Arnold v. Butler et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 6/29/2017. (jaj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SEAN ARNOLD, #B7516,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KIMBERLY BUTLER,
S.A. GODINEZ,
TERRI ANDERSON,
SHERRY BENTON,
M HOF,
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES INC.,
JOHN DOE 1, and
JOHN DOE 2,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17−cv–079−SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Sean Arnold, an inmate in Illinois River Correctional Center, brings this action
for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff claims that the defendants failed to protect him from an attack by another
inmate while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”) and were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs arising from the attack, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 6). This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the
Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
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(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Amended Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court
finds it appropriate to allow this case to proceed past the threshold stage.
The Amended Complaint
In his Amended Complaint (Doc. 6), Plaintiff makes the following allegations: Plaintiff
was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and is serving a 20-year prison sentence.
(Doc. 6, p. 6). He was transferred from Lawrence Correctional Center to Menard on October 22,
2014. Id. Upon his transfer to Menard, Plaintiff was housed with inmate Reliford, also known
as Trey-9. Id.

Reliford eventually discovered, potentially through seeing Plaintiff’s trial

transcripts in the cell, that Plaintiff was convicted of sexually assaulting Reliford’s cousin. Id.
On October 26, 2014, Plaintiff witnessed Reliford give orders to members of his gang, the

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Gangster Disciples, to attack and kill Plaintiff on sight. Id. Plaintiff attempted to reason with
Reliford, but Reliford told him: “If you speak to me again, I’ll kill you myself.” Id.
The next day, Plaintiff wrote a request to Internal Affairs / Placement to alert staff of the
threats made to his life and to request to be moved away from Reliford because he feared for his
safety. (Doc. 6, p. 7). On October 29, 2014, Plaintiff received a response from Internal Affairs
Officer M. Hof stating that Reliford was not on his enemy list. Id. For several days, Plaintiff
remained in fear for his life, until Reliford was released from segregation and sent to general
population. Id. Plaintiff was eventually released from segregation on December 29, 2014. Id.
He immediately requested protective custody and was denied by Warden Kimberly Butler on
January 9, 2015. Id.; (Doc. 6-1, p. 9). Plaintiff grieved the denial to the Administrative Review
Board (“ARB”), but Director S.A. Godinez and ARB Chairperson Terri Anderson “excluded
facts about Plaintiff Arnold’s conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault in order to deny
Plaintiff’s grievance.” (Doc. 6, p. 7).
Despite Plaintiff’s requests for protective custody and separation from the Gangster
Disciples gang because they “had a hit out on him,” on February 13, 2015, Plaintiff was moved
into the same cell as inmate Ware, who was known to be a violent member of the Gangster
Disciples gang. (Doc. 6, pp. 7, 12). Ware threatened Plaintiff, and Plaintiff immediately
informed prison staff, including Hof and Placement Officer John Doe (“John Doe 2”), about
these threats made to his life, and he requested to be moved. Id. On February 14, 2015, Plaintiff
was assaulted with a “homemade” weapon, stabbed in the head and face, and beaten in the head
with an electric fan. (Doc. 6, p. 7); (Doc. 6-1, pp. 3-7). His request to be moved was denied by
Hof on February 15, 2015. (Doc. 6, pp. 7, 12); (Doc. 6-1, p. 19). In his response to Plaintiff’s
request, Hof noted that Ware was not on Plaintiff’s list of enemies. (Doc. 6, p. 12). Plaintiff did

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not receive a response from John Doe 2.
From February 16, 2015 to April 20, 2015, Plaintiff made numerous requests for medical
attention via inmate medical requests and verbal requests to staff to receive treatment for painful
headaches, memory loss, and dizziness. (Doc. 6, pp. 7-8). These requests for medical attention
were denied. (Doc. 6, p. 8).
Elaborating on his claims against certain defendants, Plaintiff alleges as follows: Butler
“had full knowledge that [Plaintiff] was requesting protection from the Gangster Disciple Gang
and . . . that placing [Plaintiff] in the same cell with inmate Ware, who is a known Gangster
Disciple and violent inmate, would result in [Plaintiff] being assaulted by inmate Ware.” (Doc.
6, p. 9). Further, Butler had a “customary practice of denial of protection” unless the inmate in
question has listed his potential assailant on his list of enemies. Id.
The Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) has a “customary practice,” along with
its ARB employees, of regularly excluding key information when deciding grievances for
protective custody. (Doc. 6, p. 10). Godinez “promulgated, adopted and/or put into effect the
customary practice of [IDOC] to regularly exclude key information when deciding grievances for
protective custody, as an effective tactic to deny grievances.” Id. Anderson and Sherry Benton,
a member of the ARB, adopted this practice. Id. “The exclusion of any mention of [Plaintiff’s]
conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault is indicative of” this practice, because Plaintiff
believes it was essential to Plaintiff’s grievance for protective custody placement. (Doc. 6, p.
11); see also (Doc. 6-1, p. 16). February 4, 2015 was the hearing date for Plaintiff’s ARB
grievance, which was ten days before he was attacked. (Doc. 6, p. 11).
Wexford Health Services Inc. (“Wexford”) and Health Care Administrator John Doe
(“John Doe 1”) provide medical care to the inmates at Menard. (Doc. 6, p. 13). At the times

