Sparks v. Baldwin et al

Filing 7

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 5/10/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JONATHAN E J SPARKS,
No. S-10787,
Petitioner,
vs.

–00081-DRH

JOHN BALDWIN and
JASON GARNETT,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Judge:

Petitioner Jonathan E J Sparks, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections and currently housed at Big Muddy River Correctional
Center, brings this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254 challenging his continued confinement. Petitioner contends that because he
is a convicted sex offender who is unable to find suitable housing, the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) is holding him past his release date and
intends to hold him for an indefinite period. Petitioner is seeking immediate and
unconditional release from incarceration. (Doc. 1, p. 8). Alternatively, Petitioner
seeks immediate and conditional release from custody.
This matter is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the § 2254
Petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States
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District Courts.

Rule 4 provides that upon preliminary consideration by the

district court judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached
exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge
must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.”

After

carefully reviewing the Petition in the present case, the Court concludes that the §
2254 petition warrants further review.

Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that, after serving his sentence, Plaintiff was
“paroled” on paper and “returned” to prison because he lacked approved housing.
This process has come to be known as the “turnaround” or “violating at the door”
practice. 1 A recent decision from the Southern District of Illinois provided the
following overview of the turnaround practice:
In a nutshell, the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (“PRB”) is
responsible for determining whether a prisoner has served a
sufficient portion of his sentence to be released on parole/mandatory
supervised release, and if so, it can order his release. The PRB also
sets the conditions for parole and determines whether parole should
be revoked if a condition is violated. The IDOC, which is an agency
independent from the PRB, retains custody of parolees and
supervises them during their parole term. Before IDOC may release
an inmate on parole, it must determine whether an individual parolee
is in compliance with all conditions of his supervised release. These
conditions include being housed in a proper and approved residence.
The Code directs that a parolee shall not be released until suitable
housing arrangements have been made. Sex offenders face many
1

Challenges to the turnaround practice have been raised in numerous Illinois and federal cases.

See Armato v. Grounds, 944 F.Supp.2d 627 (C.D. Ill. 2013); Murdock v. Walker, No. 08 C 1142,
2014 WL 916992 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2014); Parker v. Roeckman, No. 3:13–CV–206–DRH–DGW,
2013 WL 6511486 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2013); Webb v. Robert, No. 13 –CV–00671–MJR, 2013 WL
6698081 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2013); Hughes v. Walker, No. 08–1317, 2009 WL 2877081 (C.D. Ill.
Sept. 4, 2009); United States ex rel. Neville v. Ryker, No. 08 C 4458, 2009 WL 230524 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 30, 2009); Cordrey v. Prisoner Review Bd., 386 Ill. Dec. 660 (2014); Lucas v. Department of
Corrections, 359 Ill. Dec. 802 (Ill. App. 4th 2012).

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statutory restrictions on where they may reside, such as the home's
proximity to schools, parks, day care centers, and other known sex
offenders. Numerous sex offenders who are otherwise eligible for
parole…have been and are continuing to be held in prison by IDOC
officials because they lacked an approved residence, and thus could
not comply with the conditions of their parole. This has become
known as the “turnaround practice”—an inmate is technically
“paroled,” but is turned around at the prison gate and returned to
custody because he cannot be released without a parole site.

Crayton v. Duncan, 2015 WL 2207191, at *4 (S.D. Ill. May 8, 2015) (J.
Rosenstengel) (internal quotations and citations removed).
In 2008, a group of convicted sexual offenders brought a class action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the turnaround practice. Murdock, et

al. v. Walker, et al., No.08–cv–01141 (N.D Ill. originally filed Feb. 25, 2008). The
plaintiffs alleged the practice violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

After certifying the class and upon

consideration of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Murdock
court characterized the turnaround practice as a “Kafkaesque loop,” but
concluded the plaintiffs were caught in a system that required intervention from
the Illinois legislature as opposed to from a court. Id. at *4, *15. Ultimately, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of the plaintiffs’
§ 1983 claims.

The Petition is lacking in detail regarding the specifics of Petitioner’s
underlying conviction and sentence (and the Court’s independent research
provided little additional information). However, the Court was able to discern

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the following:

Petitioner was convicted of criminal sexual assault in Jersey

County, Illinois in 2010 (Case No. 10-cf-46).

