Moir v. Amdahl et al

Filing 8

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 3/24/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DREW M. MOIR, # M-48561,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 17-cv-066-DRH

TIMOTHY J. AMDAHL,
DAVID W. RAINS,
JOHN BALDWIN,
RACHEL DODD,
MONICA CARRELL,
MICHELLE NEESE,
DEEDEE BROOKHART,
SCOTT REIS,
SHELLY JOHNSON,
DAVID SHEA,
C/O GEIER,
BYRLEY,
T. SCOTT KEEN,
and SHERRY BENTON,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Plaintiff,

currently

incarcerated

at

Robinson

Correctional

Center

(“Robinson”), has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Among other claims, Plaintiff asserts that he was denied the opportunity to
attend religious services, and was singled out for harassment on account of his
race and religion. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of
the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A .
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter
Page 1 of 21

out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss
any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a
defendant who by law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an

objective standard that refers to a claim that “no reasonable person could
suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir.
2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does
not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to
relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.”

Id. at 557.

Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v.

Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so
sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s
claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts
“should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of
action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual
allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed.

Page 2 of 21

See Arnett v.

Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Applying these standards, the Court finds that some of Plaintiff’s claims
survive threshold review under § 1915A
The Complaint
Plaintiff is white, and is a practicing member of the Al-Islam faith. During
the time period pertinent to this action, he attended Jumah services regularly.
Jumah services were held at Robinson every Friday at 1:00 p.m. (Doc. 1, p. 8).
On Friday, December 18, 2015, at approximately 12:35 p.m., Plaintiff
attempted to sign out of his housing unit (4B) to attend Jumah service. Officer
Amdahl told Plaintiff that he didn’t know anything about the service and was not
going to call to find out about it. (Doc. 1, p. 4). At approximately 1:05 p.m.,
Plaintiff went to the 4B control unit and asked Amdahl whether the Jumah service
had been called; Amdahl responded that it had not. Plaintiff requested Amdahl to
call and find out why the Jumah line had not been called; Amdahl responded,
“You shouldn’t even have it, so I’m not calling.” Id. Soon afterward, Plaintiff saw
other inmates carrying prayer rugs proceeding to the gym. Plaintiff returned to
the 4B control area and asked Amdahl to call the gym because Plaintiff had seen
other prisoners on their way there. Officer Byrley stated that no Jumah line had
been called. Plaintiff was not permitted to attend Jumah service that day.
Plaintiff filed a grievance over this incident. Several weeks later, Grievance
Officer Dodd responded, saying that memos had gone out to inform “Operations”

Page 3 of 21

of the regular Jumah schedule, and they are responsible to call all lines. Amdahl
told Dodd that each wing gets a call regarding Jumah lines, and they must not
have received a call on December 18. Plaintiff’s grievance was denied, and the
denial was affirmed by Keen (Administrative Review Board) and Baldwin (IDOC
Director). (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5).
The following Friday, December 25, 2015, Plaintiff asked a Lieutenant to
make sure Jumah was called in House 4B as he did not want the same problem
to recur. The Jumah service was called that day in 4B, and Plaintiff attended.
Upon Plaintiff’s return to his unit, Amdahl immediately shook him down
“for no apparent or valid reason.”

(Doc. 1, p. 5).

Following the shakedown,

Plaintiff asked Amdahl to call in a crisis team; Amdahl refused. Plaintiff asked for
a grievance form and for Amdahl to call a superior officer. Amdahl refused, and
ordered Plaintiff to step into the wing, which Plaintiff did. Amdahl then wrote a
disciplinary report on Plaintiff. 1

Plaintiff asked Amdahl for a crisis team two

more times when Amdahl walked through the unit, but Amdahl ignored him.
(Doc. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff later filed a grievance over Amdahl’s conduct, which was
denied. (Doc. 1-1, p. 8). After Amdahl left due to a shift change, Plaintiff asked
the new officer for a crisis team referral; this officer allowed Plaintiff to go to
Operations to discuss the crisis.
About 3:00 p.m. on December 25, 2015, Plaintiff spoke with Officer Shea to
address his crisis issue, and explained that he was being “harassed, intimidated,
1