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relevant to the Amended Complaint, Wexford maintained a policy and practice of denying
“medical attention to inmates who complain of any effects from head trauma, or injuries to the
head, as a means of saving costs.” Id. Plaintiff made many requests for medical attention, but
they were ignored.

Id.; (Doc. 6-1, p. 13).

John Doe 1 and Wexford “were deliberately

indifferent to [Plaintiff’s] medical needs when employees of [Wexford] ignored [Plaintiff’s]
request for medical care,” and this deliberate indifference caused Plaintiff to suffer medical
injuries. (Doc. 6, pp. 13-14).
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from the defendants. (Doc. 6, p. 15).
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the Amended Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to
divide the pro se action into 4 counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion regarding their merit.
Count 1 –

Butler failed to protect Plaintiff from a violent attack by his cellmate in
violation of the Eighth Amendment after receiving a grievance notifying
her of potential danger to Plaintiff.

Count 2 –

Godinez, Anderson, and Benton failed to protect Plaintiff from a violent
attack by his cellmate in violation of the Eighth Amendment by denying a
grievance from him requesting protective custody.

Count 3 –

Hof and John Doe 2 failed to protect Plaintiff from a violent attack by his
cellmate after Plaintiff informed them of the danger he faced, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.

Count 4 –

Wexford and John Doe 1 showed deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s
serious medical need involving injuries to his head in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.

As discussed in more detail below, Counts 1 through 4 will be allowed to proceed past
threshold. Any other intended claim that has not been recognized by the Court is considered

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dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pleaded under the Twombly pleading standard.
Count 1 – Butler Failure to Protect
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court held that “prison officials
have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. at 833
(internal citations omitted); see also Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2006).
However, not every harm caused by another inmate translates into constitutional liability for the
corrections officers responsible for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In order for a
plaintiff to succeed on a claim for failure to protect, he must show that he is incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the defendants acted with
“deliberate indifference” to that danger. Id.; Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889. A plaintiff also must
prove that prison officials were aware of a specific, impending, and substantial threat to his
safety, often by showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his
safety. Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996). “A generalized risk of violence is not
enough, for prisons are inherently dangerous places.” Wilson v. Ryker, 451 F. App’x 588, 589
(7th Cir. 2011) (citing Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2005); Riccardo v.
Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2004). Conduct that amounts to negligence or inadvertence
is not enough to state a claim. Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889 (discussing Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d
168, 172 (7th Cir. 1985)).
Further, it is well established that “[f]or constitutional violations under § 1983 ... a
government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” E.g., Locke v. Haessig, 788
F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. June 5, 2015). “This means that to recover damages against a prison
official acting in a supervisory role, a § 1983 plaintiff may not rely on a theory of respondeat
superior and must instead allege that the defendant, through his or her own conduct, has violated

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the Constitution.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). “An inmate's correspondence to a prison administrator may . . .
establish a basis for personal liability under § 1983 where that correspondence provides
sufficient knowledge of a constitutional deprivation.” Perez, 792 F.3d at 781-82 (citing Vance v.
Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A] prison official’s knowledge of prison conditions
learned from an inmate’s communications can, under some circumstances, constitute sufficient
knowledge of the conditions to require the officer to exercise his or her authority and to take the
needed action to investigate and, if necessary, to rectify the offending condition.”)). “In other
words, prisoner requests for relief that fall on ‘deaf ears’ may evidence deliberate indifference.”
Perez, 792 F.3d at 782.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he sent a grievance to Butler regarding the danger he
was in, but she denied it based on her policy of denying requests for protective custody unless
the person threatening an inmate is included on his enemies list. Plaintiff further alleges that
Butler knew about Plaintiff’s problems with the Gangster Disciples gang and that placing him
with Ware would endanger him, but failed to prevent the placement and the attack that resulted.
Based on these alleged facts, at this early stage, Plaintiff has stated a sufficient failure to protect
claim against Butler. Therefore, Count 1 will be allowed to proceed.
Count 2 – Godinez, Anderson and Benton Failure to Protect
The same standard applied to Plaintiff’s claim against Butler applies to Plaintiff’s failure
to protect claim against Godinez, Anderson and Benton.