It appears that Petitioner was

sentenced to a term of 3 years’ incarceration (this is an approximation based on
Petitioner’s allegations and the exhibits attached to his Petition), followed by
mandatory supervised release (“MSR”) for a term of three years to life. According
to Petitioner, the Prison Review Board first revoked his parole, without a hearing
and pursuant to the turnaround policy in September 2013. Since then, Petitioner
has been automatically revoked on six occasions (3/18/2014, 9/16/2014/
3/17/2015, 9/15/2015, and 9/14/2016). Presumably, unless the Petitioner is able
to obtain approved housing, these revocations will continue indefinitely.
Petitioner has filed grievances with the Administrative Review Board
regarding his continued incarceration. However, Petitioner has not sought review
with the Illinois state court at any level. Petitioner explains his failure to seek a
state court remedy as follows: “The ARB is the highest internal reviewing process
for the IDOC, and I cannot exhaust State judicial remedies concerning MSR,
because the State of Illinois provides no judicial review.” (Doc. 1, p. 3).

Petitioner raises substantive and procedural due process claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment, an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and a claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. Petitioner readily admits that he has not pursued any state court

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remedies prior to filing the instant § 2254 Petition. 2 However, Petitioner contends
state court remedies are unavailable to inmates in his position.

Although the

Court has considerable doubts with regard to this claim, further review of the
petition is necessary. 3 For this reason, Respondent will be ordered to answer the
Petition or otherwise file a responsive pleading.
This Order should not be construed as a decision regarding the merits of
any of the counts asserted in the Petition. In addition, the Order does not
preclude the State from making whatever argument it wishes to present, be it
waiver, exhaustion, forfeiture, timeliness, etc.

For habeas petitions challenging present custody, the proper respondent is
the “person who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power
to produce the body of such party before the court or judge.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (quoting Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)).
“[T]here is generally only one proper respondent” and “the default rule is that the
proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held.”

Id. at 434–35.

Consistent with Rumsfeld v. Padilla, Rule 2(a) of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases requires that “[i]f the petitioner is currently in
2

In order to exhaust his state remedies, a petitioner must fully and fairly present his
constitutional claims through one full round of state court review before filing a federal habeas
petition. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). For a petitioner who was convicted in
Illinois state court, this means “the petitioner must have presented each claim in the habeas
petition to the Illinois Appellate Court and to the Illinois Supreme Court in a petition for
discretionary review.” Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 382 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Boerckel, 526
U.S. at 844–45).
3
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, an exception to the exhaustion requirement may be made where
circumstances exist that render the state corrective process ineffective to protect the prisoner's
rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii).

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custody under a state-court judgment, the petition must name as respondent the
state officer who has custody.”
Petitioner is in custody at the Big Muddy River Correctional Facility, so the
proper respondent to this action is that facility’s warden, currently Jason Garnett.
Accordingly, John Baldwin, the IDOC director, shall be dismissed from this
action without prejudice.
Pending Motions
Petitioner's Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3) shall be
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge CLIFFORD J. PROUD for a
decision.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate JOHN BALDWIN as a party in
CM/ECF.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 shall proceed past preliminary screening.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall answer the Petition
within thirty days of the date this Order is entered. This Order to respond does
not preclude the State from making whatever waiver, exhaustion, or timeliness
arguments it may wish to present. Service upon the Illinois Attorney General,
Criminal Appeals Bureau, 100 West Randolph, 12th Floor, Chicago, Illinois shall
constitute sufficient service.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this
cause is REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud for further pre-trial
proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 3) is
REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud for consideration.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this entire matter be REFERRED to
Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule
72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all parties consent to such a referral.
Petitioner is ADVISED of his continuing obligations to keep the Clerk (and
Respondent) informed of any change in his whereabouts during this action. This
notification shall be done in writing and not later than seven days after a transfer
or other change in address occurs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

0, 2017

Digitally signed by
Judge David R.
Herndon
Date: 2017.05.10
13:05:43 -05'00'
David R. Herndon

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