Conway v. Gooden et al

Filing 17

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 3/28/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
GREGORY CONWAY, #N83890,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LIEUTENANT PEARCE,
C/O ESTES,
C/O WALLA,
C/O MERACLE,
HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATOR
JOHN DOE, and
KIMBERLY RICHARDSON,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16-cv-01393-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff

Gregory

Conway,

an

inmate

who

is

currently

incarcerated

at

Pinckneyville Correctional Center, brings this pro se action for alleged violations of his
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Because Plaintiff brought claims against
officials at both Western Illinois Correctional Center and Pinckneyville Correctional Center
under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Plaintiff’s case was severed into multiple
actions in this Court’s Order (Doc. 11) dated February 2, 2017 (“Severance Order”).
In the Severance Order, Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his Complaint in this action
by March 2, 2017. Id. The deadline for submitting the amended complaint has since passed. Id.
Remaining in this action are failure to protect and retaliation claims against Pearce, Estes, Walla,
and Meracle and deliberate indifference claims against Health Care Administrator John Doe and
Richardson. Plaintiff requests monetary compensation and declaratory relief. (Doc. 1, pp. 3035).
1

This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it
appropriate to allow this action to proceed past the threshold stage.
The Complaint
In his Complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff makes the following allegations related to the
remaining Counts in this action. On July 14, 2015, Plaintiff was attacked, punched in the head
and face and stabbed in the neck, chest, back, arm and leg by his mentally unstable cellmate.

2

(Doc. 1, p. 18). Prior to the attack, Plaintiff told Defendant Estes that his cellmate “was
constantly threatening to kill” him. (Doc. 1, pp. 16-17, 23). On the day of the attack, he told
Estes that his cellmate had brandished an object that looked like a knife and told Plaintiff he
planned to kill him that day. Id. Estes mocked Plaintiff, stating “[t]he Trouble-Maker needs
help, write a grievance.” (Doc. 1, pp. 17-18).
Plaintiff also told Defendant Pearce about his cellmate’s threats and weapon. Before
walking away, Pearce stated: “The big bad trouble-maker is not worried about this little crazy
guy is [sic] you? You should’ve thought about that before you started slinging all that ink all
over those grievances.” (Doc. 1, p. 19).
Plaintiff also alleges that he repeatedly told Defendants Walla and Meracle that his
cellmate was suffering from mental illness and “was constantly threatening to kill the Plaintiff.”
(Doc. 1, p. 21). In response, Walla would typically say something akin to “we don’t help
trouble-makers.” Id. Similarly, Meracle would call him a trouble-maker and “make an obscene
comment then walk away.” (Doc. 1, p. 22). Plaintiff claims these actions by Estes, Pearce,
Walla and Meracle were taken in retaliation for Plaintiff having previously complained and filed
grievances and demonstrated deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s personal health and safety.
(Doc. 1, pp. 18-23).
Plaintiff was seen by Richardson after he was attacked and given some ointment for his
stab wounds. (Doc. 1, pp. 23-24, 25-26). According to the Complaint, Richardson “tried to
render medical services she [wa]s unqualified to give” and “never followed the procedures
required for the Plaintiff to receive the correct examination and treatment.” (Doc. 1, pp. 25-26).
Plaintiff maintains that this constitutes deliberate indifference. Id.
Plaintiff was also informed by Richardson that he would be called the next day to see a

3

doctor. (Doc. 1, p. 26). Despite his swollen face, blackened and bruised eyes, swollen lip,
severe migraine, body soreness, dizzy spells, “mental and physical trauma” and “constantly
bleeding” stab wound, Plaintiff was not seen by a doctor as promised. (Doc. 1, pp. 24, 26).
Plaintiff submitted request slips to see a doctor for 11 days straight after the attack and was
denied all treatment. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that Health Care Administrator John Doe exhibits deliberate indifference
to prisoners’ serious medical needs by allowing “systemic deficiencies in staffing or procedures”
to make “unnecessary suffering happen.” (Doc. 1, p. 25). He further alleges that under Health
Care Administrator John Doe, “prisoners are unable to make their medical problems known to
medical staff” and that “[d]isorganization and dysfunction in a medical program can amount to
deliberate indifference if it prevents prisoners from receiving necessary care.” Id. Plaintiff
suggests that this disorder and dysfunction are in part, the reason he failed to receive treatment
despite his serious injuries.
Discussion
In the Severance Order, the Court identified four counts from Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint
that remained in this action:
Count 7:

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Estes, Pearce,
Walla, and Meracle for failing to protect Plaintiff from an attack by
his cellmate on July 14, 2015 after Plaintiff told them that his
cellmate had threatened his life and brandished a knife-like
weapon at him;

Count 8:

First Amendment retaliation claim against Estes, Pearce, Walla,
and Meracle for failing to protect Plaintiff from his cellmate
because he reported a sexual assault at Western Illinois and filed
grievances;

Count 9:

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim
against Richardson for attempting to render medical services she
was unqualified to provide and failing to follow proper
4

examination procedures following Plaintiff’s attack by his cellmate
on July 14, 2015;
Count 10:

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim
against Health Care Administrator John Doe for allowing
disorganization and dysfunction in the medical program at
Pinckneyville that resulted in Plaintiff’s denial of medical care by a
doctor for the serious injuries he sustained during the cellmate
attack on July 14, 2015;

Any claims not addressed herein should be considered dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count 7 – Failure to Protect
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court held that “prison officials
have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. at 833
(internal citations omitted); see also Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2006).
However, not every harm caused by another inmate translates into constitutional liability for the
corrections officers responsible for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
In order for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim for failure to protect, he must show that he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the defendants
acted with “deliberate indifference” to that danger. Id.; Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889. A plaintiff
also must prove that prison officials were aware of a specific, impending, and substantial threat
to his safety, often by showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his
safety. Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996). In other words, the defendants had to
know that there was a substantial risk that the person who attacked Plaintiff would do so, yet
failed to take any action. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733-34 (7th Cir. 2001).
However, conduct that amounts to negligence or inadvertence is not enough to state a claim.
Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889 (discussing Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 172 (7th Cir. 1985)).

