Stevenson v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
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ORDER granting 30 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson on 11/22/2019. (jmt)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KAREN LOUANN STEVENSON,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER of SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil No. 17-cv-148-JPG-DGW
ORDER for ATTORNEY’S FEES
WILKERSON, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Petition for Authorization for
Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 30).
After this Court reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner granted plaintiff’s application for benefits. The
fee agreement between plaintiff and her attorney (Doc. 30, Ex. 1) provided for a
fee of 25% of plaintiff’s past-due benefits, including past-due benefits owed to
eligible beneficiaries. Plaintiff and her two children have been awarded past-due
benefits based on plaintiff’s disability record.
25% of the past due amounts
equals $9,556.00.
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides that the Court may allow a “reasonable
fee,” not in excess of 25% of the total of the past-due benefits. However, if the
Court approves such a fee, “no other fee may be payable or certified for payment
for such representation except as provided in this paragraph.” Ibid. In practical
terms, this means that, when a fee is awarded under § 406(b)(1), counsel must
refund any amount previously awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
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U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
Here, the Court awarded an EAJA fee, but the whole
amount awarded was seized for payment to the U.S. Department of the Treasury
for payment of plaintiff’s outstanding debt owed to the U.S. Department of
Education. Doc. 30, Ex. 2. Therefore, counsel is not required to credit plaintiff
for the amount of the EAJA fee.
The Supreme Court has held that § 406(b)(1) controls, but does not
displace, contingent fee agreement in social security cases:
Most plausibly read, we conclude, § 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee
agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully
representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b)
calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to
assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002).
Having reviewed the circumstances presented here, including the time and
effort expended by counsel, the excellent result received by plaintiff and her
children, the amount of the past-due benefits and the value of the projected
benefits, the Court concludes that $9,556.00 is a reasonable fee here.
The Commissioner has responded that he does not oppose the motion.
(Tr. 32).
While the Commissioner has no direct stake in the § 406(b)(1) fee
request, he “plays a part in the fee determination resembling that of a trustee for
the claimants.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 798, n. 6.
Wherefore, Plaintiff’s Petition for Authorization for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 30) is GRANTED.
The Court awards plaintiff’s
counsel David W. Sutterfield a fee of $9,556.00 (nine thousand, five hundred fiftysix dollars).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATED: November 22, 2019.
DONALD G. WILKERSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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