Plaintiff alleges that Godinez

perpetuates a practice of excluding key information when deciding grievances for protective
custody, and that Anderson and Benton follow this policy.

Plaintiff also asserts that the

information regarding his conviction for criminal sexual assault was essential to his grievance for

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protective custody, but that it was not mentioned in the explanation for the denial of his
grievance. This denial, notably, was signed by Anderson and concurred to by Godinez after a
hearing on the issue on February 4, 2015. (Doc. 6-1, p. 16). Plaintiff’s statement to the ARB for
the hearing included the allegation that the Gangster Disciples had a hit on Plaintiff and that he
had been threatened. Id.
At this juncture, the allegations are sufficient to allow Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim
against Anderson and Godinez to proceed. Anderson seemingly had the opportunity to protect
Plaintiff from attack because Plaintiff informed her of the details of the danger he faced at his
hearing 10 days before he was attacked. Plaintiff also claims that Godinez perpetuated a policy
that ultimately resulted in the denial of his grievance seeking protective custody.

This is

sufficient to state a claim against Godinez under the applicable pleading standards because
allegations that an agency’s senior officials were personally responsible for creating the policies,
practices or customs that caused a constitutional deprivation suffice to demonstrate personal
involvement. Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 440 (7th Cir. 2015); Doyle v. Camelot Care
Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff’s allegations against Benton do not sufficiently connect Benton with the alleged
constitutional deprivations, however. Plaintiff merely alleges that Benton adopted the policy
perpetuated by Godinez. There is no indication in the Amended Complaint that her doing so
affected Plaintiff in any way or that she was even aware of the danger Plaintiff was in prior to the
attack.
For the foregoing reasons, Count 2 will proceed against Godinez and Anderson but will
be dismissed without prejudice as to Benton.
Count 3 – Hof and John Doe 2 Failure to Protect

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Plaintiff’s failure to protect claims against Hof and John Doe 2 state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under the lenient pleading standard articulated in Twombly. Plaintiff
alleges that he informed both Hof and John Doe 2 of the impending attack by Ware and the
threats that he had received from him and the Gangster Disciples. He also alleges that neither
Hof nor John Doe 2 took any actions to prevent the attack, which occurred the next day. Count 3
will therefore proceed against Hof and John Doe 2.
Count 4 – Wexford and John Doe 1 Deliberate Indifference
A prisoner raising a claim against a prison official for deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs must satisfy two requirements. The first requirement compels the prisoner
to meet an objective standard: “[T]he deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently
serious[.]’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 298 (1991)). The Seventh Circuit considers the following to be indications of a serious
medical need: (1) where failure to treat the condition could “result in further significant injury or
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;” (2) “[e]xistence of an injury that a reasonable
doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment;” (3) “presence of a
medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities;” or (4) “the existence
of chronic and substantial pain.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997).
The second requirement involves a subjective standard: “[A] prison official must have a
‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’” one that amounts to “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate
health or safety.”

Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).

Liability under the deliberate-

indifference standard requires more than negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. It is
satisfied only by conduct that approaches intentional wrongdoing, i.e., “something less than acts
or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.”

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Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from painful headaches, memory loss and dizziness as a
result of trauma to his head sustained during the attack on February 14, 2015. This pain and
suffering allegedly lasted at least from the day of the attack, February 14, 2015, until April 20,
2015, when Plaintiff submitted a grievance complaining of the pain and lack of medical
treatment. (Doc. 6-1, pp. 13-14). These allegations establish that Plaintiff had an objectively
serious medical need, at least at this stage. Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938, 941 (7th
Cir. 2015) (noting that pain alone can be an objectively serious medical condition); Hayes v.
Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 523 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).
Plaintiff has also satisfied the subjective component of the inquiry with respect to his
allegations against Wexford. The Seventh Circuit has held that a corporate entity violates an
inmate’s constitutional rights, in this case deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs, only when it has a policy that creates conditions that infringe upon an inmate’s
constitutional rights. See Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir.
2004). See also Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002) (private
corporation is treated as though it were a municipal entity in a § 1983 action). Here, Plaintiff has
alleged that Wexford maintains a policy of denying medical attention to inmates who complain
of effects from head trauma or injuries to the head as a means of saving costs. Plaintiff further
alleges that he made such a treatment request, but it was ignored pursuant to that policy.
Plaintiff has therefore stated a colorable claim against Wexford.
Conversely, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim against John Doe 1. Plaintiff
merely alleges that John Doe 1 acts under color of state law to provide medical care to inmates at
Menard, that he acts pursuant to the practice and custom of IDOC and that he was “deliberately

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indifferent to [Plaintiff’s] medical needs when employees of Wexford Health Services Inc.
ignored [Plaintiff’s] request for medical care.” (Doc. 6, p. 13) (emphasis added). It is well
established that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to § 1983 actions, and
Plaintiff has not alleged that John Doe 1 is “personally responsible for the deprivation of a
constitutional right.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted). Plaintiff’s allegations against John Doe 1 extend no further than to claim that he is
liable because he supervised people who caused a constitutional violation. This is not enough to
state a claim.
For these reasons, Count 4 will proceed against Wexford and will be dismissed without
prejudice as against John Doe 1.
Illinois Department of Corrections
Plaintiff cannot maintain his suit against IDOC because it is a state governmental agency.
The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). See also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (Eleventh Amendment
bars suits against states in federal court for money damages); Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56
F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (state Department of Corrections is immune from suit by virtue of
Eleventh Amendment); Hughes v. Joliet Corr. Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1991) (same);
Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 219, 220 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1990) (same). For this reason, IDOC will be
dismissed from this action with prejudice.

Similarly, although Plaintiff seeks to sue the

individual defendants in both their official and individual capacities, per Will, and because
Plaintiff has not requested injunctive relief, none of the claims allowed to proceed in this action
will proceed against any of the defendants in their official capacities, except as otherwise noted.

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Identification of Unknown Defendant
Plaintiff will be allowed to proceed with Count 3 against John Doe 2. However, this
defendant must be identified with particularity before service of the Amended Complaint can be
made on him. Where a prisoner’s complaint states specific allegations describing conduct of
individual prison staff members sufficient to raise a constitutional claim, but the names of those
defendants are not known, the prisoner should have the opportunity to engage in limited
discovery to ascertain the identity of those defendants. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,
577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, the current warden of Menard is not currently
named as a defendant in this action. The Clerk will therefore be directed to add the current
warden, Jacqueline Lashbrook, in her official capacity only, and she shall be responsible for
responding to discovery aimed at identifying this unknown defendant. Guidelines for discovery
will be set by the United States Magistrate Judge. Once the name of John Doe 2 is discovered,
Plaintiff shall file a motion to substitute the newly identified defendant in place of the generic
designation in the case caption and throughout the Amended Complaint.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 3), which is hereby REFERRED
to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall PROCEED against BUTLER
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2 shall PROCEED against GODINEZ
and ANDERSON. COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice as against BENTON for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 3 shall PROCEED against HOF and

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JOHN DOE 2, identified in the Amended Complaint as a placement officer at Menard, and
JACQUELINE LASHBROOK (official capacity only), who the CLERK is directed to ADD
as a defendant in this case so that she may participate in discovery aimed at identifying John Doe
2 with particularity.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 4 shall PROCEED against WEXFORD
HEALTH SERVICES. COUNT 4 is DISMISSED without prejudice as against JOHN DOE 1
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BENTON and JOHN DOE 1 are dismissed from
this action without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and
the ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS is dismissed from this action with
prejudice pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
IT IS ORDERED that as to COUNTS 1, 2, 3 and 4, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for
Defendants BUTLER, GODINEZ, ANDERSON, HOF, WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES,
LASHBROOK (official capacity only) and JOHN DOE 2 (once identified): (1) Form 5
(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of
Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Amended
Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons
(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that
Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by

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Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Service shall not be made on Defendant John Doe 2 until such time as Plaintiff has
identified him by name in a properly filed motion for substitution of parties.

Plaintiff is

ADVISED that it is his responsibility to provide the Court with the names and service addresses
for these individuals.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Reona J. Daly for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision on the pending
Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 3) and a plan for discovery aimed at identifying John Doe 2
with particularity. Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Daly for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all
parties consent to such a referral.

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If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless of whether
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 29, 2017

__s/STACI M. YANDLE____
U.S. District Judge

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