5

Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a failure to protect claim against Estes, Pearce, Walla and
Meracle. Plaintiff told these defendants that his cellmate had threatened his life and brandished a
knife-like weapon at him. The defendants failed to respond to protect Plaintiff from harm, and,
according to the Complaint, Plaintiff was attacked by his cellmate and suffered severe injuries
that could have been prevented by the defendants. Count 7 will therefore be allowed to proceed.
Count 8 – Retaliation
Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances or otherwise
complaining about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859,
866 (7th Cir. 2012); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); DeWalt v. Carter, 224
F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996); Cain v. Lane, 857
F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1988). At issue here is whether Plaintiff experienced an adverse action that
would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future and if the First Amendment activity
was “at least a motivating factor” in the defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.
Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff has alleged that Estes, Pearce, Walla and Meracle failed to protect him from an
attack by his cellmate in retaliation for his filing grievances. Whether this is true is a question
that cannot be resolved at the pleading stage. Thus, the Court will allow Plaintiff’s retaliation
claim to proceed.
Count 9 – Deliberate Indifference by Richardson
“Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” may constitute cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam). This encompasses a broader range of conduct than intentional denial of necessary

6

medical treatment, but it stops short of “negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. See also Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 734 (7th
Cir. 2001).
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show that the
responsible prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Dunigan ex rel. Nyman
v. Winnebago Cnty., 165 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 1999). Deliberate indifference
involves a two-part test. The plaintiff must show that (1) the medical condition
was objectively serious, and (2) the state officials acted with deliberate
indifference to his medical needs, which is a subjective standard.
Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). However, this test is not an
insurmountable hurdle for inmates raising Eighth Amendment claims:
[A]n Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or
failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that
the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of
serious harm . . . . Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a
substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways,
including inference from circumstantial evidence . . . and a factfinder may
conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that
the risk was obvious.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
Claims asserting deliberate indifference in the denial or delay of medical care require
evidence of a defendant’s actual knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, a substantial risk of
harm. See Chavez v. Cady, 207 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2000) (officers were on notice of
seriousness of condition of prisoner with ruptured appendix because he “did his part to let the
officers know he was suffering”). A defendant’s inadvertent error, negligence or even ordinary
malpractice is insufficient to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment constitutional violation.
See Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008); Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328,
331 (7th Cir. 2003) (courts will not take sides in disagreements with medical personnel’s
judgments or techniques). However, a plaintiff inmate need not prove that a defendant intended
7

the harm that ultimately transpired or believed the harm would occur. Walker v. Benjamin, 293
F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 641 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Given the extensive nature of the wounds Plaintiff alleges he sustained, this Court
considers Plaintiff’s injuries to be objectively serious. Further, at this juncture, Plaintiff has
satisfied the subjective prong of the analysis, given his claim that the only treatment he received
for these injuries was ointment from Richardson. Additionally, Richardson allegedly failed to
ensure Plaintiff received more thorough treatment later, though she promised he would receive a
follow-up visit from a doctor.

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Richardson

therefore satisfies both the objective and subjective requirements of the deliberate indifference to
medical needs analysis and Count 9 will be allowed to proceed.
Count 10 – Deliberate Indifference by
Health Care Administrator John Doe
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Health Care Administrator John Doe may be held liable for
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs due to the fact that he has allowed disorder
and dysfunction, including systemic staffing and procedural deficiencies, to interfere with the
appropriate and timely treatment of prisoners’ injuries and ailments, including his own. (Doc. 1,
p. 25). Notably, § 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon
fault.

Liability does not lie unless the individual defendant caused or participated in the

constitutional deprivation. See Kuhn v. Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 555–56 (7th Cir. 2012);
Vinning–El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s allegations, read liberally,
connect the policies and practices allegedly implemented and maintained by Health Care
Administrator John Doe with Plaintiff’s failure to receive appropriate care after he was attacked.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims in Count 10 will also proceed.
Pending Motions
8

Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint (Doc. 12) that is, in effect, a
motion to substitute the unidentified defendant Health Care Administrator John Doe for Christine
Brown. The motion is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to substitute CHRISTINE
BROWN for defendant HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATOR JOHN DOE in this case.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 7 shall PROCEED against ESTES,
PEARCE, WALLA and MERACLE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 8 shall PROCEED against ESTES,
PEARCE, WALLA and MERACLE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 9 shall PROCEED against
RICHARDSON.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 10 shall PROCEED against BROWN
(substituted for Health Care Administrator John Doe).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to COUNTS 7 through 10, the Clerk of Court
shall prepare for ESTES, PEARCE, WALLA, MERACLE, RICHARDSON and BROWN:
(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each defendant’s place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff.

If any defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of

Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall
take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and the Court will require that
defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

9

With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon each defendant (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered) a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on the defendant or counsel. Any paper
received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails
to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Reona J. Daly for further pre-trial proceedings.

Further, this entire matter shall be

REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly for disposition, pursuant to
Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, despite the fact
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

10

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 28, 2017

s/ STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

11