Plaintiff attaches a disciplinary summary showing that he was found guilty of possessing unauthorized
property on December 25, 2015 (a catalog from the Islamic Book Store), and punished with a 14-day
commissary restriction, based on a ticket written by Amdahl. (Doc. 1-1, p. 24).
Page 4 of 21

and discriminated against,” and the problem “not only affect[ed] my life but also
my eternity.” (Doc. 1, p. 6). Shea responded that this was not a crisis; a crisis
team should be used when someone dies. Shea asked whether Plaintiff liked it at
Robinson, and then said he could send Plaintiff somewhere where there is no air
conditioning, concluding, “Don’t play with the crisis team.” Id. Plaintiff responded
that death is inevitable and shouldn’t be a crisis, but hindering him from
practicing his religion will affect him for eternity, and is very serious.
On January 9, 2016, Amdahl approached Plaintiff in the hallway of the
unit, addressing him as “Hebrew – that’s your name, isn’t it?” (Doc. 1, p. 7).
Plaintiff responded that his name was not “Hebrew.” Amdahl took Plaintiff to the
control area, and asked him if he knew another inmate across the hall named
“Hebrew.”

Amdahl described the inmate’s physical appearance; Plaintiff

responded that he knew the person, but his name is not “Hebrew.” Amdahl said
this inmate wanted to speak to Plaintiff, and asked Officer Geier whether the
inmate was on his housing wing (4A). Geier said he was there but was probably
asleep, having just returned from work. Plaintiff returned to his own 4B wing.
(Doc. 1, p. 8).
The inmate who was the subject of Amdahl’s “Hebrew” inquiry was Bourey,
who, like Plaintiff, was a white practicing member of the Al-Islam faith. Two days
later, Plaintiff asked Bourey if he needed to speak with Plaintiff. Bourey said he
did not, and that officers had also approached him, calling him “Hebrew” and told
Bourey that Plaintiff wanted to speak to him. Neither Bourey nor Plaintiff had

Page 5 of 21

asked an officer to relay a message to the other. (Doc. 1, p. 9). Plaintiff filed a
grievance against Amdahl over this incident, which he viewed as harassment and
an encouragement to break the rules against communicating with inmates on
other housing wings. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 10-11).
On January 12, 2016, when Plaintiff checked back into his wing after
getting a haircut, Amdahl asked to inspect Plaintiff’s hair. (Doc. 1, p. 9). Plaintiff
asked why, and Amdahl replied, “To make sure it is safe.”

Id.

Plaintiff

questioned whether the officer at the barbershop had asked Amdahl to check his
hair, because that officer had already made sure Plaintiff’s hair complied with
regulations. Amdahl said, “No, I just want to see your hair.” Id. Plaintiff filed a
grievance over this incident. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 15-16).

In Amdahl’s response to the

grievance, he claimed that he was speaking to another inmate about his hair, but
Plaintiff says there was no other inmate present or returning to the unit at that
time. (Doc. 1, p. 10).
On January 22, 2016, Plaintiff again was not allowed to participate in the
Friday Jumah service. (Doc. 1, p. 10). Plaintiff went to the dayroom at 12:30
p.m. to wait for the Jumah call. Over the next 40 minutes, Amdahl called the
lines for 3 other activities, but not Jumah. At 1:10 p.m., Plaintiff asked Amdahl
to call the gym to inquire about the Jumah line. Amdahl claimed that he had
called the Jumah line “a while ago;” but Plaintiff informed Amdahl he had been
waiting ever since the dayroom opened. Id. Amdahl refused Plaintiff’s request to
be allowed to attend Jumah, and refused to call a Lieutenant. Plaintiff followed

Page 6 of 21

Amdahl’s order to step back into the wing.
Soon after this discussion, Amdahl took Plaintiff back to the control area.
No other officers were present, and Plaintiff asked if they could talk in front of
other people. Amdahl ignored this request, and locked the control room door.
Amdahl, with an aggressive tone, asked Plaintiff if he had a problem with him
(Amdahl). (Doc. 1, p. 11). Plaintiff said he had a problem with Amdahl denying
him his religious rights and services. Amdahl said, “If you have a problem then
let’s address it.” Id.

Plaintiff, fearing violence, said they could not address

anything because he would just get a ticket and nothing would be solved. Amdahl
responded, “That’s right,” then asked Plaintiff why it was always him missing
Jumah. Id. Plaintiff said, “I’m the only one who goes consistently, and you don’t
call the line.” Id. Amdahl told Plaintiff to go back to the wing and “keep [his]
f***ing mouth shut or I’ll have your ass walked to seg.” Id.
Amdahl proceeded to write Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket, claiming that
Plaintiff had used profanity and refused multiple orders to return to his wing.
(Doc. 1-1, p. 27). This ticket was expunged. (Doc. 1, p. 11; Doc. 1-1, p. 28-29).
Based on these incidents, Plaintiff raises several claims under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.

(Doc. 1, pp. 12-13).

These include claims against

Amdahl and Byrley for denial of access to religious services; claims against
Amdahl and Geier for singling out Plaintiff for discrimination and harassment
because of his religion and race; an equal protection claim against Shea; claims
against Amdahl for lying and filing illegible documents; and claims against Rains,

Page 7 of 21

Keen, Baldwin, Dodd, Carrell, Neese, Brookhart, Benton, Reis, and Johnson for
failing to take action on his grievances and violating administrative procedures.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and
punitive damages. (Doc. 1, p. 15).
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to
divide the pro se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will
use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise
directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these counts does
not constitute an opinion as to their merit. Any other claim that is mentioned in
the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 1: First Amendment claim against Amdahl and Byrley, for
preventing Plaintiff from attending Jumah services on two occasions
(December 18, 2015, and January 22, 2016);
Count 2: Fourteenth Amendment discrimination/equal protection
claim against Amdahl and Geier, for targeting Plaintiff for
harassment and intimidation because of his race and religion;
Count 3: First Amendment retaliation claim against Amdahl, for
filing an unsubstantiated disciplinary charge against Plaintiff and for
harassing him, after Plaintiff complained and filed grievances against
Amdahl for denying him access to religious services;
Count 4: Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against
Shea, for threatening Plaintiff with a transfer after Plaintiff requested
crisis team assistance;
Count 5: Claim against Amdahl for making false statements in
responding to Plaintiff’s grievances, and for filing illegible disciplinary
charges;
Page 8 of 21

Count 6: Claims against Rains, Baldwin, Dodd, Carroll, Neese,
Brookhart, Reis, Johnson, Keen, and Benton for mishandling
Plaintiff’s grievances and failing to comply with administrative rules
regarding grievance processing.
Counts 1, 2, and 3 shall proceed for further review against Amdahl.
However, Counts 4, 5, and 6 shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
Count 1 – Denial of Access to Religious Services
The Seventh Circuit recognized years ago that “while freedom to believe is
absolute, the exercise of religion is not . . . .” Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915,
920 (7th Cir. 1983), and “prison officials may legitimately impose certain
restrictions on the practice of religion in prison . . .” where there is a compelling
interest.

Id. (citations omitted).

Legitimate penological interests include the

preservation of security in prison, as well as economic concerns. See Ortiz v.

Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2009). When these concerns are raised as
justifications by prison officials for their actions that restrict the practice of
religion, the Court looks at four factors to determine whether the restriction is
constitutional:
(1) whether the restriction “is rationally related to a legitimate and
neutral governmental objective”; (2) “whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to the inmate”; (3)
“what impact an accommodation of the asserted right will have on
guards and other inmates”; and (4) “whether there are obvious
alternatives to the [restriction] that show that it is an exaggerated
response to [penological] concerns.”

Page 9 of 21

Id. (citing Lindell v. Frank, 377 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2004)). See also Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff does not make a general challenge to prison
regulations regarding access to Jumah services, nor does he complain that any
particular regulation interfered with the free exercise of his beliefs.

To the

contrary, the prison had a regular schedule allowing prisoners to attend Jumah
service, with a protocol in place to authorize their movement from the housing
areas to the gym where services were held. Therefore, whether the prison has
valid penological reasons for their regulations is not at issue. Instead, Plaintiff
complains that Amdahl purposely denied him access to the Jumah service.
Plaintiff asserts that on two occasions, Amdahl failed to call the line to
authorize prisoners to leave his housing area in order to attend the Jumah
service.

Each time, Amdahl denied Plaintiff’s requests for permission to join

other inmates at the service. On December 18, 2015, Plaintiff alerted Amdahl in
advance that he wished to attend the service, but Amdahl refused to check as to
why the Jumah line had not been called, and refused to allow Plaintiff to go to the
service even after other inmates were observed on their way there. About a month
later, on January 22, 2016, Amdahl again failed to call the Jumah line, and
refused to allow Plaintiff to attend after he inquired. At this stage of the case,
Plaintiff has adequately pled a First Amendment claim against Amdahl for
interfering with his practice of his religion, and Count 1 shall proceed against this
Defendant.

Page 10 of 21

Plaintiff also seeks to impose liability on Byrley for his inability to attend
these services. However, his recitation of the facts indicates that Byrley did not
appear to have authority to allow Plaintiff to leave his wing (4B), and was merely
present in the control room on December 18 when Plaintiff questioned Amdahl
about the Jumah line. After Plaintiff had seen other inmates walking nearby with
prayer rugs and asked Amdahl to call about the matter, Byerley stated that no
Jumah line had been called. This was the extent of Byerley’s involvement in the
matter.

While Byerley’s comment might have supported Amdahl’s decision to

continue to deny Plaintiff’s requests to call about the matter, Byerly had no duty
to intervene on Plaintiff’s behalf. Byerly’s presence and voluntary comment about
the issue are not sufficient to hold him liable for Amdahl’s actions on December
18. Plaintiff’s claim that Byerly lied when he said the line had not been called
(Doc. 1, p. 13) does not alter this analysis. Byerly shall therefore be dismissed
from Count 1 without prejudice.
Count 2 – Discrimination/Equal Protection – Amdahl and Geier
A “prison administrative decision may give rise to an equal protection claim
only if the plaintiff can establish that ‘state officials had purposefully and
intentionally discriminated against him.’” Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408,
415 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987) (citing Shango v. Jurich, 681
F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982)). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits government discrimination against a person on the basis of
characteristics such as race, national origin, or religious affiliation.

Page 11 of 21

The gravamen of equal protection lies not in the fact of deprivation of
a right but in the invidious classification of persons aggrieved by the
state's action. A plaintiff must demonstrate intentional or purposeful
discrimination to show an equal protection violation. Discriminatory
purpose, however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that a decisionmaker singled
out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected his
course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse
effects on the identifiable group.

Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453-54 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Shango v.
Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982)).
In Plaintiff’s case, he claims that Amdahl purposely singled out himself and
inmate Bourey, as the “only two white practicing members of Al-Islam in house 4,”
for harassment and intimidation. (Doc. 1, p. 13). Plaintiff’s account indicates
that Amdahl targeted him because he was a member of a racial minority within
the group of inmates who followed the Al-Islam faith.
Amdahl’s actions against Plaintiff taken due to his race and religious
membership include his “shakedown” of Plaintiff on December 25 upon Plaintiff’s
return from Jumah service; the January 9, 2016, incident when Amdahl called
Plaintiff “Hebrew” and encouraged Plaintiff and Bourey to break the rule against
communicating with prisoners in other housing areas; Amdahl’s insistence on
checking Plaintiff’s hair on January 12; and Amdahl’s confrontation with Plaintiff
on January 22 which led to the later-expunged disciplinary ticket.

Amdahl’s

refusal to allow Plaintiff to attend the two Jumah services described in Count 1
may also be considered under this Fourteenth Amendment claim.

Page 12 of 21

Additionally, Plaintiff’s equal protection claim may be considered as a
“class-of-one” discrimination claim, in which a government actor arbitrarily and
irrationally singles out an individual for adverse treatment.

See Village of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Brunson v. Murray, 843 F.3d
698, 705-08 (7th Cir. 2016); Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 747 (7th
Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff’s Complaint suggests that he was treated differently from

other similarly situated inmates, when Amdahl targeted him for the adverse
actions described above. Further, Amdahl’s comments related by Plaintiff, and
the pattern of actions he describes, indicate discriminatory animus toward him.
At this stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated an equal protection claim against
Amdahl in Count 2 that survives review under § 1915A.
Plaintiff also includes Geier in the claim based on his involvement in the
January 9, 2016, incident where Amdahl called Plaintiff “Hebrew” and claimed
that inmate Bourey wanted to speak to Plaintiff. Geier was in the control room
and was in charge of the inmates on Bourey’s wing, 4A. According to Plaintiff’s
account, Geier merely answered Amdahl’s question regarding whether inmate
Bourey was present on the wing. Plaintiff does not describe anything Geier did or
said to “single out” Plaintiff for discriminatory treatment, or to harass him in any
way. (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8; 13). Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Geier for
subjecting him to discrimination or violating his right to equal protection. Geier
shall be dismissed without prejudice from this claim.
Count 2 shall proceed only against Amdahl.

Page 13 of 21

Count 3 – Retaliation
Plaintiff does not explicitly name a retaliation claim in the Complaint.
However, Plaintiff’s narrative suggests a possible First Amendment retaliation
claim, and this claim shall be addressed in keeping with the Court’s duty to
liberally construe pro se pleadings.
Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances,
exercising First Amendment rights, or otherwise complaining about their
conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th
Cir. 2012); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); DeWalt v.

Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir.
1996); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1988). “A complaint states a claim
for retaliation when it sets forth ‘a chronology of events from which retaliation
may plausibly be inferred.’” Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir.
2000) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff describes a series of events involving Amdahl, which
prompted Plaintiff to file several grievances against him. Not only that, Plaintiff
voiced his complaints over being denied access to Jumah services directly to
Amdahl. When Amdahl searched Plaintiff on December 25, Plaintiff asked for a
crisis team and asked Amdahl for a grievance form. Amdahl knew of Plaintiff’s
intent to file a complaint against him. Based on this chronology, it is plausible
that

Amdahl’s

subsequent

harassment,

hair

inspection,

and/or

the

unsubstantiated disciplinary charge of January 22, 2016, against Plaintiff were at

Page 14 of 21

least partially motivated by Plaintiff’s earlier complaints and/or grievances against
Amdahl.
The issue in a retaliation claim is whether the plaintiff experienced an
adverse action that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future, and
if the First Amendment activity was “at least a motivating factor” in the
defendant’s decision to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d
541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009). The January 22 disciplinary charge, as well as the
other incidents of harassment, qualify as such adverse actions.

Plaintiff’s

pleading states a plausible retaliation claim, therefore, Count 3 against Amdahl
shall also proceed for further consideration.
Dismissal of Count 4 – Equal Protection – Shea
Plaintiff articulates his claim against Shea as a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claim. He asserts that Shea violated his rights by telling Plaintiff
that his problem with Amdahl was not a crisis, and then by threatening to
transfer Plaintiff to a less-comfortable prison because he thought Plaintiff abused
the crisis intervention process.

However, Shea never subjected Plaintiff to a

transfer or any other adverse action. The Complaint does not provide any factual
support to suggest that Shea treated Plaintiff any differently from other inmates
who called for a crisis intervention, thus there appears to be no basis for a claim
of discrimination or violation of equal protection rights.

Furthermore, Shea’s

expression of his opinion that Plaintiff did not have a legitimate “crisis” does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

Page 15 of 21

Because Shea did not actually carry out his threat to move Plaintiff, and
does not appear to have taken any adverse action against Plaintiff, there is no
basis to recognize a retaliation or other claim against Shea. Count 4 against Shea
shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
Dismissal of Count 5 – False Statements and Illegible Documents
In this claim, Plaintiff complains that Amdahl violated his rights by lying on
disciplinary reports and grievance responses, and that his illegibly-written
disciplinary forms violated the regulations governing prison grievance procedures.
Even if these claims are true, however, they do not amount to a constitutional
violation.
Giving false statements on prison disciplinary and grievance documents
simply does not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Further, the purported
violation of prison regulations does not give rise to a claim cognizable in a federal
civil rights action. A federal court does not enforce state law and regulations.

Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Pasiewicz v. Lake Cnty. Forest Preserve Dist., 270
F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 2001).
For these reasons, Count 5 shall be dismissed from this action with
prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Dismissal of Count 6 – Grievance Processing
Finally, Plaintiff states that a number of Defendants who received his

Page 16 of 21

grievances violated his Fourteenth and First Amendment rights by refusing to take
any action on the grievances, particularly the complaints about being excluded
from religious services. He also faults Dodd, Keen, and Neece for running afoul of
the grievance regulations by focusing on the relief Plaintiff requested in his
grievances rather than addressing the issue that gave rise to the grievance.
Neither of these assertions states a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Seventh Circuit instructs that the alleged mishandling of grievances “by
persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct
states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). See also

Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008); George v. Smith,
507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th
Cir. 1996). “[A] state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1430. The
Constitution requires no procedure at all, and the failure of state prison officials
to follow their own grievance procedures does not, of itself, violate the
Constitution. Maust v. Headley, 959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1992); Shango v.

Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1982). And as discussed above under
Count 5, the failure to follow a state regulation or administrative procedure does
not give rise to a federal constitutional claim.
None of the Defendants named in connection with this claim (Rains,
Baldwin, Dodd, Carroll, Neese, Brookhart, Reis, Johnson, Keen, and Benton) had
any involvement whatsoever in Amdahl’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to attend Jumah

Page 17 of 21

services. Nor did they take any part in Amdahl’s alleged discriminatory actions.
They only became aware of Plaintiff’s complaints after the alleged unconstitutional
actions had occurred.

Thus, these Defendants’ denial of Plaintiff’s grievances,

failure to take action on the grievances, or any other action or inaction with regard
to the grievance procedure will not support an independent constitutional claim.
Count 6 shall also be dismissed from this action with prejudice for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The above Defendants who allegedly mishandled Plaintiff’s grievances shall
be dismissed from the action. However, because Plaintiff is seeking injunctive
relief in connection with the counts which shall receive further review, Warden
Rains (or the current Warden of Robinson) shall remain in the action, in his
official capacity only. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir.
2011) (proper defendant in a claim for injunctive relief is the government official
responsible for ensuring any injunctive relief is carried out).
Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) shall be referred to the
United States Magistrate Judge for further consideration.
The motion for service of process at government expense (Doc. 4) shall be
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Service shall be ordered below on
those Defendants who remain in the action.
dismissed Defendants.

Page 18 of 21

No service shall be made on the

Disposition
COUNT 4 is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. COUNTS 5 and 6 are DISMISSED with prejudice
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Defendants BALDWIN, DODD, CARRELL, NEESE, BROOKHART, REIS,
JOHNSON, SHEA, GEIER, BYRLEY, KEEN, and BENTON are DISMISSED
from this action without prejudice. All claims against RAINS in his individual
capacity are also dismissed without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants AMDAHL and RAINS (in
his official capacity as Warden of Robinson Correctional Center): (1) Form 5
(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a
copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s
place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and
return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days
from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect
formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay
the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work
address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the
Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known
Page 19 of 21

address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed
above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the
court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an
appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for
consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be
filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of the
document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received by a district
judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading
to the complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United
States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings, which shall include a
determination on the pending motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3).
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to the United States
Magistrate Judge for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the
payment of costs under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of

Page 20 of 21

the costs, notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has
been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to
keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his
address; the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall
be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in
address occurs.

Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the

transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for
want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 24th day of March, 2017.

Digitally signed by
Judge David R. Herndon
Date: 2017.03.24
14:51:49 -05'00'
United States District Judge

Page 21 of 21