Saddler v. Aldridge et al

Filing 9

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 2/20/2017. (tjk) Modified on 2/21/2017 (tjk).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DARIUS SADDLER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 17 cv–0067 DRH

ALDRIDGE,
STROUD,
REED, and
MCCOLLUM
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Plaintiff Darius Saddler, an inmate in Vienna Correctional Center, brings
this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Plaintiff requests compensation. This case is now before the Court for a
preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which
provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible
or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a
civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
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An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

Frivolousness is an

objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find
meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

The claim of entitlement to relief must

cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture,
the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the
Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; portions of this
action are subject to summary dismissal.
The Complaint
On July 10, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a request slip to the health care unit
at Vienna complaining of pain in his ear and jaw area. (Doc. 1-1, p. 1). Dr.
Aldridge conducted a dental screening on July 19, 2016, and told Plaintiff he had
a hole in one of his teeth. Id. Plaintiff reported to Aldridge’s office on July 26,
2016 to have the tooth extracted. Id. Aldridge attempted to pull the tooth straight
out, without success. Id. Aldridge and Stroud, his assistant, informed Plaintiff
that they would have to drill the tooth in half in order to extract it. Id. Plaintiff
experienced severe pain and discomfort when the drilling started. Id. As a result

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of his pain and discomfort, Plaintiff’s body began making uncontrollable jerking
movements. Id. Aldridge asked Plaintiff why he was jerking. (Doc. 1-1, p. 2).
Plaintiff told him that he felt pain and the jerking was uncontrollable.

Id.

Aldridge told him to get out. Id. Plaintiff refused because he was bleeding and the
procedure was incomplete. Id. Aldridge stood over Plaintiff and balled his fist in
a threatening manner. Id.

Reed and McCollum ultimately escorted Plaintiff out

of the dentist’s office. Id. Plaintiff did not receive any medication for pain or
infection, any mouth rinses, any salt, or any packing to address the bleeding in
his mouth. Id.
On August 11, 2016, Plaintiff was transported to Dr. Heine in Paducah,
Kentucky to complete the procedure. Heine told Plaintiff he had an infection and
irritation. Id.
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to
divide the pro se action into 2 counts. The parties and the Court will use these
designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a
judicial officer of this Court. The following claim survives threshold review:
Count 1 – Aldridge and Stroud were deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s serious dental needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment
when they began an extraction procedure they were unequipped to
complete, ignored his complaints of pain during the procedure, and
kicked him out of the incomplete procedure without adequate
supplies to manage his aftercare and pain.

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Plaintiff has also attempted to bring other Counts, but for the reasons
elucidated below, these claims do not survive threshold review.
Count 2 – Aldridge and Stroud were medically negligent when they
had Plaintiff escorted out of the dental office mid-procedure after he
complained of pain, and failed to schedule a follow up for more than
two weeks.
As to Plaintiff’s Count 1, in order to state a clam for deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need, an inmate must show that he 1) suffered from an
objectively serious medical condition; and 2) that the defendant was deliberately
indifferent to a risk of serious harm from that condition. An objectively serious
condition includes an ailment that has been “diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment,” one that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities,
or which involves chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d
1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). “Deliberate indifference is proven by demonstrating
that a prison official knows of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either
acts or fails to act in disregard of that risk. Delaying treatment may constitute
deliberate indifference if such delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily
prolonged an inmate’s pain.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir.
2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). The Eight Amendment does not give prisoners
entitlement to “demand specific care” or “the best care possible,” but only
requires “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm.”
Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).

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Plaintiff has alleged that when he told Aldridge and Stroud that he felt pain
during drilling and that the pain was causing involuntary jerking, they stopped a
tooth-extraction mid-procedure and kicked him out.

Plaintiff also alleges that

because the procedure was suddenly stopped, his mouth was bleeding and he
required oral care, pain medication, and antibiotics, which Aldridge and Stroud
failed to provide. At the pleading stage, this is sufficient to state a claim against
Aldridge and Stroud under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference, and
Count 1 will be allowed to proceed.
But Count 2 must be dismissed without prejudice at this time. Plaintiff
also brings claims of “medical malpractice” against Defendants Aldridge and
Stroud, based on the same conduct detailed above. Where a district court has
original jurisdiction over a civil action such as a § 1983 claim, it also has
supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a), so long as the state claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact” with the original federal claims. Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d
921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008).

“A loose factual connection is generally sufficient.”

Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 495 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Baer v. First
Options of Chicago, Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995)). While this Court
has supplemental jurisdiction over these state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367, this is not the end of the matter.
Under Illinois law, a Plaintiff “[i]n any action, whether in tort, contract or
otherwise, in which the plaintiff seeks damages for injuries or death by reason of

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medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice,” must file an affidavit along
with the complaint, declaring one of the following: 1) that the affiant has consulted
and reviewed the facts of the case with a qualified health professional who has
reviewed the claim and made a written report that the claim is reasonable and
meritorious (and the written report must be attached to the affidavit); 2) that the
affiant was unable to obtain such a consultation before the expiration of the
statute of limitations, and affiant has not previously voluntarily dismissed an
action based on the same claim (and in this case, the required written report shall
be filed within 90 days after the filing of the complaint); or 3) that the plaintiff has
made a request for records but the respondent has not complied within 60 days
of receipt of the request (and in this case the written report shall be filed within
90 days of receipt of the records).

See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. §5/2-622(a).

A

separate affidavit and report shall be filed as to each defendant. See 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. §5/2-622(b).
Failure to file the required certificate is grounds for dismissal of the claim.
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-622(g); Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 613 (7th
Cir. 2000). However, whether such dismissal should be with or without prejudice
is up to the sound discretion of the court. Sherrod, 223 F.3d at 614. “Illinois
courts have held that when a plaintiff fails to attach a certificate and report, then
‘a sound exercise of discretion mandates that [the plaintiff] be at least afforded an
opportunity to amend her complaint to comply with section 2-622 before her

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action is dismissed with prejudice.’” Id.; see also Chapman v. Chandra, Case No.
06-cv-651-MJR, 2007 WL 1655799, at *4-5 (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2007).
In the instant case, Plaintiff has failed to file the necessary affidavits.
Therefore, the claim in Count 2 shall be dismissed. However, the dismissal shall
be without prejudice at this time, and Plaintiff shall be allowed 90 days from the
date he filed his Complaint (on or before April 20, 2017) to file the required
affidavits/certificates.

Should

Plaintiff

fail

to

timely

file

the

required

affidavits/certificates, the dismissal of Count 2 shall become a dismissal with
prejudice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
Additionally, Plaintiff has named Reed and McCollum as defendants in this
action. But the only allegation Plaintiff includes against them is that Reed and
McCollum escorted Plaintiff out of the health care unit after Aldridge stopped
treating him. Reed and McCollum cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference
because there is no allegation that they knew about the particulars of Plaintiff’s
dental needs. Plaintiff does not allege that he told either guard about his situation
or that he asked them to summon other medical care. Furthermore, Reed and
McCollum, as officers, had no authority to override Aldridge’s determinations on
the spot about what kind of care Plaintiff needed, nor would they have been able
to order Aldridge to continue. All that a guard can do in a deliberate indifference
case is inform the relevant medical professional about a prisoner’s need. See
Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Obviously the
guard can’t be faulted for being unable to treat an abscessed tooth, but he can be

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for not having reported [the] complaints. . . .”).

Reed and McCollum will be

dismissed without prejudice because Plaintiff has not pleaded enough facts to
raise an inference of plausible liability on his deliberate indifference claim.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s motion to request counsel will be referred to a magistrate judge
for disposition.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s COUNT 1 survives threshold
review. However, Defendants Reed and McCollum will be DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim against them.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to the medical malpractice claims in
COUNT 2 against Defendants Aldridge and Stroud is DISMISSED without
prejudice. Should Plaintiff wish to pursue that claim, he shall file the required
affidavits pursuant to 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. §5/2-622, no later than April 20, 2017.
Further, Plaintiff shall timely file the required written report(s) of a qualified
health professional, in compliance with §5/2-622. Should Plaintiff fail to timely
file the required affidavits or reports, the dismissal of COUNT 2 shall become a
dismissal with prejudice.
IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants
Aldridge and Stroud:

(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive

Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The
Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this
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Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified
by Plaintiff.

If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of

Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were
sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that
Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of
formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to a Defendant who no
longer can be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall
furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation
of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not
be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or
upon defense counsel once an appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or
other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include
with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and
correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper
received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the
Clerk or that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the
Court.

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Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading
to the complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United
States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is REFERRED to a United States Magistrate
Judge for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. §
636(c), should all the parties consent to such a referral.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against Plaintiff,
and the judgment includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will
be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that his
application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay
fees and costs or give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney
were deemed to have entered into a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured
in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court, who shall pay therefrom all
unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff. Local Rule
3.1(c)(1)
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to
keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his

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address; the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall
be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in
address occurs.

Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the

transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for
want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 20, 2017

Judge Herndon
2017.02.20
13:37:50 -06'00'
United States District Judge

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