Cunningham v. Vaughn

Filing 6

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 6/18/2017. (jaj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TIMOTHY J. CUNNINGHAM, SR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHAPLIN VAUGHN
Defendant.

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Case No. 17−cv–0125−SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Timothy J. Cunningham Sr., an inmate in Lawrence Correctional Center, brings
this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
requests monetary damages. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-

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27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
Plaintiff originally brought claims in case No. 16-1360-MJR. (Doc. 1). On February 8,
2017, the Court determined that the present claim was unrelated to the other claims in that action
and severed it into a new case pursuant to George v. Smith. (Doc. 1).
Relevant to the instant action, Plaintiff asserts that he is a Christian and requires
communion, i.e. unleavened bread and wine, on a regular basis. (Doc. 2, p. 10) (Doc. 2-7). He
alleges that Chaplain Vaughn has chosen not to offer communion at Lawrence. Id.
Discussion
The Court’s prior Order severed the following claim into this action:
Count 7 – Vaughn substantially burdened Plaintiff’s practice of religion in violation of
the First Amendment when he denied Plaintiff access to regular communion, a requirement of
his Christian beliefs;
It is well-established that “a prisoner is entitled to practice his religion insofar as doing so
does not unduly burden the administration of the prison.” Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47
(7th Cir. 1990); see Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 686 and nn. 3-5 (7th Cir. 1991)
(collecting cases). On the other hand, a prison regulation that impinges on an inmate’s First
Amendment rights is nevertheless valid “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.” O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482

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U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Legitimate penological interests include the preservation of security in
prison, as well as economic concerns. See Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2009).
When these concerns are raised as justifications by prison officials for their actions that restrict
the practice of religion, the Court looks at four factors to determine whether the restriction is
constitutional:
(1) whether the restriction “is rationally related to a legitimate and neutral
governmental objective”; (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising
the right that remain open to the inmate”; (3) “what impact an accommodation of
the asserted right will have on guards and other inmates”; and (4) “whether there
are obvious alternatives to the [restriction] that show that it is an exaggerated
response to [penological] concerns.”

Id. (citing Lindell v. Frank, 377 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2004)).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he holds sincere Christian beliefs. He further alleges that
he is being denied access to communion, and that it is common knowledge that most Christian
sects include communion as part of their services. Based on these facts, Plaintiff has articulated
a viable claim, and his case will be permitted to proceed.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Count 7 survives threshold review.
IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendant Vaughn: (1)
Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons
(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that

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Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to a Defendant who no longer can be
found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the
Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This
information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting
service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address
information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon
defense counsel once an appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or other document
submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be
filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of the document was served
on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has
not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by
the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Reona Daly for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Reona Daly
for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the
parties consent to such a referral.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the
judgment includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the
full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has
been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1)
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 18. 2017

__s/STACI M. YANDLE__________
U.S. District Judge

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