the injury. Moreover, methods of treating minor bruising
and contusions are extremely limited. Plaintiff has not specified what medical
treatment he believes he was entitled to, but his allegations make it implausible
that he required medical attention or that physician or layperson would have
thought he required care. Given the description of the injury, it is much more
likely that it resolved without resort to medical care.
dismisses

The Court therefore

without prejudice for failure to list the defendants in the case

caption and because Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded a deliberate indifference
claim.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
s 4 and 7 are DISMISSED with
DISMISSED with

.

survive threshold review.
.

3, 5-6 are

Defendants Oakley, Benton and Baldwin are
.

IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants
Beboutt, Spiller, Butler, Brookman, and Jackson:

(1) Form 5 (Notice of a

Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of
Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the
Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date
the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service
on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs
of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to a Defendant who no
longer can be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall
furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation
of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not
be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or
upon defense counsel once an appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or
other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include
with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and
correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper

received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the
Clerk or that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the
Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading
to the complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United
States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is REFERRED to a United States Magistrate
Judge for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. §
636(c), should all the parties consent to such a referral.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against Plaintiff,
and the judgment includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will
be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that his
application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay
fees and costs or give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney
were deemed to have entered into a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured
in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court, who shall pay therefrom all

unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff. Local Rule
3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to
keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his
address; the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall
be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in
address occurs.

Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the

transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for
want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 25th day of February, 2017.

Judge Herndon
2017.02.25
08:41:28 -06'00'
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE